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WAR DIARY

German Naval Staff
Operations Division

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PART A VOLUME 37

DECLASSIFIED IAW DOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ:
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

SEPTEMBER 1942

WAR DIARY OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF

(Operations Division)

PART A

September 1942

Chief, Naval Staff:	Grand Admiral Raeder, Dr. h. c.
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:	Admiral Fricke
Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff:	Captain Wagner

Volume 37

begun:	1 Sep. 1942
closed:	30 Sep. 1942

DECLASSIFIED IAW DOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ:
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington, D. C.

Foreword

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to translate important parts of the War Diary of the German Naval Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part A, Volume 37 is the eleventh one of the series to appear. Other volumes will follow shortly.

2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they contain a day by day summary of the information available to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof. Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939-1945, which have been published by this office, the War Diaries should provide valuable material for the study of naval problems arising from total war. The War Diary, Part A, is also a useful index to the German Naval Archives of World War II; references may be found in the microfilm library of Naval Records and Library.

3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited number of copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that the copies which have been distributed are made available to other offices which may be interested.

Washington, D. C.
1948

1 Sep. 1942

Items of Political Importance

South America:

The Transocean News Service reports with regard to the situation in South America that a bill calling for the severance of relations with the Axis powers is under consideration by the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, and that the bill may be passed. However, since the Government controls the Senate majority, a resolution of the Chamber of Deputies would not be binding.

A diplomatic source reveals that the President and the Foreign Minister of Chile apparently intend to delay the decision about the attitude of this country toward the Axis until after the President's return from a trip to North America. A sudden change of the policy followed thus far is hardly to be expected, unless something unusual happens.

It is reported from Columbia that this country is actually getting closer and closer to war.

According to a U.S.A. news agency report, President Roosevelt's South American representative is visiting the different countries in order to reorganize shipping.

In Uruguay the anti-Axis government policy is strongly influenced by Brazil and North America. The press urges war.

Turkey:

The Foreign Minister stated categorically to the German Embassy that there is only one possible solution of the problem of the Russian Black Sea fleet: Complete internment in a place acceptable to the Turkish Government, but positively not in a Mediterranean port. This decision is definitely not subject to negotiation and a change of this viewpoint is absolutely out of the question.

Japan:

Reports from a Swiss and an American journalist have it that the Japanese have found great quantities of raw materials in the occupied countries, in spite of the Anglo American destruction tactics, and that there is sufficient tonnage available for their transport. Neither the unavoidable losses of men and material nor the restrictions and hardships caused by the war have been able to change Japanese public sentiment. The morale of the population is high and unbroken. Ample supplies of manpower, ammunition, and food are available for the continuation of the war. An attack on Siberia is considered unavoidable by Japanese circles, unless an agreement with Russia can be reached about the demilitarization of the coastal areas.

The Italian Ambassador at Tokyo points to the following statements of the spokesman for the Japanese Army as characteristic for Japanese domestic political propaganda:

The war of greater Asia will not stop at the annihilation of Great Britain, the U.S.A. and of Chiang Kai-shek, but will be continued until the new world order is stabilized under the exalted leadership of the Emperor. The characteristics of this new order are that Japan will shape the order for the entire world according to the Japanese army's wishes and ideas and by the methods prescribed thereby.

A clearly formulated bid for world domination!

1 Sep. 1942

U.S.A.:

The press reports that the American public is being prepared for a war lasting many years, if not decades. The Commander in Chief of the U.S. Navy, Admiral King, declared in a speech that the war would last a long time and that the battle in the Pacific now in progress is by no means over yet.

Portugal:

The Portuguese Ambassador at Rio announced that Portugal would never fight against her American brethren.

According to a German News Agency (DNB) reports, the economic agreement completed between Portugal and the U.S.A., as announced by Secretary of State Hull, is exclusively concerned with the sale to the U.S.A. of raw materials stored at Angola which cannot be shipped to Portugal.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief of Operations Division, Naval Staff reports about the completion of operation "Wunderland". News about the successes achieved is not to be released, in view of the intention to repeat this operation. The cruiser SCHEER carried out her mission resolutely and successfully.

II. The Deputy to the Chief of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports about direct negotiations between the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping and Laval. According to information received thus far, Laval held out the prospect that about 200,000 tons of neutral cargo space in French Mediterranean ports could be used for the purposes of the Axis Powers, on condition that these vessels sail under neutral flag and with neutral crews. Additional conditions are that this would be the only demand of this nature and would not be repeated; furthermore, that the French be permitted to transport oil and foodstuffs from the Black Sea area on their own vessels.

The Reich Commissioner received the Fuehrer's permission to accept these terms.

III. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports about the cyclonite incident. A review of the facts offers no indication that the loss of the destroyers LEBERECHT MASS and MAX SCHULTZ was caused by the detonation of German torpedo warheads due to bomb hits. The Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters was supplied with all pertinent data for the information of the Fuehrer.

The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division further suggests that a possibility be created to supply certain important personalities of the Naval High Command with increased food rations. Similar attempts to provide extra rations for personalities in the business world working under particular strain have so far come to naught due to the opposition offered by the Reich Food Ministry as a matter of principle.

The Commander in Chief, Navy orders an investigation of the matter.

1 Sep. 1942

In a Very Restricted Circle:

IV. The Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters reported on 31 Aug.:

a. The Rumanian Mountain Division which is to be ferried across the Kerch Strait is urgently needed for our further advance in the mountains. Since the division will proceed on foot on the eastern bank, it does not need to disembark in a harbor if a landing somewhere on the coast is possible. Field Marshal List reported to the Fuehrer that the Army has to rely on the Navy for the ferrying operation but that so far it has been impossible to carry it out owing to the hesitancy of the Navy.

b. Field Marshal List further informed the Fuehrer that at the present time there are often enemy ships totalling as much as 30,000 tons anchored off Tuapse, but that German PT boats are not being used successfully enough against them. The Fuehrer demands that our forces be ruthlessly committed.

To this the Naval Staff replied as follows:

(1) The Navy commander concerned has repeatedly and unmistakably informed the respective Army commands that the Navy is entirely at their disposal for Army operations. The ferrying, in the opinion of the Navy, is not a tactical but a navigational problem. If the Army, after being duly warned of the existing danger, is willing to risk its troops, the Navy does not demand more consideration for its ships than the Army does for its manpower and valuable material.

(2) For operations by small battle weapons, Russian air and naval defenses, especially by day, must be taken into account; we have nothing with which to fight them. It goes without saying that the Navy will make an all-out effort, as long as this does not mean risking our scarce combat forces without any chance of success.

Naval Group South was informed of this telegram exchange between Vice Admiral Krancke and the Naval Staff, with copies to the Naval Representative at the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and the Navy Liaison Officer to the Army High Command. The Group was directed to confirm immediately that a complete understanding exists with all local army commands concerning the attitude of the Naval Staff with regard to point (1), and in the future to report in the daily situation reports the assignments of its combat forces in sufficient detail so that any accusations can be answered at once with figures.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the measures taken, but wishes that similar insinuations be countered most rigorously. The Naval Staff is ordered to get in touch once more immediately with Vice Admiral Krancke to instruct him accordingly.

Special Items:

I. With regard to the transfer of ship "45" to the west area (see War Diary 31 Aug.) the following additional details must be reported:

1 Sep. 1942

The proposal made by Group North on 16 Aug. with regard to the schedule of ship "45", which is supposed to sail during the October new moon period, points to the poor experiences about keeping secret the sailing of ship "23". The Group has therefore conceived the camouflage proposal already discussed. The code name is to be "Sperrbrecher 12". The Group has requested the examination and approval of the plan by Group West, together with the approval of the Naval Staff.

On 21 Aug., the Naval Staff expressed agreement with the Group's contention that the sailing of ship "45" must be kept secret better than that of ship "23". However, the Naval Staff calls attention to the time involved and the constant mine threat prevailing during this period. The Naval Staff is convinced that the date of departure and the direction of the voyage can be kept secret if orders are properly given without necessitating that the ship be transferred elsewhere. The Naval Staff therefore ordered the following general procedure, which in view of the moon phase sets 4 Oct. as the earliest sailing date for the dash through the Channel:

a. The commander in charge of the operation should receive instructions from the Naval Staff during the week of 21 to 26 Sep., and discussions should be held with the Groups involved concerning the Channel breakthrough.

b. On 28 Sep. the ship will depart for maneuvers in the central Baltic Sea (fueling at sea, maintenance of contact, etc.). In the course of these maneuvers a coded radiogram, classified "general", will arrive from the Operations Division, Naval Staff, ordering the ship to prepare for an operation in the Arctic Ocean, and thus cancelling the operation in the Atlantic.

This method worked well in the case of ship "28" in that the captain did not announce any plan, but the radio personnel let the new order become known on the ship. The ship will be recalled from these maneuvers with an order to proceed to Hamburg for shipyard overhaul in preparation for the operation in the north area.

c. The ship will sail from the Baltic to the North Sea in a westbound convoy of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North and from there will proceed through the Channel.

This procedure saves time and still leaves sufficient leeway for changes of schedule. The sailing for maneuvers appears plausible and breaks off the crew's communication with the shore. The code name "Sperrbrecher 12" becomes effective at the latest when the ship leaves for maneuvers.

Pointing out that the procedure ordered by the Naval Staff is, in general, identical with the method practiced thus far and which failed so completely the last time it was used, Group North on 24 Aug. requested once more that its proposal of 16 Aug. be let stand; this proposal has been discussed with the captain of ship "45" in great detail.

On 26 Aug. the Naval Staff informed the Group that its concern about the prolonged mine threat was undiminished and that the Naval Staff was expecting a new suggestion from the Group with regard to the effective date of the code name, but that the Naval Staff upholds the directive issued on 21 Aug. Subsequently, the Commanding Admiral, Group North again requested the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff on 28 Aug. by telephone to reconsider the decision of the Naval Staff. The results of this reexamination was reported in the conference with the Chief, Naval Staff on 31 Aug.

1 Sep. 1942

On 1 Sep. the Group confirmed the final proposal in accordance with the Naval Staff's wishes. The Group pointed out that the secrecy of the operation is seriously endangered by the presence of Blohm personnel on board ship.

Group West reported having no objections to the proposal made by Group North on 16 Aug.

II. According to the July report of the Armed Forces High Command, War Economy and Armaments Division, it can be seen that the transport situation has considerably improved and that the tension in the labor situation has lessened to a certain extent owing to the increased assignment of Russians.

The Ministry for Armaments and War Production decided to create a new priority classification "Sonderstufe DE" for the development or limited mass production of particularly urgent material and of equipment which must be procured as quickly as possible and will be ordered only once.

Complying with a Fuehrer directive, the National Steel Association (Reichsvereinigung Eisen) has mapped a program which provides for an increased steel production of 350,000 additional tons per month in its first stage and in the second stage for an overall increase by 550,000 tons per month. The second stage is to be reached already by the end of November. This increase can be achieved only by the indiscriminate use of all available ore and scrap reserves. Beginning in the first quarter of 1943 it must be anticipated that production will again decline.

Details:

The total number of foreign workers employed within Germany amounted to 4,743,000 by the end of July; 1,512,000 of them were prisoners of war.

Freight cars loaded reached an all-time peak with an average of 182,000 cars per working day.

Iron and steel production showed a slight gain. Coal production continued to develop favorably. A production loss must be anticipated if the enemy day-time air raids in the western areas are not checked.

As regards the industrial exploitation of the occupied eastern areas, the resumption of the Donets coal mining operations is an important factor. According to plan, the daily production should reach 30,000 tons by the end of the year.

The partisan problem is causing mounting difficulties.

Rumanian grain imports are extremely disappointing and amount to less than 10% of what they should be.

Situation 1 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache at Tokyo receives information by Telegram 0415 about the agreement between the Naval Staff and the Japanese Navy concerning the boundaries of the respective zones of operation in the Indian Ocean. The same telegram relates that freedom of action has been requested for the impending sailing of ship "10" to Yokohama. This applies to the route from 80° to 100° E in the waters between 20° and 30° S and continuing from 20°S,100° E to the approach point to Batavia; it includes a strip of 150 miles to either side of the course indicated. The ship will proceed through this area between 5 and 20 Sep. Japanese consent has not yet been received. For the time being, the Naval Staff has no intention of dispatching additional auxiliary cruisers to the Indian Ocean; it has, however informed the Japanese that it reserves the right to demand an expansion of the operations zone to the north, in case the enemy situation should necessitate the transfer of an auxiliary cruiser from the South Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. The reason for this reservation is the necessity to carry out supply operations in a zone of favorable weather.

Complying with a proposal of her captain, ship "14" was given the traditional name of auxiliary cruiser CORONEL.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, a convoy of 26 steamers and 4 patrol vessels on a northerly course was located at 2055 in quadrant BE 3757.

2. Own Situation:

Outside the harbor entrance of Cherbourg a tugboat capsized and sank.

3. Special Items:

(1) The following directive of the Naval Staff concerning the distribution of light forces is transmitted to Group West, the Fleet, and the Commander, Destroyers, with copy to Group North:

a. The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla is at the disposal of Naval Group West after being made ready for operations. Torpedo boats becoming available during the month of September are to be transferred to the West Area immediately following the fleet maneuvers early in October. Torpedo boats which become available at a later date, including T "22" and T "23", are to go there as soon as possible.

b. The torpedo boats T "18" and T "19" are to be transferred according to plan to the west area on 13 Sep. at the latest. Torpedo boat T "4" is to return to the shipyard only after the arrival of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla. If necessary, the shipyard period is to be delayed for a few days. The dates for engine overhaul of torpedo boats T "10" and T "14"are to be checked, and they are to be altered after consultation with Group West if the situation in the west area requires it.

(2) In view of the difficulties of navigation caused by the location of St. Malo, the Commander, PT Boats deems it inopportune to tie the PT boat arm to this place by constructing PT boat shelters there; he requests reexamination of the question whether St. Peter Port should be chosen instead, or whether the new PT boat shelter under construction at Cherbourg should be enlarged to accommodate 34 vessels. In the opinion of the Commander, PT Boats, the location of the defensive mine fields is no impediment in the long run. With regard to distance, the location of Cherbourg is no less favorable than that of St. Malo. (See Telegram 2220.)

This matter is being studied in consultation with the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Two mines were swept in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North. At noon, naval anti-aircraft guns fired at 2 enemy planes off Nordvik. Convoy and patrol operations proceeded according to plan.

2. Norway, Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

On 31 Aug., 10 steamers were anchored at Yokanga. On 1 Sep. 1 steamer and 2 patrol vessels were sighted on a southeasterly course off Cape Teriberski and 2 more patrol vessels not far off on the same course.

Own Situation:

In the area of the Commanding Admiral, Norway, a Russian battery fired 9 shells at the harbor of Petsamo on 31 Aug., without inflicting any damage. Slight enemy air activity over the west coast in the area of Kristiansand South. Transport and convoy operations proceeded without major incident.

On 27 Aug., the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway requested 500,000 coastal defense mines from the Naval Staff Operations Division, Mine Warfare and Anti-Submarine Section. Assuming that this request referred to land mines, the Naval Staff suggested that the General address this matter to the Commander in Chief, Army. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway, however, repeated his request, pointing out that he was referring to coastal defense mines and not land mines. The Naval Staff requests the Commanding Admiral, Norway to take this matter up with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway for clarification.

1 Sep. 1942

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean submits a brief report of cruiser SCHEER concerning operation "Wunderland":

After sailing on 18 Aug., the cruiser avoided a 5,000 GRT steamer headed for Archangel in quadrant AC 2314 without being detected, and reported this incident on 21 Aug. by way of submarine U "251". On 19 Aug. the northern steamer route was reconnoitered to a point east of the Einsamkeitinsel. Due to difficult ice conditions, the cruiser turned back there. On 20 Aug., fuel was delivered to submarine U "251", and then the ship unsuccessfully searched for a convoy of 9 vessels, allegedly heading southwest, which had been located by a ship plane. It is possible that the plane erred with regard to the course. Since as a result of radio monitoring it was assumed that the convoy was proceeding to the Vilkitski Strait, reconnaissance was resumed on 21 Aug. to the east and west, but without result. A thrust in the direction of Russki Island had to be abandoned due to fog, and the ship took up a patrol position west of the Nordenskioeld Archipelago. On 22 and 23 Aug. the measures on 21 Aug. were repeated. On 23 Aug., the ship plane located a convoy consisting of 10 steamers in the Vilkitski Strait, anchored off Gansen Island. (Not Hansen or Nansen Island.) On the evening of the same day the cruiser proceeded in the direction of the Yermak Bank to take up a patrol position. On 24 and 25 Aug. unsuccessful attempts were made to penetrate northwest of Russki Island for an attack on the convoy. This plan had to be abandoned due to the breakdown of the ship plane, making reconnaissance impossible. During a raid into the waters of the Nordenskioeld passages the ice breaker ALEKSANDER SIBIRYAKOV was destroyed after a brief gun battle. 22 prisoners were taken. Radio monitoring revealed that the enemy was completely in the dark concerning the cause of this loss. Thereafter, the SCHEER withdrew from this zone of operation and proceeded to Dickson Island on 26 and 27 Aug., entering the Dickson roadstead in the night, where the ice breaker TAIMYR and a 5,000 GRT tanker were probably sunk. The effect of shelling the harbor and a hitherto unknown battery, which answered the cruiser's fire, could not be observed due to poor visibility. After skirting Dickson Island, the ship bombarded the signal and radar locating stations as well as the high power radio plant and the town itself with great and visible success, as already reported. Dickson Island reported the bombardment by the cruiser via radio. Throughout this entire operation, the 3 submarines engaged in operation "Wunderland" sent the SCHEER no reports of sighting the enemy. On 28 Aug., the SCHEER searched between Spitsbergen and Franz Josef Land for single ships without success and then started on her way home.

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean and the Commanding Admiral, Group North have voiced their deep appreciation for the efficiency with which this operation was executed. In this connection, the Commanding Admiral, Group North remarked that the fact that the steamer encountered on 18 Aug. was permitted to escape was in keeping with the operational order, but that the destruction of similar valuable targets would have to be ordered in the future. The Group would also have liked to see the SCHEER utilize the opportunity to send a message on the occasion of her contact with the enemy. The Group considers the experience gained by the SCHEER'S operation as a valuable source of information for future undertakings.

The Naval Staff submits a corresponding report about operation "Wunderland" in the Arctic Ocean during the period from 16 to 30 Aug. to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, with copies to the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters, to the Naval Aide of the Fuehrer, and to the Navy Liaison

1 Sep. 1942

Officers at the Army High Command and at the Air Force Operations Staff; the Naval Staff also requests that the report not be made public, because there is a chance that this operation will be repeated; this will be feasible until the end of September or early October, depending on the ice conditions. The Naval Staff adds the following comment regarding the operation: "An operation successfully, daringly, and expertly carried out under particularly difficult conditions. The ship frequently met with a very hazardous ice situation. The action against Dickson Island must be especially commended in view of the difficulties of navigation (inadequate charts). The appearance of the pocket battleship in these waters evidently came as a complete surprise to the enemy, who may even now be unaware of the nature of the operation."

For copy see telegram 1/Skl I op 21548/42 Gkdos. in file "Operation SCHEER in the Kara Sea, Summer 1942 (Wunderland)".

Group North directs the Admiral, Arctic Ocean (with copy to the Naval Staff and the 5th Air Force) to submit as soon as possible new proposals for an operation against the enemy supply traffic, as long as PQ convoys have not been observed; this plan should be based on the experiences of the SCHEER and the results of reconnaissance by submarines and the Air Force. To be considered are:

(1) A repetition of the raid made by the SCHEER into the Kara Sea and the waters between the eastern Spitsbergen coast and Franz Josef Land, either by the SCHEER alone or together with the HIPPER.

(2) A similar raid by the HIPPER alone or together with the SCHEER or with an escort of about 3 destroyers, which would be refueled by the HIPPER.

(3) A raid of from 3 to 4 destroyers in the direction of Spitsbergen, the Barents Sea and the east coast of Novaya Zemlya, either by themselves or with the KOELN. In this case, the operational radius would be 600 miles from the base.

The operation in the Kara Sea and eastward is feasible only as long as ice conditions continue favorable, that is during September. For copy see telegram 1/Skl 1692/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in file "Doppelschlag".

Special Item:

Group North mentioned on 14 Aug. in its estimate of the situation that, according to information by the Naval Staff, reports had been received on 10 Aug. about the arrival of a convoy in Russian ports. Investigation of this matter revealed that the Group's remark referred to information disclosed by the Chief of the Communications Division, Meteorological Branch, Naval Staff. The Operations Division, Naval Staff found out that the report, which had been requested by the Group from the Chief of the Communications Division, Meteorological Branch, Naval Staff over the phone, had clearly stated that it represented a news item from the press which was considered to have no significance. When the text was transmitted as requested, it was stated once more that the report was considered false. The Naval Staff informed Group North about these facts on 1 Sep.

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1 Sep. 1942

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

One submarine was located by radio intelligence 22 miles west and one 7 miles east of the southern tip of Hogland. In the waters off Lavansaari, Shepel, and Kotlin lively mine-sweeping activity was observed. Off Laga 3 medium and 9 small warships were sighted.

2. Own Situation:

The HELA, with the Fleet Commander on board, arrived in Copenhagen. South of Samsoe a ground mine was swept by a mine-exploding vessel.

The destruction of a Russian submarine by Mine Sweeper M "37" has been confirmed. During the night of 31 Aug. a subchaser had a brush with 3 enemy PT boats northwest of Narva.

The mine fields "Seeigel 23", "28", "29", and "30" were completed according to plan.

Group North directed the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea (with copy to the 1st Air Force, a.o.) to restrict the use of naval forces in the inner Gulf of Finland as much as possible as long as the 1st Air Force is unable to provide fighter protection, unless the Finns can help out in this respect.

The Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries reports that the battery at Mummasaare and the Army Coastal Battery "509" at Kurgolovo are ready for action. Convoy and transport service continued as planned and without incident.

Special Item:

Group North repeatedly suggested to the Naval Staff that the naval forces in the Baltic Sea be reinforced. In this Group North is guided by the thought that the Russian fleet could some day try to break out of the inner Gulf of Finland into the Baltic Sea, for instance for internment in Sweden. The Naval Staff is convinced that the Russian Baltic fleet would rather fight to the last, even when its anchorages are threatened, than leave and be interned, for political as well as psychological reasons. Furthermore, in the opinion of the Naval Staff the Gulf of Finland is sealed off so effectively that attempts to break out would result in very heavy losses. Under no circumstances would more than a few vessels succeed in reaching open water. The disadvantages which might thereby be caused must be risked in view of the fact that submarines, PT boats, and other combat forces would have to be withdrawn from other war theaters, thus creating serious shortages in those places.

The Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters; the Naval Representative on the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff; the Navy Liaison Officers to the Army High Command and the Air Force Operations Staff are informed of this viewpoint taken by the Naval Staff.

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1 Sep. 1942

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Lively air reconnaissance, particularly heavy in the Bay of Biscay, where the sighting of 4 submarines was reported. Two more submarine sighting reports were intercepted from the West Indies, one more from southeast of Bahia, and another southwest of Rio.

2. Own Situation:

4 submarines sailed from French Atlantic ports and 4 additional ones from home ports.

Submarine U "601" of the Arctic Ocean Group is advised that she may advance to approximately 90° E. The main operations area of submarine U "251" is between 70° and 80° E. Submarine U "255" is ordered to proceed to the point of rendezvous with the ULM in quadrant AG 9655.

The operation in the North Atlantic against the convoy in quadrant AK was considerably hampered by the fact that the submarines got within the range of the enemy planes. Although almost all of the submarines were able to close in on the target, the results were meager. 2 steamers were probably torpedoed. Several submarines report damage caused by depth charges and bombs.

An additional convoy was observed on a southerly course in quadrant BE 2735, against which 3 submarines were assigned to operate on their way south.

No sinkings have been reported from the eastern U.S. coast or the West Indies, or from the South Atlantic submarine group.

In the Mediterranean, submarine U "375" probably sank 1 steamer (4,000 GRT) out of a convoy on 26 Aug.

Additional reports are contained in the Supplement to the Submarine Situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

With submarine U "179" the first of the large submarines type IX D has reached the zone of operations.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day Dungeness was attacked by fighter bombers; during the night of 1 Sep., 6 of our planes raided Sheffield, Hull, Leeds, etc.

2. Enemy Incursions:

180 enemy planes flew over our territory, 155 of them over Germany proper, concentrating their attacks on Warsaw and Saarlautern.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Fighter bombers, dive bombers, and bombers operated in North Africa in support of the offensive of the Panzer Army.

1 Sep. 1942

4. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Western Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, 36 planes flew in from the Atlantic to Gibraltar by 2000; they are expected to proceed to the east. At 0200 one tanker escorted by 1 corvette arrived in Gibraltar from an unknown direction, and 1 CALEDON-class cruiser arrived from the Atlantic. The CHARYBDIS remained outside and east of the harbor during the day, probably for maneuvers.

No traces could be found during the day of 19 vessels which were again reported in the Strait of Gibraltar on an easterly course during the night of 31 Aug.

Central and Eastern Mediterranean:

No reports about the sighting of ships were received, except for a warship of unidentified type which was reported by a German plane 45 miles southwest of the southeastern tip of Crete on a course of 310°

However, radio monitoring intercepted reports of lively reconnaissance activity and attacks against German convoys, both in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation:

During an enemy air raid on Tobruk during the night of 30 Aug. the oil pipe line was damaged. The steamer MONSTELLA was towed to Corfu on 31 Aug. where she is being unloaded.

The German Naval Command, Italy reported that the Italian Navy agrees to the proposal of assigning Augusta as a base and operational harbor to the 7th PT Boat Flotilla. As soon as the 7th PT Boat Flotilla reaches Augusta, the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla will transfer to Porto Empedocle.

The Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy is proceeding to the command post North Africa, in order to assume command of all naval forces and ships of the German Navy based in North Africa.

Special Item:

The mining of the approaches to Malta, which inflicted some losses on the enemy due to its surprise element, has nevertheless not succeeded in disrupting enemy shipping. The efforts to cut the supply of Malta by mining operations must therefore be continued and made more effective. The Naval Staff sees possibilities of increasing the effect of the mining operation in the following measures:

(a) By closing the waters between the southern tip of Malta and the 500 m line with a number of mine fields and by the extensive use of ~~cutting-floats.~~

(b) By effective minelaying by the Navy and the Air Force to seal off the eastern tip of the island.

(c) By aerial mining of Valletta harbor.

A directive to this effect is sent to the German Naval Command, Italy and the Naval Representative on the Air Force Operations Staff. They are requested to see that the Commanding General, South issues the necessary orders.

For copy see 1/Skl I E 21260/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

During the night of 31 Aug. the north-bound convoy PUGLIOLA was attacked by enemy planes southwest of Crete; also the steamer BOTTIGLIERI, en route from Suda to Benghazi, and the 2 tankers ABRUZZI and P.C. FASSIO, en route from Taranto to Tobruk, were all unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes. Otherwise transports proceeded according to plan.

Unloaded at Tobruk on 30 Aug.:

494 tons plus 750 tons from tankers;
on 31 Aug.: 1,242 tons plus 80 tons from tankers

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report about the naval situation.

The Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea has delivered about 12,000 tons of fuel to Italian ships in the course of the transport operations to North Africa; supported in his stand by Naval Group South, he strongly protests against the demand made by the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Supply and Fuel Branch, that deliveries out of German stores should only be made after previously obtaining permission. Such a ruling would interfere with his command authority in matters for which he is responsible. Group South submits proposals to ensure the fuel supply of Italian ships in the Aegean Sea. For details see Telegram 1800.

The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division is attending to this matter.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

The 3rd Mine Sweeper Flotilla began mine-sweeping operations north of the Kerch Strait on 31 Aug. The flotilla was under unsuccessful long-range fire of an enemy battery.

The harbor entrance of Temryuk was cleared by blasting to a width of 25 m and a depth of 2.75 m.

Bad weather affected convoy operations.

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Between 26 and 30 Aug., 1,665 tons of ammunition were shipped from Mariupol and Taganrog to Azov.

Army Group A informed Naval Group South of a decision by the Army High Command whereby shipping and transports from Rostov up the Don are to be in the hands of the 3rd Field Waterways Detachment.

Group South advocated essentially this viewpoint in the past, in contrast to that of Army Group A and the Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine. (See Telegram 1950.)

VIII. Situation East Asia

The Military Attache at Bangkok reports concerning the situation in the southwest Pacific between 9 and 29 Aug. amongst other things:

"I am informed by the Japanese India Bureau that the enemy forces in India are estimated at less than 10 divisions, equipped with comparatively ample materiel; the number of units made up of Europeans is small, however, and the number of planes is given as 400. The Japanese believe that the coming campaign in India would be of even more pronounced colonial character than the Malaya and Burma campaigns. Therefore fewer Japanese forces are being provided for this assignment; probably 2 or 3 divisions will be sent across the Burma borders, and 2 more divisions will be landed. The operation is to be executed similar to the landing on northern Luzon in the Philippines, that is, first enemy air bases will be seized by airborne forces and seaborne units. Japanese flying boats, based on the Andaman Islands, reconnoitered the east coast of India. The preparations for an invasion of Ceylon are apparently being given priority."

Sumatra: Contrary to Japanese expectations, the oil production of the first year has already reached 3,000,000 tons; for the second year it is planned to push this figure to 6,000,000 tons.

New Guinea: Following a renewed failure to advance over land from Huon Gulf toward Port Moresby, the Japanese succeeded in landing on the southeastern tip near Milne Bay. American fighters and bombers were observed.

Bismarck Archipelago: Lively enemy air activity (Rabaul).

Solomon Islands: The Military Attache describes the situation there as follows: Attempts of the U.S.A. to regain these islands led to 2 major naval engagements. The Americans succeeded in landing air forces on Tulagi, Guadalcanal, and Malaita. A seesaw battle with the Japanese garrison is in progress on Tulagi Island.

Australia: American reinforcements were brought up by air transport. Japanese submarines are operating off New Zealand and off the Australian south coast. Japanese air forces raided Port Hedland, Broome, and Wyndham, and concentrated on Port Darwin.

According to British press reports, the Japanese fleet has now been withdrawn from the southwest Pacific after suffering heavy losses (15 ships sunk and damaged).

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According to American reports of 31 Aug., the Japanese forces landed in Milne Bay were almost completely annihilated.

According to a Domei report, an enemy landing attempt on New Britain, undertaken by one submarine, ended with the destruction of the submarine and the capture of the small landing detachment.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The enemy is tenaciously defending the mountain valleys south of Krasnodar. Southwest of Baksansk enemy attacks broke down on the sector of the Rumanian Mountain Division. South of Isherskaya the enemy is entrenched in a system of heavily fortified positions and is bringing up reinforcements from the south and southwest.

Army Group B:

The area west of the railroad Astrakhan-Kizlyar was cleared of the enemy. The tracks were blown up by a long-range patrol and a train was set afire. West of Astrakhan approximately 20 trains were observed. Along the chain of lakes south of Malyye Derbety the enemy in front of the Rumanian division was reinforced. Our divisions which had advanced beyond the Don-Volga are engaged in heavy fighting with Russian tank forces. At Kremenskaya the enemy retreated behind the Don River. The situation at Serafimovich has been restored.

Central Army Group:

No major engagements took place on 31 Aug. at the crucial points in the Zhizdra River sector and the Rhzev area.

Northern Army Group:

Enemy attacks resulted in varying success at Kholm, Staraya Russa, Demyansk, on the Pola River and at Soltsy. Very fierce fighting resulted from the enemy attack launched south of Lake Ladoga with strong forces and tanks along the entire front up to the Lovat River; it required bringing up our entire reserves. Enemy pressure continues. The situation is difficult.

2. Finnish Front:

Nothing to report.

3. North Africa:

No report was received from the Panzer Army.

According to a Reuter report, the British troops were withdrawn from Abyssinia.

Official British reports have it that an engagement with light forces developed in the morning of 31 Aug. at El Himeinrah as a result of an attack by Rommel. The fight is still in progress. A weak attack

mostly by Italian forces against the central front sector is said to have been repulsed.

The attack on Tobruk during the night of 30 Aug. is said to have been carried out by several U.S.A. heavy bomber formations.

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Items of Political Importance

Brazil:

President Vargas has declared a state of war, so that the order for general mobilization can be issued.

Japan:

Foreign Minister Togo has resigned. According to press comments, the reasons for this step are personal. The Prime Minister has taken over the Foreign Ministry. The Prime Minister also announced that he intends to create a Ministry of Greater East Asia which will administer all matters relating to the territories occupied by Japan and promote the production of raw materials in these areas. He emphatically demanded that Japanese armed might be strengthened and a very high degree of cooperation between all branches of the armed forces be achieved.

Spain:

According to the German News Agency (DNB), Franco has declined for the time being to accept the resignations of the 3 defense ministers.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Deputy to the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports:

(a) The opposition of Staatsrat Blohm against the manufacture of collapsible landing craft has finally been overcome. 6 such vessels are now being constructed at Leyden and 6 at Rheinhausen and will be delivered in 4 months.

(b) The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command has ordered that in addition to the 10,000 tons of fuel already delivered to the Italians out of the Navy's supplies, another 10,000 tons have to be put at their disposal in September. A new directive regarding October will follow. The Minister of Economics is to negotiate with Rumania about deliveries, but the prospects are considered poor. At present Germany's fuel oil situation is relatively good. Rumanian petroleum production must be expected to decline further during the coming winter.

II. The Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section, Operations Division, Naval Staff reports about the conferences between the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping and Laval regarding the availability of ships lying in French Mediterranean ports (see War Diary, 1 Sep.). For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

III. In reply to an inquiry by the Chief, Naval Staff concerning the state of German warfare against Brazil, the Chief of the Naval Staff Operations Division reports: In accordance with a directive from the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, German submarines are at present under orders not to attack Brazilian harbors or ships within 20 miles of the Brazilian coast; these orders were issued at the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Office asked for temporary restraint because of the effect further sinkings might have on the attitude of Argentina and Chile.

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In a Very Restricted Circle:

IV. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff reports:

a) about the short report of the SCHEER regarding operation "Wunderland", as recorded in the War Diary of 1 Sep.

b) regarding the charges made against the Navy in connection with operation "Bluecher II" and the PT boat operations in the Black Sea.

According to a report from Vice Admiral Krancke, it cannot safely be maintained that Field Marshal List made these accusations. Admiral Krancke was present only at part of the conference between the Fuehrer, List, and Keitel. The steps planned against Field Marshal List must therefore be dropped. Vice Admiral Krancke has meanwhile seen to it that the Fuehrer and the Armed Forces High Command have received the correct information on the basis of materials submitted by Group South in the meantime.

Group South states that the charges made by Army Group A (see War Diary, 1 Sep.) are completely unjustified. As far as the Navy is concerned, the tasks connected with the ferrying were clear ever since 10 Aug., and on 22 Aug. the Admiral, Black Sea wrote to the Chief of Staff, Group South, exactly as follows: "This waiting for 'Bluecher' is very trying, and I have just let Scheuerlen know once more that we had better watch out, lest we run completely into the September bad weather period. However, I am very much afraid that Mattenklott is not wholeheartedly in favor of the operation, has distinct misgivings with regard to the sea voyage, and is hoping that the combat mission will turn out to be merely a ferrying mission; consequently very valuable cargo space is lying about more or less idle for a long time."

The Group requests that this information not be used for the time being since it is taken from a private letter and because we do not want to accuse an Army commander as readily as is evidently the case the other way around. It has been made clear over and over again to the Army and the Army Group, that everything connected with the problem of supplies and that includes the break through the Kerch Strait, will be done according to the wishes of the Army. Also the decision as to the risk involved lies with the Army. The Navy simply furnishes information about the possible consequences for later operations as, for instance, the additional commitment of landing craft; otherwise it continues to carry out its tasks until the Army is fully aware of these consequences and is willing to accept them.

From the data available to the Group (photo reconnaissance and its interpretation), generally only about 13,000 tons of shipping are lying inside the harbor of Tuapse and not outside of it. On the basis of numerous operations carried out so far, the Admiral, Black Sea had reached the conclusion that the Russians had shifted their supply traffic from night to daytime, due to the activities of our naval forces; this belief was based on the fact that little or frequently no traffic at all had been encountered. PT boats can, of course, not go into action every day and the Air Force is obviously concentrating on other tasks.

The Group points out that Admiral Brinkmann has left for a conference with the Admiral, Black Sea. After next Wednesday, he will visit Army Groups A and B and the Navy Liaison Officer at the Army High Command, so that he can be called on to help clarify this question. ~~(See Telegram 1800.)~~

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Telegram 1800 likewise contains a report concerning the operations of light naval forces, submitted by Group South in accordance with the Naval Staff directive. The 1st PT Boat Flotilla was in action uninterruptedly from 2 Aug. to 10 Aug. Operations which had been planned for the periods 11 to 20 Aug. and 24 to 30 Aug. could not be carried out due to bad weather. On all other days operations were carried out and successes achieved. Moreover, Group South has ordered all subordinate commands concerned to submit all relevant information which might be used to evaluate or refute the charges made (see Telegram 0938).

The Admiral, Black Sea is given explicit orders not to undertake any steps of his own with regard to Army Group A at this time, but to leave this to the Commander in Chief, Navy.

The Navy liaison officers at the Army High Command and the Air Force General Staff, and the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters have been fully informed of the above.

For copies of the telegrams exchanged in the matter see 1/Skl Ia 21609/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVa.

The Chief, Naval Staff is leaving for northern France in the afternoon on an inspection tour of the Dieppe area and will be absent from Berlin until the morning of 4 Sep.

Special Items:

I. With regard to the Naval Staff's review of the situation at Crete (1/Skl Ib (plan) 1381/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV) the Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy comments as follows:

Because of my long and extensive experience in working with the Italians, I feel that I should add a few words to the conclusions reached in the matter, with which I fully agree:

We have no guarantee that the Italians will give active and loyal support to German interests after this war. Apart from the fact that the attitude of the Italians from the political point of view is and always will be purely egotistical, their working methods, according to German criteria frequently lack the necessary energy and systematic thinking even in their own interests. All the less can it be expected that they will work in the interest of Germany when this conflicts with their own interest, as in Greece and Asia Minor. German interests can be upheld in a way adequate for the future of the country only if supported by military might.

For further discussion of this question see 1/Skl 1686/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

II. An intelligence report from a not too reliable source, dated Stockholm, 31 Aug., mentions preparations for large-scale air raids on Stettin, Magdeburg, Chemnitz and the inland port Duisburg-Hamborn. Allegedly an attack on Vichy is planned, too. Large tow barges, totalling 2,500,000 tons, are said to be in readiness for troop transports in various northern harbors of the British Isles, a part of them in The ~~Wash and at Hull. During the past 4 weeks 200,000 tons of war~~ materiel were reportedly shipped to Murmansk and Archangel from the

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British Isles.

The German Embassy at Madrid with due reservation transmits a report, according to which a British courier letter intercepted 2 weeks ago by Spanish authorities indicates that Anglo-American landings in northern Spain are planned. Investigations made by the Spanish General Staff are said to have confirmed this assumption. According to them, the British and Americans intend to land at several suitable small coastal places west and east of Santander. Immediately following a successful landing, the government would be overthrown with the assistance of the monarchists, the Reds would be freed and armed, and Spain thrown into chaos. The British consular officers at Santander and Bilbao are said to be actively engaged in the preparations for the landings; the Spanish General Staff therefore reportedly proposed to the Foreign Ministry the expulsion of the British consul Battes, the Cuban consul Almagna San Martin and the American consul Pedro Nogues Alonso (all of Santander) as well as the arrest of the chief pilot of Santander and other Spaniards in the British service.

This is the second instance that alarming news was found in allegedly genuine British courier material intercepted in Spain. It is altogether possible that this method is being used to spread false rumors. The Stockholm intelligence report, too, bears close examination.

Situation 2 Sep. 1942

I. Warfare in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

At 2240 the British 7,742 GRT steamer MANAAR sent a QQQ message, reporting a suspicious ship approximately 300 miles southeast of Freetown; this report was revoked 20 minutes later.

Indian Ocean:

Approximately 340 miles east of Aden the British tanker BRITISH GENIUS sighted a periscope and evaded a torpedo.

It is highly gratifying to see Japanese submarines active in these waters.

According to a Budapest intelligence report of 2 Sep., a U.S. convoy arrived at Bandar Shahpur during the second week of August. 3 steamers unloaded there and 3 smaller steamers at Bushire and Khorramshahr. The larger ships of the convoy came from Halifax, while the smaller ones had joined at Baltimore. A Russian commission is said to have taken over the tanks delivered at Bandar Shahpur and to have shipped them immediately to the Caucasus. It was allegedly the largest shipment of tanks ever sent from Canada to Russia.

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Pacific Ocean:

Allied reconnaissance reported at 0555, 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers on a course of 350° at d'Entrecasteaux Islands off the south-eastern tip of New Guinea; another 2 cruisers on zig-zag courses were reported between 0825 and 0928.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff confirmed to the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN by Radiogram 1057 that ships "28" and "23" had reported on 29 Aug. that they had received supplies from the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN and dismissed her. The Naval Staff therefore deduces that the supply ship started on her way to Japan on 29 Aug. as ordered on 21 Aug.

The Naval Staff confirms by Radiogram 1947 to the TANNENFELS the report received by ship "10" according to which the TANNENFELS was dismissed on 30 Aug. to the waters 1° farther west and 240 miles farther south than point "Trimmplan". The Naval Staff therefore assumes that the TANNENFELS is proceeding in accordance with the order of 19 Aug.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance in the Channel brought no observations of particular interest.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

An enemy air raid on La Pallice occurred between 0710 and 0716. 3 mine sweepers went to the aid of an Italian submarine damaged by aerial attack in quadrant BF 8390 and 3 went to the aid of a German submarine disabled in BF 5340 and unable to submerge.

At 0715 the supply ship PASSAT, anchored in the St. Nazaire roadstead, was attacked by a low-flying enemy plane; no air raid alarm had been sounded previously. She was badly damaged by a bomb hit at the stern and set afire. It was possible to extinguish the fire. Casualties are considerable. Attempts are being made to tow the ship to port.

The loss of this valuable vessel which was ready to sail for the supply of the auxiliary cruisers is a very serious blow. It remains to be seen how much of her cargo can be salvaged.

Prompted by today's air raids on the roadsteads of La Pallice and St. Nazaire, Group West calls the attention of the 3rd Air Force to the necessity of reinforcing the anti-aircraft defenses, since roadsteads are indispensable as alternate anchorages, and even valuable ships must use them at times for limited periods.

The Group suggests that anti-aircraft barges like those requested for the Gironde estuary be provided for La Pallice and St. Nazaire also, and if this should prove impossible, 4 anti-aircraft vessels at each place.

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Channel Coast:

Nothing to report about the naval situation.

Group West reports on the further enlargement of the flanking minefields in the Channel: mining of the gaps between D2 and E1 (code name "Runenschrift") and between C2 and D1 (code name "Ranke") by means of cutter floats, to be carried out by motor mine sweepers based at Boulogne.

The Naval Staff considers these measures very appropriate.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

During the night of 1 Sep., 5 enemy planes flew over the Danish west coast, Little enemy air activity in the Dutch area. It is belatedly reported that a Spitfire was shot down in the forenoon of 1 Sep. by mobile naval anti-aircraft guns at Scheveningen.

The mine-exploding vessel "164" struck a mine in the Hubertgat and sank. North of Borkum, the steamer MATTHIAS STINNES, in the Elbe-Ems traffic, struck a mine, but remained afloat. 5 ground mines were swept on the convoy route between Terschelling and Borkum.

1 boat was damaged and towed to shore during an enemy air attack on the Rhine Flotilla near Domburg.

2. Norway, Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, 2 steamers on a southerly course were located in the western fairway off Kanin Nos; in Byelusha (on the southwest coast of Novaya Zemlya) 4 steamers and 6 patrol vessels were sighted.

Own Situation:

Within the area of the Commanding Admiral, Norway only moderate enemy air activity on the Arctic coast on 31 Aug., 1 and 2 Sep. Attacks on a westbound convoy off Sylte Fjord and on the Havningberg coastguard station were ineffective. From the west coast reports were also received of enemy daytime air activity on 1 and 2 Sep.

Convoy operations continued according to plan.

3. Arctic Ocean:

There is still no news from the ULM. Group North directs the Admiral, Arctic Ocean to cut short operation "Zar", whether completed or not. The corresponding order is transmitted to the ULM by

the Admiral, Arctic Ocean via Radiogram 1508.

Group North informs the Admiral, Arctic Ocean that it wishes operation "Doppelschlag" to be carried out as soon as possible, and suggests the following:

On or about 3 Sep. the SCHEER and the HIPPER are to sail to the Gimsoe area, where the HIPPER will refuel; on 4 Sep. they are to proceed 200 miles to quadrants AF 85-AT 33 at a speed of 21 knots escorted by 3 destroyers carrying no mines. From there the SCHEER is to proceed to the vicinity of Nordenskioeld Archipelago, Dickson Island, and the Yenisei River estuary; the HIPPER to the mouth of the Ob River and farther west. For 2 to 3 days they are to operate against enemy shipping and bombard the coast. Following this, they are to return, if possible together, searching for ships sailing singly between Novaya Zemlya and Spitsbergen. The Group is not planning to have the HIPPER lay mines.

Operation "Doppelschlag" is under the command of Rear Admiral Meisel as senior commander,

Group North, moreover, reports that it has given instructions for mining operation "Zarewitsch-Romanow", to be carried out by 4 mine-laying destroyers and 1 combat destroyer. For telegram see 1/Skl 1707/42 Gkdos. Chefs., in files "Doppelschlag".

The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff informed the Commanding Admiral, Group North by telephone that it is planned to extend the operation of the SCHEER. The TIRPITZ is to be made ready for this purpose (following repairs, her maximum speed is at present 27 knots). The Commanding Admiral, Group North has been told that the operation may also be carried out by either the SCHEER or the HIPPER, and he reported in this connection that the SCHEER is not ready for action; for this reason it would be impossible to start the operation prior to 8 Sep.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

During the night of 1 Sep. enemy air activity over the Baltic Sea as far as Kolberg. From there the enemy planes flew overland to Warsaw and Kutno, and returned by the same route. More planes from the east flew over East Prussia and into the Warsaw area.

Nothing of importance to report from the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea. One He 177 crashed in quadrant AO 7261.

The Commanding Admiral, Group North intends an inspection tour to the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea and the Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries between 10 and 20 Sep.

The mine fields "Seegel 35" and "38" in the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea were laid according to plan. A Finnish mine layer in cooperation with 2 vessels of the 1st Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla has completed mine field "Narpa".

Anti-submarine patrols and convoy missions proceeded according to plan without major incidents.

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V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

No reports were received from the submarines in the Norwegian area.

The operations in the North Atlantic against the two convoys in quadrant AL were cut short. The groups "Vorwaerts" and "Stier" were combined into a new task force "Vorwaerts", consisting of 13 submarines, for operations against a convoy from Great Britain to America which is expected on 4 Sep.

No reports about the achievements of the submarines operating on the American coast were received.

Submarine U "109" reports from quadrant FF 3650 the sinking of the 10,000 GRT steamer OCEAN NIGHT after a chase of 22 hours.

Additional reports in Supplement to Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

German fighter bombers raided the Isle of Wight during the day. Also a sailing cutter was sunk. During the night of 2 Sep. five Ju 88's raided Leeds.

2. Incursions:

200 of the 216 enemy flights reported during the night of 2 Sep. penetrated into German territory. The attacks centered on Karlsruhe, where 50 to 60 planes wrought considerable damage. For details see daily situation report.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Our planes flew combat missions in support of the Panzer Army and carried out reconnaissance.

4. Eastern Front:

130 planes were reported shot down at the various army sectors. The airfield of Murmashi on the Arctic coast was attacked. Reconnaissance activity at all other sectors of the Eastern Front.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

The C-class cruiser sailed from Gibraltar on 1 Sep. and one

tanker arrived there during the night of 1 Sep. Three loaded tankers escorted by 3 corvettes arrived from the Atlantic. At noon the following ships were in Gibraltar: 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, one of which in dock, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers, 21 steamers, and 11 tankers. 81 planes were on the airfield.

According to an intelligence report from Spain, Gibraltar is allegedly expecting the arrival of aircraft carriers and battleships to serve as escort of a most important convoy to the Mediterranean.

An unusually large number of submarines was reported sighted in the Central Mediterranean.

No reports about the sighting of other warships or steamers were received from the Central and Eastern Mediterranean. According to radio intelligence, air reconnaissance activity over these waters was particularly lively and successful. Malta-based planes reported a destroyer on a westerly course off Cape Spartivento and a tanker and 3 destroyers on a southerly course south of Corfu. Alexandria-based planes reported a convoy of 1 steamer and 1 destroyer steering a northwesterly course off Cape Krio and 7 lighters sailing eastward off Derna.

Photo reconnaissance of 1 Sep. revealed that 5 steamers totalling approximately 25,000 GRT arrived in the harbor of Suez.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

German PT boats off Alexandria had to discontinue their operation during the night of 1 Sep. due to weather conditions. Marsa Matruh was raided by enemy planes during the night of 31 Aug. and Bardia at noon of 1 Sep. No damage was reported from either place.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

During the night of 1 Sep. the tanker P.C. FASSIO was sunk off Derna by enemy planes. In the same area the escorted tanker ABRUZZI with 484 tons of fuel for the German Army was damaged by a bomb hit on the evening of 1 Sep. and was abandoned by the crew. Another air attack occurred during the night of 1 Sep. on the escort of the steamer PROSERPINA east of Otranto. In the forenoon of 2 Sep. two empty landing barges were damaged by machine gun fire from enemy planes east-northeast of Derna.

On 1 Sep. the German steamer MENES was damaged during an enemy bombing raid on Candia.

Otherwise supply traffic to Africa and African coastal shipping proceeded according to plan.

> The extraordinarily lively and successful enemy air activity against the African supply operations is extremely troublesome as such, but particularly so at the present moment. The effect on the operations of our troops in Egypt is particularly harmful since supply traffic to Africa never reached the proportions necessary to permit adequate preparation for the land operation now in progress, in spite of the constant pressure by the German Naval Command, Italy during the past weeks and in spite of the explicit promise of the Duce. On the other hand, it is becoming more and more evident how serious a matter it is that Malta is not yet in our possession and how appropriate it would have been to

stick to the original plan "first 'Herkules', then Tobruk". We should not have abandoned this plan unless our Air Force had been strong enough to paralyze Malta in order to provide the greatest possible measure of safety for our supply shipping; our planes, however, were able to do this only for a very brief period.

The amount of cargo unloaded at Tobruk on 1 Sep. was 1,297 tons.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The damage to the steamer MENES was caused by a short circuit and fire following a bomb hit on the main supply cable and the pier of Candia. The cargo below deck is probably undamaged.

Otherwise, convoys in the Aegean operated according to plan.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed lively traffic of small vessels and PT boats south of Taman Peninsula. 1 heavy cruiser and 1 flotilla leader were located at sea off Poti. German planes attacked a submarine 120 miles south of Kerch. Lively shipping was observed on the Volga River.

Own Situation:

Operation "Bluecher II" was initiated on the evening of 1 Sep. as scheduled. The landing on the enemy coast has been in progress since 2 Sep. 0200 according to plan, and thus far without casualties.

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla under Captain Toenniges, which operated off the south coast of the Taman Peninsula during the night of 1 Sep., torpedoed and sank 2 tankers, 2 steamers, and 6 large lighters, totalling 15,400 GRT according to uncontestable observation.

The Italian subchaser flotilla which was sent out in the same night for torpedo operations south of the Kerch Strait encountered no targets. Another mission of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla against shipping off the Taman Peninsula is scheduled for the night of 2 Sep. The Italian subchasers cannot go into action due to weather conditions.

Two Italian submarines cut short an operation off the Bessarabian coast on 1 Sep. due to bad weather. Convoy traffic was suspended in the afternoon of 1 Sep. owing to the weather; resumption is planned for 4 Sep.

Group South reports that the transshipments in the areas of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov during the month of August reached a total of 101,000 tons; it consisted of 36,000 tons of armed forces supplies to the Ukraine, 10,000 tons of armed forces supplies to other places, 31,000 tons of non-military supplies, and 24,000 tons of return cargo.

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VIII. Situation East Asia

The German Admiral at Tokyo reports on the basis of Japanese information:

In the course of the second battle of the Solomon Islands, 1 enemy submarine, 2 destroyers, and 1 transport were sunk in a number of individual engagements. All planes which had landed on the Guadalcanal airfield were allegedly destroyed. The enemy is trying to safeguard the supply of the landed forces by every means. On 31 Aug. Japanese submarines attacked an enemy aircraft carrier off the southeastern tip of the eastern Solomon Islands; one torpedo hit was observed. In Milne Bay Japanese army units were landed to seize the nearby airfield.

> It appears that both sides are making strong efforts to retain possession of the Solomon Islands and consider this matter as of greatest importance in view of the strategic significance of this island group for Australia.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

In spite of beginning bad weather, landings on the Taman Peninsula were made after 0200 of 2 Sep. according to the plans outlined for operation "Bluecher II". 3 assault detachments were disembarked and took several villages south and southwest of the landing places by surprise; they were supported by fire from the battle ferries. Around 1500 the northern part of the peninsula was in our hands. Also, the landing on the point southwest of Tamanskaya Bay succeeded as planned. The central part of the island was occupied where it is 1.5 km wide. Rumanian cavalry divisions advanced on the hills southwest of Temryuk. From Anapa the attack was carried south and southeast along the coastal road.

Spearheads of the V Army Corps advanced in the direction of Novorossisk against strong enemy resistance. One of our battalions, which had been cut off, had to be extricated in hand-to-hand fighting south of Goryachi. The 111th Infantry Division formed a bridgehead across the Terek River at Mozdok; the river was also crossed southwest of Kislyar by units of the 370th Infantry Division.

Army Group B:

Southwest of Stalingrad German and Rumanian divisions have advanced beyond the Stalingrad-Kalach railroad and are now engaged at Voroponovo 10 km west of Stalingrad. Our forces advancing from the northwest are about to merge with the forces coming up from the south. At Serafimovich the enemy succeeded in penetrating deeply into our lines. It was necessary to throw the 22nd Panzer Division into the gap.

Central Army Group:

Fighting flared up again south of Sukhinichi. East of Vyazma and in the Rzhev sector the enemy has resumed his attacks with great numbers of tanks and strong artillery. This battle is now going on with varying success. The enemy suffered heavy casualties.

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Northern Army Group:

Also south of Lake Ladoga the enemy offensive remains unchecked. In some places there was fierce hand-to-hand fighting. On the Leningrad front the enemy attacked the L Army Corps with tanks and infantry, following a strong artillery barrage. All thrusts were halted by counter-attacks.

2. Finnish Front:

Repeated attacks of small enemy detachments at the Aunus and Maselskaya fronts were repulsed. Enemy reinforcements on the Rybachi Peninsula indicate imminent attacks. A rather weak enemy landing attempt on the south shore of Motovski Bay was repulsed.

3. North Africa:

Very heavy enemy air attacks by day and night. An enemy counterattack against our attacking force was repulsed. On the northern front sector the enemy succeeded in temporarily penetrating into our position; the situation has already been restored. It must be expected that the enemy will be reinforced by at least one division within 8 to 10 days after the arrival of the convoy which is to put into Suez early in September.

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3 Sep. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Spain:

Franco has reorganized the Cabinet; the Foreign Minister Suner is leaving his post and, in a significant move, is relinquishing the presidency of the Falangist Political Committee to his brother-in-law Franco. The appointments of General Jordanas as Foreign Minister and of Ascensio as Army Minister are considered favorable from the German standpoint. The reorganization of the Cabinet is an indication of great domestic tension. Its direct cause was evidently the bitter conflict which has existed for a long time between extreme Falangists and the traditional right-wing groups of the country, which some time ago led to the attempt on the life of War Minister Varela at Bilbao that cost many lives. Foreign policy probably plays no decisive role in the conflict at this stage. There can, however, be no doubt that the British are trying with all means to deepen the existing rift. When the question of Spain's participation in the war is considered, the precarious position of the government must, under all circumstances be taken into account.

Japan:

The resignation of Togo, the last civilian minister of the Japanese Cabinet, was a purely personal matter, at least according to emphatic official statements. The government spokesman expressly stated that this resignation has no connection with the Russian situation nor with the creation of the new ministry. Foreign newspapers which point out that Togo's influence in the Cabinet has been decreasing more and more probably come closest to the real cause. For example, he was not notified of the attack on Pearl Harbor until hours after it had taken place. His resignation would thus tend to achieve greater solidarity and more singlemindedness within Japan's political leadership which is now completely in the hands of the military.

Turkey:

Willkie is expected in Ankara on 4 Sep., where he will hand a message from Roosevelt to President Inonu.

Italy:

So far, the Italian Government has not received a formal Brazilian declaration of war, either directly or indirectly, and the Italian Government has therefore had no cause to take a stand.

Argentina:

A report of the parliamentary investigating committee about the hearing of the First Officer of the GRAF SPEE in order to clarify the question of responsibility for the escape of a great number of the ship's crew will allegedly be made shortly.

The Committee for Anti-Argentine Activities has ordered the arrest of an officer of the GRAF SPEE.

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3 Sep. 1942

Special Items:

I. On the occasion of the 4th anniversary of Britain's entry into the war, the London radio surveyed the last 12 months of the Battle of the Atlantic. It was pointed out that by 1 Sep. 1942 German submarines had regained about the same importance as they had a year ago; however, their chances of success have diminished due to improved defenses, and the number of new ships now surpass the number sunk. For a detailed report concerning this broadcast see the Naval Intelligence Division's publication Foreign Press (Naval Reports), No. 206, paragraph 2.

The First Lord of the Admiralty announced with regard to the number of submarines destroyed that the months of July and August were the most successful of the war (which is unfortunately true).

As regards the most important German warships, he had exact information on the present location and state of readiness of the TIRPITZ, SCHARNHORST, GNEISENAU, PRINZ EUGEN, SCHEER, HIPPER, and LUETZOW.

II. For a map showing the locations where German ships were damaged or lost due to enemy planes, mines, bombs, and submarines during August 1942 see 1/Skl 1 E 21667/42 Gkdos. in file "Own Ship Losses".

III. According to available information, the effect of our mining operations on the British coast during the month of June was particularly poor, although more mines were laid than in May and April. (577 mines as compared to 319 and 273 respectively.) The enemy's very effective defense measures are probably responsible.

An evaluation of the observations made, both with respect to the enemy countermeasures and conclusions to be drawn, appears in 1/Skl I E 20021/42 Gkdos. Copies nos. 59 and 60 are in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

IV. On 29 Aug. the German Admiral at Tokyo had a conference upon request of the Japanese Navy about fundamental problems of communications. The fact that a document containing the distribution of the Japanese fleet was captured on the NANKIN has evidently created an impression of insufficient security of the Japanese communications system. The Japanese communications system is organized on the pattern of the British and American: crystal-controlled transmitters; only exchangeable code tables are used; radio operators, coding and maintenance personnel are kept separate, each trained only for specific duty. Control station traffic unknown. The use of call letters causes concern. Would like to know about German cipher devices and experiences had with them. No confidence in mechanical coding devices. Two Enigma cipher machines available have never been used. We have promised to put them in condition and demonstrate their use.

According to a report of the Chief of Communications Division, Naval Staff several Enigma machines are on the way to Japan and 3 code systems are being worked out.

V. On 18 Aug. Group West submitted and expressed full approval of an analysis by the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West about the ratio between the forces available in his area and the demands currently made on them.

The Commander in Chief, Navy has acknowledged that the demands of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West are basically justified.

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These demands are as follows:

a. Permanent allocation of a torpedo boat flotilla (WOLF, MOEWE, or torpedo boat "37").

b. Ample allocation of motor trawlers.

c. Reconditioning of foreign torpedo boats to serve as escort boats in the west area.

d. Transfer of the fishing steamers of the 18th Mine Sweeper Flotilla to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West as soon as the 28th Mine Sweeper Flotilla has been commissioned.

e. Increase of the shipyard capacity in the west area.

The Chief of Operations Division, Naval Staff refers this matter to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch and requests compliance with points b to e as far as possible, if not already done.

The allocation of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla in addition to the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla to Group West has been ordered by the Chief of Operations Division, Naval Staff.

An additional modern mine sweeper flotilla is thus not being allocated at this moment to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West because it is impossible at present to withdraw a modern mine sweeper flotilla from the area of Group North. It should be investigated, however, whether it would not be possible to rush replacement of the auxiliary mine sweeper flotillas by up-to-date mine sweepers, which is now under way. (Delivery dates should be advanced or at least adhered to; the trial period should be shortened.)

VI. The Attache Section of the Naval High Command informed the Japanese Naval Attache on 31 Aug. that the German Navy gratefully appreciates the generous assistance rendered by the Japanese Navy to the common war effort by making available two planes; the German Navy has the sincere desire to reciprocate by declaring its willingness to defray all expenses for the sojourn, the required overhaul, and the equipment of the Japanese submarine "I 30".

VII. The Naval Staff Communications and Intelligence Division discusses the following in order to throw light on the enemy situation:

a. The secret order by Stalin of 28 Jul. 1942.

b. The probable behavior of the Russian fleet in the event that the German Army continues its advances and in the face of the imminent loss of their last remaining bases.

For copy see 1/Skl 29916/42 geh. in War Diary, file "Barbarossa".

VIII. A compilation of the enemy communications intercepted in the period from 24 Aug. to 30 Aug. 1942 by radio decoding and radio monitoring is contained in Secret Radio Intelligence Report No. 35/42.

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Situation 3 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

According to an intelligence report from Ponta Delgada, 1 American and 2 British destroyers arrived there on 2 Sep. for a brief stay for replenishment.

South Atlantic:

According to a French communication to the German Armistice Commission, France the ships touching Freetown on the route from the Cape to Great Britain are temporarily released from the regulation to refuel at Capetown prior to proceeding to the British Isles, and they are to refuel at Freetown, if calling there. It was also declared preferable that ships sailing from the Cape to North America refuel at Freetown rather than in South America.

Obviously the distribution of coal is beginning to cause difficulty.

Indian Ocean:

The British tanker BRITISH GENIUS, which on 2 Sep. radioed sighting a submarine, was torpedoed 170 miles east of Aden on 3 Sep.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "28" reported at 1857 by short signal:

"My position quadrant GZ 24. For overhauling will withdraw to quadrant HN 83 end of month."

The Naval Staff acknowledged with Radiogram 2036 that ship "28" will withdraw from her present position in quadrant GZ 24 by the end of the month to quadrant HN 83 for overhaul.

Information about the enemy situation transmitted by Radiogram 1608.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

As revealed by air reconnaissance, 2 large steamers, 15 other vessels, 3 landing boats, several patrol boats, and motor boats on various courses were in the Solent. Otherwise little shipping was observed off the Isle of Wight.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ground mine was swept off Lorient. Submarine U "256" which was damaged in the Bay of Biscay by enemy bombers was returned to Lorient under her own power. The damaged Italian submarine which

suffered considerable casualties anchored at Santander. Torpedo boat T "4" arrived at Brest for engine repairs.

Channel Coast:

One ground mine was swept northeast of Dunkirk.

3. Special Item:

At noon of 2 Sep. the Armed Forces High Command announced that British prisoners of war taken during the engagement of Dieppe were to be laid in chains; this announcement was made on account of an enemy order captured on this occasion, according to which the hands of prisoners were to be tied to prevent them from destroying their papers. The British War Ministry lost no time to publish an announcement on the evening of 2 Sep. to the effect that an investigation was under way whether such an order actually had been issued. At the same time it vigorously denied that even a single German prisoner's hands had been tied and added that any such order, if it had been given, would be revoked. Owing to this announcement, the Armed Forces High Command cancelled the threatened steps toward the British prisoners. For the corresponding directive of the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff see 1/Skl 21707/42 Gkdos. in file "Enemy Landing at Dieppe on 19 Aug. 1942".

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

North of Borkum, 1 ground mine was swept by a mine-sweeping plane and 2 by harbor patrol vessels.

140 ground mines were swept during the month of August in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North.

2. Norway and Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Area of the Commanding Admiral, Norway: On 31 Aug. Russian batteries located on the Rybachi Peninsula fired on the harbor of Petsamo, on Trifona, and on Liinahamari without causing damage.

On 1 Sep. enemy planes were active over the Arctic coast. Bombs were dropped on the convoy escorted by the light gun carrier GERMANIA off Vardoe. Convoy operations proceeded according to plan.

Ship lifting gear was towed into Trondheim on 2 Sep.

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Arctic Ocean: According to a report of the Port Commander, Vardoe, a rowboat with 4 survivors and 21 dead crew members of the mine-laying vessel ULM arrived there during the night of 2 Sep. The surviving first mate of the ULM stated that the mine layer was destroyed by British destroyers between Bear Island and Spitsbergen at 2300 on 29 Aug. The Commanding Admiral, Group North welcomed the survivors by Telegram 1720.

Thus the concern which has been felt for days about the long silence of the ULM has unfortunately been justified. Further details must still be clarified. In the first place, it is incomprehensible how the ship happened to be at the reported place of her sinking on 29 Aug., evidently after completing her mining mission. From the directive to withdraw given by the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, it would seem that the vessel would have proceeded northeast or east from Novaya Zemlya. It is noteworthy that air reconnaissance during these last few days did not see any trace of either the ULM or the enemy destroyers.

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean reports the execution of mine-laying operation "Peter" by submarine U "589" on 28 Aug.: 16 TMC mines were laid in the waters from the entrance to the Strait of Matochkin east of 54° E and south of 73° 23' N.

Concerning operation "Doppelschlag", Group North orders that a full load consisting of 96 EMC mines be provided for the HIPPER, with which she is to lay barrages in the waters west of Yermak Bank along probable or known shipping lanes. The boundary between the areas of mining operations of the HIPPER and the SCHEER is to be fixed at the discretion of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean. The mines are to be set for 3m depth to explode after 60 days.

The TIRPITZ is to be ordered to maintain a minimum degree of readiness for the duration of operation "Doppelschlag", so as not to interfere with her repair work. The submarines in the north area are to act as radio relay stations; they will relay important orders and communications from land to the forces at sea throughout the mining operations "Zar", "Zarewitsch", "Romanow", and for operation "Doppelschlag".

The Commanding Admiral, Cruisers reports in answer to the Group's directive of 2 Sep. about the command of operation "Doppelschlag" that it is indispensable that he have command of the operation if two of his ships take part. He suggests that the captain of the HIPPER should take command in case the SCHEER does not participate in the operation.

This proposal conforms fully with the opinion of the Naval Staff.

However, Group North decides to keep the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers on board the TIRPITZ, since the TIRPITZ and her destroyer escort must be held in readiness to assist in operation "Doppelschlag" in case of an emergency, or to operate against the PQ convoy; in either case the TIRPITZ would doubtless be the center of action.

The Naval Staff is going to submit its dissenting viewpoint to the Commander in Chief, Navy upon his return from Dieppe.

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The Commanding Admiral, Cruisers reports that the cruiser SCHEER is not capable of more than 25 knots prior to overhaul of her engines; she has exceeded her normal operating period and is thus liable to break down. This practically eliminates the SCHEER from participation in the undertaking.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Nothing to report from the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea.

In the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea bad weather has prevented work on the "Seeigel" minefield and also mine-sweeping activities. Convoy service according to plan.

Special Item:

In view of potential Russian internment plans for the Baltic fleet, Group North requested on 28 Aug. that as many submarines as possible be held in readiness as they become available for operations; these would be called in at short notice and would be posted between Apolda and the Swedish coast. They would be required only for a few days.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines requested on 29 Aug. that this operation not be carried out because it requires submarines of full combat readiness and because the date of the operation can by no means be determined. In his opinion, the planned operation could not be carried out within just a few days. Thus, the submarines would be kept from their principal task, the war against merchant shipping in the Atlantic, for a considerable time; this, however, could not be warranted by the results which might be achieved.

The Naval Staff shares the viewpoint of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and decides that the request of Group North cannot be granted for the time being. The Naval Staff remarks that clear indications for Russian break-through plans would create a new situation requiring the commitment of all forces which could be mobilized. For copy see 1/Skl 6080/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

V. Merchant Shipping

According to the Naval Ordnance Division, War Economy Branch, about the same quantities of iron ore as in the corresponding period of last year were shipped from Scandinavian ports for Germany's account from January to July 1942. The amount shipped on Swedish vessels rose from 52% to 59% while the amount on German, Danish, Finnish, Dutch, and Norwegian ships decreased correspondingly.

From 1 Jan. to 17 Aug. 1942, 65,148 tons of Scandinavian iron ore were lost in transport, equal to 1½% of the total quantity shipped.

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VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

During the night of 2 Sep., the RAMILLIES sailed from Gibraltar in a westerly direction under escort of 5 destroyers. In the southern rendezvous area 2 submarine sighting reports were intercepted. Reports about attacking submarines were heard from the St. Lawrence River and from the west entrance of the Strait of Belle Isle.

2. Own Situation:

The submarines U "517" and U "165" penetrated through the Strait of Belle Isle into the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Submarine U "517" sank 2 steamers totalling 11,500 GRT in quadrant BB 2258 and has left again by way of the Strait of Belle Isle. Submarine U "165" entered the St. Lawrence River, but lost contact with a convoy previously observed.

No reports of any successes were received from the submarines in the West Indies, the South Atlantic, or the Mediterranean. Additional reports in Supplement to Submarine Situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Fighter bombers raided localities on the southern coast during the day.

During the night of 3 Sep. only 2 planes were reported over German territory, flying over the Baltic Sea into the area of Bromberg and Thorn without dropping bombs. In the entire west area there was little enemy air activity.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Bomber planes supported the Panzer Army. Reconnaissance missions over the Mediterranean.

3. Eastern Front:

101 enemy planes were shot down at the various Army fronts. Reconnaissance missions over the waters of the Eastern Front revealed nothing of importance.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, the RAMILLIES, escorted by 4 to 5 destroyers, sailed from Gibraltar during the night of 2 Sep. in westerly direction. (See Submarine Situation.)

4 submarines were sighted off an Italian port of the central Mediterranean. In the eastern Mediterranean, 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers were observed by Italian air reconnaissance approximately 75 miles north of Port Said on a westerly course, and 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers about 65 miles west of Haifa on a northeasterly course.

Radio monitoring intercepted several reports from Alexandria-based planes about sighting and attacking steamers and convoys, and about a futile gunfire and torpedo attack of a British plane against an Italian hospital ship 60 miles north-northeast of Tobruk.

According to an intelligence report from Haifa, a special task force of 16 submarines, some of them of a new type, arrived at Alexandria on 1 Sep.; they are supposed to attack German and Italian transports.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

The Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy took over the North African command station at Marsa Matruh on 2 Sep. Enemy planes raided Tobruk during the nights of 1 and 2 Sep.; the harbor escaped damage.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

PADENNA, SPORTIVO and BIANCHI are en route from the Aegean Sea to Tobruk. 50 miles north-northwest of Tobruk, where this convoy should be according to dead reckoning, a German plane observed a burning vessel. No reports were received from the convoy thus far.

The motor ship MONTI, en route from Naples to Cotrone was torpedoed during the night of 2 Sep. by an enemy plane and had to be beached in the morning at Punta Stilo. Other convoys proceeded according to plan.

Goods unloaded at Tobruk on 1 Sep. amounted to 1,016 tons plus 756 tons from tankers, and on 2 Sep., 733 tons plus 300 tons from tankers. At Marsa Matruh, 638 tons were unloaded between the afternoon of 1 Sep. and the forenoon of 2 Sep.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

One submarine was reported in the Strait of Cerigotto on the forenoon of 2 Sep.

Own Situation:

Convoys in the Aegean Sea according to plan. 2 auxiliary sailing vessels with a cargo of anti-aircraft ammunition and medical supplies are en route from Crete to Africa.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to intelligence reports, 12 ships of the Black Sea fleet, including 4 cruisers, arrived at Poti from the north on 29 Aug. On 31 Aug. at 0040 six transports carrying wounded soldiers, war material, and special detachments sailed from Novorossisk in a southerly direction; on 1 Sep., 5 PT boats, 2 mine sweepers, and 2 transports

arrived at Novorossisk from the Sea of Azov.

On 31 Aug., 1 aircraft carrier (?), 6 tankers, 1 heavy and 3 light cruisers, 9 submarines, and 5 transports arrived at Batum. According to a report from Anapa, 3 enemy PT boats and 11 small warships, all heading for Taman, were observed in the early morning of 2 Sep.

According to prisoner of war statements, the PARIZHSKAYA KOMUNA was badly damaged, probably by a mine, during the Kerch operation of December 1941. The ship was anchored at Poti until the end of May. The cruiser VOROSHILOV has been ready to sail since the end of May. Allegedly, not more than 3 or 4 destroyers are ready for action.

Own Situation:

The first day of operation "Bluecher" went according to plan. Enemy naval forces were not encountered. Two landing barges were damaged, otherwise no losses were incurred. In the evening of 2 Sep. the second wave embarked under unfavorable weather conditions; it landed with full success on 3 Sep. at 0600. The enemy was taken completely by surprise. One Siebel ferry was badly damaged by enemy action; 1 landing barge, 1 Siebel ferry, 1 small vessel, and approximately 40 engineer assault boats were lost due to bad weather. Another landing barge and another Siebel ferry were damaged by high seas. 6 Siebel ferries and 6 engineer landing boats are temporarily out of action due to engine breakdowns. Casualties among the personnel are low. Supply traffic was suspended temporarily on the evening of 2 Sep. by agreement with Corps Headquarters until the weather improves, in order to avoid further ship losses. Tuzla Spit is firmly in German hands thanks to the assistance rendered by a landing barge. The mine barrage off the Russian coast guard station at Ilich was swept by the 3rd Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla. A new loading berth is being provided. The harbor of Kerch is being reorganized as port of destination for our supply traffic.

During the night of 2.Sep., the 1st PT Boat Flotilla under the command of Lt. Toenniges was assigned to provide flank protection for the Army and to operate against enemy shipping south of the Taman Peninsula. One 4,000 GRT tanker and 2 steamers totalling 4,500 GRT, one of them loaded with ammunition, were torpedoed and sunk. The 1st PT Boat Flotilla has thus sunk a total of 34,500 GRT since the beginning of the Caucasus offensive.

The harbor of Yeisk has been cleared for supply tasks. Also the port of Anapa is ready for use.

Special Item:

a. On 24 Aug. Naval Group South made an extensive analysis of the situation (see Op. Stab 6050/42 Gkdos., 1/Skl 21104/42 Gkdos.) which explains and supplements directives given in the past in order to ensure a uniform conception on all points in the subordinate commands in the Black Sea area. The Commanding Admiral, Black Sea is authorized, at his discretion, to supplement the Group's analysis by additional directives or comments to the commands under his authority. Moreover, the above anlysis is to serve as a basis for conferences of naval liaison officers with the authorities of the Army and Air Force.

Copies of the analysis of the situation were transmitted to the Naval Staff Operations Division, and to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division.

The Naval Staff Operations Division agrees completely with the ideas expressed therein. The Group's conclusions concerning the connections between these 3 problems are particularly appropriate. Turkey's treatment of the question of the Russian Black Sea fleet; the Turkish attitude during the future course of the war; possession of the Suez Canal area. The present tasks with regard to measures to be taken against the Black Sea fleet, when the latter is being threatened with the loss of the last remaining bases, illustrate vividly that the Black Sea, the Dardanelles, the Aegean Sea, and the eastern Mediterranean are dependent on each other strategically and politically to such a degree that the decision about a final clear-cut sovereignty over them can only be solved for all of these areas simultaneously. The key to the solution of this problem is Suez.

b. With reference to a communication from the Naval Liaison Officer to the Army High Command concerning the organization of Sevastopol as transshipping port for Army supplies, Naval Group, South points out that the Navy has gone ahead with this project, in spite of the Army's indecision. Before the harbor can be used it must be swept of mines, and crane equipment must be brought up from the naval shipyard at Nikolayev. A Sea Transport office ready to start functioning is already established at Sevastopol, and pier space for medium sized vessels is already available. (See Telegram 1725.)

IX. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The 46th Infantry Division completed the occupation of the peninsula north of Taman Bay including the point, and is now advancing to the south. Rumanian forces are advancing north of the lagoon of Kiziltash. The bulk of the Rumanian Corps and units of the V Army Corps are attacking Novorossisk. On the Terek River the bridgehead northwest and west of Mozdok was widened. The town of Kizlyar was mopped up.

Army Group B:

The area north of Chalchutea was cleared of the enemy. The 4th Panzer Army repulsed a flank attack south of Stalingrad. The tank forces which crossed the railroad line Stalingrad-Kalach and are advancing in the direction of Stalingrad broke through the enemy positions and are directly west of the city. Also infantry of the LI Army Corps advancing from the north and northwest are just about to unite with our tank spearheads. An attack by 150 tanks from Stalingrad to the north was repulsed with heavy enemy losses.

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Central Army Group:

See-saw fighting on the Zhizdra River continues. Also east of Vyazma and in the area of Rzhev the enemy is still on the offensive. However, we succeeded in keeping the situation in hand. In the rear of the Army Group's left wing, partisan bands are again increasingly active. Cases of destruction of railroad beds and rolling stock are increasing.

Northern Army Group:

Enemy attacks at the same battle areas continue. An enemy attack across the Neva River was repulsed. The enemy was also unable to gain any ground south of Leningrad.

2. Finnish Front:

Increased enemy reconnaissance activity is reported from the area of the Rybachi Peninsula and at the Litsa front.

3. North Africa:

On 3 Sep. enemy reconnaissance detachments very cautiously felt their way toward our motorized group. On the other hand, enemy air attacks on this group continue in undiminished strength by day and night. Normal enemy reconnaissance and artillery fire in front of our fortified positions. Aerial photo reconnaissance revealed more than 300 tanks in the area of the 1st enemy tank division.

The situation report shows already that our offensive has hit a snag. We must await further developments.

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4 Sep. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

The analysis of the naval situation by the First Lord of the Admiralty on the occasion of the anniversary of the war (see War Diary of 3 Sep.) touched not only on the state of submarine warfare, as already reported; it refers briefly also to the situation of the German heavy battleships and the Malta situation and then goes into detail about the problems of British and American shipbuilding. See Political Review No. 207, paragraph 1 and the appendix of the Naval Staff Intelligence Division's Foreign Press Analysis No. 207.

India:

In his radio address to the Indian nation, General Wavell remarked among other things that the 4th year of the war began with much better prospects for the Allies than the year 1918. "At that time the German forces were available to be used in the west following the victory over Russia, whereas today our Russian allies are pressing them hard. Today, the Germans and not the Allies must carry the burden of Italy, and war production in the U.S.A. is in full swing already." Finally, Wavell termed the Indian soldiers fighting on all fronts the true representatives of India; they are the ones who matter and not the politicians entangled in domestic quarrel, nor the undisciplined youth and irresponsible rowdies.

Spain:

Political Review Nc. 207, paragraphs 2a and b, contains further comments regarding the cabinet reorganization and sketches a picture of Spanish/Anglo-American relations. According to the opinion predominating in London, Spain will remain neutral, at least while Suez is in British hands. The British are convinced that Franco desires to keep his country out of the war in spite of his pro-Axis sympathies and that Brazil's entry into the war had a sobering effect on the Axis sympathizers in Spain, because this fact seems to indicate that the largest South American country no longer believes in an Axis victory.

> The British carefully avoid mentioning Spain's domestic weakness, evidently in order not to show that they have had a part in it.

U.S.A.:

Roosevelt's address at the International Youth Congress contained nothing worth mentioning.

Reuter reports the arrival of U.S. troops in the Belgian Congo.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief of the Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports about the loss of the mine-laying vessel ULM as recorded under Situation Arctic Ocean.

Rear Admiral Klueber took over the command as Admiral, Arctic Ocean.

II. The Deputy to the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports:

(a) The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has taken over shipping also in the Norwegian area, as of 1 Sep.

(b) Complying with the Fuehrer's order to transfer cargo space from the Navy to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, 46 ships which are in good shape, totalling 174,000 GRT, and 12 ships under repair, totalling 55,000 GRT, have been transferred to date. An additional 62 ships of 85,000 GRT, including the ships in the Norwegian supply traffic, are earmarked for transfer. The total number of ships involved is therefore 120, totalling 315,276 GRT or 441,000 register tons.

The Commander in Chief, Navy orders that a confirmation be requested from the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, acknowledging that all his demands have been met to the fullest extent.

(c) The transport of submarines and landing barges to the Black Sea by way of the Danube is being delayed by the low water level at Ingolstadt due to drought.

III. The Chief, Naval Staff expects the Quartermaster Division's report on the progress made in reinforcing the defenses of the German river estuaries in the German Bight; these reinforcements were supposed to be completed by 1 Sep.

During the inspection at Dieppe, the Chief, Naval Staff was informed about the great tension existing between the Army and the Navy concerning the emplacement of Army coastal batteries. Army artillerymen adhere to their ingrained views based on land fighting, and cannot be convinced of the changes required for combatting targets at sea. The Fuehrer plans an early conference with all authorities concerned with the coastal defense of the west area.

The Chief, Naval Staff announces further that the Commanding Admiral, France is going to propose the creation of a guard detachment for naval installations in France, because the Army is no longer in a position to attend to this task. The Recruitment Division, Bureau of Naval Administration is directed to examine this matter.

IV. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports:

(a) With the exception of the already completed IOWA, the U.S. Navy has temporarily suspended further work on the remaining battleships of the same class in order to await the experiences from the operations in the Pacific. It is remarkable that, while the displacement of the IOWA was increased by 10,000 tons compared to original plans, the original armament, including the gun caliber, was not altered. The increased tonnage thus benefitted solely the speed or the range and the armor protection.

(b) With regard to the proposition of the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division concerning the Ilich Works at Mariupol, it must be said that extensive conversion would be required before the plant could be used for the proposed purpose. However, the plant has since been taken over by Krupp for the manufacture of Army projectiles.

V. The Deputy to the Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports about the losses sustained by enemy merchant shipping during the month of August as verified by the Naval Intelligence

4 Sep. 1942

Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch:

Total loss: 247 ships of 1,087,329 GRT

German submarines sank 107 of these ships with a total of 542,398 GRT. The Japanese sank 40 vessels with a total of 235,165 GRT.

Verified total enemy losses from the beginning of the war up to 31 Aug. 1942 reach the sum of 21,007,539 GRT.

For the report of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch see the appendix to 3/Skl FH (c) 16015 g in file "Ship Losses".

The Chief, Naval Staff states in connection with the above figures that the goal set by the Navy has more or less been achieved for the moment.

VI. The Chief, Naval Staff orders that the great number of enemy landing craft of different types captured at Dieppe are to be thoroughly examined and their practical value established.

The matter is referred to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division.

In a Very Restricted Circle:

VII. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports:

(a) Concerning Group North's directive for operation "Doppelschlag", as reported in War Diary of 2 and 3 Sep.:

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the proposal of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers, with respect to command over the latter's forces. But since the Commanding Admiral, Group North would be placed in an awkward position were he required to revoke his own order--which he upheld against the protest of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers--the Chief, Naval Staff merely orders the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff to inform the Commanding Admiral, Group North that it would be contrary to his repeatedly expressed opinion for a ship commander to function simultaneously as task force commander.

(b) Concerning the report of 2 Sep. of the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters with regard to the analysis of the situation and the plans for the Eastern Front (see War Diary, file "Barbarossa"):

A certain shortage of forces in the Army and Air Force which is becoming evident at this long front prohibits the execution of several major operations simultaneously. This means that probably only a fraction of the operations planned can be executed during the remainder of this year. A cancellation of the offensive toward Kandalaksha and the uncertainty about the seizure of Leningrad are matters of importance for the Navy.

Special Items:

I. The Foreign Office transmits a report of 2 Sep. from the Military Attache at Bangkok, based on information from the Japanese India

Bureau; according to this report, the General Staff at Tokyo announced that no decision has yet been reached as to the dates and sequence of the operations against Russia, India, and Australia which are in preparation.

The following represents the personal view of Lt. Col. Maki, Chief of the India Bureau:

(1) Japan will not attack Russia this coming fall. An attack after Russia has been defeated in Europe is possible, provided it involves no risks.

(2) The India campaign will take place this year, when the monsoon period ends. The army for this offensive is being trained in Manchuria at this moment. The Japanese expect that the German advance toward Suez and the Middle East will cause an anti-British uprising of the Mohammedans, which would facilitate the Japanese operations. The date for the Japanese undertaking depends on this move.

(3) The operation against Australia is postponed for the time being. It is assumed that northeast Australia and the islands to the east will be seized at a later date.

The German Ambassador and the Military Attache at Bangkok consider Maki's analysis essentially correct and assume that the former Philippine divisions will form the invasion army for India under the command of Yamashita.

For this telegram see 1/Skl 1728/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV. 6 arguments in confirmation of the view expressed in paragraph 1 are included.

II. As reported on 3 Sep. by the German Admiral at Tokyo, Kojima sent word that about 1/3 of the submarines operating in the Indian Ocean have been transferred to the area of the Solomon Islands in view of the developments there.

This report has been communicated to the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters, to the Naval Representative of the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, and to the Navy Liaison Officers to the Army High Command and the Commander in Chief, Air Force.

III. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch reported on 2 Sep. about the tentative shipyard schedule of the following ships:

TIRPITZ:	In active service in the north area. She is to be overhauled at the Deutsche Werke, Kiel, from end of October 1942 to January 1943. There is some difficulty with regard to the dock problem, because the GRAF ZEPPELIN might be in Kiel at the same time.
SCHARNHORST:	Repairs concluded on 15 Aug. At the moment in training. From 1 to 3 Oct. she is to participate in tactical maneuvers of the fleet. Will be ready for operations early in October.
GNEISENAU:	In Gdynia in need of repair.

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HIPPER: Operating in north area. To enter the Deutsche Werke in Kiel following the TIRPITZ, beginning approximately early in Feb. 1943.

PRINZ EUGEN: Shipyard period scheduled to end on 15 Oct. 1942. Subsequently training.

ADMIRAL SCHEER: For the time being on operations in north area. To be fitted with new electric motors (Diesel) after 1 Feb. 1943. Expected to take 3½ months approximately.

LUETZOW: Structural repairs at Deutsche Werke, Kiel, to last until latter half of October. Subsequently training and assignment to Naval Gunnery School from 12 Nov. to 15 Dec. 1942. Thereafter available for north area. Replacement of electric motors and of 28 cm gun barrels planned for May 1943, lasting 3½ months approximately.

NUERNBERG: Left the shipyard middle of August. At the moment in training till early October. Scheduled for participation in tactical maneuvers of the fleet.

KOELN: At present in north area. Requires about 4 months in shipyard for repair of cables, thus restoring full combat readiness. Cannot be accommodated in German shipyards during the winter. Ship must get along without repairs for the moment. Since due to stability reasons her range is limited (oil consumption), an examination is under way regarding possibility of continued operations.

LEIPZIG: In training with the Naval Inspectorates. Scheduled for participation in fleet maneuvers from 1 to 3 Oct. To enter the shipyard probably in the spring of 1943. From 5 Nov. to 15 Dec. assigned to Naval Gunnery School.

EMDEN: Systematic overhaul at Wilhelmshaven shipyard from 15 Aug. to about 31 Oct. On this occasion replacement of armament and installation of experimental degaussing gear. After 1 Oct. 1942 to be used for training of naval cadets.

IV. With reference to Group North's objection to the security regulations for the transfer of ship "45" to the west area in view of the presence of Blohm personnel on board, the Naval Staff requests an examination whether the latter's presence is necessary. If so, the camouflage order will be changed to call for returning to Bremen or Wilhelmshaven for the alleged purpose of installing some special device for an operation in the North.

Situation 4 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

According to press reports, the U.S. Navy Department plans

to transfer several ships, i.e., 2 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, and 3 others of the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific Ocean.

South Atlantic:

Evaluation of information obtained by the radio decoding and intercept services shows the following instructions for enemy shipping in the South Atlantic, amending more extensive instructions which we do not know:

(1) Vessels sailing in either direction between the British Isles and African ports as well as between South African and West African ports, including ships which have separated from OS convoys, are to follow a course 300 miles off the African coast between Capetown and 03° 00' S, thence between the coast and a line through the following points:

a.	03° 00' S	03° 30' E
b.	Equator	01° 00' W
c.	02° 30' S	07° 30' W
d.	Equator	20° 00' W
e.	05° 00' N	23° 00' W
f.	10° 00' N	26° 00' W

Ships running between West African and West Indies ports are to follow these instructions between points a. and e.

(2) Ships sailing in either direction between West Indies and South African ports must keep south and west of:

a. (A line ?) between 33° 00' S, 10° 00' E and 17° 30' S, 22°30'W.
b. A line between 17° 30' S, 22° 30' W and St. Paul's Rock.

(3) Southbound ships between (American East Coast) and South American ports are to sail between 100 and 200 miles east of (St. Paul's) Rock; northbound ships are to sail between 200 and 300 miles east of (St. Paul's) Rock.

(4) Ships in either direction between the British Isles and West African as well as South American ports farther south than Cape San Roque are to sail as outlined under (3) and west of 07° 00' S, 25° 00' W.

(5) Between African and South American ports ships are to follow the direct route.

The Naval Staff adds the following comments:

Shipping has been concentrated into narrow lanes along the African coast due to the operations of our auxiliary cruisers.

The points mentioned as the eastern limits of the traffic lanes in the western South Atlantic are probably specially patrolled.

Paragraph (4) may mean that ships between the British Isles and South American ports should proceed according to paragraph (3), and ships between West African and South American ports west of 07° 00' S and 25° 00' W. Paragraph (4) has not definitely been corroborated by sailing instructions intercepted thus far.

It can be assumed that the waters between St. Paul's Rock to a point 200 miles east of it are also heavily patrolled.

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The Naval Attache at Buenos Aires reported on 29 Aug. that meat-carrying vessels are sailing to the British Isles mostly via Freetown, other steamers either via Freetown or Port of Spain. Motor vessels and coal-burning ships usually call at Port of Spain.

Indian Ocean:

On 2 Sep. the German Consulate General at Lourenco Marques submitted an agent report, according to which a U.S. convoy with troops and material passed there. Another convoy of 15 vessels for Iran left Capetown, where a third convoy from the U.S.A. was expected. A total of 10 American ships are scheduled to pick up manganese at Lourenco Marques and Durban. The Americans intend to station as many as 500,000 men in South Africa, which is to become the base of operations directed toward Australia, India and the Middle East. 5 or 6 light cruisers left the Mediterranean via Suez. Greek port and shipping authorities were shifted from Alexandria to Mombasa.

Special Item:

According to a French communication to the German Armistice Commission, France, a burning British bomber plane crashed at Mogador on the morning of 2 Sep., apparently after being fired at. At 0730 a flight of French fighters had a brush with 3 British bombers 20 km west of Casablanca. 1 Curtiss was shot down.

These incidents prove that French resistance against the crossing of French territory has intensified.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff informed the Attache at Tokyo with Telegram 2355 that the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN with 104 prisoners would arrive at point "Rose" around 24 Sep. and that the TANNENFELS completed the delivery of supplies to ship "10" on 30 Aug. according to plan.

By Radiograms 0640 and 1124 all ships in foreign waters are informed about the enemy shipping instructions for the South Atlantic as recorded under Enemy Situation.

Additional information about the enemy situation by Radiograms 0400 and 2058.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed only normal shipping in the Channel.

Between 24 and 28 Aug. all important ports on the south coast east of the mouth of the Axe River were covered by surprise photo reconnaissance. The photographs show that the concentrations of small craft suitable for landing purposes are still centered between Poole and Selsey Bill. The 3rd Air Force comments on the result as follows:

a. Since no photographs were taken of the area west of the Axe estuary, the total number (3,296) of small craft established on the English south coast including the southern part of the Thames River

estuary between 24 and 28 Aug. does not present a complete picture. By basing our estimate on the figure for 28 to 30 Jul. for the western Channel (1,543), it can be assumed that the total number of small craft suitable for landings, now in ports of the southern coast inclusive of the southern part of the Thames estuary, approximates 5,000.

b. Due to the fact that the center of concentration is clearly the area Poole-Chichester-Southampton, we can continue to assume that potential landing operations would be launched and large-scale operations could also be fed from there.

c. The possibility of large-scale landing operations certainly exists, judging from the types of vessels established by photo reconnaissance and by the experiences gained from the Dieppe operation.

For copy of the corresponding report from Group West see 1/Skl 21797/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The Biscayan tuna-fishermen are beginning to go over to net fishing because of renewed British threats and because the tunafish are migrating north. 1 mine was swept at the mouth of the Gironde.

Channel Coast:

The Alderney Harbor Defense Group established that the 7 man crew of the Casquets lighthouse and radio beacon was probably captured by the enemy. The radio station is destroyed, but signs of a struggle are not visible. This may have a connection with the sailboat destroyed by the 3rd Fighter Command on 2 Sep. Further investigation of the matter was ordered. (See Telegram 2115.)

The 2nd, 4th, and 5th PT Boat Flotillas are scheduled to lay mines the night of 4 Sep.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports only slight traffic off the Humber and in the Thames estuary.

Own Situation:

During the night of 3 Sep. enemy planes dropped bombs over the Emden area. North of Borkum, 1 ground mine was swept by a mine-exploding vessel. Channel-sweeping had to be partly cancelled due to bad weather.

The Group supports the proposal of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North made to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division concerning replacement of the 6 mine-exploding vessels which were lost, and points out that the mine situation in the North Sea cannot be controlled in

the long run if the British ground mine offensive continues. As an emergency measure, one mine-exploding vessel was transferred from the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North. (See Telegram 1249.)

This proposal is in keeping with the policy already followed for a long time by the Naval Staff.

Group North further requests the Naval Staff to supply definite information about the deliveries of mine-exploding vessels, mine-sweeping vessels and mine-sweeping planes which may be expected during September and up to November. (See Telegram 1246.)

The Chief, Naval Staff will give his opinion.

2. Norway:

Convoy operations suffered somewhat from bad weather.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway renews his request for permission to lay an EMF minefield between Skraaven and Flatoe in the Vest Fjord, at 2 meters depth, since EMF mines have been declared ready for operational use. The original request was denied by Group North in March 1942. (See Telegram 2015.)

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to a Danish intelligence report, a convoy consisting of approximately 10 steamers sailed from Reykjavik on 31 Aug. for an unknown destination.

Own Situation:

According to a report of Group North, the mine-laying ship ULM sank as early as 25 Aug. at 2300. The date given as 29 Aug. was caused by an error in transmission. When the ULM encountered 3 British destroyers on her scheduled approach route "Zar" northeast of Bear Island, her captain gave order to scuttle and abandon the ship in view of her hopeless situation after the enemy had begun to fire from a great distance. Mines had not been laid. One of the British destroyers remained at the spot of the sinking for quite some time. It was not observed whether prisoners were taken. The British destroyer paid no attention to a passing crowded cutter. Another cutter capsized. All 3 enemy destroyers fired with machine guns on the fast-sinking ULM and on the life boats as they were being lowered, according to statements of First Mate Bohn.

An additional report must be awaited. The 3 destroyers evidently concerned were sighted by our air reconnaissance and by submarines on 26 Aug. after 0945 in quadrant AB 3855 (see War Diary of 26 Aug.). The ULM was the unfortunate victim of a chance patrol run of light enemy forces.

5 ships of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla sailed from Alta Fjord to Kirkenes on a mine-laying mission.

Concerning the blockade of Murmansk:

With reference to the Naval Staff's directive concerning mine-laying

operations in the Arctic Ocean during the coming winter (see War Diary 8 Aug.), Group North remarks that it is impossible to cut the supply route to Murmansk even by the most extravagant use of mines; the reason being that enemy mine-sweeping operations can neither be prevented nor disturbed, that coastal traffic close to the shore of Kola Peninsula cannot be attacked and, finally, because only very few of the enemy defense installations are known. The Group can at best harass enemy shipping in Murmansk, and therefore proposes to lay a minefield from quadrant AC 8589 via 8917 to 8972 to connect with the minefield "Bantos A". It is planned to make further additions out at sea and later as far as quadrant 8980. A further minefield with timing devices should be laid from quadrant AC 8581 to 8813 in view of minefield "Wiesengrund". Between these two minefields, mines should be laid by motor mine sweepers and PT boats, because the Group figures that there are enemy barrages in this areas so that destroyers could not be used there. Moreover, the Group proposes laying aerial mines in the port of Vladimir, in the Polyarnoye Bay, the Kildin Strait, the inner Murmansk Bay, the Volokovaya Bay and the Tyuva Bay. Aerial mines might also be laid in the approaches to Iokanga Bay, Teriberski Bay, Podzakhata Bay and Rynda Bay. Moored mine barrages should be considered also between Kola Bay and the entrance to the White Sea. The Navy requires about 800 to 1000 large mines and the same number for additions to existing minefields.

The destroyers, the KOELN, and possibly after the end of October also the NUERNBERG, BRUMMER, and OSTMARK are intended for use as mine carriers. The Group, summarizing the situation, points out that even the most extensive use of mines will bring occasional successes only and no lasting effect can be expected from them. If it is absolutely necessary we could stay out of the waters south of 70° 12' N between 32° 20' E and 36° 00' E, but the submarine operations against convoys would be badly affected. The Group suggests that the Army be told now that it is impossible to cut off sea supplies to Murmansk completely, so that the Army will not have the wrong impression and will not make false plans.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Nothing to report from the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea.

In the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea, an unsuccessful submarine attack was made on a German convoy west of Porkkala. A submarine alarm was caused southwest of Utoe by an underwater explosion, probably from a ground runner. In the Aland Sea a Finnish convoy was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine.

The Armed Forces High Command is informed by letter 1/Skl I op 21693/42 Gkdos. about the Fuehrer's decision with regard to the report of the Commander in Chief, Navy of 26 Aug. In his decision the Fuehrer accepted the Navy's viewpoint that the Leningrad shipyards be spared. Copy of letter in file "Barbarossa".

V. Merchant Shipping

An American periodical surveys the problem of U.S. cargo space.

4 Sep. 1942

The Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch made an abstract of the most interesting parts of the article, which mostly consists of a very expert analysis of the present situation; otherwise, its statements indicate the same difficulties, which to some extent probably exist in all belligerent countries with regard to merchant shipping. The abstract is contained in short report No. 28/42 of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch.

According to press reports, a shipyard on the U.S. Pacific coast has completed a 10,500 ton Liberty freighter within the record time of 31 days from keel-laying to final delivery. Another report has it that U.S. shipyards delivered steamers and tankers totalling 753,000 tons (probably weight tons) during the month of August, after delivery in July of 71 vessels totalling 790,300 tons.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "456" of the Norwegian group is supposed to arrive at 1600 on 6 Sep. at 70° N,46° E for a mining mission of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla.

No reports about any achievements were received from the North Atlantic and from the American East Coast.

Submarine U "125" from the South Atlantic group reports sinking a coastal steamer of 820 GRT south of the Gold Coast in quadrant EV 8123. This sinking caused strong air patrol activity.

Submarine U "205" torpedoed a destroyer off Jaffa in the Mediterranean.

Additional reports in Supplement to Submarine Situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Fighter bomber and reconnaissance missions were carried out over several localities in southern England during the day. For details see daily situation report. During the night of 4 Sep. propaganda material was dropped over Southampton and Portsmouth.

2. Enemy Incursions:

150 out of 176 enemy planes flew into German territory; 50 came from the east and 100 from the west. 10 of them were shot down by fighters. The raids in the east were carried out in an area extending from Libau to Elbing, Kutno, Lodz, and Bratislava; Vienna and Budapest were also raided. For details see daily situation report.

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3. Mediterranean Theater:

Our planes supported the Africa Corps and at night made severe attacks on enemy tank and troop concentrations on the northern sector of the Egyptian front.

4. Eastern Front:

81 enemy planes were shot down at the Army fronts. Reconnaissance activity over the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and Lake Ladoga revealed nothing of importance.

5. Special Item:

The Air Force Operations Staff amended its previous order and directed that the first two mine-sweeping planes delivered from the new production are to be transferred into the Kerch area for temporary use by the 4th Air Force.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

On 3 Sep., 2 destroyers arrived in Gibraltar and 1 transport was towed into the Atlantic. Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Tobruk had an air raid during the night of 3 Sep.

8 boats of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla will start from Rotterdam on 10 Sep. for transfer to the Mediterranean via the Rhine-Rhone Canal.

The German Naval Command, Italy submits the reply of the Italian High Command to the stand of the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff in the matter of closing the Strait of Sicily (see War Diary of 11 Aug.). For a copy of the telegram see 1/Skl 21775/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

In the evening and during the night of 3 Sep., a convoy consisting of the PADENNA, the BIANCHI, and the SPORTIVO was attacked by enemy planes. The PADENNA and the BIANCHI were set afire and had to be abandoned. The BIANCHI sank 40 miles north of Tobruk, while the SPORTIVO reached Tobruk. The damaged steamer ABRUZZI was towed into Ras el Hilal on 3 Sep. where attempts are being made to unload her cargo. 1 landing barge sank en route from Derna to Crete due to damage caused by bad weather.

Otherwise, convoy operations proceeded according to plan.

Goods unloaded at Tobruk on 3 Sep. amounted to 977 tons, plus 293 tons from tankers.

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Volume of Maritime Shipping during August 1942:

From Italy to Africa:	16,194.9	tons of armed forces supplies
	865	vehicles
	709	men
From Aegean Sea to Africa:	1,545	tons of armed forces supplies
	152	vehicles
	697	men
Total	17,739.9	tons of armed forces supplies
	1,017	vehicles
	1,406	men

In addition to the above figures, 7,742 tons of armed forces supplies, 425 vehicles and 3 men were lost with the following vessels: MONVISO, LERICI, PILO, CAMPEIRO, ISTRIA, BIXIO, DIELPI, and the tanker SAN ANDREA.

13,115 men and 1,115 tons of materiel were transported to North Africa by air.

This achievement must be regarded as entirely inadequate as far as armed forces supplies, including fuel, are concerned, in view of the resumption of our offensive which had been planned for the end of August.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Heavy gunfire was directed against Yenikale and Tuzla Spit on 2 Sep.

Own Situation:

In spite of bad weather, the 3rd Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla marked the channel to the new landing place at the Ilich coast guard station with buoys. 22 Russian inertia contact mines and 1 lead horned mine were detonated at the Dolgaya Spit. Drifting mines still constitute a menace to shipping. Shipments to Yeisk were postponed owing to weather conditions, and for the same reason neither PT boats nor Italian subchasers were able to operate.

PT boats S "26" and S "49" arrived at Constanta by way of the Danube on 3 Sep. Also 4 landing barges arrived at Sulina from Linz.

It is planned to transfer 2 Italian submarines to Burgas where they are to prepare for a reconnaissance mission to the Bosporus, since they may be needed if the Russian naval or merchant fleet should try to break through. As soon as a new base on the Caucasian coast is won, the boats will be assigned a zone of operations in that area.

The 4.5 cm battery at Balaklava is provisionally ready for action.

Special Items:

a. The Commanding Admiral, Black Sea reports that the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas agrees to the Navy's not taking over Dniepr coastal shipping, and will handle loading and unloading itself.

b. A copy of the comments of Group South addressed to the Naval Liaison Officer at the Army High Command regarding the transfer of Nikolayev-Kherson transshipment traffic to Sevastopol is sent to the Naval Staff Operations Division and the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Sea Transportation Branch. For copy see 1/Skl 21841/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVa.

IX. Situation East Asia

A telegram from the German Admiral at Tokyo reports that Japanese submarines during the month of July sank 10 ships of 95,000 GRT, the air forces 1 ship of 4,000 GRT, and surface forces 1 ship of 9,500 GRT; since the beginning of the war, 263 vessels totalling 1,644,000 GRT have been sunk.

A Japanese auxiliary cruiser seized the steamers HAURAKI and GEVOTA in the Indian Ocean; according to an RR signal intercepted by the DOGGERBANK, the HAURAKI was captured at 26° 44' S, 82° 50' E, which is in the zone of operation of ship "10". The German Admiral at Tokyo has taken the necessary steps at the Japanese Navy Department.

According to the U.S. Navy Department, U.S. submarines have reported sinking a Japanese light cruiser, 3 steamers and 1 tanker and damaging 2 steamers and 2 tankers; none of them were in connection with the operations in the Solomon Islands, and none were previously mentioned in the Navy Department's communiques.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The 46th Infantry Division met with strong resistance on the Taman Peninsula, the enemy trying to shield troop embarkations there. Our concentric attack on Novorossisk is making slow progress. Several enemy thrusts from the direction of Tuapse were repulsed. German forces broke through enemy positions north of Vozmeseskaya and advanced to the south. Also the bridgehead north of Grozny was expanded southward. Enemy attacks on Kizlyar were repulsed.

Army Group B:

Heavy traffic observed on the railroad line to Astrakhan from the south was effectively disrupted. South of Stalingrad, strong enemy forces are holding out in heavily fortified positions west of the bend in the Volga River, German tank and infantry divisions

carried the attack from the west to the center of the city of Stalingrad and are engaged in fierce fighting about 4 km from the Volga River. Divisions of the LI Army Corps are taking part in the attack. Also the tank and motorized units fighting north of Stalingrad have begun to attack and have reached the hills north of the city in spite of strong counterattacks. Massed enemy attacks from the north, which were launched after an intensive artillery barrage, were dispersed with the assistance of strong air force formations. South of Livny the enemy renewed his offensive and succeeded temporarily in penetrating our positions.

Central Army Group:

The action south of Sukhinichi has developed into a bitter defensive battle against an enemy which is being constantly reinforced. East of Vyazma, Russian bomber planes attacked our positions and rear communications. The enemy tank offensive in the area south and east of Rzhev continues. After a massed artillery barrage, a few enemy tanks succeeded in breaking through our lines at several places; most of them were destroyed.

Northern Army Group:

Partisan fighting west of Kholm. Attacks on the stretch leading to the II Army Corps were frustrated. South of Lake Ladoga and east of Leningrad the enemy repeated his attacks. In a thrust southeast of Leningrad he succeeded in forcing the Police Division back a few kilometers.

2. Finnish Front:

Local enemy offensive activity on the isthmus and at the Maselskaya Army Group. About 130 Russians crossed Lake Ond and captured the village of Ondozero. Scouting and assault detachments increased their activities at the Litsa sector.

3. North Africa:

In the course of 4 Sep. the enemy launched several futile attacks in the area of Alamnayil and suffered heavy losses. The commander of the 6th New Zealand Brigade was taken prisoner. According to his statements, General Auchinleck has become supreme commander in India, while General Wavell allegedly received a higher command. The enemy reconnoitered at the southeastern flank of our forces with scout cars and tanks.

5 Sep. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Denmark:

The Prime Minister addressed the Danish nation over the radio and appealed to the population to be prudent; the speech was motivated by a number of sabotage acts against the German Armed Forces. The Danish press repeated and emphasized the warning.

Great Britain:

The financial secretary of the Admiralty warned against the propaganda for a Second Front, which has allegedly not yet calmed down in Great Britain.

Vernon Bartlett declared that the possibility of a collapse of the Soviet Union should not be discounted; no one should imagine that Russia, China and the U.S.A. are waging war for the sake of a British victory.

Australia:

The Prime Minister spoke about the cooperation between the United Nations and particularly emphasized that the relations between Australia and the U.S.A. are becoming closer, and are balanced by the give and take between these countries.

Portugal:

Lisbon Foreign Office circles do not believe that Brazil would agree to American wishes for the occupation of the Portuguese Atlantic islands.

Russia:

It is rumored in Washington congressional circles that the Russian Government declined a U.S. offer of troops. Russia allegedly pointed out that she has sufficient manpower of her own, but that Allied deliveries of materiel leave much to be desired.

Iran:

The Prime Minister has denied foreign rumors that Iran will join the war on the side of the Allies in the immediate future.

U.S.A.:

According to a Reuter dispatch, Welles announced that the U.S. Government has protested most vigorously to Vichy against the mass deportations of Jewish refugees from France.

Argentina:

The Ministry of the Interior prohibited all publication of movements of ships belonging to belligerent powers.

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5 Sep. 1942

Special Items:

I. The German Naval Command, Italy reports that the German General at Italian Armed Forces Headquarters declared it impossible to continue the North African offensive. It is intended to retreat to the initial positions. Rommel gave the following reasons:

a. The offensive was delayed due to extensive minefields, and there were heavy losses.

b. The planned surprise was unsuccessful.

c. British air superiority is too great.

d. There is insufficient fuel.

e. Conclusion: A quick success can no more be attained.

Supplies are inadequate for a prolonged heavy systematic fight to achieve the objective.

The German General added that Cavallero requested Field Marshal Kesselring to return from Africa to discuss the necessity of renewing the fight against Malta, so that North African supply shipments can be continued. According to the report of the German General at the Italian Armed Forces Headquarters to the German Naval Command, Italy, the Italian High Command radioed to the Commander in Chief, Panzer Army on 3 Sep. as follows:

"The Duce took note of your decision to stop the offensive and announces that every effort will be made to transport supplies in order to enable the Army to repulse a possible enemy offensive and to make a successful counterattack. The Duce warns again of a possible enemy offensive in the direction of Siwa."

It is significant that the first Italian reaction to the new situation should stress the Malta project. The Naval Staff shares the opinion that neglect of operation "Herkules" is exacting a heavy price. The Naval Staff will support this opinion as strongly as possible in order to prevent to the best of its ability a future repetition of similar serious mistakes.

Situation 5 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff instructs ship "10" by Radiogram 0440, intended also for the information of all ships in foreign waters, that the zone of operation of our auxiliary cruisers in the Indian Ocean, as of 10 Sep. is limited as follows by agreement with the Japanese Navy: 35° S, 60° E; 30° S, 70° E; 30° S, 100° E; 50° S, 100° E; 50° S,

60° E, and west of 60° E and south of 40° S.

Ship "10" is further informed that Japanese consent to freedom of operation en route to the Sunda Strait has not yet been received; the date of dismissal for the voyage to Japan depends on the receipt of this consent. (See Radiogram 0127.)

The TANNENFELS will pass through quadrant GZ 40 around 12 Sep. The Naval Staff plans to have her meet ship "28" to deliver the Japanese plane. Since the submarine task force "Eisbaer" will cross the equator east of 15° W on 10 Sep. on her voyage to the Cape area and will operate there after 25 Sep., the plan of ship "28" to withdraw to quadrant HN is wise. The original plan to transfer ship "28" to the Indian Ocean must be abandoned at present, since Japan has cut down the zone of operations there. As soon as the Cape operations of task force "Eisbaer" are terminated, it is intended to transfer ship "28" back to the eastern South Atlantic, until an adequate zone of operations in the Indian Ocean can be established.

Directives to this effect are transmitted to ship "28" with Radiogram 1522.

The CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN is instructed to proceed along the assigned latitude (see War Diary of 21 Aug.) to the longitude of point "Forelle", then to head for point "Rose" and to continue on route "Gelb". See Radiogram 2032.

The Naval Staff plans to replace the auxiliary supply ship PASSAT by the tanker BRAKE and to have the latter supply ship "23" in her present zone of operations; also a rendezvous of the UCKERMARK with ship "28" is planned for the end of September. All ships in foreign waters are informed by the Naval Staff by Radiogram 1911 about the plans for ships "23", "28", and "10".

In addition, all ships in foreign waters are instructed about the route of the Japanese diplomatic exchange ship from Lourenco Marques to Liverpool. EL NIL is scheduled to sail on 5 Sep. and NARKUNDA on 9 Sep. The ships are not to be molested. (See Radiogram 0122.)

Radiogram 1156 informs all ships in foreign waters about the silencing of the ultra long wave transmitter between 14 Sep. and 20 Oct. on account of repairs. Radiogram 0533 deals with the enemy situation.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance over the western part of the Channel revealed nothing of interest.

According to an intelligence report from Belgrade, the rebel leader Mikhailovich received radio instructions from London to stage large-scale revolts between 15 and 25 Aug. Now the same instructions were issued for the period of 6 to 16 Sep. This repeated directive is interesting for the reason that the enemy landing at Dieppe on 26 Aug. coincided with the first period, so that a connection between these events appears possible. Thus the period between 6 and 16 Sep. may again be assumed to be a critical one for the West Area.

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2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

At 1730 an attempt to blow up the St. Assise radio station was uncovered. Explosive charges were removed from two of the main masts of the 500 KW transmitter.

Channel Coast:

During the night of 4 Sep. the German AFRICANA convoy was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes between Boulogne and Dunkirk. At 1030 Le Havre was attacked by planes, and the net barrage as well as 1 harbor patrol vessel were damaged.

In countermeasure for the shelling of our convoy by a British long-range battery, the battery St. Margaret at Cliff and the city and harbor of Dover were shelled on 4 Sep. between 2210 and 2250 with 7 38 cm rounds and 25 28 cm rounds by the batteries Todt, Grosser Kurfuerst, 702 and 1/725.

The mine-laying operations of the PT boat flotillas were cut short owing to the weather.

With regard to the short report of Group West concerning the seizure of the crew of the Casquets lighthouse see Telegram 1953. The lighthouse has been remanned and the defenses reinforced, because the light is essential for naval warfare. The Group emphasizes the value of the lighthouse as an excellent advance observation post, as proved by the Dieppe lighthouse. The upkeep is insignificant, compared with the weak and slow-moving patrol vessels which are always open to enemy attack.

For the supplementary report of Group West, see Telegram 2400.

A suspicious 3 master was halted at 2030 by one of our fighter planes north of Barfleur and badly damaged. Sinking was not observed.

Special Items:

a. In view of the important part played by enemy fighter forces during the Dieppe action, the Commanding Admiral, Group West suggested that in the program for construction of harbor defenses as part of the Westwall fortifications the priority of sectors 2 and 3 be interchanged.

The Naval Staff does not agree with this proposal and insists that the order of priority must remain as established. For copy of the Naval Staff's extensive comment and the entire exchange of telegrams see 1/Skl I op 1661/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

b. The temporary stay at Brest of the former Commanding Admiral, Battleships, Vice Admiral Ciliax has apparently caused rumors to circulate that the battleships will probably return there. Group West points out that this is an opportunity to deceive the enemy and cause him concern and requests a decision or directive in this respect.

The Commander in Chief, Navy agrees with the Naval Staff that nothing else needs to be done, since the rumors have probably already accomplished their purpose. Group West is advised to this effect by telephone. For copy see 1/Skl 1713/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIB.

c. Group West reports additional plans for mine-laying operation KA. Cutter floats will be laid in the following area: 49° 58'N, 00° 49.5' W; 50° 01' N, 00° 50.5' W; 50° 05.5'N, 00° 20' W; 50° 03' N, 00° 19' W. The code name for the operation is "Finale". 4 boats of the 2nd Mine Sweeper Flotilla will carry out the operation.

The laying of barrages R II and R I will be known as operations "Runenschrift" and "Ranke" respectively.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

During the night of 4 Sep. approximately 60 enemy planes concentrated their attack on Bremen and wrought heavy damage (see Telegram 0701). Leaflets were dropped in the Wilhelmshaven area.

Convoy and channel-sweeping activities in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North had to be curtailed due to the weather.

2. Norway:

On 2 Sep. the enemy fired 33 rounds on the harbors of Petsamo and Trifona as well as on Rybachi Peninsula without effect. On 2 and 4 Sep. enemy planes were active over the arctic coast. Bombs caused casualties among the crew of subchaser "1111" off Vardoe.

Otherwise nothing to report.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported 5 steamers on a course of 45° south of Novaya Zemlya at 1630. At 1218 a convoy was observed assembling in the Hval Fjord. 10 to 12 steamers, 2 tankers, 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, 4 destroyers, and 6 patrol vessels were counted. At the same time 1 aircraft carrier, 2 destroyers, 1 passenger liner of 20,000 GRT, 1 steamer and 1 patrol boat were anchored in the Reidar Fjord (on the northeast coast of Iceland).

The Air Commander, North Sea (West) reports that his forces located and reported the exact positions of 2,291 mines between the Norwegian west and the British east coast and Iceland during the period of 20 Feb. to 30 Aug.

Own Situation:

Group North reports having instructed the Admiral, Arctic Ocean that the SCHEER is not to take part in operation "Doppelschlag", which is to be carried out by the HIPPER alone, at the earliest possible date in accordance with previous plans. The fleet is ordered to investigate the shipyard situation at once in connection with the SCHEER'S need for an engine overhaul.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

During the night of 4 Sep. enemy planes from the east carried out nuisance raids and attacks on Koenigsberg, Lodz, and Warsaw. Bombs were dropped at sea, off Memel, probably aimed at a convoy. For details see Telegrams 0715 and 0753.

Nothing of importance was reported from the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea. A Danish mine sweeper swept 1 mine in the Little Belt, another one was swept by a harbor patrol vessel west of Fehmarn Island and still another one by a vessel equipped with towed coil gear off Swinemuende.

In the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea, the barrages "Seeigel" 31, 32, 36, 37 were laid according to plan during the night of 4 Sep. The Mine Sweeper M "30" had an encounter with enemy PT boats off Vigrund.

1 enemy mine sweeper and 1 tow barge were sunk in the Kronstadt Sea Channel by battery Koenigsberg and an anti-aircraft battery.

Mine-sweeping, submarine patrols, and convoy operations proceeded according to plan.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

No news of any importance was received during the day. A belated report of 28 Aug. revealed that the U.S. submarine "07" was operating in the Gulf of Maine in conjunction with surface forces.

According to a British official announcement, 160 crew members died when the EAGLE was sunk.

Press reports reveal the recent sinking by submarines in the North Atlantic of the following vessels: HOHENSDE (?), PENROSE, SIRIS, NORTH DEVON, META, SKEDGATE, BENROFF, HOLLYSIDE, ALF, and the Norwegian steamer HAVSTEN.

Radio New York reports an announcement of the Brazilian Air Ministry, according to which Brazilian planes sank a number of enemy submarines off the coast.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "251" of the Norwegian group explains that the report of mine danger in quadrant AT 6249 was based on sighting what could be buoys or mines on the surface.

Group "Loss" is ordered to take up patrol positions in the North Atlantic from quadrant AJ 8815 to BC 2279.

Submarine U "513" sank 2 large ore ships of 18,500 GRT in a daylight attack off the U.S. coast in quadrant BB 6376. In the course of the attack the boat was rammed and has now withdrawn for repairs.

Submarine U "171" reports from the West Indies sinking a 12,000 ton tanker of the CADILLAC type in quadrant DK 5165.

5 Sep. 1942

Submarine U "506" of the South Atlantic group probably sank a 6,000 GRT steamer out of a small convoy in quadrant FF 2938.

Additional reports in Supplement to Submarine Situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

10 Spitfires were shot down during the day. Localities in southern England were raided by fighter bombers; results were observed in some cases.

In the night of 5 Sep. pamphlets were dropped over cities in southern England.

2. Incursions:

During the night of 5 Sep. only a few enemy planes flew over the coastal areas of the Baltic and the Channel, none over German territory.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Our planes supported the Panzer Army, Africa and carried out reconnaissance in the Central Mediterranean.

4. Eastern Front:

Over the various Army sectors 119 enemy planes were brought down.

Reconnaissance activity in the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean.

The harbor of Murmansk was raided; results were observed. 8 enemy planes were shot down by fighter escorts and 1 of our planes was lost.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing of importance to report.

2. Own Situation:

Tobruk was raided by enemy planes during the night of 3 Sep. without damage to harbor installations.

The motor ship MONTI, beached at Punta Stilo, was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes during the night of 4 Sep.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The Italian steamer ALBACHIARA (1,244 GRT) was sunk at 0135 by an enemy submarine while proceeding in convoy from Benghazi to Tobruk.

Otherwise, the transport of supplies proceeded according to plan without major incident.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring revealed the KHARKOV, 1 destroyer and a total of 8 submarines at sea in the eastern part of the Black Sea. Air reconnaissance sighted one merchant vessel proceeding south in the Tuapse area.

According to an intelligence report based on statements of war prisoners the following ships of the Black Sea fleet have been sunk:

The destroyers FRUNSE, BODRY, BYITELNI, BYSTREM, NEZAMOSHNIK, and SHAUMYAN; the gunboats KRASNY, FLMENIYA, ARMENIPA, besides 4 PT boats, 3 trawlers, and 1 hospital ship.

Damaged: the cruisers MOLOTOV and KRASNY KAVKAS and the destroyer SPOSOBNI, all by bomb hits, and the destroyer SOVERSHENNY by a mine.

Own Situation:

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla under the command of Lt. Christiansen sank 4 steamers and 4 lighters totalling 9,500 GRT during a torpedo attack south of Taman Peninsula in the night of 4 Sep. In the course of this action, PT boat S "27" sank, probably because one of her own torpedoes was a circle runner. For details see Telegram 1720.

During the night of 3 Sep. relatively little personnel and materiel could be ferried in connection with operation "Bluecher" because of bad weather. Taman Peninsula has been firmly in German hands since 4 Sep. Only the south shore is still held by the enemy. It must be assumed that enemy forces are being evacuated by means of small craft and the 1st PT Boat Flotilla has been given orders accordingly. (See above.)

Total amount of cargo unloaded in August:

At Mariupol: 7,670 tons in 413 voyages.

In the Sea of Azov: 10,500 tons.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

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5 Sep. 1942

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The offensive against Novorossisk was carried to a distance of 2 to 4 km from the town. Bitter fighting against superior enemy forces is in progress north of Tuapse. Enemy attacks north and west of Maisky were repulsed. The positions south of Mozdok are held by our panzer forces.

Army Group B:

The offensive against Stalingrad is making slow but steady progress. A strong enemy attack against the northern sector succeeded temporarily. By throwing in all of our reserves, we were able to restore the situation. Enemy attacks in the eastern Don River bend and west of Livny were repulsed.

Central Army Group:

All enemy attacks at the Zhizdra River front failed. In the Rzhev area the enemy offensive strength declined.

Northern Army Group:

Fresh divisions of the 11th Army effectively relieved the situation at the sector between Soltsy and Lake Ladoga. Renewed enemy attacks on the front of the Police Division at the Leningrad sector failed.

2. Finnish Front:

The enemy forces which had landed on the west shore of Lake Ond were destroyed.

3. North Africa:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain and Russia:

In a message addressed to the youth of Great Britain, Ambassador Maisky called for the creation of a second front.

Spain:

The new Foreign Minister Jordanas told the German Ambassador that Spain's foreign policy will continue to be determined by the principle of non-belligerency and friendship for the Axis. He has ordered the Spanish press to remain friendly toward Germany.

Special Items

I. The Naval Representative at the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff communicated on 5 Sep. as follows:

a. The Fuehrer is reserving a directive for the execution of operation "Nordlicht" until after another conference with Field Marshal von Manstein and General von Richthofen.

b. Since the 3rd Mountain Division will be committed for operation "Nordlicht", operation "Lachsfang" is cancelled for the time being. Thus, the date for operation "Nordlicht" now depends on the restoration of the situation at the 16th Army Corps, on the allocation of the necessary forces and ammunition, and on the weather conditions.

The Naval Staff informs Group North accordingly.

II. The causes responsible for discontinuing the offensive are revealed by a report of the High Command, Panzer Army, Africa, dated 3 Sep. The principal reason is that the necessary fuel was not delivered as requested in order to carry out the operation planned in the defined area. Out of the amount of 5,000 tons announced by the Italians on 3 Aug., 2,600 tons had already been sunk by 3 Sep. With the steamers BIANCHI and SPORTIVO scheduled to arrive at Tobruk on 3 Sep., the fuel supply of the Army would be ensured for 3 days after 7 Sep. at the rate of 100 kilometers per vehicle per day. The fuel situation of the Italian forces is still much worse.

Apart from the unsatisfactory fuel situation, the following reasons make it necessary to call off the offensive:

a. The first objective which should have been attained by the morning of 31 Aug. in an area 40 to 50 km east of the starting point was reached only in part in the evening of 31 Aug. on account of delays caused by minefields, the existence of which was not known. Thus the element of surprise, an important prerequisite for the success of the operation was lacking.

b. Grave losses of men and materiel by day and night ever since the beginning of the operation, caused by enemy air raids.

On 3 Sep. the Duce took note of the decision to halt the offensive and informed the Command, Panzer Army that everything possible will continue to be done to rush the transport of supplies, so that the army will be

in a position to repulse a potential enemy offensive and to launch a successful counterattack.

Marshal Cavallero attempted on 4 Sep. to prove to the German General at the Italian Army Headquarters that tactical reasons were primarily responsible for calling off the offensive; and that the supply situation was not so unfavorable at the time the decision was taken, since numerous shiploads of fuel were still en route then, the majority of which were sunk only at a later date.

He also pointed to the endangered shipping situation which demands unequivocally that the Alamein position be held under all circumstances; if the Royal Air Force should advance further westward, transports to Tobruk would become altogether impossible. In order to keep the Panzer Army in combat shape, Malta must be paralyzed more effectively, since we can no longer hope to eliminate the enemy air forces in Egypt in the near future.

The Malta problem is at present so urgent that the Duce has requested Field Marshal Kesselring to come to Rome for a conference about resuming the battle against the island on a larger scale and increasing the air protection of shipping.

For the report of the German Naval Command, Italy see War Diary of 5 Sep. The Naval Staff will comment separately on this problem.

Situation 6 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

According to an intelligence report from Portugal, the U.S. is still trying to have Brazil occupy the Portuguese Atlantic islands. Agents are to make the necessary preparations, beginning with the Cape Verde Islands.

South Atlantic:

A directive to Allied shipping reveals once more that the coal supply is meeting with difficulties; ships are advised to load enough coal in South Africa to last for the entire voyage to the U.S.A., because not more than 300 tons apiece can be allotted to any ship at Trinidad.

Indian Ocean:

An agent reports that the U.S. cruiser JUNEAU, escorting a U.S. convoy, arrived at Colombo and sailed one week later as escort of another convoy for Australia.

It is belatedly revealed by a deciphered radio communication of the Admiralty that the enemy in connection with the capture of the MADRONO is aware that a German auxiliary cruiser is operating in the Indian Ocean. The ship is referred to as auxiliary cruiser "E".

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2. Own Situation:

On 5 Sep. the Japanese Admiralty expressed agreement through the Naval Liaison Officer to the operations plan for a German auxiliary cruiser in the Indian Ocean in accordance with our proposal. Copy of the corresponding note in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

Ship "10" receives information about the sailing order to the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN for the voyage to Japan through the Indian Ocean. See Radiogram 1135.

Ship "28" is advised by the Naval Staff to meet the TANNENFELS after 12 Sep. at a point 4° further south and 7° further east than point "Utrecht" and to take aboard the Japanese plane and half of the available supplies. The other half is earmarked for ship "28". The TANNENFELS is unable to supply fuel. (See Radiogram 2115.)

Instructions for the TANNENFELS for her rendezvous with ship "28" are sent by Radiogram 2206.

Information about the enemy situation by Radiogram 0622.

The German Admiral at Tokyo reports on 5 Sep. a request of the Japanese Navy to check on the advisability of the visit by auxiliary cruiser "10", in view of the very critical fuel situation. For a copy of the telegram, which apart from the above contains what the German Admiral at Tokyo believes to be the real reasons for this rather odd Japanese behavior, see 1/Skl 21936/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

No extraordinary ship movements were observed in the Channel.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The first major case of sabotage is reported to have taken place on 3 Sep. The Diesel generator of the submarine pen at Brest was damaged by an explosion. Two attempts were made to blow up the transformer plants in the shipyard area, but were only partially successful.

Channel Area:

The suspicious sailing vessel damaged off Barfleur on 5 Sep. by gunfire was towed into Cherbourg and turned out to be a French fishing vessel. For the night of 6 Sep. a mine-laying mission of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla and mining operation "Runenschrift" are scheduled.

An enemy long-range battery opened fire on a German convoy at 2135. In turn Army Coastal Battery "702" fired on the enemy batteries. Batteries "Todt" and "Grosser Kurfuerst" fired on Dover.

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6 Sep. 1942

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Little air activity over the German Bight and the Skagerrak. According to photo reconnaissance, the following ships were at Scapa Flow at noon: 2 battleships of the KING GEORGE V class, 1 battleship of the RODNEY or NELSON class, apparently 1 heavy cruiser of the CUMBERLAND class, 3 light cruisers, 1 destroyer escort, 1 destroyer flotilla leader, and 4 destroyers.

Own Situation:

Enemy air raids by small forces were carried out on the steel and nitrogen plant at Ijmuiden and on the Wesermuende area.

Convoy operations according to plan. Mine-sweeping activities curtailed by bad weather.

2. Norway:

On 5 Sep. at 0532 a British plane with Australian crew made a forced landing within range of the Arctic coast after being fired on by the subchaser "1105" at Vardoe. The plane, which will be salvaged, carried valuable secret intelligence material. For this reason the incident will not be published.

Enemy planes attacked subchaser "1103" on 6 Sep. off Vardoe without inflicting any damage.

The tugs SEETEUFEL and TAIFUN returned with their tows to Kristiansand, South due to bad weather, after a vain attempt to leave.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, the following ships were in the inner Reidar Fjord (Iceland) at 1345; 2 aircraft carriers, 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, and 9 destroyers. An additional cruiser was observed arriving. This observation, together with the accumulation of merchant vessels and warships seen on 5 Sep. in the Hval Fjord, lead to the assumption that a convoy will leave soon. The assumption is confirmed by the secret radio instructions salvaged from the British plane which made a forced landing off Vardoe. According to a preliminary report of the 5th Air Force, this plane belongs to squadron 455 which was transferred to the Murmansk area as added protection for the convoys PQ 18 and QP 14.

As further established by the 5th Air Force, the papers found in the salvaged plane contain complete radio communication instructions for PQ 18 and QP 14. They are being interpreted at Kirkenes, and the information will be passed on by telegram.

Own Situation:

The 5th Destroyer Flotilla returned to Kirkenes at 0300 due to the STEINBRINCK'S touching ground; 3 of the destroyers sailed again at 2000 for mining operations "Romanow" and "Zarewitsch".

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The Admiral, Arctic Coast reports to Group North, with copy to the Naval Staff, further information in connection with the loss of the mine-laying vessel ULM. Among other findings it is revealed that the ULM first hoisted the Panamanian flag as ordered, and then when the enemy opened fire, hoisted the German war flag. She then fired a few 10.5 cm rounds in reply. The secret documents were destroyed. It can hardly be expected that there are additional survivors, unless some were taken prisoner by the enemy, which is doubtful. For details see Telegram 1400.

Group North suggests how the report about scuttling the ship should be released; the enemy's unfair treatment of helpless survivors is to be emphasized. (See Telegram 1257.)

The Naval Staff will first examine the legal aspects of this question.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

According to Danish press reports, the Swedish steamer VIROS (190 GRT) sank on 3 Sep. west of Hirtshals after striking a mine. Fishing steamers are reported to have run into a mine field off Hirtshals. It seems that the enemy has extended his mining activities recently to the Skagerrak.

The Finnish steamer BRITANNIC (2,200 GRT) sank in Aalborg Bay due to striking a mine while sailing in a prohibited channel.

Otherwise nothing of importance to report from the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea.

In the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea the minefields "Seeigel 33" and the Onterjaervin cutter float barrage were laid according to plan. Mine-sweeping activities suffered from bad weather.

Transport and convoy operations proceeded uneventfully.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Very lively reconnaissance activity of the 19th Air Group.

A submarine attack was reported 50 miles southwest of Aruba.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "251" of the Norwegian group was assigned an operation zone off the northern tip of Novaya Zemlya; the zone of operations of submarine U "601" ends at 90° E.

In the North Atlantic, task force "Vorwaerts" is ordered to operate against the convoy presumed to be in quadrant AK 93. The "Loss" group is to take up new patrol positions between quadrants AJ 8631 and 9736.

No reports about any achievements were received from the U.S. East Coast.

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Submarine U "164" sank 1 steamer of 2,000 GRT in quadrant EC in the West Indies.

Submarine U "107" of the South Atlantic group reports 4 unescorted steamers on a southerly course off Lisbon; she sank 2 of them, totalling 8,500 GRT, on 3 Sep.

Seven submarines are being combined to form task force "Iltis"; they are to start from positions between quadrants CF 7556 and 8654 on 9 Sep. at 2000 and to proceed southward at the rate of 160 miles a day.

Submarine U "109" sank the steamer TUSCAN STAR (11,449 GRT) in quadrant FF 1149.

The South Atlantic group, including task force "Eisbaer", receives permission to attack as far south as 5° S.

Additional reports in Supplement to Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day reconnaissance and fighter bomber activity against Dover and Aldershot.

During the night of 6 Sep. several localities, among them Sunderland, were raided.

2. Enemy Incursions:

130 out of 180 planes penetrated into western German territory. The attacks concentrated on Duisburg, where damage was fairly heavy. For details see daily situation report.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Our air forces supported the North African Panzer Army.

4. Eastern Front:

The Air Force General Staff reports 57 planes shot down. Reconnaissance was flown over the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report, the battleship RAMILLIES which left Gibraltar on 3 Sep. took aboard 1,000 infantrymen and 60 machine guns. The same number of Canadian and Scotch troops was disembarked there by a transport which arrived during the night of 4 Sep. This was evidently a relief operation.

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An intelligence report from Spain contends that the ships which passed the Strait of Gibraltar during the nights of 30 Aug. and 1 Sep. were probably landing craft, coastal patrol boats, and tugboats, the arrival of which at Gibraltar has allegedly been established. In the evening of 5 Sep. another 20 small vessels reportedly entered Gibraltar under naval flag, among them the corvette K "79", 2 tugs and 12 motor launches.

Nothing to report about the enemy situation in other parts of the Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation:

During the aerial attack on the convoys of the PADENNA and the BIANCHI on 4 Sep., the Italian torpedo boat POLLUCE was also sunk.

As a result of an enemy air raid on Tobruk during the night of 4 Sep. 1 Italian landing barge was disabled.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The following ships have been added to the disturbingly large number of those lost so far:

a. The motor ship MANARA was torpedoed by an enemy plane out of a convoy south of Corfu and was towed to Corfu.

b. The steamer PAOLINA, damaged on 27 Aug. off Cape Bon by striking a mine, has sunk.

The steamer ALBACHIARA, sunk on 5 Sep., carried a cargo of 480 tons of fuel for the 3 branches of the German Armed Forces, and 66 tons of Army materiel.

2 Italian hospital ships left North Africa for Italy on 4 and 5 Sep. with approximately 1,000 German wounded soldiers.

4 mine sweepers sailed from Taranto and Brindisi for North Africa during the night of 5 Sep.

Special Items:

On 30 Aug., the German Naval Command, Italy submitted a summary and analysis of the British convoy operation in the Mediterranean during the period of 10 to 15 Aug. 1942 with 2 maps attached. For photostat, copy no. 8, see 1/Skl 2K995/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

The Naval Staff does not fully share the opinion of the German Naval Command, Italy with regard to the purpose of that operation. The Naval Staff considers it altogether plausible that the supposed operation was planned exclusively to supply Malta. The statements made by the surviving crew members in Tunis would support this assumption, but the German Naval Command, Italy did not take them into account. According to these statements, the convoy consisted of not more than 12 to 14 merchant vessels. This matter has not yet been clarified. The importance of thus supplying Malta by five large vessels has since become only too apparent through the development of the supply situation during the recent weeks and its dire consequences for the operations of the North African Panzer Army.

6 Sep. 1942

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

On 5 Sep. the enemy launched a futile aerial attack on the steamer PROSERPINA at Candia. 1 of the attacking planes was shot down.

Convoy traffic proceeded uneventfully.

Special Item:

The Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea has expressed his view in detail to the Bureau of Naval Administration about the question of reducing the costs for the occupation of Greece. In this connection, Group South reiterates that the major portion of the expenses in Greece charged to the Navy are incurred in the interest of all branches of the Armed Forces. For copy of his telegram see 1/Skl 22030/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance revealed 2 convoys of 3 tankers on a southeasterly course west of Gagry, 1 convoy and a floating dock in tow southwest of Novorossisk, 1 tanker sailing from Tuapse, another tanker off Sukhum, all on a southeasterly course.

Own Situation:

A mission carried out by 4 Italian subchasers on the evening of 5 Sep. in the area of Novorossisk was unsuccessful.

In view of the offensive towards Novorossisk, the 1st PT Boat Flotilla operated close to shore between Tuapse and Sochi, and 4 Italian subchasers between Novorossisk and Cape Idukopas during the night of 6 Sep. No report about any achievements was received thus far.

The harbor of Anapa is protected with 2 captured 4.7cm guns, one 2cm anti-aircraft gun and 8 Rumanian 7.5 cm anti-tank guns. In addition, we captured two 15 cm and two 10.2 cm guns. The mine situation has not yet been clarified.

The supply service between Kerch and Taman has started under escort of the 3rd Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla; also transports to Yeisk have begun.

The suitability of Temryuk as transshipping harbor for the Kuban traffic is under investigation.

As a result of renewed conferences with Army Group A, the maritime and river transport from Rostov and up the Don River has been made a responsibility of the Navy, after all. The Army Engineers Field Waterways Detachment has been subordinated for this purpose to the harbor command of Rostov.

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VIII. Situation East Asia

As related by the German Admiral, Tokyo, the Japanese Naval Staff reports about the situation in the Solomon Islands as follows:

Tulagi and Florida are in American hands. Heavy fighting in progress on Guadalcanal. The strength of the U.S. forces is estimated at 10,000 men and is growing through reserves brought up on destroyers. The Japanese are landing army units; they place particular importance on this action and consider the Solomon Islands the key position for operations against Australia.

IX. Army Situation:

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The port city of Novorossisk was captured at 1830 by German and Rumanian forces. Otherwise the situation on the Caucasian front shows no important changes.

Army Group B:

Some of our formations operating against Stalingrad were reorganized. Enemy attempts to break through the encirclement to the northwest failed. West of Serafimovich the enemy succeeded in crossing the Don River southward and to push in the left wing of the Italian Division.

Central Army Group:

East of Vyazma the enemy attacked from a southerly direction with superior forces and broke into our positions. The penetration was sealed off. Counterattacks are in progress. There was only little fighting at the Rzhev sector.

Northern Army Group:

All enemy attacks undertaken at various sectors of this group were repulsed.

2. Finnish Front:

Scouting activity and gun fire on both sides.

3. North Africa:

Normal reconnaissance and artillery activity on 5 and 6 Sep. Less enemy air activity. Between 30 Aug. and 5 Sep. we destroyed or captured a total of 124 enemy tanks and armored cars; we destroyed about 100 motor vehicles, 10 guns, and 22 anti-tank guns, and took 400 prisoners.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

In its first number after reappearing, the Daily Worker demands the immediate opening of a second front, closer collaboration with the U.S.A., greater assistance to the Red Army, and the resumption of negotiations with India regarding the creation of a national government.

Spain:

According to press reports a Spanish-Argentinian trade agreement was signed on 5 Sep. It was agreed that Argentina will deliver 1 million tons of wheat and 3,500 tons of tobacco which will be paid by Spain with the construction of 2 new 9,000 GRT merchant vessels and 1 CERVANTES type destroyer. Spain also undertakes to deliver 30,000 tons of steel.

Argentina:

The deliberations of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies concerning the break of relations with the Axis Powers continue. The Government is trying to prevent a final report.

Chile:

A secret Senate vote referring to the question of breaking diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers is slated for 9 Sep. It may bring an anti-German majority.

Japan:

The press emphasizes strongly that there will be no change in the relations with Russia in the near future.

Hungary:

Rumors of an alleged change of the Vienna decision are officially denied.

Special Items:

I. In a discussion between the Chief of Staff of the Naval Staff and Admiral Nomura, the basic problems of German and Japanese strategy were clearly outlined.

For a transcript of the conversation see 1/Skl Ib 1768/42 Gkdos. Chefs in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

II. In connection with the transfer home of the cruiser SCHEER, Group North reported its plan to provide 4 torpedo boats as escort, namely the T "9" and T "12", which are at this moment in Trondheim engaged in open water torpedo firing, and the T "15" and T "17" which are at the disposal of the torpedo school for submarine and torpedo training.

The Naval Staff informed Group North, with copy to the Fleet and the Commander, Destroyers, that further delays and reduction of submarine and torpedo training cannot be tolerated. The torpedo boats T "15" and

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T "17" can therefore be released for the intended purpose only if the operation occurs between training periods and the ships are not in need of overhaul at that time.

III. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines utilizes the discussion about developing an anti-destroyer missile to state his fundamental views on cooperation of naval ordnance with the Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

The Submarine Division of the Naval Staff will attend to the matter. For copy no. 4 see 1/Skl 1743/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

IV. A review of the dock facilities for large warships in the U.S. and U.S. overseas possessions is contained in report no. 41/42 of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Navies Branch.

For a press report about the expansion of the U.S. cruiser fleet see appendix to report no. 209 of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Press Branch.

The Chief, Naval Staff is on an inspection tour in the Crimea and will return on 10 Sep.

Situation 7 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

The German Armistice Commission, France submits the evaluation of French reconnaissance on the West African coast during the first half of 1942, as received from the French in the course of the regular exchange of information:

a. Freetown is the main control and assembly port (le grand regulateur) for convoys sailing from the British Isles to India via the Cape. On the average 30 to 40 merchant vessels are in the harbors; the number increases to over 100 when several convoys are in port at the same time.

b. Convoys from the British Isles to the Cape apparently run between 19° and 23° W on a southerly course and pass on either side of the Cape Verde Islands. The ships head for Freetown at a great distance from the French West African coast.

c. Convoy escorts:

(1) For fast convoys and troop transports: 1 slow battleship or aircraft carrier or 2 large cruisers, in each case supported by 5 to 6 destroyers or corvettes.

(2) For slow convoys consisting of freighters: As a rule, 1 cruiser with several destroyers or corvettes, sometimes destroyers or corvettes alone.

(3) For convoys formed at Freetown from single ships: several corvettes.

d. Tankers arrive and depart singly. They most likely come from either Curacao or Trinidad.

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(e) Convoys remain at Freetown from 4 to 8 days to replenish supplies of water, food, and fuel.

2. Own Situation:

At 2038 the following short signal was received from ship "10":

"Owing to present poor prospects in present zone of operations request dismissal to Japan as soon as possible."

Receipt is confirmed by the Naval Staff with Radiogram 2154.

Ship "28" is instructed to leave the Japanese plane on board the TANNENFELS to be picked up by ship "23", if it is smaller and lighter than an Arado plane, because ship "23" is having difficulties with the Arado on account of its weight and size. Ship "23" is likewise informed. At the moment, 4 reserve Arado planes are on 3 different vessels, all ready for sailing. (See Radiogram 2312.) Both ships are directed with Radiogram 0523 to remove the rubber gasket of the pistol connection of the torpedo warheads, in order to fasten the pistol more securely.

The German Admiral, Tokyo reports that no answer has yet been received from the Japanese Admiral Staff to the inquiry about the operation of a German auxiliary cruiser in the South Pacific, in spite of repeated reminders. The interpreter hinted that the Japanese do not desire German ships to penetrate into Japan's real zone of operations. The German Admiral proposes that this question be resumed when ship "10" is in Yokohama.

Information about the enemy situation is sent by Radiogram 1554.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the report of Group West, no clues as to potential landing operations can be deduced from the enemy's mining activities during August.

Air reconnaissance observed mine-sweeping operations between Dungeness and Dover and also off Hastings.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The WESERLAND is scheduled to depart on 8 Sep.

Channel Coast:

Due to weather conditions, the mine-laying mission of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla schduled for the night of 6 Sep. was cancelled. During the same night mine-laying operation "Runenschrift" was carried out according to plan. Operation "Ranke" is planned for the night of 7 Sep. In addition, mine-laying operations by 6 boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla off the southern coast and torpedo operations by 14 boats

of the 2nd, 4th, and 6th PT Boat Flotillas off the southeastern coast are planned for the night of 7 Sep.

The Armed Forces High Command reports by telephone that the Fuehrer agrees to remanning the raided Casquets station, if certain conditions are observed.

The Fuehrer requests an immediate thorough investigation and report about the following:

a. Which local commander was responsible for the defense.

b. Whether any of the responsible authorities can be assumed to be guilty.

c. What orders had been issued to the garrison of the base.

d. What defense facilities are available (details and photos to be submitted).

The Fuehrer orders that anyone responsible for faulty defenses should be called to account.

A corresponding directive is issued to Group West and the Admiral, French Coast, with copy to the Naval Representative at the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff; it orders Group West to clarify the matter of responsibility and to answer the different questions for which the Admiral, French Coast will furnish the required data immediately. The report is to be transmitted to the Naval Staff by courier.

According to an additional report of the Armed Forces High Command, the Fuehrer asked for further information about the following points:

a. Was the Naval Shore Commander, Normandy aware of the order that small advanced bases must be adequately protected against surprise attacks in proportion to the danger to which they are exposed?

b. Were all precautions taken in this particular case? If so, what were they?

c. How was it possible that the base was raided nevertheless?

d. Was the divisional commander responsible for the defense sector of the Naval Shore Commander, Normandy informed of the fact that the island was garrisoned?

These questions are also transmitted to Group West and the Admiral, French Coast for answering.

It seems that the Armed Forces High Command is under a wrong impression about the importance of that small advanced post.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

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Own Situation:

Enemy air reconnaissance ranged over the entire German Bight during the night of 6 Sep. 4 bombs were dropped on Emden.

5 enemy courier planes crossed the Skagerrak from Sweden to England. Strong enemy air forces flew across the area of the Admiral, Netherlands. Aerial mines are suspected in quadrants AN 9596 and AN 9593. 4 ground mines were swept in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North.

Around noon, 15 U.S. Boeing type bombers and several Spitfires raided Rotterdam, dropping 10 bombs. The shipyard escaped damage.

It is belatedly reported with reference to the raid on 6 Sep. upon the blast furnaces at Ijmuiden that a half month's production of steel will be lost due to the destruction of 2 Siemens-Martin furnaces.

2. Norway:

A Russian battery of the Rybachi Peninsula fired unsuccessfully on a cutter and a Finnish passenger vessel entering Petsamo. On 6 Sep. a submarine chaser group off Vardoe was attacked by 2 enemy planes with resulting slight damages and losses of personnel. Another air attack off the Sylte Fjord on a westbound convoy was unsuccessful.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway requests the permission to lay an additional mine field in the Kalangen Fjord, because the Norwegian inertia contact mines laid in January 1942 seem to be no longer active, according to observations. (See Telegram 1930.)

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to a decoded radio message, the 95th Naval Air Force Regiment received the following instructions from the Chief of Naval Air Forces, Russian Arctic Fleet:

For the protection of convoys PQ 18 and QP 14, I herewith order:

The operation for the protection of convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 is to be divided into 5 stages corresponding to their routes.

1st stage: Voyage of convoy PQ 18 from Iceland to 10° (probably E) from 10 to 12 Sep. 1942.

2nd stage: Voyage of PQ 18 from 10° to 25° E. Departure of convoy QP 14 from (Polyarnoye ?). Approximate duration from 10 to 12 Sep. 1942.

3rd stage: Voyage of PQ 18 between 25° and 41° E, of QP 14 after reaching point 146 and unknown point 361. Approximate duration from 12 to 14 Sep. 1942.

4th stage: Voyage of PQ 18 and QP 14 off Novaya Zemlya. Approximate duration from 14 to 16 Sep. 1942.

5th stage: Voyage of PQ 18 from unknown point 146 to unknown point 148, of QP 14 from Novaya Zemlya in the direction of Iceland. Approximate duration from 16 to 20 Sep.

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According to another decoded radio directive of 2038, air force units are being transferred to the air force station at Ponoi on the east coast of the Kola Peninsula and placed under the operational command of the 95th Air Force Regiment. The command of the latter was to transfer on 7 Sep. from the Vayenga air force station with the forces assigned to him and be ready to operate from Ponoi.

Around midnight the 9th Air Force Regiment received the following operations order dated 5 Sep. from the staff of the naval air forces of the Arctic Fleet:

a. The TIRPITZ and the SCHEER are at unidentified locations in quadrants 835 and 873; the HIPPER is in quadrant 349 and (presumably German destroyers) are in 374. Their bases are at 637 in western Norway; they cruise periodically in 145, thus threatening Allied convoys.

b. Naval air forces of the Arctic Fleet with other assigned air units, including the air forces of the 14th Army and the 122nd and 104th Air Divisions will protect the voyage of convoys PQ 18 and QP 14, both of them simultaneously while PQ 18 is proceeding from Novaya Zemlya to 389.

Air reconnaissance located the following ships in the Seydis Fjord at 1020: Aircraft carrier ARGUS, 1 light DIDO class cruiser, 2 cruisers, apparently U.S. SOMERS class, 2 destroyers of the V and W classes, 1 KJ class destroyer, 6 additional destroyers, 1 tanker, 1 steamer.

Own Situation:

On the basis of information found in the enemy plane after its forced landing on 6 Sep., Group North intends to have the HIPPER and the KOELN and 5 destroyers stand by for an operation against convoy QP 14 from the Alta Fjord; from what has been learned so far, QP 14 will sail approximately 2 days later than PQ 18. The planned mining operations in the Pechora Sea are postponed for the time being. The Commanding Admiral, Group North inquired from the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff by telephone whether he may count on receiving permission to use the TIRPITZ for the same operation as the HIPPER and KOELN. The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff replied in the negative. The HIPPER and KOELN can be committed only outside the range of the probable escort forces of PQ 18. In this case the TIRPITZ is not needed. Should it seem necessary to commit the TIRPITZ, however, in case it appears that strong escort forces will be encountered, we must reconsider the entire question of committing our naval forces against PQ 18 as against previous convoys.

The Naval Staff informs the Naval Representative at the Armed Forces High Command, the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters, and the Naval Representative at the Air Force Operations Staff about the plans of Group North.

Due to the altered enemy situation, the Admiral, Arctic Ocean has made it the main task of the submarines to intercept the convoys. The mine operations "Romanow" and "Zarewitsch" are to be carried out according to plan by 3 destroyers of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla.

Group North ordered the Admiral, Arctic Ocean to postpone execution of operation "Doppelschlag" until it is clear when convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 will depart; to hold the available submarines in readiness to operate against the convoys, cancelling any mining missions previously planned; and finally, to dispatch the HIPPER and the KOELN under escort of 4 destroyers against convoy QP 14. The Admiral, Arctic Ocean has

operational command, the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers tactical command. For this purpose, the task force will transfer to Alta Fjord; the TIRPITZ and 1 or 2 destroyers will be held in reserve in the Bogen Bay. The SCHEER is to be transferred soon as far as Trondheim.

The Commanding Admiral, Cruisers had hoisted his flag on the TIRPITZ as ordered, even before this directive became effective.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Nothing to report from the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea.

Concerning the reinforcement of Denmark's coastal defenses, the Naval Staff reports to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff that a wrong impression was given, since additional coastal batteries cannot at this time be made available. The Naval Shore Commander, Denmark has made a request to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Denmark pertaining to the construction of hedgehog defenses at the bases of Frederikshavn and Skagen against attacks from land. (See War Diary of 27 Aug.)

In the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea minefield "Nashorn 13" was laid according to plan. Mine-sweeping operations were curtailed in part by bad weather.

Special Item:

Due to erroneous information about the number of German torpedo mines type B used in the minefield off Windau, the Commander, Mine Sweepers, North had reported this barrage removed following the sweeping of 12 mines, although 24 mines had actually been laid. Consequently 5 vessels ran into the minefield. The Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea reported on 3 Jul. in reply to an inquiry of the Naval Staff that the wrong figure had been given to the Commander, Mine Sweepers, North Sea by the task force commander at that time. The Naval Staff requests Group North for its comment, in order to be able to submit the matter to the Commander in Chief, Navy for a decision regarding further action. For copy see 1/Skl I E 21704/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

V. Merchant Shipping

Short report no. 29/42 of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch contains information about ore shipments from Lulea, about the markings of the Spanish ships chartered by Switzerland, about the ships lying in the harbor of Gibraltar and the harbor traffic of Gibraltar during the latter half of August, and about the British emergency measures for the relief of congestion at South African ports.

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VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance over the southern rendezvous area was lively. 3 messages about the sighting of submarines and one report about an attack on a submarine were intercepted.

From the American coast one report of a submarine attack in the St. Lawrence River and one about sighting a submarine in the Gulf of St. Lawrence were intercepted. A special radio message warned of mines in an area off Cape Hatteras. A message about sighting a submarine off the Brazilian coast south of Bahia does not refer to German submarines.

2. Own Situation:

The non-attack order on route "Anton" for the area north of 20° N was reinstated as of 8 Sep. at 0000, in view of the resumption of blockade running operations.

4 new submarines, newly arrived from home in the Atlantic, are ordered to approach quadrant AJ 83 via AK 65.

A remarkable success was achieved in the St. Lawrence River by submarine U "165". She observed 2 hits each on 3 steamers of a convoy; the steamers may be considered sunk. In the Gulf of St. Lawrence, submarine U "517" torpedoed 3 steamers; according to radio intercept service they were probably sunk, too.

The submarines of the South Atlantic group located a convoy on a northerly course in quadrant CF 6192. During a daylight attack on a cruiser escorting this convoy, submarine U "333" was forced to submerge and assumes the cruiser to be a decoy working with a subchaser group.

The position of "Kirschbluete" at 0200 was 0°, 20° W.

The Second Admiral, Submarines belatedly reports the sinking on 2 Sep. of submarine U "222"; this took place in the course of maneuvers of the 27th Submarine Flotilla and followed a collision with submarine U "626". Only the captain, 1 ordnance officer and one petty officer were rescued.

Additional news in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Throughout the day nothing of importance happened. During the night of 7 Sep. Bedford was raided; alternate targets were Great Yarmouth, Cambridge and Ipswich.

2. Enemy Incursions:

5 of the 88 enemy incursions reported during the night of 7 Sep. penetrated into German territory. For details see Situation, North Sea.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Support of the operations of the Panzer Army.

4. Eastern Front:

In 1,600 sorties at the various army fronts 87 enemy planes were shot down by fighter planes, 24 by anti-aircraft artillery; we lost 3 planes. Reconnaissance activity over the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and the Arctic Ocean.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to a report from the Naval Attache at Rome originating in diplomatic circles there, information has leaked out from the British Admiralty that a convoy is being assembled to supply Malta with fuel; the British are determined to bring the convoy through regardless of the price.

Nothing new was learned about the enemy situation in the entire Mediterranean area.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

2 Italian PT boats were in waiting position off Cape Bon in the evening.

2 German PT boats are under way from Suda to Navarino, a third one from Augusta to Naples.

At 2030 the Italian shore between Cape dell'Armi and Cape Spartivento was under gunfire from enemy submarines; no major damage was reported.

The German Naval Command, Italy transmits an account of German successes and losses in the period of 30 Aug. to 5 Sep. and information about the numerical strength of the units of the Panzer Army, Africa as of 5 Sep.; this was contained in the daily situation report of the Panzer Army, Africa of 6 Sep. (See Telegram 1950.)

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The convoy consisting of the motor ships RAVELLO, MANARA, SESTRIERE, and ANKARA was attacked by 15 enemy planes on the afternoon of 6 Sep. en route from Benghazi. The MANARA was hit by a torpedo and had to be beached on the coast of Corfu.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports that the floating dock sighted on

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6 Sep. passed southeast of Tuapse in the forenoon. 10 PT boats, 5 patrol vessels, 1 small steamer and about 50 small vessels were observed at Gelendzhik.

According to radio monitoring, the cruiser KRASNY KRIM and the flotilla leader KHARKOV were off the central and southern parts of the east coast, 1 destroyer and an unidentified ship were west of Tuapse in the forenoon, and 2 submarines were in an unidentified position at sea.

Own Situation:

During the night of 5 Sep. Italian subchasers torpedoed a steamer lying 10 miles southwest of Anapa. It is possible that this is the damaged grounded steamer already reported by the Air Force.

Mine-searching and sweeping operations proceeded according to plan. In the harbor of Mariupol one mine was swept by a mine-sweeping plane.

2 Rumanian destroyers escorted the tankers ALBARO and CELENO. Transport and convoy service on schedule.

A large portion of the town of Anapa has been destroyed by bombs and has been evacuated almost completely. A damaged stone pier and a 20 ton crane can be repaired.

IX. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The ferrying of the 3rd Rumanian Mountain Division to the Taman Peninsula is progressing according to plan. German forces are mopping up town and outskirts of Novorossisk. The situation at the remaining sectors of this Army Group is unchanged; enemy attacks continued and failed completely.

Army Group B:

Enemy sorties from Stalingrad were halted. The northern front of the XIV Panzer Corps north of Stalingrad was attacked by weak enemy forces. Except for 2 local enemy thrusts, no important actions.

Central Army Group:

South of Sukhinichi, the enemy followed cautiously our forces withdrawn to new lines of defense. The penetration east of Vyazma was cleaned up. In the area north of Rzhev a temporary enemy penetration was repulsed. An enemy thrust on the western front north of Byeloi was unsuccessful.

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Northern Army Group:

West of Kholm successful fighting against partisans behind our lines. South of Lake Ladoga fresh German troops gained considerable ground at the point of penetration.

2. Finnish Front:

Enemy reconnaissance activity is increasing.

3. North Africa:

Our forces have gone over to the defense, making use of extensive British mine fields. Weak enemy thrusts in the southern sector were repulsed. Normal gunfire at the northern sector.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

The Government protested to the U.S.A. against the bombardment of French towns by American aircraft.

Portugal:

The dismissal of Suner is hailed particularly in Portugal, where he was considered as an advocate of a single Iberian state, whereas Jordana is held friendly to Portugal. However, Lisbon circles are far from believing that the reorganization of the Spanish Government is a step toward the stabilization of the domestic situation.

U.S.A.:

On 7 Sep. Roosevelt delivered a sensational message to Congress and asked for a vote on 1 Oct. on a bill empowering the President to take all necessary steps in order to prevent an inflation. Should Congress refuse its consent, the President himself would assume the sole responsibility for his actions. For details see Political Review No. 210, paragraph 5.

The President also discussed this problem in a fire-side chat and on this occasion reviewed the war situation. He declared that the Allies must concentrate their forces on 4 principal theaters of war: Russia, the Middle East, the Pacific, and the front in western Europe, which will definitely have to be established in order to defeat Germany. About a dozen different locations are suitable for an invasion and a successful offensive. All preparations required for such an operation have been made in the U.S.A. as well as in Great Britain.

Another bill sent to Congress reduces the draft age from 20 to 18 years.

Special Items

I. In connection with the interrupted offensive in Egypt, the Deputy Admiral, Naval Command, Italy submits the following analysis:

1. In the Naval Command's opinion there can be no doubt that in the last analysis the North African offensive could not be continued because of inadequate supply shipments. Thus, unfortunately, the fears of this command were realized.

2. All our efforts in the past to increase supplies to any extent failed, and if we use the same methods we cannot expect to achieve results in the future either. Now that the offensive has been halted, it depends on a solution of the supply problem whether the Panzer Army will be in a position even to hold its own in the face of an enemy whose strength is constantly increasing.

3. Therefore the problem of supplies absolutely must be solved. The first prerequisite for achieving this is to preserve the available tonnage; this requires that:

a. The losses due to enemy action must be reduced to a tolerable level.

b. The unavoidable losses must be replaced.

4. It is my opinion with regard to point 3 a. that we cannot expect to make headway by continuing as in the past to counter enemy operations with defensive measures. Even if we can strengthen our submarine defenses, we are not equipped at present to deal with the highly superior skill of the R.A.F. in night operations at sea. This situation has reached proportions which must inevitably lead to disaster unless it can be checked. Today more than ever I can see only one possibility, namely by going over to the offensive: The R.A.F. in the Central Mediterranean, and that means Malta, must be eliminated. At this point we must make a new start immediately.

The only suggestion the Naval Command, Italy can advance with regard to point 3b is that an attempt be made to acquire either neutral or French tonnage in spite of all difficulties. The reduction of tonnage at our disposal has become a threat which requires that no stone be left unturned.

The Naval Staff submits this comment to the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters, to the Naval Representative at the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff, and to the Naval Liaison Officers at the Army High Command and the Air Force Operations Staff for their information, with the following remark:

Prospects of reinforcing our submarine defenses effectively are not very bright. There are chances for doing something about 3b, following the successful conclusion of the negotiations between Kauffmann and Laval. Otherwise the Naval Staff agrees with the analysis of the German Naval Command, Italy, insofar as the incomplete information received to date permits.

For exchange of telegrams see 1/Skl 1742/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

A detailed analysis of the North African situation by the Naval Staff is contained in Telegram 1/Skl Ib (plan) 1775/42 Gkdos. Chefs. of 8 Sep. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

The analysis ends with the following demand:

In order to safeguard our position in the Mediterranean, to protect Italy, to prevent a planned British offensive, to frustrate the enemy's plans for a defensive front, and to create the prerequisites for a direct connection between Germany and Japan, the Naval Staff believes that the following requirements must be met:

1. North Africa must be held, if at all possible, from the Alamein position.

2. Our air forces must be greatly reinforced.

3. Malta must be seized.

4. The plan of an offensive against Suez at a later date must be adhered to.

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Until further notice this viewpoint is not to be passed on.

II. As anticipated by the German Admiral at Tokyo, the Japanese Navy, after inspecting the DOGGERBANK, requested 3 each of the G7a and G7e type torpedoes, and TMB and TMC type mines, as well as instructions in their use by the DOGGERBANK'S crew.

This matter is being examined.

III. As on similar occasions in the past, the account about the laying of the Cape Bon minefield (see War Diary of 27 Aug.) given by Admiral Riccardi to the German Naval Attache at Rome is termed incorrect by the Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy.

After the German Naval Command had protested on 18 Jul. 1942 against laying mines without timing devices and for no urgent operational reason, the Italians cancelled the operation which had been scheduled for the evening of 18 Jul. Subsequently the Italian Naval High Command, accepting the German viewpoint, planned a minefield with timing devices set for 48 hours, which was to be laid if there was acute danger of enemy forces breaking through the Strait of Sicily. This fact was known and both sides had agreed on this step. When the British convoy in the western Mediterranean got under way, this barrage was laid according to plan timed for 72 hours. No German authority interfered with this step in any way; on the contrary, when the British convoy approached, a confirmation was demanded that the measure agreed upon had actually been executed. As far as could be ascertained on our part, the Italians themselves have no reliable data to support Admiral Riccardi's claim that 3 steamers of the convoy ran into the newly established minefield.

The Naval Staff sends the following remark to the Naval Attache at Rome, with copy to the German Naval Command, Italy:

1. Admiral Riccardi's account that the laying of the minefield in French territorial waters was to be cancelled at the request of the Commander in Chief, Navy shortly prior to the beginning of the British convoy operation, is incorrect.

2. On the contrary, the Naval Staff had consented on 11 Aug. 1942 to the Italian plan suggesting that timing devices be adjusted for 72 hours instead of 48 hours.

3. The Naval Staff had suggested the preparation and the laying of such a minefield in the event that the enemy's intention was recognized to break through the Strait of Sicily with considerable forces, an operation which, if successful, could upset the strategic situation in the Mediterranean. When Italian authorities wanted to lay the minefield around the middle of July for reasons not considered sufficient by the Naval Staff, the latter opposed such action at that time.

4. You are requested to look up the details of this matter at the German Naval Command, Italy, which receives a copy of the above.

IV. The Fleet Command reports: The Commander in Chief, Air Force feels unable to assign operational forces to the training units for participation in the Navy's maneuvers scheduled for the period of 1 Oct. to 3 Oct. 1942. Due to the situation at the front, operational units cannot be spared. The training units themselves do not have sufficient fuel at this moment to fulfill their own duties. The Commander in Chief, Air Force will take up the matter again later.

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The Fleet requests the Naval Staff to approach the Commander in Chief, Air Force once more and to see that at least a small fleet force as well as the training units of the Air Force can take part in the maneuvers. The 5th Air Force also places great value on the planned maneuvers and proposes that the planes which are now being reequipped at the Rechling testing station be used for this purpose. (See Telegram 1300.)

The Naval Staff Operations Division will try to arrange this.

Situation 8 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

The U.S. Navy uses groups composed of ships of different size and type instead of groups of uniform type. These groups are named "task forces" and consist of "task groups" subdivided into "task units".

In the South Pacific Task Force "23" and Task Group "1" with Task Unit "16", also the Task Groups "4", "6", and "9" have been observed so far. They are operating in the Recife-Freetown-Capetown-Montevideo area, Recife being their main base. One of their principal tasks is the protection of AS convoys part of which proceed to the Middle East. The task force consists presumably of the following ships: OMAHA, CINCINNATI, MILWAUKEE, MEMPHIS, SOMERS, JOUETT, DAVIS, WINSLOW, BALCH, MOFFETT, SAMPSON, GREENE.

So far, only a few have been observed in the Pacific.

Those stationed in India and Australia are known to be Task Forces "41" and "42", the latter forming the escort of a GP convoy, and "44" which is engaged in escort duty for PG, CO, and ZK convoys. Among others, the 4th Destroyer Squadron and the 7th and 9th Destroyer Division are components of these task forces.

Neutrals:

As reported by the Argentine Foreign Ministry,23 officers and 107 petty officers and men have escaped from the total of 1,044 interned crew members of the GRAF SPEE.

2. Own Situation:

Etappe Tokyo relays objections by the captain of the REGENSBURG against the sailing instructions from point "Rose" to point "Registerbehoerde", based on his observations on the outbound voyage that enemy shipping is concentrated in the area between 23° and 25° S, 90° and 75° E. He suggests that the REGENSBURG proceed from the Sunda Strait via point "Rose" to 32° S 96° E and then head straight for point "Revierfahrt". (See Telegram 1954.)

The Naval Attache at Tokyo is informed by Telegram 2350 that the Japanese Naval High Command's permission for ship "10" to attack enemy shipping while proceeding to the Sunda Strait arrived through

the Japanese Naval Attache at Berlin simultaneously with the communication of the Naval Attache, Tokyo to that effect. Ship "10" will reach the position 13° S, 105° E on 20 Sep. and will proceed from there to the Sunda Strait. This point was chosen by the Japanese Naval High Command.

With regard to the fuel supply of ship "10" while in Japan, the Naval Attache at Tokyo was informed by the Operations Division, Naval Staff by way of the Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Intelligence Division Section IV that the ship will need only 6,000 tons of gas oil, since she can probably use 3,000 tons of any commercial grade Diesel oil. The Etappe is to be advised to place approximately 200 tons of this fuel at the disposal of the captain for trials immediately upon arrival of ship "10". (See Letter 1808.)

Instructions regarding permission to attack enemy shipping on the voyage to Japan, effective immediately, and order to be at 13° S 105° E on 20 Sep. are transmitted to ship "10" by Radiogram 1156.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance revealed 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 1 patrol vessel off Start Point at 1930; at 2300 a convoy was observed east of the Isle of Wight. Radio monitoring located about 20 different ships at sea in the Devonport area, including mine sweepers, subchasers, motor gunboats and the PRINCE ALBERT; also the LOCUST which took part in the Dieppe raid.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Blockade runner WESERLAND sailed on schedule. The weather forecast for 9 Sep. predicts a visibility of 10 miles for the waters between Santander and Cape Ortegal and intermittent fog close to the shore.

The UCKERMARK and SPICHERN are scheduled to sail in the evening of 9 Sep.

Channel Coast:

Steamer SOLGLIMT, proceeding in convoy, was engaged at 0325 off Cherbourg by 2 British motor gunboats which were driven off by escorting mine sweepers. There were 2 dead, including the fleet surgeon, 5 severely and 7 slightly wounded on mine sweeper M "10", caused by 2 cm shell hits from the SOLGLIMT. At 0347 the convoy was attacked off Etaples by enemy motor gunboats which had been lying in wait. They succeeded in dodging 6 torpedoes. Although the action lasted more than an hour, our ships suffered no serious damage or losses.

During the night of 7 Sep. mine-laying operation "Ranke" and the mining mission of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla in quadrants BF 2384 and 2387 were carried out according to plan. For short report of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla see Telegram 1035.

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Torpedo operations of the 2nd, 4th, and 6th PT Boat Flotillas against enemy convoys achieved no results. Upon returning to base these flotillas had a brush with enemy forces. For short reports of the flotillas see Telegrams 1145 and 1705.

Special Item:

A British periodical published a picture of a German PT boat flying the British war flag in the British service. In the opinion of the Commander, PT Boats, not a single German PT boat is in enemy possession. The picture may concern S "111" which was briefly towed by British motor gunboats on 15 Mar. 1942. For the comment of the Commander, PT Boats see 1/Skl 22173/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Enemy air activity north of the West Frisian Islands during the night of 7 Sep. Low-flying planes reached Heligoland and Norderney. Mine-laying off the Ems River mouth is suspected. 1 plane was shot down off Terschelling. It is belatedly reported that 1 British aerial mine was swept on 7 Sep.

The Swedish steamer TYNNINGOE, proceeding in convoy 339 sank after striking a mine in quadrant AN 8331. Convoy 1902 was unsuccessfully bombed in quadrant AN 8239. The SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN is transferring from Wilhelmshaven to Cuxhaven. Otherwise nothing to report.

The Commander in Chief, Air Force requested the Naval Staff to give orders that the Air Force, Group Command Central Area be informed about convoys including Swedish ships in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North because Swedish shipping circles have again complained of lacking fighter protection.

2. Norway:

A fjord boat leaving Petsamo was unsuccessfully fired on by a Russian battery on Rybachi Peninsula on 6 Sep. Enemy planes raided Havningsberg on 6 and 7 Sep. A harbor patrol boat collided with a mine sweeper off Haugesund and sank. Transports and convoy service according to plan.

Group North maintains its opposition to an EMF barrage in Vest Fjord as suggested by the Commanding Admiral, Norway (see War Diary of 4 Sep.) and requests consideration whether a minefield against surface forces should not be laid in the closed area of Vardoe. (See Telegram 1323.)

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3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to a decoded radio message of 0639 an office of the Arctic fleet now located in the vicinity of Pechora harbor, probably at Naryan Mar, is to be transferred to Belushya Bay (Novaya Zemlya) on 10 Sep.

Air reconnaissance revealed the presence of 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 5 or 6 large steamers, 1 tanker, and 10 small merchant ships or patrol vessels at Hval Fjord at 1620. The roadstead of Reykjavik was empty.

At 2015 a convoy of 12, probably even more, steamers escorted by 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers, sailing on a 10° course, was sighted in quadrant AE 1480 (Denmark Strait). At 1830 1 heavy cruiser and 2 destroyers on a northerly course were observed in quadrant AE 28 and at 2015 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers escorting 12 steamers in quadrant AE 1479.

The latter cannot be identical with the steamers reported in Hval Fjord at 1620. (Distance about 220 miles.)

Re-examination of a reconnaissance photo revealed that the aircraft carrier seen in Seydis Fjord and identified on 7 Sep. as the ARGUS is actually an airplane tender similar to the LANGLEY (a converted steamer).

According to photo reconnaissance of 6 Sep., approximately 20 ships were at Iokanga, 6 of them steamers of 3,000 GRT each. Visual reconnaissance on 8 Sep. showed 3 steamers of that size. 3 steamers of 3,000 GRT on an easterly course under escort of 2 destroyers and 1 patrol vessel were observed between Kanin Nos and Kolguyev in the afternoon of 7 Sep. Today at noon 4 steamers of 3,000 to 4,000 GRT each were in Kola Bay.

Own Situation:

The Naval Staff informed the Naval Representative of the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters, and the Naval Representative on the Air Force Operations Staff about the probable sailing dates and daily runs of convoys PQ 18 and QP 14, as learned from decoded radio communications of 7 Sep.

Considering the TIRPITZ'S state of combat readiness, the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers proposes to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, with copy to Group North and the Naval Staff, to let this battleship as well as the SCHEER take part in the attack on the QP convoy, which would assure us of a maximum of striking power. In this case the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers would direct the action from aboard the TIRPITZ. The proposal is supported by the Fleet.

Group North points out that this proposal should have been made through the proper channels and should have been submitted to the Group, via the Admiral, Arctic Ocean.

Group North assumes that convoy PQ 18 will be south of Jan Mayen on 10 Sep. at approximately 10° W, not 10° E, and will proceed to Novaya Zemlya by daily runs of 200 miles along latitude 76°, a little to the south of Spitsbergen; thence along the island's west coast via Kanin Nos to Archangel. It will reach Novaya Zemlya probably between 10 and 16 Sep. According to this, the convoy must have sailed from Reykjavik on 7

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Sep. and must be in Denmark Strait on 8 Sep.

It is anticipated that convoy QP 14 will sail from Kanin Nos on 12 or 13 Sep. and thus meet convoy PQ 18 off Novaya Zemlya on 15 or 16 Sep. It should be off Spitsbergen by 18 or 19 Sep. If this assumption is correct, the forces escorting convoy PQ 18 will return westward with convoy QP 14 and the heavy covering force will remain in its waiting position west of the line Bear Island-Spitsbergen until convoy QP 14 has passed.

Group North reasons that these circumstances will make it very difficult for surface forces to close in on either of the convoys; it could, however, be accomplished if the attack on QP 14 were made over the shortest possible approach from the North Cape area during the night. The attack would then take place approximately somewhat to the east of the Bear Island-Spitsbergen line. In the Group's opinion attacks by submarines and the Air Force have the best prospects of success.

The Group contemplates the following measures:

a. A surface attack on convoy QP 14 will be attempted by the SCHEER, HIPPER, KOELN, and 5 destroyers. Their transfer to Alta Fjord under the tactical command of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers will be timed so that the operation can start from there any time after the evening of 11 Sep. The over-all command of the operations against both convoys will be in the hands of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean. The ships will leave Alta Fjord when Group North issues the code word "Meisenbalz".

b. Repairs on the TIRPITZ are to be so arranged that she will be ready for 27 knots on 12 hour notice. After completion of repairs (expected on 14 Sep.), and after the start of "Meisenbalz" she will be on 3 hour readiness.

c. In view of the restrictions imposed, it appears unlikely that a situation will arise which will call for the commitment of the TIRPITZ. However, if this necessity arises, she will be escorted by a destroyer and the torpedo boats T "9" and "12".

The 5th Air Force is requested to take over the following tasks, besides its normal reconnaissance activity:

a. To reinforce the fighter defense of Alta Fjord following the arrival of the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers.

b. During operation "Meisenbalz" reconnaissance missions are to be flown as directed by the Admiral, Arctic Ocean.

c. To advise the bomber squadrons that it is particularly important and necessary for the success of the attack of our forces that the enemy escort forces be put out of commission.

The Naval Staff has this to say about the above directives:

(1) Since the waters between 30° and 60° E are free of ice far to the north, it is not unlikely that the heavy covering force will proceed eastward beyond the Bear Island-Spitsbergen line in view of its operational range.

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(2) It can be assumed that the escort of both convoys will be at a minimum between Novaya Zemlya and the coast of Kola Peninsula. In this section the naval escort will be replaced by air protection and nothing definite is known about the latter's strength. Along the remaining route the escorting forces can be assumed to be concentrated first on convoy PQ 18 and later on convoy QP 14.

(3) Particular attention must be paid to tankers; in previous operations they enabled even light forces to take part in the action by refueling them at sea. It will be useful to inform the 5th Air Force about this fact.

For respective telegrams see 1/Skl 1765/42 and 1772/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in file "Operation Eispalast".

The Naval Staff submits the Navy's plans for the operation against convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 to Fuehrer Headquarters, to the Naval Representative of the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and to the Naval Representative on the Air Forces Operations Staff, as follows:

(1) Submarines will concentrate on convoy PQ 18.

(2) a. If the enemy situation is favorable, it will be attempted to have the SCHEER, HIPPER, KOELN and 5 destroyers attack convoy QP 14. For this purpose this task force under the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers will be transferred to Alta Fjord so as to be ready for operation on the evening of 11 Sep. Code word for start of operation is "Meisenbalz".

b. The TIRPITZ with an escort of 1 destroyer and 2 torpedo boats will first be on 12 hour readiness, later on on 2 to 3 hour readiness at Narvik.

(3) Submarines will be directed to such points of the area Iceland-Faeroe Islands which according to previous experiences will be passed by the heavy covering forces.

Vice Admiral Krancke is notified that additional data for his report to the Fuehrer will follow in due time.

The Naval Representative at the Air Force Operations Staff is informed also of Group North's demands on the 5th Air Force.

For telegram see 1/Skl I op 1773/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in file "Operation Eispalast".

Group North informs the Commanding Admiral, Submarines that in case submarines proceeding to operations areas pass the Iceland-Faroes area and could participate temporarily in the operation against the convoys, quadrants AE 53, 37, 56, 5931, 93, 96, 99, and 47 are promising locations where, according to past experience, heavy enemy naval forces can be counted on to appear.

No reports were received regarding operations "Romanow" and "Zarewitsch".

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a report of the Admiral, Denmark from a source of unknown reliability, the British Naval Attache at Stockholm is said to have announced a British air attack on the ferry slip of Helsingoer and on ferries which are in operation, in order to cut off the supply of Norway.

The reinforcement of the inadequate anti-aircraft defenses has been requested of the Commander, Anti-aircraft Defenses, Denmark.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report from the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea.

The minefields "Seeigel 30", "31", and "32" in the area of the Commander Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea were reinforced according to plan. Minesweeping was hampered by bad weather.

Transport and convoy service proceeded on schedule. Leave ship ILLER ran aground upon departing from Hangoe. The entire crew and personnel on leave are safe.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring revealed ship traffic west of Gibraltar, probably in connection with the arrival of ships or of a convoy.

Lively reconnaissance activity in the southern rendezvous area. 3 reports from the St. Lawrence River about the sighting of submarines were intercepted and from the Gulf of St. Lawrence a message concerning an attack by a submarine and the sighting of another. U.S. steamer PENNMAR (5,568 GRT) sent an SSS signal about sighting a submarine 40 miles east of Halifax.

2. Own Situation:

3 more submarines are on the way to the zone of operations from Germany and 1 from a western French base.

Submarine U "617" sank a 1,500 GRT steamer in quadrant AE 7672 in the North Atlantic. No reports regarding the operation against the convoy east of the Azores were received today.

No successes were reported from the U.S. coast.

Following a report from submarine U "333" which substantiates the assumption of a submarine trap in quadrant BE and the northern sector of quadrant CF, all submarines are warned once more.

Group "Eisbaer" is located at present in quadrant FE. The group will receive supplies after 20 Sep.

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Due to the Japanese Navy's demand for a reduction of the German area of operation in the Indian Ocean, the planned transfer there of the auxiliary cruisers operating at this time in the eastern part of the South Pacific cannot take place. For the time being ship "28" is ordered to quadrant HN where she will not interfere with the operation of Group "Eisbaer". It is planned for a later date to authorize operations in the area between 15° W and west of a line running from quadrant GR 89 to quadrant FE 91 via St. Helena. After arriving in the Capetown area, Group "Eisbaer" can therefore be permitted to attack single ships east of the above line only. At present ship "23" operates in the South Atlantic west of longitude 15° W.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines is being informed of this situation and is requested to report the dates and rendezvous points with supply ships as well as their route instructions in order to allow sufficient time to coordinate the requirements of auxiliary cruisers and submarines.

For copy of directive to this effect see 1/Skl Iu 1764/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

For further information see supplementary submarine situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The same report contains an analysis of the prospects of future submarine warfare by the Naval Staff Operations Division, Submarine Section; it climaxes in the demand that construction of offensive and defensive submarine weapons must speedily be adapted to cope with present developments which are already gravely threatening to limit submarine operations. The most serious thought is being given this matter by the Naval Staff. It is imperative to exploit all means which may help to boost the effectiveness of the submarines. Nothing must be neglected in order to convince the authorities of the Armed Forces and of armaments production that submarine warfare must be given everything it needs without any restriction and, most of all, without any further delay, since submarine warfare is the only effective weapon at our disposal to fight the enemy naval powers. The Naval Staff never entertained any doubt that naval warfare alone can force Great Britain and the U.S.A. to make peace. The Naval Staff is thus compelled to judge all other efforts solely from one angle, namely to what degree they will benefit naval and primarily submarine warfare against enemy shipping. It must and will relentlessly demand that all war planning be done with this situation in mind and that all conclusions be drawn immediately from the inescapable fact that the strongest purely continental power can at best hold its own in the face of naval powers, but never impose its will on them. Utmost vigilance is imperative as soon as the first indications become apparent that the most powerful weapon of naval warfare, the submarine is being rendered ineffective by improved enemy defense methods. With this thought uppermost, the Naval Staff is tackling the acute problems by which it is confronted and which require a thorough investigation of the possibilities of making submarine warfare more effective.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day and night of 8 Sep. small forces raided several localities in southern England. Propaganda leaflets were dropped over Portsmouth and Southampton.

2. Incursions:

140 enemy planes flew into southwestern Germany, concentrating on Ruesselsheim. For damage at Ruesselsheim (Opel Works), Frankfurt on Main, Mainz, etc., see daily situation report.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Nothing to report.

4. Eastern Front:

121 enemy planes were shot down on the various army sectors. Reconnaissance activity in the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and the Arctic Ocean. A small force attacked Murmansk.

5. Special Item:

The Operations Staff, Air Force agrees to the request of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch concerning the immediate training of 5 sailors and the allocation of 2 model 330 Focke Achgelis autogyro lookout kites so that one ship may be equipped with them at once. (See Telegram 2040.)

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

The warship situation at Gibraltar remained essentially unchanged. According to intelligence reports from Spain, about 50 small vessels (subchasers, trawlers, tugs, patrol vessels, and landing barges) are at the pier. The transport LEINSTER sailed during the night of 7 Sep. for an unknown destination.

4 submarines were reported sighted in the central Mediterranean. No other ships were reported sighted in the Mediterranean. Reconnaissance and bomber plane activity was reported by air reconnaissance. A number of messages concerning reconnaissance and air attacks on convoys and destroyer escorts were intercepted.

According to a communique of the British Admiralty, submarines definitely sank 5 large merchant ships and 2 medium sized vessels during the last weeks apart from the successes achieved by the Royal Air Force and the Naval Air Force. In addition, 3 vessels were damaged by submarines.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

2 German PT boats sailed from Navarino and 4 from Suda for Augusta.

An Italian subchaser reported on 7 Sep. sinking an enemy submarine off the Peloponnesian west coast.

Enemy planes raided Tobruk on the evening of 6 Sep.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The RAVELLO and SESTRIERE arrived at Benghazi at noon, the

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ANKARA and auxiliary vessel BRIONI at Tobruk. At 0600 the ANKARA was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy bombers. The escort destroyer FUCILIERE was damaged.

Other convoys proceeded according to plan without interference.

Special Item:

The Naval Staff advises the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, with copy to the German Naval Command, Italy, about its stand on the reply of the Italian High Command to the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command of 7 Aug. regarding the closing of the Sicily Strait. The German Naval Command, Italy is advised of the Naval Staff's agreement with the plans submitted for the execution of the measure. For copy see 1/Skl I E 22169/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Check-sweeping of the Cerigotto Strait, where mines are suspected, brought no result.

Otherwise nothing to report.

Special Item:

The Naval Construction Division reports with regard to the demands of Group South and the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch concerning the construction of anti-submarine vessels for the Aegean Sea: Auxiliary ship DRACHE and 4 subchasers will be completed at Trieste on 24 Sep. and 24 Oct. respectively. The contemplated construction of armed trawlers at Skaramandka could not be begun due to lack of labor, although lumber and steel have been available for some time. The Naval Construction Division is therefore using the Varna shipyards, where 24 armed trawlers are to be constructed between September 1942 and April 1943 and 18 more between April and August 1943.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

On 7 and 8 Sep. movements of light forces and the floating dock in tow were observed by reconnaissance planes off the east coast in the Tuapse and Adler area. According to photo reconnaissance, the following ships were at Batum on 7 Sep.: The hull of a warship, 2 cruisers, 1 torpedo boat, 1 mine sweeper, 4 submarines, 2 PT boats, 6 tankers, 9 steamers, and 1 floating crane. At Poti on the same day: 1 battleship, 1 warship hull, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 training ship, 6 destroyers, 2 of which were in dock, 16 submarines, 2 of which in dock, 5 motor mine sweepers, 5 PT boats, 13 steamers, etc.

Lively shipping activity was observed in the Caspian Sea and between Astrakhan and Stalingrad. For details see daily situation report.

Own Situation:

During the night of 6 Sep. the 1st PT Boat Flotilla was deployed between Tuapse and Sochi, Italian subchasers between Novorossisk and Gelendzhik for torpedo operations. No shipping was encountered.

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Otherwise nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia

On the basis of information received by the Japanese Naval High Command, the German Admiral, at Tokyo reports:

1. Solomon Islands: Efforts are being made to destroy enemy planes on Guadalcanal. For this purpose air attacks were made on 2 and 5 Sep., during which a total of 16 enemy planes was destroyed; the enemy succeeded, however, in bringing up replacements. On 4 Sep. light enemy forces were attacked by destroyers off Guadalcanal. 1 destroyer was sunk, 1 other destroyer or fairly large warship was likewise sunk. On 6 Sep. a Japanese submarine sighted 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, and several destroyers south of Paulo Island at 13° 00' S 162° 00' E. 2 torpedo hits were scored on the carrier but the sinking not observed. Japanese Army forces on Guadalcanal were reinforced. An early offensive, aiming primarily at the airfield, may be anticipated.

2. New Guinea: A Japanese landing attempt at Rabi (Milne Bay) encountered strong enemy resistance. The situation at this moment is unfavorable to the Japanese, owing to enemy air superiority, the presence of enemy tanks and difficulties of terrain. Nevertheless, additional landing attempts may be made.

3. Aleutians: A Japanese submarine sighted several cruisers and destroyers north of Umulak on 3 Sep. A submarine which penetrated into Nazan Bay (Umulak Island) on 4 Sep. scored a torpedo hit on a heavy enemy cruiser. The result was not observed.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

Heavy fighting continues in the Novorossisk area. Strong enemy attacks at the Terek River, both sides of Mozdok.

Army Group B:

After regrouping, tank and motorized infantry units launched a new attack on Stalingrad. The enemy is undertaking massed sorties and diversionary attacks on the northern sector of the XIV Panzer Corps, all of which were repulsed.

Central Army Group:

Strong enemy tank formations brought up via Kaluga and Kozelsk, advancing in southwesterly direction, indicate impending attacks in the area south of Sukhinichi. A strong enemy attack is under way east of Vyazma. Fighting on a small scale is going on in the Rzhev area.

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Northern Army Group:

The demarkation line between the 18th and the 11th Armies runs from Trossno to Maluksa. The 11th Army is north of this line. South of Lake Ladoga and in the Leningrad area the enemy continued to attack in some sectors.

2. Finnish Front:

Nothing to report.

3. North Africa:

No situation report has been received as yet.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

On 8 Sep. Churchill addressed the House of Commons, giving for the first time after a long interval an account of the situation. Among other things, he discussed the convoy which got through to Malta in August, and declared: "The convoy and its escort suffered heavy losses. 1 British aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, and 1 destroyer were sunk and other ships damaged; however, this price was not too high in view of the result achieved, because it is of greatest importance for the situation of the entire Middle East that Malta be in a position to interfere effectively with the enemy communications to Libya and Egypt."

Churchill termed the raid on Dieppe forced reconnaissance, an action which is necessary before operations on a larger scale can be inaugurated.

The cruiser SHROPSHIRE is allocated to Australia to take the place of the CANBERRA which was sunk during the battle of the Solomon Islands.

The Allies continue to exercise air superiority. The daylight bombings by the U.S. Air Force, which are made from great altitude and with remarkable aim, are a new factor, the importance of which is increasing.

Merchant shipping losses are still very grave, but a distinct improvement can be noticed since July. It is credited to the perfection of the convoy system off the American coast. The last two convoys to Malta and Russia increased the losses considerably. However, construction of new merchant vessels lately exceeded the number of sinkings. Recently the fight against submarines has become more successful than ever before. Of great importance also was the bombing of German shipyards used for the construction of submarines.

Naval warfare is the basis for all Allied efforts.

Churchill then discussed the Egyptian situation and the shift of high command posts which became necessary in this theater. Roosevelt lent ships in order to transport an additional 40,000 to 50,000 men to the Middle East. "Excellently equipped troops have arrived by way of the Cape of Good Hope; and it was possible to send them directly to Egypt, so that the defense of this country will be ensured during the coming months."

"Rommel's offensive was blocked because many of his supply ships were sunk by submarines. Since his position thus became difficult, he launched a major offensive on 31 Aug. which started rolling at the very moment when all British defense preparations had been completed. The attack was repulsed primarily because of British numerical superiority of guns and tanks."

"The organization of the 10th Army (Iran and Iraq) has made good progress; particularly its air force has been reinforced. It will possibly be able to lend assistance to the left Russian flank, but in any event will defend Iraq."

The Prime Minister also spoke about his visit to Moscow:

"The results of the Moscow talks cannot be divulged. The Russians are of the opinion that neither the British nor the Americans have done enough to ease their burden. We were impressed, however, by the Russian

leaders' confidence in our loyal determination to come to their support.

In concluding, Churchill characterized the situation as tremendously improved during the last 2 years. Allied with the greatest nations, Great Britain is on the path to total victory. Germany is hated in all European countries more than any nation had ever been hated within the annals of history. The hour of liberation will be the hour of retaliation.

The debate following the speech was brief and drew little participation from the House.

For a complete report see Political Review No. 211.

> Churchill's statements ought to be studied carefully in the original. They offer valuable hints for an analysis of the present situation. See note in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

The council of the British trade unions, now in session, expressed confidence in Churchill. A motion for the admission of communists was defeated by a vote of 2,500,000 against 2,100,000.

In a speech, Smuts termed the Mediterranean basin the most important theater of war. The resources of the Allies are threatened and all their efforts will be in vain if the enemy is not driven out of North Africa.

Turkey:

Pressure exerted by the British and U.S. Ambassadors in order to achieve the repeal of the stipulations of the Montreux Convention, thus permitting Russian warships free passage through the Dardanelles, failed to accomplish this purpose.

Special Items:

I. A. The Deputy Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division informed the Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff on 8 Sep. as follows: Vice Admiral Krancke telephoned that the Fuehrer has again expressed his opinion that all ships suitable for Norway are to be transferred there.

B. The Fuehrer's viewpoint supports the Naval Staff's plans regarding assignments for the surface forces during the winter. Since the Fuehrer is also apparently influenced by the possibility of enemy operations against the Norwegian coast, the question of whether the NUERNBERG should be used in Norway in spite of existing limitations is answered automatically.

C. In a conference between the Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff and the Deputy Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff, the Operations Division, Naval Staff agreed to the replacement of the KOELN by the EMDEN, notwithstanding the latter's lower speed and inferior anti-aircraft equipment. The EMDEN is actually the only seaworthy German cruiser; she can be used in Norway, however, only following final tests of the newly installed degaussing gear.

II. A. With reference to the plans for a new battleship, the Fuehrer reiterated his demand for larger caliber guns.

In this connection the Naval Staff Operations Division recapitulates briefly its own demands applying to a ship of this type:

B. The main object is to increase the offensive power of type "H 41" by using higher caliber guns. All other specifications should be retained, if possible, in order to avoid an undesirable increase of the ship's displacement.

By means of her superior armament the ship must be able also in difficult situations to defeat adversaries which are otherwise her equals. "Difficult situations" exist when the ship is simultaneously subjected to air attacks, the weather is unfavorable (poor visibility, heavy seas), the ship has been on operations for a long time and has little hope for an early return to base, etc.

In other respects, as for instance armor, speed, and range of operation, the ship is to follow the specifications for model "H 41".

C. The Naval Staff Operations Division is of the opinion that the increase of displacement which goes with the increased caliber of the main guns must be held to a minimum. Otherwise the armament of the ship need not be increased in proportion to the increased gun caliber; it is rather to be maintained as heretofore. Furthermore, attempts should be made to make up for the increased weight of the guns by savings applied to other equipment, if not in full at least as much as possible. Theoretically this could be applied as follows:

(a) Weight of engines, resulting in a reduction of speed.

(b) Fuel supply, resulting in a reduction of range.

(c) Armor and under-water protection, resulting in reduced resistance.

(d) Remaining armament, resulting in reduced striking power.

Re (a) The Naval Staff Operations Division cannot concede a further reduction of speed, which has already been lowered to 28 knots by measures recently taken (protection of ammunition chambers against bombs).

Re (b) It is assumed that no considerable saving of weight can be achieved by reducing the fuel supply to a level corresponding to a range for example of 18,000 miles at an average speed of 19 knots. Even if bases were available to us in foreign waters, a range of 20,000 miles at a speed of 19 knots would still be required, so that concessions in this respect could be made only if they would result in a very considerable gain. This question requires a thorough examination.

Re (c) A reduction of armor thickness or a lessening of under-water protection cannot be advocated by the Naval Staff Operations Division; it is willing, however, to forego an increase of these factors in proportion to the greater gun caliber. Specifications based on those planned heretofore for "H 41" are considered adequate and offer sufficient leeway for the final calculations.

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Re (d) (1) The caliber of the main guns has been fixed. The number of guns and their disposition must afford maximum fighting efficiency.

(2) The amount of anti-aircraft artillery must be maintained as heretofore.

(3) The importance of retaining efficient secondary guns is accentuated by the following conclusions: The main guns are an "expensive" affair in view of ammunition requirements and wear and tear on the gun barrels. Their use must be limited to worthwhile targets and cannot be justified for fighting light cruisers and destroyers.

(4) It is therefore imperative that the secondary guns and the heavy anti-aircraft guns be of different caliber and be placed according to weight.

(5) A thorough examination of the problem of whether the secondary guns should be mounted in casemates or turrets might result in saving weight.

(6) Torpedo equipment cannot be dispensed with.

D. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is requested to take the above conclusions into account in working out the plans for "H 41" in consultation with the Naval Construction Division and the Naval Ordnance Division and to report to the Naval Staff Operations Division about any further steps in this connection.

III. Field Marshal Kesselring's report to Mussolini of 7 Sep., as related by the German General attached to the Italian High Command, reveals the following picture of the situation:

a. The Alamein line is to be held under all circumstances.

b. It is still planned to resume the offensive as soon as the supply situation and the strength of our forces will permit. The Egyptian front is gaining importance in connection with the pressure on the Middle East from the Caucasus.

c. Due to weather conditions, Malta cannot be captured sooner than before next summer. Thus the only way to safeguard the transport of supplies to North Africa is to neutralize Malta by increasing our air forces.

d. Additional steps for more efficient convoy protection by closer cooperation between naval and air forces are to be considered during conferences between the Commanding General, Armed Forces South, and the Italian High Command.

e. Field Marshal Kesselring plans to report on 8 Sep. to the Commander in Chief, Air Force and to the Fuehrer at the Fuehrer's Headquarters.

The Naval Staff's views on this matter can be found in War Diary of 8 Sep.

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IV. The Italian Admiral attached to the Naval Staff requested the British operations order for the Dieppe action. The Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command agrees to the Naval Staff's proposal to comply with this request.

Situation 9 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

According to an intelligence report the MALAYA and WARSPITE with 4 destroyers have been at Freetown since 7 Sep.

As far as the MALAYA is concerned, the report is evidently erroneous, since this battleship was observed at Gibraltar by the Intelligence Center, Spain. The RAMILLIES was probably mistakenly identified as the MALAYA.

Indian Ocean:

According to a source so far unproved, a heavily escorted convoy from the U.S. and the British Isles is expected to arrive in Egypt via the Cape at the end of September.

2. Own Situation:

On 8 Sep. at 2116, ship "28" reported by short signal: "I am in large quadrant GQ. Weather at rendezvous point unfavorable. Planning to proceed immediately to waiting area "Komponisten" for overhaul. Awaiting supply ship." The last garbled group is interpreted: meeting point "Schubert".

The Naval Staff acknowledges receipt with Radiogram 0141.

The Naval Staff informs ship "10" by Radiogram 0840 that the KULMERLAND left Dairen on 26 Aug. and will pass point "Saale" probably on 10 Sep., from where she will proceed by way of a point 10° east and 2° south of point "Orleans". It is not contemplated to have her meet ship "10".

The poor prospects in the former zone of operation of ship "10" were known to the Naval Staff, but had to be accepted in view of the delay in learning the Japanese intentions. The Japanese reply to the repeated requests concerning the zone of operations was only received on 7 Sep. Ship "10"'s request to be dismissed to Japan was granted on 7 Sep. by Radiogram 1156. The date of 5 Sep. fixed by Radiogram 0440 has thus been extended to 20 Sep. Notification to this effect is transmitted to ship "10" by Radiogram 2209.

Ship "23" is informed by Radiogram 2314 that the TANNENFELS will arrive on 21 Sep. from Japan for the delivery of provisions at a point 3° south of point "Schubert". She will probably be able to take over prisoners. Ship "23" is instructed to dismiss the TANNENFELS to Europe upon completion of supply delivery and to report the date of her dismissal when convenient.

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Complying with ship "28"'s request, the TANNENFELS will receive orders to be at point "Schubert" every day beginning 18 Sep. The Naval Staff has no objection to ship "28" overhauling in the "Komponisten" area; she is advised to this effect by Radiogram 1504 and instructed to send the TANNENFELS to the rendezvous with ship "23" at a point 3° south of point "Schubert" following the delivery of supplies.

The KULMERLAND is instructed to head from point "Rose" directly to point "Kurzwellensender" without touching point "Kurzschluss". See Radiogram 1342.

The Naval Attache at Tokyo is advised that the REGENSBURG is to head directly for point "Rechenstab" without touching point "Registerbehoerde" because the alternate course suggested by her captain would come too close to a zone of heavy traffic. See Telegram 2245.

All ships in foreign waters are advised by Radiogram 0522 about the position on 7 Sep. of "Kirschbluete" at the equator and 22° W; information about the domestic Spanish situation and the development of German-French relations was sent by Radiogram 2147.

Enemy situation report by Radiogram 0432.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, 2 British or U.S. light cruisers on an easterly course were sighted between La Coruna and Cape Prior. An inquiry at the Spanish Naval Staff determined that these cannot be Spanish ships.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The WESERLAND reported at 1716 by short signal from position 8° W that she had been attacked by planes at 1500. The signal's coding seems to indicate that the vessel is undamaged.

Group West confirms the report by Radiogram 1929 and adds: "We assume that contact was lost and ship is continuing her voyage."

The UCKERMARK and SPICHERN sailed according to plan.

As reported by Group West, the PIETRO ORSEOLO will definitely be ready for operations on 15 Sep. During the first 3 days her speed will be 16 knots; the continuous speed for the entire voyage will be 14 knots.

A mine detonation outside the fairway was observed in the inner roadstead of St. Nazaire.

Channel Coast:

Mine-exploding vessels swept 2 ground mines at point "228" on route "Herz". A convoy headed for the Channel Islands was attacked by 20 enemy planes between Cape de la Hague and Alderney. 1 motor coaster was sunk. Mine-laying operation "Finale" and a mine-laying

mission of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla are scheduled for the night of 9 Sep.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy reconnaissance planes flew over the area of the Ems River mouth at noon. The Swedish steamer TYNNINGOE which sank on 8 Sep. was not equipped with degaussing gear nor was she demagnetized, but was proceeding in the wake of a mine-exploding vessel. A ground mine was swept off Borkum. Convoy and patrol services in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North proceeded according to plan.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

The Japanese Military Attache at Stockholm reports that the Swedish General Staff expects an enemy landing in Norway to take place during the current year. Apart from British forces, also Norwegian and U.S. units are allegedly in readiness for this purpose at Inverness in northern Scotland and on the Orkney Islands.

Air reconnaissance on the approaches to the Norwegian west coast was livelier than in recent days.

Own Situation:

An enemy air attack on a group of subchasers off Vardoe on 8 Sep. was unsuccessful. Enemy planes were active on the evening of 8 Sep. in the west coast area. The destroyers STEINBRINCK and ECKOLDT sailed for Narvik from Kirkenes.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway is once more requested to assign mine-exploding vessel "181", because vessel "139", the only other one available, requires shipyard repairs. Mine protection of the fleet anchorages and of the approaches in the Narvik and Trondheim areas can be furnished reliably only by mine-exploding gear. (See Telegram 1300.)

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, convoy PQ 18, consisting of 35 merchant vessels under escort of 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, and 6 patrol vessels, was located at noon in quadrant AE 1240. Approximately at the same time reconnaissance planes reported a force of 1 battleship, 1 aircraft carrier, and 9 cruisers or destroyers in quadrant AE 2550 and a force of 1 heavy cruiser and 10 destroyers in quadrant AA 9710. Both forces were reported apparently on identical courses (330° and 340°). In view of the relatively small difference between these positions there is a possibility that the forces reported as two are actually identical.

The 5th Destroyer Flotilla sighted a diving submarine in quadrant AC 7229 at 2326 on 8 Sep.

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Own Situation:

The 5th Destroyer Flotilla completed operations "Romanow" and "Zarewitsch" according to plan.

In accordance with the new instructions (see War Diary 8 Sep.) the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers transferred from the TIRPITZ to the HIPPER.

In view of the overall situation, Group North does not anticipate that the TIRPITZ will be permitted to take part in the operation on account of existing restrictions; the battleship is therefore instructed to stand by at Narvik in order to avoid waste of fuel. In accordance with the Naval Staff's suggestion, the 5th Air Force is advised by Group North that the effectiveness of enemy escort forces will be decisively affected if any tankers sailing in convoy PQ 18 are put out of commission at an early stage.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines intends to station the 4 submarines sailing from Kiel on 10 Sep. in the Denmark Strait approximately in the area of quadrants AE 10, AD 20 and farther south to AE 47, where they are to intercept convoy QP 14 as suggested by Group North. He therefore requests the Admiral, Arctic Ocean and Group North, with copy to the Naval Staff, to forward all air reconnaissance reports speedily and continually.

5 submarines of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean are ordered to take up the following 5 positions: quadrants AB 1790, 4210, 4250, the southern third of AB 32 and the northern third of AB 35, and the central and southern thirds of AB.

Submarine U "601" belonging to the group of 3 submarines assigned to the eastern Arctic Ocean is ordered to assume position in quadrant AT north of the entrance to Matochkin Strait by 15 Sep.

Special Items:

The Chief of the Naval Liaison Staff, Finland conferred some time ago upon his own initiative with the Commander in Chief of the Finnish Navy about the possibility of using a number of Finnish submarines for German operations in the Arctic Ocean from bases in northern Norway. Finnish Headquarters objected, principally on account of the technical inadequacy of Finnish submarines. Group North supported the suggestion made by the Chief of the Naval Liaison Staff, Finland to submit the matter to the decision of a higher authority.

The Naval Staff Submarine Division checked on the possibilities of providing the necessary replacements and bases and arrived at the following conclusions:

a. German shipyard workers could only be supplied at the expense of repairs of superior German submarines.

b. Spare parts, machinery, and special supplies are unavailable at Finnish shipyards in the quantities required, and since some of them were manufactured by German firms, the replacements would have to come from Germany. This, in turn, would put an additional burden on German industry because the parts in question are generally not made in mass production.

c. No difficulties are seen with regard to bases.

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The Naval Staff is convinced that the above-mentioned difficulties are not in proportion with the gain which can be expected, all the more since the range of operation of the Finnish submarines is small and because since they are overaged frequent breakdowns and repairs are probable. Besides, 3 submarines of limited usefulness offer no particular advantage in view of the number of operational submarines now being delivered every month.

Group North is therefore advised that the idea of using Finnish submarines in the Arctic Ocean is dismissed. The Chief of Naval Liaison Staff, Finland is informed to this effect by way of the Naval Attache.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Nothing to report from the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea. Minefield "Nashorn 14" was laid according to plan in the area of the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea.

Mine-searching operations were hampered by bad weather. Convoys and transports proceeded according to plan. Steamer LEDA, replacing steamer ILLER, sailed from Danzig.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance in the Bay of Biscay was carried out by 38 planes. 2 reports about sighting submarines were intercepted from this area, 3 from the U.S. east coast and 1 from the West Indies.

According to intelligence reports from Portugal, a British passenger plane sighted a convoy of approximately 40 British and U.S. ships on a southerly course on the morning of 6 Sep. about 150 miles west of Cape St. Vincent; the convoy carried troops and was escorted by 2 aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers.

Moreover, a convoy is expected at Lisbon between 9 and 11 Sep. which will reportedly be strongly escorted in view of the German submarines operating in Portuguese waters. Several British steamers lying at Lisbon will allegedly sail directly for the British Isles.

2. Own Situation:

2 more submarines are en route to the zone of operations. For operations of the Norwegian submarines see Situation, Arctic Ocean.

In the North Atlantic, Group "Vorwaerts" made contact with a westbound convoy of 11 to 15 steamers in quadrant AL 7463.

Submarine U "755" of Group "Loss" sank a U.S. auxiliary cruiser of 3,000 GRT in quadrant AJ 9727; the ship was armed with four 10.5 cm guns.

Upon her return to base, submarine U "510" reports a suspected subchaser force in quadrant BE 7923.

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Submarine U "66", returning from the western North Atlantic, sank the Swedish steamer PEIPING (6,390 GRT) in quadrant DQ 18.

No reports about achievements in other zones of operation have been received.

Additional reports in supplement to submarine situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Special Items:

a. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines points to 5 instances which have occurred since 16 Jun., in which enemy planes succeeded in forcing us to abandon favorably progressing submarine operations within the range of our He 177 planes; he also points out the possibilities which would have offered themselves if German planes of this type could have intervened. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines is convinced of the absolute necessity of making available He 177's, the only plane type suitable for this purpose, as quickly as possible and not after a delay of months, so that the planes may cooperate in combatting enemy convoys. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines therefore asks the Naval Staff and the Air Commander, Atlantic Coast to request the assignment of the first available squadron of He 177 planes to the Air Command, Atlantic Coast for the above purpose, and calls attention to the old promise that the first He 177's would be placed at his disposal for the support of submarine warfare.

For copy of telegram see 1/Skl 22271/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

> The above request meets with the full approval of the Naval Staff. If the appearance on the scene of He 177 planes will force the enemy to shift his convoy routes further west beyond their range, this would at least relieve our submarines to a large extent from interference by enemy planes which must take off from a British home base or from Gibraltar. The proposal of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines will be followed up.

b. The Naval Staff instructs the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to submit an analysis of the situation and plans for the use of SMA mines. On this occasion the Naval Staff emphasizes the necessity of notifying the Naval Staff in time whenever submarine operations are planned as a consequence of information received. The Naval Staff must know the opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines concerning planned operations, as for instance the shift of emphasis to the fighting of convoys and the motivation for his steps prior to their execution. This applies also to special measures which may have special consequences (e.g., of a political nature).

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

2. Incursions:

In the evening of 9 Sep., 10 enemy planes concentrated on

Osnabrueck. Regarding the attack on a German convoy off the Channel Islands see Situation West Area.

During the night of 9 Sep. there were 110 enemy incursions into German territory, about 70 of them from the east. In the east they penetrated as far as Memel, Ruegen, Gablenz, Prague, Lemberg, Hungary; in the west, Heligoland, eastern Friesland, Skagen, Denmark. They did not concentrate on a particular target. Only a few bombs were dropped. 2 or 3 planes reached Berlin from the east. No enemy planes were shot down.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

199 planes were observed on the Valletta airfield. Otherwise nothing to report.

4. Eastern Front:

111 enemy planes were shot down on the Eastern Front. Reconnaissance missions were flown over the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Arctic Ocean.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, preparations for the embarkation of troops are being made at Gibraltar. Details were not yet reported.

Air reconnaissance observed 3 submarines, 3 mine sweepers and 3 patrol vessels at Valletta, in addition to the merchant vessels and tankers previously reported. 3 medium large steamers escorted by 4 patrol vessels were sighted in the eastern Mediterranean during the forenoon 50 miles north-northeast of Port Said on an easterly course, and at noon 2 destroyers on an unidentified course 50 miles west of Haifa.

According to a Portuguese report, a convoy of 19 British and U.S. steamers with food, ammunition and troops for Malta arrived at Port Said on 3 Sep. It is asserted that the convoy will receive an escort of 15 warships at Alexandria. The sailing date was not disclosed.

> This report may well be correct. It would confirm and supplement a report of the Attache at Rome, according to which it will be attempted to force a supply convoy through to Malta under all circumstances. (See War Diary of 7 Sep.)

According to another intelligence report, it has been established that a number of old torpedo boats converted into anti-aircraft vessels were at Haifa in the middle of August; these ships carry up to 10 anti-aircraft guns and machine guns each, in place of their dismantled torpedo tubes.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

On 7 Sep., 2 British aerial mines were swept near Marsa Matruh by means of towed coil gear. An enemy air raid on Marsa Matruh

during the night of 7 Sep. caused no damage in the harbor.

The damaged Italian destroyer FUCILIERE anchored at the Cape Krio (Crete) roadstead. 6 German PT boats arrived at Augusta.

The Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reports that during his absence operations in North Africa will temporarily be controlled from there. The permanent solution would require assigning 2 staff officers to the Naval Commands, North Africa at Tobruk and Marsa Matruh. (See Telegram 1145.)

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa

German anti-aircraft artillery on board the motor ship SESTRIERE reported shooting down an enemy plane on 8 Sep. During the night of 8 Sep. the convoy to Tobruk and Benghazi consisting of steamers ISEO and KALLIOPI was unsuccessfully attacked by bombers north of Derna. Otherwise supply shipments proceeded according to plan and without interference.

The 3 minesweepers which arrived at North African ports on 8 Sep. carried 281 men, 307 vehicles, 11 guns, 15 anti-tank guns, 7 tanks and 4,144 tons of Armed Forces supplies, including 1,500 tons of fuel for German units.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Group South believes that the enemy submarine reported on 8 Sep. destroyed by an Italian torpedo boat is nothing but a submerged wreck of a ship with an oil cargo located by search gear and attacked by depth bombs.

Convoy traffic according to plan.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

It was observed from land that strong Russian forces were disembarked in the harbor of Novorossisk on 8 Sep.

> The capture of Novorossisk, reported on 6 Sep., apparently did not yet include all of that city.

According to air reconnaissance of the forenoon of 9 Sep., the number of coastal craft in the harbor of Gelendzhik has increased. A large number of light ships (PT boats and motor mine sweepers) were observed in the waters off Novorossisk.

The Naval Staff Intelligence Division issued a report on data in connection with the situation in the U.S.S.R. It contains information about the Russian submarines and mine sweepers in the Caspian Sea and about transport facilities on the Caspian Sea routes Baku-Gurev, Baku-Krasnovodsk and from Persian ports to Krasnovodsk. For copy see 1/Skl 30718 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVa.

Own Situation:

On the evening of 7 Sep. the 2 Rumanian destroyers escorting the tank convoy were unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine 2--

miles west of the Bosporus approach buoy. Lively traffic of small craft and patrol vessels, evidently including some torpedo boats, was observed in the Bosporus.

An exploratory sweep and submarine chase carried out by 3 motor mine sweepers off the Crimean south coast on 8 Sep. had no results. On 9 Sep. a sweep by 4 motor mine sweepers is scheduled from Yalta through the southern portion of the Kerch Strait to Anapa in order to establish a mine-free route.

A Croatian motor minesweeper group searched for mines off Yeisk. Minesweeping aircraft swept 2 mines off Yeisk on 7 Sep.

2 Italian subchasers were sunk and 2 others damaged during an enemy air raid on Yalta. The Italian subchaser flotilla is to be transferred to Feodosiya. A Croatian patrolling pilot vessel sank on 6 Sep. after striking the German minefield off Genichesk.

3 German PT boats sailed from Ivanbaba to Constanta on 8 Sep. for motor replacement.

Transport and convoy traffic proceeded on the whole according to plan.

Up to and including 8 Sep. the Kerch Strait had been crossed by 8,400 men, 3,470 horses, and 936 vehicles. The ferrying of the 3rd Rumanian Mountain Division will probably be completed by the afternoon of 10 Sep. Operations Staff Scheurlen was dissolved and has left.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

Stubborn fighting for the dominating positions in the Novorossisk area continues. South of Krasnodar the enemy retreated in southerly direction. The enemy is successfully defending the approaches to Tuapse, Klydzh and Maisky. Enemy pressure continues also south of Mozdok.

Army Group B:

The battle for the strongly fortified defense positions of Stalingrad is still raging. Heavy enemy pressure on the northern front of the XIV Panzer Corps continues.

Central Army Group:

Strong Russian tank and infantry forces renewed their attacks in the Rzhev area following a heavy artillery barrage. Enemy units advancing on both banks of the Volga from the direction of Zubtsov captured a few villages. With this exception, all enemy attacks failed.

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Northern Army Group:

Enemy forces which penetrated into our lines on 8 Sep. south of Lake Ladoga were destroyed. An attempt by strong forces to cross the Neva River south of Schluesselburg did not succeed.

2. Finnish Front:

Nothing to report.

3. North Africa:

No situation report of the Panzer Army was received.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

The Chancellor of the Exchequer reported to the House of Commons that the cost to Great Britain of the first 3 years of war amounted to 10 billion pounds; taking into account the normal peace-time debt this figure rises to 12.1 billion. 40% of this tremendous figure has been raised by taxes.

During the debate about Churchill's address, members of the Labour Party called for more assistance to Russia. Mr. Bevin came out for the immediate establishment of the second front and commented that the British nation has more confidence in Voroshilov's and Timoshenko's judgment than in Churchill's. Another representative of the Labour Party sharply rebuked this statement.

The London Press agrees with Churchill's opinion that the war situation is slowly improving in favor of the Allies. The Times in particular remarked that the House of Commons has clearly shown that the present moment is not the time to criticize the basic principles of the conduct of the war.

France:

According to Reuter, Washington has rejected the French protest against the bombing of French cities with the statement that such war measures have to be taken. The U.S. Charge d'Affaires announced that retaliatory steps against American residents in France would result in an immediate break of relations.

U.S.A.:

Secretary of State Hull announced that the U.S. has established military bases on the Galapagos Islands with the permission of the Ecuadorian Government.

Japan:

The Chief of the Press Department at Headquarters, Colonel Yakagi, declared that the war in the Pacific will last very long, since it has grown beyond its original object which was the application of the New Order to China. Japan is fully determined to continue even if the war lasts 100 years.

Special Items:

I. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North asked for at least 10 naval barges to serve as guncarriers in order to reinforce the light ships operating in Dutch coastal waters against enemy motor gunboats. The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff decided that 10 additional naval barges should be converted at once into guncarriers and put at the disposal of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North. The resulting reduction of the number of naval barges available for supply transports in Germany must be accepted. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch had voiced concern over this proposal and suggested allocating 3 or 4 of the guncarriers under construction for the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North.

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II. According to an intelligence report, a naval unit which cooperates with the Free French Navy, has been recruited from natives of the Syrian and Lebanese Republics. It comprises approximately 2,000 men who received uniforms at Beirut and were shipped to Alexandria to join French training detachments.

III. Survey of convoys and transports during August 1942 in the area of Group North.

	Norway	Commanding Admiral Defenses North	Commanding Admiral Defenses Baltic Sea	Naval Station Baltic	Commander, Mine-Sweepers Baltic Sea
(a) Escorted warships:	138	59	48	132	23
(b) Escorted merchant vessels					
Number:	605	453	72	283	347
GRT:	1,463,372	1,004,853	369,671	1,141,718	1,054,669
(c) Aerial attacks:	6	14	-	8	36
Submarine attacks:	3	-	-	3	1
PT boat attacks:	-	1	-	-	1
(d) Total losses by					
Mines:	-	5	6	4	3
Bombs:	-	-	-	-	-
Submarine torpedoes:	2	-	-	-	2
PT boat torpedoes:	-	-	-	-	-
(e) Mines swept:	8	140	13	59	25
Planes shot down:	-	2	-	1	2
Submarines sunk:	-	-	-	-	3
PT boats, etc. sunk:	-	3	-	-	3
(f) Number of transported					
men:	10,254	-	16,676	63,352	56,427
Horses:	549	-	2,398	-	2,229
Vehicles:	1,251	-	1,885	63	1,044
Armed Forces supplies (tons)	249,010	-	23,612	275,465	459,632

For detailed report of Group North see 1/Skl 22118/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

IV. Enemy reports compiled from decoded radio messages and by radio monitoring for the period of 3 Aug. to 6 Sep. are contained in Radio Intelligence Report No. 36/42 of the Chief of Naval Communications Division, Radio Intelligence Branch.

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Situation 10 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

It is learned from a Japanese source that a convoy of 47 steamers with airplane equipment and 10,000 men sailed from New York on 30 Aug. for Para (Brazil).

According to an Italian report, the REVENGE was in the waters off Durban at the end of August.

It is reported from Lourenco Marques that a large convoy sailed from Capetown on 31 Aug. for New York via La Plata. The route is said to have been far to the south.

Indian Ocean:

The German Embassy at Paris was informed by Darlan's office that strong Anglo-American forces have been landing since 0400 of 10 Sep. on the west coast of Madagascar; the operation is centered at Majunga, where 18 enemy ships have been counted. There is strong air activity. An attack on Ambanja has been in progress since 0700. An enemy warship disembarked troops at Morondava. Shortly before 0700 the Governor reported that the French had offered resistance, but since 0700 all communication with Madagascar is interrupted. According to French opinion, the chances of successful resistance are slight.

Pacific Ocean:

According to a Japanese report, 1 U.S. battleship and 6 cruisers arrived in the Canal Zone for transfer to the Pacific.

The Japanese Military Attache reports from Kuibyshev that 30 Russian steamers proceeded west over the northern route between 29 Jun. and 16 Jul.; 9 more left on 18 Aug. with the icebreaker MIKOYAN and another 4 on 24 Aug.

> This would permit a considerable supply flow to Russia and proves the necessity of our conducting operations like "Wunderland" as soon as the season permits.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff informs ship "10" by Radiogram 2207 that the DRESDEN sailed from Saigon on 8 Sep., will pass point "Saale" around 15 Sep. and has received the same sailing instructions as the KULMERLAND.

The Attache at Tokyo reports the sailing of REGENSBURG on 9 Sep. from Yokohama via Kobe and Batavia, and that she will leave Singapore probably on 8 Oct. The ship is equipped to accommodate 150 prisoners of war. (See Telegram 1900.)

The Naval Staff agrees to let the Japanese have the requested torpedoes and mines and has no objections to instructing them in their use. The Attache at Tokyo is advised to this effect.

Enemy situation report by Radiogram 1937.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance revealed lively traffic of steamers and small warships in the Channel area.

According to radio monitoring the escort vessels ALBRIGHTON and GLAISDALE which took part in the Dieppe raid left Portsmouth in the evening.

A British plane reported at 2138 of 9 Sep. an attack on a NARVIK-class ship 11 miles west of Cape Vilano. The message was rebroadcast to all ships in home waters.

At 1020 an escort ship of an SL convoy reported the presence of a shadowing plane from quadrant BE 5256; the ship was on a course of 9° and was proceeding at 7 knots.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Reconnaissance in a westerly direction was carried out in the evening; the enemy was not sighted. Group West informs the WESERLAND of this fact and also transmits the weather forecast for the area around 43° N 15° W, according to which mostly cloudy skies and possible fog are to be expected. The other 2 blockade runners can figure on about 10 miles visibility in the southern portion of the Bay of Biscay. At 2015 the WESERLAND reported from 15° 30' W that she was being pursued by a hydroplane around 2000. The grouping of the signal was interpreted as on previous occasions to indicate that the ship was so far undamaged.

Group West acknowledged receipt of the message and transmitted a report sent by a British plane to Gibraltar concerning a merchant vessel of less than 10,000 GRT observed at 42° 05' N on a 235° course proceeding at 10 knots. See Radiogram 1815.

Supply ship BRAKE sailed according to plan. For barrage report concerning the entrance to Brest naval base see Telegram 2225.

Channel Coast:

The mine-laying mission of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla and mining operation "Finale" were executed according to plan during the night of 9 Sep.

Torpedo operations of the 2nd, 4th and 6th PT Boat Flotillas are scheduled for the night of 10 Sep.

The motor tanker HEXE hit an underwater obstruction off Nieuport and sank. During an attack on the Channel Island convoy on 9 Sep., one of the attackers was shot down for sure and a second one probably, by patrol vessels.

A belated report about the convoy action off Etaples during the night of 7 Sep. tells of the probable destruction of an enemy PT boat and of damage to several others. The enemy attacked 8 times and our ships successfully dodged 5 torpedoes.

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Mine-laying operations "Nacht" and "Falter" (cutter float barrage and minefield in the northern portion of the Seine Bay) are scheduled for the night of 10 Sep.

The office of the Admiral, Amphibious Forces is established at Antwerp as of 10 Sep.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Enemy planes flew over the coastal area of the German Bight during the night of 9 Sep. and mine-laying is suspected north of the West Frisian Islands. Enemy planes flew over Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland into the Baltic Sea entrances and the Baltic Sea. Night fighters shot down 1 plane northwest of Nissum Fjord. A convoy off Schiermonnikoog was bombed without result. The 13th Mine Sweeper Flotilla swept 3 mines. Convoy service on schedule.

2. Norway:

On 9 Sep. Liinahamari harbor was shelled by a Russian battery on Rybachi Peninsula but no damage was caused. Army Coastal Battery 1/773 returned the fire. A Norwegian trawler was unsuccessfully bombed and strafed by a Russian plane off Havningsberg on 7 Sep. There was enemy air activity over the Arctic Coast on 8 Sep. and over the Stavanger area on the west coast on 9 Sep.

The request of the Commanding Admiral, Norway for allocation of a mine-exploding vessel (see War Diary of 9 Sep.) is rejected by Group North which decides that the protection of the fleet anchorages and approaches against ground mines must be effected by means of towed remote clearance gear. For details see Telegram 1617.

Group North agrees to the suggested laying of a new minefield in Malanger Fjord (see War Diary of 7 Sep.). It remains to be decided whether the minefield should be laid right away or is to be delayed until the arrival of deep water cutter floats.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

5 to 7 British ships were located on 9 Sep. by radio monitoring in the southern exit of Gorlo Strait and in the Archangel area. 2 Russian submarines and probably 3 other submarines were at sea.

At 1510 a British ship reported sighting 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, and 6 destroyers in quadrant AB 9884. The reporting ship was definitely established as a submarine. It is interesting that the message was coded in a key which had thus far not been used by submarines. The force was first reported on a 100° course and thereafter on a 270° course.

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Radio monitoring also intercepted a report of the 95th Air Regiment of 9 Sep. at 2323, according to which the operations group had executed on 8 Sep. 11 missions to locate convoys and to establish the presence of submarines. A total of 6 vessels was mentioned in the report. Positions could not be decoded.

Today's air reconnaissance was unable to locate convoys PQ 18 and QP 14.

Surveying the enemy plane situation of 9 Sep., the Admiral, Arctic Ocean states that, as shown by aerial photos, the number of planes on airfields in the Murmansk area as far as Niva has increased perceptibly. Likewise, a considerable increase in the number of fighter planes has been noted in spite of the fact that the figure of planes shot down is consistently high. According to prisoner statements, 2 squadrons were transferred to the Murmansk area early in September after having been trained mostly for the use of torpedoes. This measure indicates the intention of protecting convoy shipping to a large extent by air forces. Reconnoitering of the Iceland coastal areas has become difficult due to increased anti-aircraft defenses. The improvement of airfields in the area Iokanga-Western Channel-Cape Kanin and the increase of planes based on them point to the fact that the convoy route to Archangel along the west coast of Novaya Zemlya is being protected by air forces. Ship traffic observed between the western channel and Byelushya Bay leads to the assumption that another air base is under construction at Byelushya.

Own Situation:

The task force of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers was spotted by the enemy while emerging from the Grimsoestraumen and the Gavle Fjord, as established by the radio intercept service (see Enemy Situation). The British submarine fired a four-fan at the task force in quadrant AB 985848; all 4 torpedoes were end-of-run detonators. No further incident of importance occurred during the remainder of the task force's transfer to Kaa Fjord.

The Naval Staff submits the following analysis of the information obtained from air reconnaissance concerning convoy PQ 18 to the Fuehrer Headquarters, the Armed Forces High Command and the Operations Staff, Air Force.

Convoy PQ 18 assembled on 8 and 9 Sep. north of Iceland; it consists of 35 vessels and is protected by 1 or 2 battleships, 3 or 4 cruisers, approximately 15 destroyers and possibly also by 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier. So far, nothing is known about the whereabouts of the heavy covering force which must be counted on to consist of 1 or 2 aircraft carriers and 1 or more battleships. It could not yet be established whether convoy QP 14 got under way. For copy of telegram see 1/Skl I op 22336/42 Gkdos. in file "Operations 'Eispalast' and 'Meisenbalz'."

The same commands were also informed about the measures taken against convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 as reported by Group North, namely:

(1) Transfer of HIPPER with Commanding Admiral, Cruisers on board, SCHEER, KOELN and 5 destroyers from Bogen Bay to Kaa Fjord, where they are scheduled to arrive on 11 Sep. at 0500.

(2) Transfer of torpedo boats T "9" and "12" from Trondheim to Narvik where they will be at the disposal of the TIRPITZ. The destroyers ECKOLDT and STEINBRINCK will probably arrive at Narvik on 11 Sep. from Kirkenes and they, too, will be at the disposal of the TIRPITZ.

(3) Submarines U "88", U "403", and U "405" are en route from the Spitsbergen and Bear Island area to a patrol line extending through quadrants AB 1790, 4210, and 4250. En route the zone of operations are the submarines U "589", U "377", U "408", and U "592". The submarines U "435" and U "457" will probably be ready for operations by 12 Sep. at Narvik, and U "378" at Trondheim. Submarine U "703" is at Harstadt on a brief stay for refueling. The total number of submarines is 11.

(4) 4 submarines will operate against convoy QP 14: U "255" in quadrant AC 98 following refueling, U "601" in quadrant AT 17 probably after 15 Sep., U "456" at the White Sea entrance; U "251", following refueling at Kirkenes, will be disposed as required by the situation at that time.

The fact that the task force of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers was spotted that early by a British submarine and unsuccessfully attacked by the latter proves once more that the Arctic area is greatly imperiled by submarines, particularly when enemy convoys are under way. Group North therefore orders the intensification of uninterrupted surveillance of the entrances and exits of the inter-island channels and of the entire route outside the islands when warships are being transferred. For copy see 1/Skl 22380/42 Gkdos. in operations file.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

3 British courier planes flew over the Skagerrak on their way from Sweden to England during the night of 9 Sep.

2. Own Situation:

During the night of 9 Sep. enemy planes operated in Danish waters and in the eastern and central Baltic Sea. Mines are suspected to have been laid in the Kattegat. For details see Telegram 0724. Since it is very likely that mines were laid for the first time also in the eastern portion of the Kattegat in the vicinity of Cape Kullen, it will be necessary to reroute merchant vessels. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea asks that the number of minesweepers be increased. (See Telegram 1200.) Otherwise, there is nothing to report from the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea.

One ground mine was swept off Sassnitz and one off Trelleborg.

Nothing to report from the area of the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea.

Minesweeping operations of the pinnaces were affected by bad weather.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

An enemy plane reported from the northern rendezvous area to

have scored 4 hits on a submarine in the area west of Reykjanes. 18 planes were observed in the southern rendezvous area. About the location of a northbound convoy in quadrant BE 5256 see Enemy Situation, West Area.

4 reports about sighted submarines were intercepted from the American east coast and in the West Indies.

2. Own Situation:

4 more submarines have sailed for the zone of operations, 3 of them from home bases.

Regarding operations of the Norwegian submarine group against convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

Group "Vorwaerts" is operating in quadrant AK 9699 against a westbound convoy in the North Atlantic. The air escort which, according to one of the submarines, is protecting the convoy could apparently not become very effective due to weather conditions. Thus, the submarines have good opportunities as reflected by the successes achieved:

Submarine U "657" sank an 8,000 GRT tanker

Submarine U "584" sank a straggler tanker of 9,000 GRT

Submarine U "218" sank a 5,000 GRT steamer and probably a 3,000 GRT steamer

Submarine U "96" torpedoed 3 steamers totalling 16,000 GRT, which probably sank.

In addition, a steamer of undetermined size was torpedoed by submarine U "659" and a 5,000 GRT steamer by submarine U "608". One submarine had to withdraw on account of damage through depth charges, another one moved away temporarily for the same reason. The operation continues.

Off the American east coast a 7,000 GRT transport was sunk in quadrant BB 6333 out of a small convoy by submarine U "513".

Submarine U "69" completed the mine-laying mission in Chesapeake Bay.

No reports of any successes were received from the West Indies, the South Atlantic, or the Mediterranean.

Further reports in supplement to submarine situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Giving his reasons, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines submits a request to reserve the area beyond a 600 mile radius from Capetown for submarine operations and to shift the boundaries fixed for the return voyage of the submarines to the southwest by approximately 500 miles in the southern portion and approximately 200 miles in the northern portion.

In reply, the Naval Staff decided to fix the operations area for the return voyage of Group "Eisbaer" as follows: Southern boundary is the latitude of 40° S, the western limit runs from the lower left corner of quadrant GZ 16 to the lower left corner of quadrant FE 91. The permission to attack targets within a radius of 300 miles from St. Helena and Ascension Island is withdrawn herewith. The establishment

of latitude 40° S as southern boundary was necessary in view of the blockade runner traffic to and from Japan.

For copy of telegrams, containing reasons for request and the decision see 1/Skl Iu 1779/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

2. Incursions:

There were 200 enemy incursions into western German territory during the night of 10 Sep. Their attacks centered on Duesseldorf where heavy damage was wrought. For details see daily situation report. 15 planes were shot down by our fighters, 15 by anti-aircraft artillery and 1 by naval anti-aircraft artillery.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force supported the operations of the Africa Corps. Enemy air activity was light. Otherwise nothing to report.

4. Eastern Front:

54 enemy planes were reported shot down thus far.

On 9 Sep. an He 111 plane landed on Spitsbergen in search of a suitable emergency landing place. For results of reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean see Situation, Arctic Ocean.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, 3 cruisers and 7 or 8 steamers, all of undetermined nationality, were observed off Cape de Gata about 5 miles from the coast sailing on an easterly course on the forenoon of 9 Sep.

Cape de Gata reported that engine noises could be heard throughout the night of 8 Sep. and that 10 planes on an easterly course were observed in the morning of 9 Sep.; a few hours later 3 planes passed in a westerly direction. Air reconnaissance reported nothing about the above mentioned naval force.

Nothing else to report from the entire Mediterranean area.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Enemy planes attacked Tobruk during the night of 8 Sep., in

the evening and during the night of 9 Sep. Except for a sailing vessel, no damage was caused in the harbor.

1 PT boat transferred from Naples to Augusta. As of 7 Sep., the German Naval Command, Italy is directing operations from Rome. The Naval Staff submitted copies of the survey compiled by the German Naval Command, Italy about the British August convoy from Gibraltar to Malta to the Naval Representative of the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, to the Naval Liaison Officer on the Army High Command General Staff, to the Naval Representative on the Air Force Operations Staff and to Naval Group, South; the Naval Staff pointed to its own comment on this subject of 17 Aug. (see War Diary of 17 Aug.) and the differences of opinion concerning the probable destination of the convoy.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Transport of supplies from Italy and Greece to North Africa and coastal supply traffic proceeded according to plan without major incident.

Due to interruption in communications no situation reports were received from Naval Group South. Information by telephone revealed nothing of importance.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The situation did not change essentially.

Army Group B:

Stubborn fighting for the possession of Stalingrad continues. Enemy attacks on the northern sector of the XIV Panzer Corps launched by a full division were successfully repulsed save for a temporary local penetration. A see-saw battle is in progress at the front of the Rumanian divisions east of Svoboda. The over-all situation is unchanged.

Central Army Group:

Enemy attempts to seize the highway between Demenskoye and Yukhnov were unsuccessful. West of Zubtsov our advancing troops clashed with attacking enemy forces. The battle is still in progress. Otherwise the situation in the Rzhev area remained essentially unchanged.

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Northern Army Group:

In the afternoon, units of the 11th Army launched an attack to mop up the enemy penetration south of Lake Ladoga. Enemy attempts to cross the Neva River east of Leningrad failed.

2. Finnish Front:

An enemy thrust in the Kandalaksha sector was repulsed. It is reported that a fresh Ural division has arrived in the rear of the Litsa sector and a reindeer-ski brigade for the protection of the southern flank. The enemy damaged the power line of the Kolosjoki nickel mine with explosives. The operation of this most important plant is not seriously affected.

3. North Africa:

Enemy scouting activity was light, harassing fire continued in varying force. During the period from 30 Aug. to 9 Sep. a total of 170 enemy tanks and scout cars was destroyed.

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Items of Political Importance

With regard to the British attack on Madagascar, the British Government issued an official communique saying that the attitude of the French Government has made it clear that compliance with essential demands of the British High Command made on the Governor of Madagascar regarding protection against attacks by the Axis Powers can no longer be expected by peaceful means. The British Government has no territorial claims in Madagascar, which remains French.

The U.S. State Department declares that the British step is being taken with the complete approval of the U.S. Government. The British and the U.S. Governments agree to return Madagascar to France after the war or at any moment that the necessity of Allied occupation ceases to exist.

The French Government published a communique about the invasion but limits itself to a mild condemnation of this uncalled-for attack.

As further reported from London, it is pointed out that ever since Diego Suarez was occupied, Japanese planes have been permitted to fly over the French part of the island at will; at the same time Japanese submarines have been taking on supplies and Japanese naval officers allowed to go ashore. Besides, German agents have received assistance.

Great Britain:

Referring once more to India, Churchill stated that the situation has improved and generally calmed down. Cripps' proposals which have the approval of the Government represent its official viewpoint. Churchill also stated that 140,000 Hindus enlisted during the last 2 months, leading him to conclude that the Congress Party, which represents only 1/8 of India's population, is unable to divert India's army from its duty.

During the ensuing debate, Churchill's statements were strongly attacked by the Left.

The complete address is contained in the supplement to the Foreign Press Review of the Armed Forces High Command of 11 Sep.

With regard to the responsibilities of the First Lord of the Admiralty, the War Minister and the Air Minister in case of combined operations of the 3 branches of the Armed Forces, Churchill declared that the main responsibility rests with the War Cabinet and the Defense Minister, while the individual ministers are responsible for the details within the competence of their respective offices.

In a debate about the question of pay, the present pay rate of the Armed Forces was severely criticized in comparison with the much higher pay of the U.S. forces in Great Britain.

Turkey:

The German Embassy reports that Willkie arrived at Ankara on 8 Sep. and intends to proceed to Teheran on 10 Sep. He will not see the President since he does not carry any special message from Roosevelt.

Argentina:

The arrest of 1st Lieutenant Drews of GRAF SPEE was due to his refusal

to appear before the committee investigating anti-Argentine activities. His release is expected shortly, as a consequence of a German official protest.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Naval Staff has returned from his inspection trip to the Crimea. The Commanding Admiral, Black Sea urgently needs a vacation for reasons of health. The Commander in Chief, Navy agreed to having Rear Admiral Heye substitute for him as suggested by the Commanding Admiral, Group South.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division reports as follows:

a. The German-Japanese naval communications agreement was signed today and went into effect. This represents a major step toward cooperation between Germany and Japan. For copy see 1/Skl 22952/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

b. American planes, engaged in special missions under fighter escort, have recently been interfering with the Air Force's anti-aircraft warning service in the west area. Countermeasures are absolutely required in order to avert trouble.

c. The newly developed radar set for flying boats ("Hohentwiel") has a range of 15 km at an altitude of 50 m and a range of 400 km at an altitude of 1000 m. It thus approximates the performance of the British equipment.

d. The Chief, Naval Staff calls attention to the complaint of the Commanding Admiral, Group South about the inadequacy of technical communications within the Group's area and requests the Chief, Communications Division, Naval Staff to send an expert to this area to assist in improving the situation.

III. As reported by the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division the Fuehrer commented on the Navy's tasks for the coming winter. Survival in this war depends on the undisturbed possession and exploitation of the Petsamo nickel mines. It is therefore clear that the seizure of northern Norway and the disruption of German communication lines to this area remain a prime objective of enemy strategy. For this reason, the principal task of the Navy, apart from submarine warfare, consists in bolstering the defense of northern Norway and all available forces must be concentrated there. The Fuehrer demands that the TIRPITZ, if at all possible, not be sent to Germany for shipyard overhaul. Neither does he agree with the operations planned for the heavy naval forces.

With regard to the above, the Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff remarks as follows:

The reinforcement suggested may be achieved with gun barges, as planned for the Channel area.

The transfer of SCHARNHORST and NUERNBERG to northern Norway has already been arranged for. The Diesel engines of the TIRPITZ could possibly be repaired at Trondheim. The shipyard overhaul of the SCHEER can be postponed until summer, if necessary. Besides, a stay of not more than 4 weeks at a German shipyard could be justified.

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The Chief, Naval Staff emphasizes the correctness of the Fuehrer's judgment and orders an immediate examination of the ship repair facilities in Norway.

The Naval Construction Division reports that the SCHEER can be docked at Oslo. The Fleet Commander would prefer the transfer to a German shipyard.

IV. The Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff reports further about the shipyard worker problem:

The 300 militarized workers assigned to the Aegean Sea must be included in the 3,200 men to be supplied by the Naval Recruitment Division. Besides, the Minister of Armament and War Production reported to the Fuehrer that it was impossible to carry out his order to release the shipyard workers required. The Fuehrer, while not repealing his directive, has ordered the Minister of Armament and War Production to take the matter up with the Commander in Chief, Navy once more. Thus the matter stands where it was before.

The Fuehrer also ordered that drastic measures be taken in connection with the bomb plot at the Brest submarine pen.

The Commander in Chief, Navy will advise the Commanding Admiral, France to this effect directly by telephone.

The Fuehrer refuses to accept the reported schedule for the reinforcement of the heavy coastal batteries and orders that this job be speeded without reducing the thickness of the concrete construction. The only thing that can be omitted is the concrete roofing of the heavy batteries in circular mounts.

V. The Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff reports his concern about the problem of training young officers for Fleet forces; so far, the entire crop of new officers has been assigned to submarines and the air forces. The Commander in Chief, Navy calls for a report on this subject by the Naval Officer Personnel Division and the Naval Recruitment Division.

VI. The Chief, Naval Staff and the Naval Staff discussed the Fuehrer's demand for severest retaliation in reply to the reported British behavior on sinking the mine-laying vessel ULM; they agreed that this delicate problem requires the most thorough study lest such measures boomerang and hurt German crews. It would furthermore be the first instance within the annals of naval warfare that an explicit order to use force against shipwrecked personnel would be given.

As far as the ULM incident is concerned, the facts known at this moment by no means present a clear picture of the situation. The result of the investigation, which is still in progress, will be submitted to the Fuehrer.

VII. As reported by the Naval Construction Division, the shipyard work on the LUETZOW will be completed by the end of October so that the ship will probably be ready for operations following the necessary tests, etc. on 16 Nov.

Thus, the repair will take much longer than estimated and it appears uncertain whether the ship can be assigned, as planned, to the training course for gunnery officers; this matter has had to be

postponed a number of times in spite of its great urgency. Since the cause of the delay is attributed to the lack of skilled labor, the Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff suggests that this case also be submitted to the Minister of Armament and War Production as well as to the Fuehrer as an example of the difficulties resulting from the labor scarcity in all fields.

In a Very Restricted Circle:

VIII. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the Armed Forces High Command directive of 5 Sep. concerning operation "Nordlicht"; see War Diary of 6 Sep., Special Items.

A report is also made about the account of the German General attached to Italian High Command Headquarters; see War Diary of 9 Sep.

Special Items:

The Naval Staff submits copies of its comment on the North African situation (see War Diary of 8 Sep.) to the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters, to the Naval Representative on the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command and to the Naval Liaison Officer to the Army General Staff for their information and states in this connection:

The Suez area and Egypt represent the key to the British position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Naturally, the enemy too, has recognized that the establishment of an impregnable front in this area is the most important strategic problem at this moment. If the Army believes that an attack on the Suez area from the west is impossible, it should launch an offensive against the Suez area from the east and penetrate to Basra in order to prevent an enemy threat to our flank and at the same time eliminate the Iraq oil fields.

However, the following should be taken into account: Germany went to war in the Mediterranean in order to assist her Italian ally in order to protect the Mediterranean position and Italy. This vital task has lost none of its importance and the protection of the Mediterranean front demands that the North African front must be held. This in turn hinges on the flow of supplies, which can be maintained only if Malta is either completely paralyzed or seized. As we have learned from experience, it takes the continuous commitment of strong forces to tie up Malta without capturing it, besides causing constant high losses and wear and tear on equipment. The early seizure of Malta therefore remains a must and should not be delayed by waiting for favorable weather conditions in the summer 1943; this step should be taken soon.

The situation therefore calls for strong forces in the Mediterranean in any case; the elimination of Malta requires considerable reinforcement of our air forces and strengthening of the North African front. On the other hand, the success of a thrust against the Suez area from the east through the Caucasus and across Turkey is doubtful and requires strong forces, too. For all these reasons the Naval Staff maintains that it should be attempted with everything we have to take Suez from the west.

For copy of telegram 1/Skl I b (plan) 1775/42 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

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Situation 11 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

On 10 Sep. the German Ambassador at Buenos Aires reported that according to statements made to the Hungarian Charge d'Affaires on 9 Sep. at the Argentine Foreign Office, news was very recently received from Rio de Janeiro to the effect that a major operation against Dakar originating from Brazil is planned by the Allies in the near future. This is supposed to be the surprise announced in Churchill's address.

Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

As suggested by the Commander in Chief, Navy, on 3 Sep. the Fuehrer promoted the captain of ship "28", Commander (Naval Reserve) von Ruckdeschell to Captain (Naval Reserve) for extraordinary distinction in action.

The Naval Staff transmits this information to ship "28" with congratulations of the Commander in Chief, Navy. See Radiogram 2202.

The sailing order issued on 6 Sep. to the TANNENFELS is cancelled and the ship instructed to proceed to the rendezvous point with ship "28", 1° north and 7° 30' west of point "Saege". The Naval Staff figures that she will arrive there on 18 Sep. at the earliest. Immediately following the rendezvous with ship "28" another rendezvous with ship "23" is to take place at a point 3° south of the rendezvous point with ship "28". From there the TANNENFELS has orders to proceed to Europe via point "Treibanker". (See Radiogram 0428.)

The Naval Attache at Tokyo reports by Telegram 1818:

(1) The Japanese Navy requests that prisoners not be disembarked at Batavia this time, but taken to Japan.

(2) The Japanese Navy is now investigating whether it might be possible to sail through Macassar Strait to Medan and to pick up 30 German sailors who are desired in Tokyo as a personnel reserve. Cable reply is requested whether the SCHLIEMANN is able to comply.

(3) Due to the lack of tankers, the Japanese Navy is eager to utilize the empty tank space of the SCHLIEMANN to transport crude oil to Japan from the south area. This was approved; the freight rate is to be determined later. Cable reply is requested regarding the available space. Loading port will be named at the proper time.

The Naval Staff instructs ship "10" via Radiogram 2016 about the positions of enemy vessels, the names of which are being used by our vessels for camouflage purposes. All ships in foreign waters are informed by Radiogram 0711 about the cover names being used by the blockade runners TANNENFELS, KULMERLAND, and DRESDEN, sailing from Japan.

Radiogram 2247 informs the UCKERMARK that the Naval Staff takes charge of her on 12 Sep. at 0600.

Enemy situation report to all ships in foreign waters by Radiograms 0635 and 1613.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

At 1645 radio monitoring intercepted a message from a British plane about sighting a medium sized merchant vessel in quadrant BF 7931 on a 300° course; after 1905 a British plane repeatedly reported about an attack on a merchant vessel sailing an easterly course 10 miles west of Cape Ortegal.

An intelligence report from Spain contains statements of enemy diplomats at Barcelona, according to which U.S. parachute units arrived with 2 convoys at southwestern Scotland a short time ago and are to be used for impending nuisance raids on the Channel coast.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

For the information of WESERLAND and SPICHERN, three FW 200 planes conducted long-range reconnaissance in the area between 42° 30' N and 43° 30' N to 21° 00' W. According to weather forecasts a visibility of approximately 8 miles is to be expected off the Spanish northwestern coast and northeast of the Azores; visibility will probably increase further on 12 Sep. The reconnaissance mission brought no results. Group West kept WESERLAND, SPICHERN and BRAKE informed about weather reports and German reconnaissance activity. Up to daybreak no reports from German sources were received about the fate of the merchant vessels spotted and attacked by enemy aircraft; these are undoubtedly our blockade runners.

At 2225 the tanker ERMLAND, proceeding from La Pallice to St. Nazaire, was damaged by a mine, but continued on her course with one engine.

Channel Coast:

The mine-laying operations "Nacht" and "Falter" as well as the mine-laying mission of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla were carried out during the night of 10 Sep. according to plan. For short report of 5th PT Boat Flotilla see Telegram 0820.

Enemy ships north and northeast of Cherbourg were located and shelled by Army coastal batteries; it is assumed that these ships were operating against our PT boats.

Torpedo missions of the 2nd, 4th and 6th PT Boat Flotillas, totalling 14 boats, directed against convoy traffic brought no results as far as steamers were concerned. The boats made contact, however, with light enemy combat forces. A crippled enemy motor launch was captured and taken in tow by boats of the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla after her crew had been rescued by another British ship--whether all or only part of the crew is not clear from the report. All secret documents, the radar set and charts were captured. The captured launch was handed over to patrol vessels and tugs off Den Helder, which brought her safely into port.

Some of our PT boats suffered slight damage and casualties. According to prisoner statements, all of the enemy motor gunboats and motor launches had sailed from their bases at 1800 of 10 Sep. for the purpose of intercepting our PT boats. For short reports of the 3 flotillas involved in this action see Telegrams 1929, 1900, and 2135.

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Although the operation did not attain its original object, it was a gratifying success through the capture of the enemy ship, the documents, and the radar set.

Special Item:

An inquiry of the Naval Staff brought the following reply from Group West:

The Commanding Admiral, France reports that apart from the Casquets, the following naval posts exist on isolated cliffs and in lighthouses located beyond the coastal defenses:

a. Area of the Admiral, Channel Coast:

Radio beacon Vierville (to be transferred shortly to the base)
Lighthouse and radio beacon Ver
Lighthouse Cape de la Hague
Radio beacon Linreville (transfer to Anoville in progress)
Lighthouse Le Grand Jardin, located on a rock off St. Malo
Lighthouse at Naval Signal Station Corbiere
Lighthouse Sercq

b. Area of the Admiral, Western France:

Roches Douvres, La Paon Roseda, La Croix (entrance of Lezardrieux), Les Heaux de Brehat, Les Sept Iles de la Batz, Ile Vierge, Les Pierres Noires, Ar Men, and Ile Penfret.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

At 1040 a submarine was sighted off Ijmuiden by a control vessel of the Admiral, Holland, which may have had some connection with the attempted flight of 2 Dutch engineers in a paddle boat.

Own Situation:

During the night of 10 Sep. a great number of enemy planes flew in and out of the area of the Admiral, Holland. 1 low-flying plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft artillery. Bombs were dropped near Rotterdam and mines off Terschelling. Patrol boats shot down 2 more planes.

The diving tender OLDENBURG was attacked by enemy planes on 10 Sep. in the German Bight; no damage was inflicted. A group of 2 patrolling vessels was attacked at 0445 by an enemy PT boat in quadrant AN 8315; patrol vessel "1239" was severely damaged by a torpedo hit and suffered casualties; she was towed to Terschelling. Due to the report about an enemy submarine off Ijmuiden the area is being kept under surveillance and an investigation of the matter is under way. It is suspected that mines were dropped on the approach to Hook of Holland.

6 mines were swept in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North, 1 of them by a mine-sweeping plane.

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Convoy and patrol service according to plan. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North reports that the British vessel towed to Den Helder was identified as motor gunboat "335".

Group North points out that last night's lively enemy activity in the Scheldt estuary, reports about parachutists, heavy air activity, British PT boats and gunboats off the Dutch coast, and the submarine sighted off Ijmuiden all merit attention.

2. Norway:

Enemy planes were active over Petsamo on 8 and 9 Sep., over Kirkenes on 10 Sep. and over Stavanger on 11 Sep.

Convoy and minesweeping operations proceeded without incident according to plan.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway reports his intention to assign 3 minelaying vessels to lay the 7 anti-submarine barrages between Kristiansand South and Stavanger in 2 stages probably on 18 Sep. For details see Telegram 1270.

With regard to Group North's suggestion to provide a minefield against surface forces east of the anti-submarine barrage in the closed Baroe area, the Commanding Admiral, Norway points out that the Naval Staff turned down a similar plan as long ago as 10 Mar. 1941. (See Telegram 1920.)

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report of 10 Sep. from Denmark, a convoy of 8 steamers sailed from Hval Fjord for Russia on 7 Sep.; this is probably part of convoy PQ 18.

Air reconnaissance brought no further information.

Own Situation:

On the basis of reports from the Admiral, Arctic Ocean and Group North, the Naval Staff submitted the following summary of the day's events to the Fuehrer Headquarters, the Armed Forces High Command and the Commander in Chief, Air Force:

(1) No new information was received concerning convoys PQ 18 and QP 14.

(2) The task force of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers transferred according to plan and anchored in Kaa Fjord at 0400 on 11 Sep. The force was detected by the enemy (by their radio intercept service) when emerging from the Gimsoestraumen and the Gavle Fjord. An enemy submarine in quadrant AB 9858 fired a 4-fan, but missed.

The 5th Destroyer Flotilla reports that the ECKOLDT will leave Bogen Bay for Alta Fjord at 0600 on 12 Sep.

Visibility in the western portion of the 5th Air Force's reconnaissance sector was greatly reduced by rain, snow squalls, and in parts also by fog setting on the surface, all of which explains why PQ 18 could not be observed.

~~7 submarines~~ of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean will be posted as of 13 Sep.

at 1200 in a patrol line extending from quadrant AB 32 to quadrant AB 38.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Convoy and patrol missions in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea were carried out according to plan. Group North is unable at present to comply with his suggestion for reinforcing the minesweepers. (See War Diary of 10 Sep.) The Group points out that the small available forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea must be concentrated on the principal traffic routes as in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North, and that traffic must be re-routed and limited to a few ports. For this reason it is urgent that the bulk of traffic be shifted from Aalborg to Aarhuus, as planned by the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea. If necessary the Hirtshals area will have to be kept closed for some time. The main traffic must be routed east of Laesoe-Anholt through very deep water. (See Telegram 1351.)

Mine-sweeping activity in the area of the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea was reduced to a minimum on account of bad weather.

Convoy operations proceeded without interference according to plan.

With respect to the demand of the Swedish Navy that German troop transports should not use the Falsterbo Canal, Group North has taken a stand, which in the opinion of the German Naval Attache at Stockholm, may have political repercussions. The Naval Attache at Stockholm requests new instructions. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. In this connection the Commanding Admiral, Group North, recommends urgently that any rights which we may have for using the Canal not be sacrificed for petty political considerations.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

As revealed by intercepted radio messages, subchasers were directed against a periscope allegedly sighted in the eastern portion of the Firth of Forth.

Very lively reconnaissance activity ranged over the Bay of Biscay as far as the northern Spanish coast. A submarine proceeding on a southerly course was attacked by a plane southeast of Cape St. Vincent.

8 submarine sighting reports were intercepted off the American coast, and 2 from the Caribbean; a submarine attack was also reported from the Caribbean Sea.

2. Own Situation:

Regarding the operations of the Norwegian submarines see Situation Arctic Ocean. The operations of Group "Vorwaerts" in the North Atlantic against the westbound convoy continued with good results.

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Submarine U "92" torpedoed a 4,000 GRT steamer; she was not observed to sink.

Submarine U "96" sank a sailing vessel by gunfire.

Submarine U "380" fired a 4-fan at a 9,000 GRT tanker; 3 detonations were heard but no result observed.

Submarine U "211" observed 4 hits on 4 steamers with a 4-fan; no sinkings were observed.

The reports received give no indication to what degree the attacked ships were damaged or sunk.

Submarine U "92" heard 2 detonations as a result of a 4-fan fired against a destroyer.

Reports about achievements off the American coast were not received.

Submarine "U 514" sank 2 steamers totalling 12,000 GRT off Barbados and the schooner HELEN FORSEY in quadrant DD 92 by gunfire.

Nothing of particular importance was reported from the South Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

A highly deplorable loss is the death of Commander Muetzelburg the captain of submarine U "203", as the result of an accident.

Additional reports in supplement to Submarine Situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In the Africa Corps area dive bomber and fighter bomber attacks were carried out with good results.

3. Eastern Front:

81 enemy planes were shot down at the various Army sectors.

Reconnaissance flights of 6 FW 200's in the Arctic Ocean furnished no information due to bad weather.

An enemy camp at Eina Guba and camps and debarkations at Pikyushev were raided with observed good results.

Special Item:

The Commanding Admiral, Group North reports that only one of the 8 minesweeping planes allocated to Group North on 16 Aug. by the Commander in Chief, Air Force has been received so far and requests that the promised

remaining planes be assigned as soon as possible in view of the acute threat from ground mines.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

The CHARYBDIS sailed from Gibraltar during the night of 10 Sep. in an unknown direction. None of the ships reported off Cape de Gata on 9 Sep. was observed in the Mediterranean, so that this report was probably in error.

Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Enemy planes raided Tobruk during the night of 10 Sep.; no damage was reported.

At 0150 of 10 Sep. the Italian hospital ship ARNO en route from Naples to Tobruk was torpedoed by enemy planes north of Tobruk and sank 9 hours later. 200 men were rescued, 70 are missing. Further details must be awaited.

The decision of the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff regarding the proposal of the German General attached to Italian High Command Headquarters about the minefield in the Strait of Sicily conforms to the wishes of the Naval Staff (see War Diary of 8 Sep.).

For copy of telegram see 1/Skl 22403/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Tanker ABRUZZI, which was damaged on 1 Sep., was towed from the emergency port of Ras el Hilal to Benghazi on 10 Sep.

Transports proceeded according to plan and without major incident.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The naval situation remained unchanged on 10 and 11 Sep.

Group South submits a report of the Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea, which had already been brought to the knowledge of the Commander in Chief, Navy during his visit to the Crimea; it calls attention to the fact that the funds at the Navy's disposal will be completely exhausted by 15 Sep. by payments for ship repairs and materials due to the inflation of Greek currency. The same situation will arise in the administrative section and will necessitate discontinuing of all ship repair work on 15 Sep., including work on the steamer MENES. Since the Greek workmen will disperse, it will later be necessary to build up from scratch a working force for the shipyards and repair shops. The Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea warns of the gravity of the situation. (See Telegram 1210.)

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With these conditions in mind Group South requests a decision whether:

a. The order limiting funds for Greece is to be revoked, or

b. Repair work, new construction and acquisition of supplies is to be stopped. (See Telegram 1230.)

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will study this matter and consult the Armed Forces High Command as well as the Ministries of Economics and Finance.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring has been intercepting messages from a battleship, escorted by flotilla leader KHARKOV and 2 destroyers, in the southeastern part of the Black Sea since the evening of 10 Sep., and another destroyer in the northeastern part. A submarine was located at 1930 northeast of Cape Sinope.

Reconnaissance planes sighted a small northbound convoy off Sochi and a southbound escorted merchant vessel west of Sukhum.

According to a report from the Naval Defense Unit Black Sea, the flotilla leader TASHKENT and the destroyer BDITELNIY are lying on the bottom of the harbor of Novorossisk, their guns removed.

Own Situation:

4 vessels of the 3rd Mine Sweeper Flotilla swept 15 mines between Kerch and Anapa. Off Anapa a Russian barrage of inertia contact mines was found. Otherwise mine-sweeping operations proceeded according to plan.

A single-row net barrage was laid off Feodosiya.

It was belatedly reported that a third Italian subchaser was damaged during the enemy air raid on Yalta on 9 Sep.

Convoy service proceeded uneventfully.

Group South reports that only 3 German PT boats and 3 Italian subchasers, aside from the small submarines, will be available for operations until the beginning of October. The naval barges engaged in operation "Bluecher" have suffered considerable damage and require repair urgently before they can be used at sea. The Group therefore proposes to Army Group A that these naval barges be replaced immediately by Siebel ferries for a period of 3 weeks. (See Telegram 1230.)

Naval Group South anticipates an intensification of activity on the part of the Russian Black Sea fleet; due to lack of offensive weapons of its own, the Group further proposes to Army Group A and the 4th Air Force that they paralyze the enemy by air attacks.

A copy of this proposal was submitted to the Naval Staff with the remark that Group South believes it necessary to inform also the Armed Forces High Command.

The Naval Staff therefore informed the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff of the above.

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Group South further informed the Naval Staff about its protest to Army Group A against the use of the Army's motor boat group "Loeper" for coastal patrols off Novorossisk which was placed under the command of Army Group Ruoff. (See Telegram 1400.)

This step corresponds to the viewpoint of the Naval Staff, too.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

Fighting immediately east of Novorossisk continues. West of Mozdok an assault detachment of tanks succeeded in breaking through the enemy position south of the Terek River and in advancing beyond the Kurp River. An enemy armored train was stopped north of Grozny.

Army Group B:

The battle for Stalingrad continues. An enemy attack at the juncture of German and Italian forces at Bolshoi was halted by an Italian counterattack.

Central Army Group:

Enemy attacks on both sides of the Volga River and the Zubtsov-Rzhev road were repulsed by the "Grossdeutschland" Infantry Division. Otherwise nothing to report.

Northern Army Group:

The enemy attacked at Soltsy, south of Lake Ladoga and on the Neva River sector.

2. Finnish Front:

Enemy attacks on the Kandalaksha sector were repulsed. Lively ship traffic was observed in Motovsky Bay in the direction of the Rybachi Peninsula.

3. North Africa:

No situation report was received from the Panzer Army.

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Items of Political Importance

The significance of Africa for Allied warfare is being discussed in the U.S. press at the present time. It is said that Roosevelt's and Churchill's speeches clearly forecast an Allied offensive to regain control of the Mediterranean. If any major operation against Germany is to be undertaken from the west, it is imperative to secure the Allied Mediterranean flank. It is known that U.S. troops recently landed in the Belgian Congo. The problem of Africa from a strategic angle is also being discussed in the Spanish press.

Great Britain:

The Trade Union Convention rejected a motion demanding the immediate establishment of the second front and decided to leave the decision and the timing of this matter to the Government. This resolution is considered as a personal success for Churchill and as consolidating the position of the War Cabinet.

Spain:

The Transocean News Agency reports that Suner is gathering a circle of loyal personalities who are to prepare his return to political activity. Prominent friends of Suner have resigned their membership in the Falangist organization. It was officially announced that the leaders of the Falange and the civil governors of 4 provinces have resigned.

The reorganization of the Cabinet does not appear to have eased the internal political tension.

Iran:

The German News Agency (DNB) reports from Istanbul that all combat forces of the Russian occupation army in western Iran have been withdrawn. Only special forces of the Police Commissariat have been left behind. Unrest continues and also the insurrection of the Kurds gained momentum.

Argentina:

According to a Spanish report, the Minister of the Interior has ordered the crew of the GRAF SPEE to be interned in a guarded concentration camp in order to prevent further attempts to escape.

Special Items:

I. As regards preparations for operation "Ilona", Group West plans to concentrate the naval forces and forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West in the take-off ports at the beginning of a 10-day advance warning period which the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West will announce. The Army is planning to capture the various ports by land without assistance on the Navy's part. Thus there are no Army units to be embarked. Apart from a request to have 1,000 ELC mines and 1,000 type B anti-submarine mines ready in time at Chateaudun, the Group reports that plans for laying barrages can only be made after the situation is ripe for it. It may become necessary to call for 2 mine-laying vessels.

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The Naval Staff approves these plans and is investigating what quantity of mines can be placed at the Group's disposal as operational reserve at Chateaudun.

With reference to the Fuehrer's directive concerning operation "Ilona", the Naval Staff points out that the war situation does not permit accumulating armament, ammunition, etc. exclusively for operation "Ilona". The Commanding Admiral, France has meanwhile made considerable demands which have led to a depletion of the torpedo supply of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines. Group West is therefore requested to reexamine the measures ordered for immediate execution with this in mind.

II. In the course of preliminary planning for operation "Aida" the Naval Staff called on the German Naval Command, Italy to analyze the possibilities of using Italian special weapons in the North Sea and the Channel and also Italian subchasers in the Mediterranean to reinforce the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla. (See War Diary of 15 Jun. and File "Aida".) In the opinion of the German Naval Command, Italy, standard Italian subchasers offer no prospects of success in torpedo and mine-laying operations off the English south and southeastern coasts, an opinion which coincides with that held by the Naval Staff. As far as the commitment of Italian subchasers for the support of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla is concerned, the German Naval Command, Italy calls attention to the fact that the Italian Navy has just transferred 12 subchasers to North Africa which are engaged in operations there. The German Naval Command, Italy holds that it is impossible to include them in German PT boat operations because of insufficient training, even if they could be placed under German command, which is highly improbable.

III. The Commander in Chief, Navy ordered the allocation of gun barges to Norway. (See War Diary of 11 Sep.) At the present time 64 naval barges are in use in Norway. 149 more are under construction, 10 of which have been assigned for use as guncarriers to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West, and 10 to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North. 39 are reserved for the Admiral, Amphibious Forces for operation "Wiesengrund"; he already has 81 completed barges for that purpose at his disposal. Consequently 90 of the barges under construction have not yet been allocated and could be equipped as guncarriers immediately. Should operation "Wiesengrund" be cancelled and the 120 barges allotted to it not be required for other operations, these, too, would become available. It must be considered, however, that motor barges once fitted as guncarriers would require another reconversion if they were to be used as transports later on, so that only those that are absolutely needed should be converted into guncarriers. The Commanding Admiral, Norway is requested (copy to Group North) to report how many guncarriers are considered necessary to reinforce the coastal defenses in the Norwegian area.

IV. It can be expected that Russian ships will attempt to pass through the Dardanelles in the event that all Russian Black Sea bases are eliminated. Such an attempt on the part of warships would be a violation of the Montreux Convention, the stipulations of which would probably be invoked by Turkey. Similar restrictions do not exist, however, in the case of merchant vessels. The Naval Staff is therefore investigating whether and how the stipulations of the Montreux Convention could be applied to merchant vessels, too. Should this question be clarified in our favor, the Naval Staff intends to suggest that the Foreign Office get in touch with Turkey.

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Situation 12 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Neutrals:

The Portuguese Ambassador informed the Foreign Office that the Portuguese steamer LUANGO sailed from Baltimore to Havana at 1600, and that steamer VILLA FRANCA will sail on or after 13 Sep. from San Joan to Portugal.

3. Own Situation:

Ships "28" and "23" are informed about the operations of Group "Eisbaer" by Radiogram 1856. The Naval Staff leaves it to the two auxiliary cruisers to meet for a discussion of their respective zones of operation until withdrawal of the submarines from the South Atlantic. Until an agreement is reached the longitude of 15° W remains the boundary line between these zones.

Radiogram 1918 advises the DRESDEN to proceed from point "Rose" directly to point "Dispache".

The suggestion of the Naval Attache at Tokyo to mine the eastern entrance of the strait is declined for political reasons. (See Telegram 0100.)

The Naval Attache at Tokyo reports that the Japanese Admiralty's permission for operations by ship "10" on her voyage to the Sunda Straits should be construed to mean merely an agreement to a shift of the ship's zone of operation. It is not to be construed as an approval of a visit to Japan, which is still dependent on the adjustment of the oil problem, as clearly stated by the Japanese. The Attache recommends that ship "10" should under no circumstances be allowed to proceed to Japan unless the oil supply problem has been settled. (See Telegram 1158.)

Radiogram 1621 notifies all ships in foreign waters that after 13 Sep. submarines are prohibited from attacking unescorted single ships on route "Anton". Enemy situation report by Radiograms 0753 and 0341.

The Naval Attache at Tokyo reports the information gathered from a British radio operator who had been aboard the GEDANIA as member of the prize crew. This man stated that the GEDANIA was captured on 4 Jun. 1941 by an auxiliary cruiser; measures to scuttle the ship were ineffective, the explosion going off mainly in the interior. All secret documents were allegedly thrown overboard so that none of them fell into enemy hands. The crew remained unharmed.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance revealed the following ships at ~~Plymouth~~

in the afternoon: 2 battleships, one of them in dock, 3 cruisers, one of them in dock, 2 destroyers, 2 submarines, etc.

Photo reconnaissance of 10 Sep. on the southern coast from Portland to Eastbourne showed no change in the number of landing craft. The areas west of Portland and east of Eastbourne were not covered. Changes regarding the anchorages of landing craft in the Poole area and the presence on the beach of Cowes of boats previously observed at Southamptom indicates that landing maneuvers are going on continuously.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

SPICHERN reported at 0259: "Am breaking off operation, my position 6° 30' W. Require assistance urgently. Plane at 0800."

From the grouping of the signal it is believed that the vessel is undamaged.

Group West informs the SPICHERN that the intention to discontinue operation is approved and that 3 torpedo boats are leaving St. Jean de Luz immediately to meet her.

The BRAKE receives orders to "break off mission, return immediately, escort forces will meet you at the point of departure."

Both ships are informed that assistance by air forces may be expected after daybreak. (See Radiogram 0448.)

The Group reports the measures taken to the Naval Staff by Radiogram 0505.

3 German planes took off at 0630 and at 0740.

WESERLAND is notified by Group West that the weather forecast indicates a visibility of 5 to 8 miles along her probable route.

SPICHERN was picked up by the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla at 1040 in quadrant BF 9717. Her port engine is out of commission due to explosion of a bomb near the ship. BRAKE is under way to La Pallice.

> Thus for the first time a breakthrough attempt of the 2 blockade runners has failed. WESERLAND and UCKERMARK seem to have been luckier this time.

Channel Coast:

Mine-laying mission "Schlaf" was carried out according to plan. Nothing else to report.

Special Items:

Group West submitted its reply to the questions regarding the Casquets outpost; relayed by the Operations Division, Naval Staff from Fuehrer Headquarters. The fact is stressed that Casquets is not a strong point but merely an advanced post. Group West believes that the post was taken by a ruse, because no signs of a struggle have been found; access to the cliff appears possible only

with the aid of people thoroughly familiar with the locality, which could have been provided by the former British lighthouse crew which had fled to England. For copy of the report which answers all questions in great detail see 1/Skl 22621/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

During the engagement of 11 Sep. 2 British motor gun boats were severely damaged and had to be taken in tow by other vessels. An enemy attempt at boarding patrol vessel VP " 1239" was foiled with hand grenades. Another attack by 2 motor gunboats on a group of patrol vessels at point "Alex" is reported from the Dutch coast as having taken place during the night of 10 Sep.; on this occasion 1 hit was observed on each of the attackers, while our patrol vessels suffered no damage.

Steamer DITTMAR KOEL struck a mine in quadrant AN 6999 at 0505 and was towed into the Elbe estuary.

The request of the Commander in Chief, Air Force concerning fighter protection for Swedish convoys in the German Bight was relayed to Group North by the Naval Staff. In this connection the Group reports that fighter protection will be provided to the extent warranted by the available forces.

2. Norway:

Steamer ROBERT BORNHOFEN (6,643 GRT) carrying coal sank en route from Tromsoe to Kirkenes 6 miles south of Honningsvaag following an explosion, the cause of which is not known yet.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway reports that the remaining 4 vessels of the 5th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla cannot be dismissed for shipyard repairs at present in view of the newly arisen submarine situation resulting from the fleet operations against convoy PQ 18.

Group North directs the Commanding Admiral, Norway to lay the anti-submarine barrages between Kristiansand South and Stavanger at the earliest possible moment. The 4th Minesweeper Flotilla cannot be withdrawn from northern Norway for the time being. Mine-laying ships ROLAND and SKAGERRAK, lying at Swinemuende, and KAISER at Wesermuende are assigned to the operational command of the Commanding Admiral, Norway.

The Armed Forces High Command considers it unnecessary that the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway should be hooked up directly with the Air Force - Navy circuit. Both the Commanding Admiral, Norway and the 5th Air Force are responsible for informing the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway concerning the naval

situation and air reconnaissance of interest to him; they also furnish him with a survey of the over-all situation based on the various individual reports after evaluation. (See Telegram 1700.)

This decision refers to a request submitted by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway welcomes the announcement of the Naval Staff about the manufacture of cutter floats suitable for depths of 100 m to 500 m and will use them in the future for new flanking barrages; however, he considers it impossible to lay them in addition to and in front of already existing flanking barrages, because mine-laying vessels cannot be used in the dangerous neighborhood of the minefields and because the motor minesweepers, which alone are suitable for this purpose, would have to be withdrawn from their other activities for many months.

To this the Naval Staff remarks that these protective barrages can also be laid at greater distances from existing minefields without losing any of their effectiveness. It is acknowledged that the Commanding Admiral, Norway is short of vessels. As a matter of principle, the possibility of laying cutter floats later should be kept in mind.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Operation against convoy PQ 18:

a. Convoy PQ 18 was spotted at 1320 in quadrant AB 4642 by air reconnaissance. It was proceeding on a 70° course and consisted of 27 merchant vessels, 1 aircraft carrier, and 5 destroyers. Since 1803 submarine U "405" has been maintaining contact with the convoy in quadrant AB 2787. The positions reported by the submarine and by the Air Force do not agree; it is assumed that the latter's report is incorrect.

b. A heavy enemy force (2 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 5 destroyers) was sighted by air reconnaissance at 1215 in quadrant AE 2631. General course 30°.

At 1205 the Air Force reported 3 light cruisers, 5 destroyers and 1 tanker in quadrant AG 4877 on a 230° course, position not clearly defined (by weather observation plane). At 1040 another plane reported 8 destroyers on varying courses in quadrant AG 7861. These reports may refer to the same enemy force; it seems that light combat forces are refueling at the position mentioned.

d. Thus far 3 submarines are operating against the convoy; 5 more are approaching the passage between Bear Island and the South Cape.

Fuehrer Headquarters, the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, and the Operations Staff, Air Force were informed of the above by the Naval Staff.

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean combined the 7 submarines operating against convoy PQ 18 into a special group "Traegertod". "Nomen sit omen." ("Traegertod" = the death of the carrier. Tr. N.)

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12 Sep. 1942

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Mine-exploding vessel "24" struck a mine in the Great Belt and was towed to Kiel. Convoy operations in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea proceeded according to plan.

The laying of minefields "Sauna IV" and "Seeigel 34" in the area of the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea was prevented by bad weather. Minesweeping activity had to be curtailed.

A Finnish steamer was torpedoed by an enemy submarine on the evening of 11 Sep. in the Gulf of Bothnia about 50 miles east of Gaevle and another Finnish steamer at noon of 11 Sep. in the southern Aaland Sea. As a consequence transport and convoy service from Libau to Reval has been suspended.

Group North has now modified the minelaying plans of the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea for the prevention of a possible break-through of the Russian fleet, and has canceled the plan for a barrage east of the "Seeigel" barrage; instead, the Group has ordered that an uninterrupted mine belt extending from the Finnish inter-island passages to the Esthonian coast, west and south of the "Seeigel" minefield, be laid, which is to be made particularly strong at points where the Russian ships might attempt a break-through. This operation (code name "Seeteufel"), in which the Finnish Naval Staff is to participate, is to be carried out with all available German and Finnish mines and cutter floats. In addition, provisions are to be made for the immediate laying of cutter floats and interspersed mines east of the "Nashorn" minefield and in the "Sauna" and "Brummbaer" areas in case of an emergency.

V. Merchant Shipping

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping submits a survey of the intended use of shipping space in September 1942:

The tonnage needed for Armed Forces supplies and other important supplies for Norway have increased to approximately 700,000 - 750,000 tons. It remains to be seen whether the quantities provided for northern Norway can be handled by the harbors of the area.

Tonnage needed for Finland amounts to approximately 130,000 tons, for the Baltic countries approximately 75,000 to 120,000 tons.

For shipments of coal from the North Sea approximately 300,000 to 350,000 tons are needed.

In view of the advanced season and the supply situation, the shipment of Lulea ore and of timber for mines, paper manufacture and building purposes must be speeded as much as possible. Greatest importance is to be placed therefore on stepping up the circulation of available tonnage. There must be no interference with shipping on the transport routes.

It is difficult to increase ore shipments as ordered by the Fuehrer,

since neutral tonnage is carrying the bulk of all shipments and any increase in the amount of German shipping space would be possible only at the expense of the transports to Norway. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping assumes therefore that it will hardly be possible to raise the amount of September shipments considerably over 1,200,000 tons.

Group North, the Commanding Admiral, Norway and Naval Station, Baltic were notified of the above by the Naval Staff.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Regarding operations against convoy PQ 18 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

Radio monitoring intercepted messages of British planes reporting sighting several German submarines west of Faeroe Islands. Reports from British warships about a surfaced submarine were intercepted from the same area.

Reconnaissance over the Bay of Biscay was again particularly lively.

From the American coast and the West Indies 4 reports about sighting submarines were received. Barbados reports the shelling of Bridgetown.

According to an intelligence report from Portugal, a convoy of 18 British and U.S. steamers sailed from New York for Capetown on 7 Sep.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "251" reports firing a torpedo which missed at a Russian submarine in quadrant AC 8286 and firing at the radio station and storehouses on Einsamkeit Island on 8 Sep.

The operation of Group "Vorwaerts" against the convoy in the North Atlantic continued successfully. Submarine U "608" sank 2 steamers of 5,000 GRT each, 1 of 10,000 GRT and 1 of 9,000 GRT. Submarine U "404" reported sinking a 6,000 GRT tanker and firing 3 single torpedoes at 3 ships; the sinking of 2 of them was established beyond doubt by sound detection. The total sunk is estimated at 11,000 GRT. The submarine reported the convoy as consisting of 18 steamers sailing in 2 widely dispersed groups and protected by 6 escort vessels.

The 9,000 GRT ship reported sunk by submarine U "608" proved to be steamer HEKTORIA of 13,800 GRT.

The last reported sighting by submarine U "96" puts the strength of the convoy at 12 to 15 steamers and 2 destroyers. Submarine U "411" reported only 10 or 11 smoke clouds.

The operation is being continued.

A new group, "Pfeil", consisting of 9 submarines is reported from

the eastern North Atlantic; they are stationed on a line from quadrant AL 4745 to 7816.

No successes were reported from the American coast and from the West Indies.

Group "Iltis" of the South Atlantic submarines is ordered to assume position in patrol line from quadrants DH 7148 to DH 7358 in order to intercept an SL convoy.

Nothing to report from the Mediterranean.

Additional reports in Supplement to Submarine Situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The Naval Staff informs the Commanding Admiral, Submarines (copy to Group West) that the order forbidding attacks on route "Anton" is extended to the area south of latitude 20° N as of 13 Sep. at 2000; this measure is due to operations of blockade runners. Thus the entire route "Anton" is closed for attacks.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day reconnaissance activity and fighter bomber attacks on Salisbury, the results of which were not observed. Mines were laid off the English eastern coast.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Operations in support of the Panzer Army Africa. Malta was attacked by Italian planes during the night of 11 Sep.

3. Eastern Front:

57 enemy planes were shot down at the various Army sectors. Reconnaissance activity over the Black Sea and Caspian Sea.

For operations against convoy PQ 18 see Situation, Arctic Ocean.

Special Item:

See Telegram 1325 for directive of the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff concerning the participation of planes of the training units in the combined maneuvers of the Navy from 1 to 3 Oct.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

An intelligence report from Spain states that the

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CHARYBDIS left Gibraltar for England where she will undergo repairs.

A reliable agent reports that the British Mediterranean fleet will shortly be heavily reinforced by U.S. warships based at Gibraltar.

A French report, received by way of the German Armistice Commission, states that 2 very large submarines on an easterly course were sighted on 11 Sep. at 1730 approximately 50 miles north of Algiers.

Otherwise nothing of importance was reported from the Mediterranean area.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

An enemy air raid on Tobruk during the night of 11 Sep. caused no damage in the harbor.

5 vessels of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla transferred from Augusta to Porto Empedocle.

According to the latest Italian report, the number of missing crew members of hospital ship ARNO amounts to 30.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Nothing to report.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

During the night of 11 Sep. an infantry post on the south coast of Crete was fired on by a surfaced submarine. Otherwise nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported at noon sighting a force consisting of 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, and 1 minesweeper, headed for Poti, 30 miles west of Batum.

Radio monitoring revealed continued fleet activity. The above-mentioned force was identified as a battleship without the fleet command, flotilla leader KHARKOV, 3 destroyers, and 2 submarine tenders. Another destroyer was identified in the northeastern part of the Black Sea and a submarine tender and 9 submarines in an undetermined position at sea.

According to statements from war prisoners, 6 medium-sized submarines, the gunboats LENIN and MARKIN, and several motor torpedo boats were at Baku at the end of 1941. Up to the middle of 1942 no minefields had been laid in the Caspian Sea.

The Frunse Naval Academy is said to have been moved from Leningrad to Astrakhan in August 1941. 800 officer candidates are supposed to be enrolled.

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Another intelligence report of 12 Sep. states that the Astrakhan river ports are occupied by 28 paddle steamers and 16 tankers of 465,000 GRT, 53 barges of 60,800 GRT, and approximately 500 small craft. 2 paddle steamers, 1 tanker and 21 steamers totalling 32,800 GRT as well as 6 gunboats are lying in the Astrakhan roadstead. More vessels are at sea.

Own Situation:

PT boat missions scheduled for the night of 11 Sep. were canceled due to bad weather.

Motor minesweepers achieved results along the Crimean southwestern coast between Cape Sarich and Foros, and a minesweeping plane in the Anapa area. Otherwise minesweeping operations proceeded uneventfully and were partially hampered by the weather.

After completion of operation "Bluecher", RA boats (probably foreign motor mine sweepers taken over by the Germans, TR.N) were assigned directly to the Commanding Admiral, Black Sea. The motor boat group was placed at the disposal of the Naval Shore Commander, Crimea for minesweeping in the Kerch Strait.

Contrary to a previous report, operational staff Scheurlen was not disbanded, and is located at Simferopol.

During the night of 9 Sep. the capture of the entire Novorossisk harbor area was completed. The pier serving coastal shipping and the coal yards including railroad sidings are intact. All storage facilities are destroyed and burnt out. All buildings and installations were requisitioned for the Navy.

For a further intelligence report concerning the harbor of Novorossisk see Telegram 1802.

Convoy traffic, which was partly hampered by bad weather, proceeded without major incident.

Special Items:

a. Group South requests that the 11th Army High Command immediately place at its disposal the wire communication system in the Crimea and in the Ukraine or that a new system be established as fast as possible. See Telegram 1130.

   The Chief, Communications Division, Naval Staff will attend to the matter.

b. Group South states its requirements for transport planes. See Telegram 1200. This matter will be handled by the courier squadron.

IX. Situation East Asia

The British invasion of the Madagascar west coast placed Nossi-Be in the north and the ports of Majunga and Morondava in the hands of the enemy. British forces are penetrating farther

inland. Churchill announced to the House of Commons that the operations against the key bases at the west coast of the island had to be undertaken because enemy submarines might otherwise operate from them against Allied shipping in the Mozambique Strait.

According to U.S. press reports, a large Japanese warship and a heavy cruiser were damaged by American planes on 24 Aug. during the operations in the Solomons area.

On 28 Aug. Allied submarines allegedly sank 2 Japanese transports with approximately 4,000 men aboard off the southeastern China coast.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The battle south, east, and southeast of Novorossisk continues. The situation at the remaining sectors of the Caucasus front is characterized by continuous enemy attacks. Our line northwest of Grozny had to be taken back due to strong enemy pressure.

Army Group B:

The offensive against Stalingrad is making slow progress toward stubbornly defended fortifications at the outskirts of the southern suburbs. Also the forces in the central and northern sectors of the town gained some ground. Enemy diversionary attacks from the north continued. Italian units threw the enemy across the river in the southern part of the Don River bend. However the enemy achieved a deep penetration into our lines west of Svoboda which must be eliminated.

Central Army Group:

Due to heavy losses the enemy had to abandon his attacks on both sides of the Volga at Zubtsov.

Northern Army Group:

Enemy attacks south of Lake Ladoga, which had been anticipated, were repulsed by divisions of the 11th Army. South of Schluesselburg the enemy failed in a renewed attempt to cross the Neva River in boats.

2. Finnish Front:

A strong enemy reconnaissance thrust at the Kestenga sector was repulsed. An enemy attack at the Kandalaksha sector was broken up before it got under way.

3. North Africa:

Enemy artillery activity as usual. Reconnaissance activity was slight.

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Items of Political Importance

Concerning the assault on Madagascar

Laval warned that caution is necessary with regard to retaliatory steps, because the enemy is in a position to apply more effective counter-measures. As a French statesman he is obliged to take this into account.

It is felt in London that Vichy must realize that a declaration of war on Great Britain would immediately involve the U.S.A.

Secretary of State Hull declared that there is no reason to believe that relations between the U.S.A. and France will change as a result of the recent British step against Madagascar.

Laval, certainly much against his will, seems to be straddling the fence.

The significance of the battle for Stalingrad for the general European war situation is discussed by the Moscow correspondent of the Times and evidently represents the opinion of enemy official circles. The latter discount the possibility that Stalingrad can be held but believe that the tough and stubborn resistance is intended to weaken Germany to a degree which will preclude her recovery. The same purpose is attributed to the unceasing Russian attacks on the central and northern fronts. The British and Americans accept the fact that Russia's offensive strength is vanishing at least at an equal rate. There is reason to assume that Churchill, on his visit to Moscow, tried to win Stalin over completely to this viewpoint. He probably did not mention of course that the weakening of Russia is after all not deplored too deeply in London and Washington.

Situation 13 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

According to a report of the Naval Attache at Buenos Aires, the air base on the Brazilian island of Fernando Noronha has been in operation since 15 Aug. As early as July the Americans founded civilian aeronautics clubs in every town on the Brazilian coast; regular coastal patrol service is to be organized with planes delivered to these clubs.

Indian Ocean:

A London periodical briefly discusses the blockade-runner traffic between Germany and Japan. It voices the assumption that the blockade-runners sail around Cape Horn. Judging by the character of the magazine, the matter was discussed primarily because of an interest in the cargo, so that not too much importance should be attributed to the strategic aspects of the discussion.

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2. Own Situation:

At 2017 ship "28" reported by short signal having captured thus far a total of 11 vessels of 77,000 GRT. She also reported heavy steamer traffic in large quadrant GQ 45. The Naval Staff acknowledged receipt of the message and informs all ships in foreign waters to that effect by Radiogram 2105.

By Radiogram 2345 the Naval Staff notifies ships "28" and "23" that the UCKERMARK will reach quadrant GD around 24 Sep. and that the BRAKE was recalled because of an air attack. Ship "28" should therefore transfer the mail and war diary to the TANNENFELS and, if possible, leave all supplies for ship "23" aboard. Apart from a 3 months supply, the UCKERMARK is also carrying an Arado plane for ship "28". A second Arado is packed in cases and is meant for ship "10". A meeting of the UCKERMARK and ship "23" is not planned for the time being. (See Radiogram 2345.)

WESERLAND is notified that the Naval Staff is taking over command at 1200; the first sailing orders are transmitted by Radiogram 1016.

By Radiogram 1638 UCKERMARK is advised to cross the latitude of St. Paul's Rock at a distance of 350 miles east of the rock, then to sail to quadrant GD by following a southerly course and not to cross longitude 20° W in an easterly direction between the equator and 05° S.

The Naval Attache at Tokyo is informed by Telegram 1545 about the vessel which the HOHENFRIEDBERG will use as camouflage, and about the reference points for the latter and the ROSSBACH.

The Chief, Communications Division, Naval Staff agrees to have the Japanese learn the contents of Naval Communications Instructions II (NV II). The Naval Attache at Tokyo is informed to this effect by Telegram 1930.

All ships in foreign waters are instructed about the regulations governing radio communication between ship "10" and "Kirschbluete" by Radiogram 1442.

Information about the relations between Germany and Argentina, also about the resignation of the Japanese Foreign Minister by Radiogram 0459.

Radiogram 2041 informs ships in foreign waters that a German submarine sank the British steamer LACONIA in quadrant FF 77; German surface vessels are not going to the rescue of Italian prisoners of war which were on the ship.

Enemy situation report by Radiograms 0954 and 1900.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

2 mines were swept on route "Herz".

Minelaying operation "Wandler" was executed according to plan during the night of 12 Sep. At 0230 a small vessel was sunk by Army artillery fire north of Bayeux; 3 British crew members were picked up, who claim to have been sent out in a boat with 11 men from a vessel lying 3 km offshore to take prisoners. A second boat was to follow them upon a light signal which they were to give after reaching shore. A British naval officer is among the prisoners.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

6 mines were swept on the convoy route between Heligoland and Ameland. Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Norway:

The harbor of Petsamo was shelled by a Russian battery on the Rybachi Peninsula during the night of 10 Sep.; no damage was caused.

A moored mine was observed in the Utsire waters; the area was thereupon closed to shipping. Enemy air activity was reported from Petsamo on 10 Sep. and from the area of Stavanger and Kristiansand South on 12 Sep.

Convoys in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Norway proceeded without incident.

The Commanding Admiral, Cruisers asked the Commanding Admiral, Norway to widen at once by 100 m net enclosures 1 and 2 in Bogen Bay, because ships get too close to the nets as experienced during the west storm of 27 Aug. and are thus endangered. The Commanding Admiral, Norway calls attention to the order of the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division according to which the distance between ship and net should not exceed 75 m, and requests a decision.

The matter will be handled by the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Operation against QP 18:

~~The convoy~~, which was shadowed by ~~submarine U "405", proceeded~~

on an easterly course toward the center of the passage between Bear Island and Spitsbergen. Its last reported position was given by submarine U "405" at 1755 as quadrant AB 3416. The first in the series of successes was achieved by submarine U "408" which sank a 7,000 GRT steamer in quadrant AB 6569 at 0952. At 0954 another steamer of the same size was sunk in quadrant AB 2566 by submarine U "589", which also fired a two-fan at the escorting aircraft carrier; she believes that she may have scored 1 hit. However, according to an Air Force report of 1310 the carrier was not damaged. At 1137 submarine U "457" also established contact with the enemy. Submarines U "592" and U "255" sailed from Harstadt and Kirkenes, respectively, to participate in the operation.

Beginning at 1600, the Air Commander, Lofoten Islands launched an attack on convoy PQ 18 with 28 He 111 torpedo planes, 20 Ju 88's and 8 He 115 torpedo planes. The Air Commander, North dispatched an additional 18 torpedo planes and 17 bombers. The Air Force reported as definitely sunk today 9 merchant vessels totalling 61,000 GRT, as probably sunk 1 tanker and 5 merchant vessels with 48,000 GRT, as damaged 10 or 12 steamers with a total 90,000 GRT, conceding the possibility of duplications.

Group North reports the following plan for operations of the surface forces against convoy QP 14, since the SCHEER is not participating:

(1) Alternative A: As soon as reconnaissance results are available, the HIPPER will set out with 4 destroyers. Prior to this 2 destroyers will transfer to Kirkenes from where they will sail immediately after receipt of word that QP 14 has been sighted; their task is to maintain contact for the HIPPER force. Code word of operation is "Meisenbalz I".

(2) Alternative B: If QP 14 is not sighted, the HIPPER with her escort of 4 destroyers will proceed in the direction of Matochkin Strait. She will comb the presumed route of the convoy as far as latitude Kostin Strait and return, depending on the situation, either to Kirkenes or Alta Fjord. Code name of operation is "Meisenbalz II".

(3) Both alternative A and B depend on the location of the SCHEER force and on whether the HIPPER force can leave the inter-island waters undetected. Operation A or B must start on the evening of 13 Sep. at the latest.

(4) In the event that neither of these alternatives should materialize for the above reasons, the HIPPER with an escort of 3 or 4 destroyers will carry out a mine-laying mission at the northwestern tip of Novaya Zemlya after the approach of PQ 18. At the same time the SCHEER will be withdrawn to Trondheim with 2 destroyers to which 2 torpedo boats will be added at Narvik. In case of favorable weather, the SCHEER will proceed directly to Germany.

At 1430 Group North was instructed by telephone that the commitment of the surface forces is subject to the approval of the Naval Staff.

At 1700 Group North telephoned for approval of operation "Meisenbalz II". The Group plans to keep the sailing route of the HIPPER and her 4 destroyers far enough from the northern Russian coast to minimize as much as possible the threat from the reinforced British Air Force. In the Naval Staff's opinion the operation may either result in complete failure due to the lack of reliable information or, if the convoy has actually sailed undetected, lead to its being annihilated or damaged,

as it is believed to be only weakly protected.

The Chief, Naval Staff was called over the telephone in the forenoon by the Fuehrer, who once more emphasized the value of the ships in Norway and the necessity of avoiding losses without adequate return. The Chief, Naval Staff believes that the chances of success for the planned operation are small and that he can therefore not assume the responsibility of risking losses from enemy submarines and planes; for this reason he decides against the Group's request. The decision of the Commander in Chief, Navy is transmitted to Group North at 1845 by telephone after the Commanding Admiral, Group North reported that the Admiral, Arctic Ocean had been directed to refrain from dispatching the 2 destroyers to Kirkenes as ordered earlier by Group North in preparation for operation "Weisenbalz II".

At 1914, Group North advised the Admiral, Arctic Ocean and the 5th Air Force, with copies to the Naval Staff and the Commanding Admiral, Norway, that permission for operation "Weisenbalz" had not been granted and that their activities are to be confined to attacks on damaged ships if the opportunity presents itself. The stand-by order for the Air Force is thereby cancelled.

The HIPPER, the 8th Destroyer Flotilla and the IRBEN are on 3 hour readiness.

Group North believes that it would be desirable to have a submarine equipped as fuel tanker for submarine operations in the Arctic Ocean and requests the assignment of "UD 2" as soon as it is ready for operations, or of another similar suitable vessel. The Group believes that such a submarine would be particularly desirable for the period when the operations area in the Arctic Ocean and the Kara Sea is increased through the receding ice.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Nothing to report from the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea.

Naval Station, Baltic ordered the suspension of shipping on routes "35" and "37" for the time being and released instructions regarding new routes "40a" and "43". For details see Telegram 0145.

Minelaying and minesweeping activities in the area of the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea suffered from bad weather. Convoy service proceeded according to plan.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Normal reconnaissance activity in the North Atlantic.

Numerous submarine sighting messages were intercepted from the western Atlantic; 4 submarines were reported on the northern route, 1 off the Canadian coast, 2 off the U.S. coast and 3 in the Caribbean. In the

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latter area a submarine attack was reported.

2. Own Situation:

Concerning operations against convoy PQ 18 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

Further successes were achieved against the westbound convoy in the North Atlantic (quadrants BC 62, 63, etc.) by Group "Vorwaerts". Submarine U "594" sank the steamer STONESTREET (6,131 GRT), submarine U "92" scored 3 hits on 3 steamers totalling 17,000 GRT, but was unable to observe their sinking on account of strong counteraction. The success of the group's operation against this convoy has thus reached 97,000 GRT.

> This must be appreciated all the more as it was achieved without any loss among our submarines and partly by inexperienced crews on their first operation.

Group "Loss", which is deployed in a patrol line from quadrant AJ 8631 to AJ 9796 and has been reinforced to 12 submarines, was ordered to attack a convoy of more than 20 steamers on a northeasterly course which was located by submarine U "216" in quadrant AK 64. Details have not yet been reported.

Nothing was heard about successes off the American coast.

In the West Indies, submarine U "515" sank the tanker STANVAC MELBOURNE (10,444 GRT) in quadrant ED 9992 and the steamer WOENSDRECHT (4,668 GRT). Submarine U "512" sank tanker PATRICK J. HURLEY (10,600 GRT) by gunfire, following a futile torpedo attack. The submarine suspects that the tanker was protected by anti-torpedo nets.

Submarine U "558" sank a tanker of 7,000 GRT and another of 8,000 GRT out of a convoy in quadrant ED 8378, and torpedoed with 2 hits each a steamer of 5,000 GRT and a tanker of 7,000 GRT.

No successes were reported from the Mediterranean.

In the South Atlantic, steamer TREVILLEY (5,300 GRT) was sunk on 12 Sep. in quadrant FF 8588 by submarine U "68".

More news in supplement to submarine situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

On 12 Sep. submarine U "156" of Group "Eisbaer" sank the British troop transport LACONIA at 04° 52' S, 11° 28' W, which is 8' within the permissible area of attack. Following the sinking it was learned that the steamer had 1,500 Italian war prisoners on board; 200 of them were picked up by submarine U "156", while many hundreds more were in lifeboats and rafts. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines ordered all submarines in the vicinity to go to the scene. The Italian submarine CAPELLINI was also directed there.

The first concern of the Naval Staff was to relieve the submarines of Group "Eisbaer" from participation in the rescue work so that they might continue to the South Atlantic; at the same time a way to save the survivors had to be found. This could have been done either by bringing them to the French Ivory Coast port of Bingerville on board our submarines, or, as suggested by the captain of submarine U "156", by proposing to the British via the international steamer frequency

that the scene of the sinking be declared a neutral area. In this event we would promise not to attack any of the ships dispatched to the rescue if the same assurance were received for our submarines.

The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff ordered the first alternative and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines was therefore instructed as follows: "All submarines are to head for Bingerville. It should be attempted to transfer survivors to French vessels at sea. If this proves impossible, disembark at Bingerville." Simultaneously, Vichy was requested through the Foreign Office to dispatch vessels from Bingerville directly to the scene to meet our submarines.

The question of neutralizing the scene of the sinking was submitted for examination to the Foreign Office and to the Naval Representative on the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. Before the Foreign Office was able to comment on the matter, the Naval Aide of the Fuehrer communicated the latter's decision:

(1) There can be no question of notifying the British.

(2) Submarine U "156" should simply have submerged and left.

(3) The continuation of operation "Eisbaer" is the first consideration.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines was therefore advised as follows:

(1) The French have been requested to dispatch vessels from Bingerville and to prepare for possible arrival of German submarines. So far no reply has been received.

(2) Operation "Eisbaer" is not to be held up by rescue work, therefore only such boats are to participate which do not belong to that group. Should submarines of group "Eisbaer" already be engaged, they are to be relieved as soon as possible. Hartenstein should explain about his supply and fresh water situation so that if possible the submarine can take part in operation "Eisbaer".

(3) The neutralization of the scene of sinking or an agreement with the British cannot be considered.

At 1920 the Foreign Office transmitted an affirmative reply, according to which fast vessels and planes are being dispatched at once from Dakar and Bingerville.

The Naval Staff notifies the Commanding Admiral, Submarines of this reply and requests to be kept constantly informed about the positions of the submarines.

For the information of the French, the German Armistice Commission is instructed by the Naval Staff as follows:

(1) The submarines were ordered to head for point 1° 57' S, 11° 22' W in quadrant FF 4486 where they are to be met by French vessels for the transfer of survivors.

(2) Suggested identification signals for German submarines and French vessels:

a. Star shells: for calls 1 red and 1 green star, for replies 2 green stars.

b. Letters for light signals or Morse lamp: for calls GU, for replies DB.

(3) The Commanding Admiral, Submarines urgently requests that no planes be dispatched, because submarines must fear approaching planes and would have to submerge at once.

A communication from the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to the German Armistice Commission reveals that submarine U "156" is headed for 01° 57' S, 11° 21' W, where she will transfer survivors probably on 14 and 15 Sep. to 2 type IX submarines and the Italian submarine CAPELLINI; these in turn will put into Bingerville.

For the Naval Staff's notification of the German Naval Command, Italy see Telegram 1917.

The following final report is transmitted to Fuehrer Headquarters and the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff:

(1) The submarines were instructed that operation "Eisbaer" is not to be delayed by rescue operations. Submarines of group "Eisbaer" which do not carry survivors continue on their course to the South Atlantic, those with survivors on board are to transfer them as quickly as possible. The submarines have distributed the survivors as directed, so as to be able to submerge.

(2) The French were requested by way of the Foreign Office to dispatch vessels from Bingerville to the scene of the sinking. The French promised to send fast vessels immediately, possibly also a warship. The German Armistice Commission and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines are in touch with each other with regard to further rescue measures.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

2. Incursions:

About 100 enemy planes penetrated into northwestern Germany during the night of 13 Sep. Attacks concentrated on Bremen where very heavy damage was caused. For details see daily situation report.

A few planes flew also into Rumania from the east and dropped bombs on Bucharest.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Nothing to report.

4. Eastern Front:

Reconnaissance activity over the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. Regarding operations against convoy PQ 18 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to an Italian report, a convoy from the British Isles is expected at Gibraltar during the next few days.

Submarines were sighted in the forenoon off La Spezia, off Ragusa, south of Cape Krio (Crete) and east of Tobruk.

German planes in the eastern Mediterranean sighted 2 steamers and 4 escort vessels on an easterly course north of Alexandria, and 6 light ships 15 miles northeast of Alexandria, proceeding at full speed on a westerly course.

Radio monitoring revealed lively submarine activity in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, reports of British planes were intercepted at noon about a westbound convoy of 1 steamer and 1 destroyer and also about 2 northeast-bound destroyers escorted by a plane off the west coast of Crete.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Heavy air attacks on anti-aircraft and searchlight batteries of Tobruk began at 2045, which were still in progress at midnight.

A naval barge was damaged by a mine in the harbor while leaving Tobruk at noon.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Supply transports from Italy to North Africa proceeded according to plan, those from Greece to North Africa suffered from bad weather. For the same reason coastal supply traffic in North Africa had to be suspended.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report about the naval situation.

Group South reports that during the month of August 1942 9 submarines and 72 merchant vessels of 32,214 GRT transporting 782 men were escorted in the Aegean Sea, in addition to which 51 merchant vessels of 7,132 GRT proceeded unescorted. Auxiliary sailing vessels of 6,900 GRT transported 470 men.

The above-mentioned traffic suffered 3 enemy air attacks. Enemy submarines caused the loss of steamers WARTFELS and CAMPERIO and of 4 auxiliary sailing vessels. Italian traffic through the area is not included in above compilation.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring revealed that up to 0600 1 cruiser, 1 flotilla leader and 1 destroyer were at sea in the southeastern portion. In the same area 5 destroyers, 2 large ships and 2 submarine tenders were located in the evening; also 7 submarines at sea at unidentified positions.

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Own Situation:

Due to the weather situation, the scheduled PT boat operation off Novorossisk had to be cancelled. Mine-sweeping proceeded according to plan. 3 Italian submarines sailed from Constanta for Sulina on their way east. The 2 remaining Italian submarines transferred to Burgas for operations at the entrance of the Bosporus. Only 3 of the Italian subchasers and 2 ships of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla are ready for operations. 3 naval barges were newly commissioned. Convoy and transport services proceeded according to plan. It is belatedly reported that on 11 Sep. 1 barge loaded with steel girders and 1 motor boat sank and one barge ran aground off Dolyanskaya, all of which were in tow.

During the month of August, 15 warships were escorted in the Black Sea, in addition to 114 merchant vessels totalling 91,061 GRT; besides, 194 unescorted merchant vessels of 7,570 GRT, which carried 760 men in addition to other cargo. Enemy air attacks on convoys occurred every day. An enemy submarine sank 1 barge; 1 tugboat, 1 naval barge and 1 Siebel ferry were sunk by mines. A total of 41 mines was swept.

Special Items:

1. Regarding Group South's proposal to replace naval barges temporarily by Siebel ferries for operation "Bluecher", the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff states that utmost importance is placed on terminating this operation; that therefore no naval barges should be withdrawn, if possible, and necessary repairs should be postponed till after the operation is concluded. The Armed Forces High Command counts on additional naval barges becoming available continuously.

This decision is transmitted to Group South by Telegram 1918.

2. In connection with its proposal to attack the Russian Black Sea fleet with planes, Group South reports that according to a communication from Army Group A, the Air Force will primarily be assigned to support Army operations for the duration of the favorable season; Army Group A therefore considers that the time to concentrate on the Russian fleet will come only when weather conditions deteriorate. Group South suggests informing the Armed Forces High Command of the above. (See Telegram 1945.)

The Naval Representative on the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff is notified.

VIII. Situation East Asia

The U.S. Navy Department announces continued Japanese efforts to oust U.S. forces from Guadalcanal and Tulagi. More Japanese reinforcements have been put ashore.

Allied Headquarters reports the sinking of a Japanese destroyer off the Normanby Island by a direct bomb hit. According to press reports from Mac Arthur's headquarters, the situation of Port Moresby has taken a grave turn for the worse because the Japanese have passed the highest elevation on their advance from Buna toward Port Moresby.

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IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

Chmaidia, west of Mozdok, was taken after bitter fighting. Also Nizhni Kurp fell into our hands after a hard struggle. Strong enemy air attacks were made on the spearheads of our attacking forces.

Army Group B:

At Stalingrad our forces south of the railroad broke through enemy lines and penetrated deeper into the suburbs. North of Stalingrad we succeeded in taking the Tartar Moat by assault and in capturing a city block and barracks to the west of it. Pressure on the strip between the Volga River and the railroad was weaker today.

Central Army Group:

Several enemy attacks west of Zubtsov were repulsed. Another attack north of Rzhev also failed.

Northern Army Group:

Repeated enemy attacks on our positions south of Lake Ladoga were repulsed, the enemy suffering heavy losses.

2. Finnish Front:

At the southeastern front sector the enemy attacked an advanced fortified post with tanks and armored train; he was thrown back after a temporary penetration. At the Murmansk sector, 2 Russian infantry companies landed on the south shore of Motovsky Bay and withdrew after destroying 2 strongpoints. According to prisoners, an offensive from the Rybachi Peninsula is planned around 15 Sep. in order to establish connection with the Litsa front.

3. North Africa:

No situation report has been received.

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Items of Political Importance

Australia:

The Prime Minister urged, in a statement about the war situation, that Australia's Army should be sufficiently strong to send reinforcements to the Middle East if necessary in addition to being able to defend herself. Australia cannot expect the Allies to supply shipping, since they need all transport vessels for other purposes.

Chile:

According to the Transocean News Agency, the Chilean Senate voted to support the President's policy of non-belligerence. Communists and Socialists refrained from introducing a resolution calling for a break in relations with the Axis Powers.

Turkey:

British circles in Ankara are responsible for the rumor according to which Willkie offered Turkey equipment for 6 motorized divisions and financial assistance under the Lend-Lease Law, in return for which Turkey is to remain neutral. In addition, Willkie is said to have proposed that Turkey take over the Russian Black Sea fleet and thus strengthen her own naval defenses if and when the opportunity arises. Turkish political circles offer a completely different version about Willkie's mission by contending that his visit was merely the outcome of Turkey's request for clarification about her inclusion in the list of beneficiaries of the Lend-Lease Law, a measure taken by the U.S.A. without Turkey's knowledge. Willkie arrived at Bagdad on 12 Sep. and was received by the Regent on 13 Sep., to whom he allegedly handed a letter from President Roosevelt containing the offer of a personal guaranty of Iraq's post-war independence, if Iraq would actively take part in the war on the side of the Allies. The Prime Minister is said to have reiterated the assurance that Iraq would enter the war on the Allied side if the war should approach the Near East from the Caucasus.

Special Item:

The Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters communicated on 5 Sep. that the Fuehrer, on the basis of the first report concerning the sinking of the mine ship ULM, had voiced his intention to issue an order to the effect that our warships should act in similar cases exactly as the British did, who allegedly machine-gunned the survivors who had taken to lifeboats. The Naval Staff was to submit proposals whether this procedure was to be followed in the case of warships only or also in the case of merchant vessels; furthermore, whether the order was to be given only to submarines or to the other naval forces, too. In keeping with the Naval Staff's opinion expressed during the conference on the situation with the Chief, Naval Staff (see War Diary of 11 Sep.), the Naval Staff urgently requested in a telegram to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff that the news about the ULM's sinking not be published and all steps considered in this connection be postponed, since information about the machine-gunning of the survivors is insufficient so far, and the investigation has not been completed. On the same day Group North was requested to clarify a number of points which are decisive for evaluating the British behavior from the viewpoint of

international law. On 13 Sep. Group North replied that it had reached the conclusion after renewed questioning of the survivors that there is no proof of deliberate firing on survivors, but that the enemy apparently had done nothing toward their rescue.

Today, the Naval Staff submitted a detailed report to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and to the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters and suggested that before ordering any retaliatory measures it should be considered whether these would not affect ourselves more than the enemy. For evaluating this case it is important to keep in mind that no evidence has been found thus far that British authorities ever ordered the use of weapons against German survivors. It could therefore be taken for granted that, if the existence of such a German order became known, the enemy's propaganda would exploit it in a manner, the consequence of which can hardly be estimated. A detailed analysis of the problem is contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Situation 14 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache at Tokyo requests an order to CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN to proceed to Medan through the Sunda Strait in order to pick up German seamen.

With regard to the difficult fuel situation emphasized by the Japanese in connection with the stay of ship "10" in Japan, the Naval Attache at Tokyo suggests that after completion of repairs, ship "10" fill up with Diesel oil; additional later fuel requirements should then be forwarded to her by Etappe Japan early in 1943 by means of a supply ship or a blockade runner. The Attache reports that the Japanese Navy feels that Germany shows no understanding for Japanese fuel difficulties, and calls attention to the fact that Japanese submarine operations are being curtailed due to our gas oil demands. He proposes therefore to have the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN call at Balik Papan on her voyage to Japan, where she should take on 500 tons of Tarakan oil in order to test it and should also take along 200 cu. m. oil mixture so that ship "10" can try it out. (See Telegram 1818.)

Enemy situation report by Radiogram 1840.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, another landing attempt was scheduled for 15 Sep. in the vicinity of Bordeaux and on the Channel coast.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

Patrol boat "1807" struck a mine and sank off Ostend. Minelaying operation "Burgstaken" was carried out according to plan. Torpedo operations of the 2nd, 4th, and 6th PT Boat Flotillas are scheduled for the night of 14 Sep.

Special Items:

a. Group West reports its intention to lay a cutter float barrage and 2 minefields in the area north of Barfleur. The minefields are to be known as "R VI", "Fritz VIII" and "Fritz IX". Code names: "Weichsel", "Oder", and "Elbe".

b. In connection with the defense of the Scheldt estuary the Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, West asked for confirmation that 24 naval barges now at Antwerp, 3 or 4 naval barges at Breskens, 6 vessels of the Rhine Flotilla at Flushing, 2 fishing steamers, 8 large drifters and 16 trawlers belonging to the 32nd Minesweeper Flotilla would be at his disposal in the event of any fighting at the Scheldt estuary.

Following consultation with Group North, the Naval Staff informed the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West that the 712th Division is directly in touch with the Commander, Amphibious Forces regarding the use of the naval barges. At the present time 16 naval barges are available at Antwerp, 5 more are temporarily out of commission. 3 naval barges are ready for operations at Breskens. The vessels of the Rhine Flotilla as well as the 32nd Minesweeper Flotilla have assignments of their own in case of action. Any unassigned vessels in the harbor ready for operations are at the Army's disposal.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Lively reconnaissance activity in the direction of the Nord Fjord, Jutland and the southern part of the North Sea. Radio monitoring intercepted a report by a British plane about an attack on a submarine 140 miles west of Stadland.

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Own Situation:

It is reported belatedly that mine-exploding vessels swept 4 ground mines on 13 Sep. 3 more ground mines were swept on 14 Sep. by the 13th and 21st Minesweeper Flotillas.

Convoy and patrol services proceeded according to plan.

A single enemy plane dropped 4 demolition bombs on Wilhelmshaven at 0627; 3 buildings were damaged. 3 demolition bombs were dropped at Groden near Cuxhaven.

At 2315 a heavy enemy air raid on Cuxhaven began, which was still in progress at midnight.

2. Norway:

Enemy air activity is reported at the northern coast in the Bodoe area and at the west coast in the areas of Haugesund and Stavanger on 13 Sep. and in the Kristiansand South area on 14 Sep.

A 4-row net barrage was laid in Skjomen Fjord according to plan.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway reports his intention to lay the Malangen Fjord minefield at once, because the delivery date of cutter floats for water depths of 100 m to 500 m is still absolutely indefinite according to information from the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate. The Mine-Laying Experimental Command did not receive the order from the Naval High Command to develop the cutter floats until 12 Sep.

Transport and convoy services in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Norway proceeded according to plan.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

The official Russian News Agency reports the sinking of a submarine by Russian ships in the Barents Sea on 12 Sep.

Radio monitoring revealed that not more than 2 British ships were present in the Archangel area. Between 2 and 5 Russian submarines were located at sea. Reports about German submarines were intercepted from 45 miles west and 84 miles south of the South Cape; these messages were broadcast by the Commander in Chief of the Russian Arctic Ocean fleet.

Own Situation:

After careful examination of the available information, the Air Commander, Lofoten Islands reports the number of merchant vessels composing convoy PQ 18 as 45 at 0855 of 13 Sep. and as 43 after 1000. Between these hours 2 ships were sunk by German submarines. (See War Diary of 13 Sep.)

Our submarines established contact with PQ 18. At 2330 of 13 Sep. submarine U "457" observed the convoy assembling west of South Cape escorted by an aircraft carrier. Submarine U "403" was damaged by aerial mines and depth charges and is now operating against stragglers.

The submarines were driven from the convoy in the course of the day by strong air and destroyer escorts and had to keep at a safe distance also on account of the continuous attacks by German air forces. Our offensive operations therefore met with difficulties. Submarine U "457" sank a 6,000 GRT tanker and a 4,000 GRT steamer at 0400 and believes to have scored 2 hits on a destroyer. In the afternoon submarine U "377" reported a subchaser disguised as a merchant vessel. A submarine which sailed from Bergen is headed for quadrant AB 26 and has orders to look for damaged vessels on the convoy route.

The Air Commander, Lofoten Islands dispatched 36 torpedo planes and 18 bombers against convoy PQ 18 after 1530. The 5th Air Force reports today's result as 6 steamers and 1 tanker with a total of 49,000 GRT sunk, as well as 1 destroyer. In addition, 3 steamers of 21,000 GRT were damaged and a destroyer probably damaged. The aircraft carrier may have been hit by 3 aerial torpedoes; columns of water were observed. However, no confirmation of any damage has been received as yet. The convoy was last sighted at 1900 on a southerly course and consisted at that time of 28 merchant vessels.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

4 bombs each were dropped on Kiel and Luebeck early this morning. A smoke screen was laid at 0635 for half an hour around the Kiel shipyards.

Convoy and patrol activity in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea proceeded according to plan.

Bad weather continued to hamper minelaying operations of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea. Steamer FINLAND, carrying 1,000 men on leave, was damaged off Utoe by an enemy submarine. The ship is being towed to port. Casualties are 2 dead and 25 wounded.

Convoy and transport services proceeded otherwise according to plan.

Finnish authorities suspended all sailings from Bothnian Gulf ports until convoy service between Kasko and Mantyluoto has been established.

V. Merchant Shipping

Spanish ore shipments to Great Britain rose again during July 1942. The monthly average for the January-June period amounts to approximately 62,000 tons of iron ore and 15,000 tons of pyrite. The corresponding figures for July are about 69,000 and 34,000 tons.

An extensive report on the Spanish law of 21 Aug. tightening government control of sales of Spanish merchant tonnage is among other subjects contained in short report No. 30/42 of the Naval Staff Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch. The text of the law is also included.

According to Radio Daventry, the Canadian Navy Minister announced that 10,000 ships loaded with ammunition and other supplies have crossed the ~~Atlantic from Canada to the British Isles since the war began.~~

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According to U.S. federal shipping authorities the 10 U.S. "Liberty" shipyards delivered 56 Liberty ships of 10,000 tons each during August. These vessels were built on the average in 82.89 days per ship from keel laying to commissioning.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report, except the usual submarine sightings.

2. Own Situation:

See Own Situation, Arctic Ocean regarding operations against convoy PQ 18.

The operation against the outbound convoy in the North Atlantic by Group "Vorwaerts" was called off because chances of attack became very slight on account of decreasing visibility. As a further success it is reported that submarine U "91" torpedoed a 2-stack destroyer which burst in flames; it was observed beyond doubt that another destroyer pulling up alongisde her was sunk.

This ends the list of achievements of this remarkable operation.

No reports were received from Group "Loss".

Our submarines were unable to establish contact with the incoming convoy in quadrant AK 62. Group "Pfeil" has orders to terminate this operation if the situation should not change before nightfall and to proceed to quadrant AL 92.

No successes were reported from the American coast.

Submarine U "515" reports another success by sinking steamer OCEAN GUARD (8,000 GRT) and a 3,500 GRT steamer in quadrant EE 6770.

Submarine U "66" of the South Atlantic group sank the unescorted blacked-out steamer BREDA (6,800 GRT) in quadrant FF 8587.

For additional news see Supplement to Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Concerning operations for the rescue of the LACONIA survivors:

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines is advised by telephone that there is a possibility of French warships (destroyer flotilla leaders) being assigned to this task.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines suggests that it would be useful to direct the French to proceed to the scene of the sinking and at the same time also to the rendezvous point designated for the delivery of survivors. Since, however, according to latest reports, the majority of the survivors is crowded into lifeboats, submarine U "156" is waiting on the scene for 2 other submarines to arrive. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines therefore requests that the French ships be sent directly to the scene of the sinking and not to the rendezvous point

designated previously. At 1020 the German Armistice Commission reports that the French were instructed accordingly. At 1530 it submits a report about the conferences with the French delegation, in the course of which the French were advised that everything depends on the French ships arriving in time. Therefore the French were requested to report soon which ships were sent and when they can be expected to arrive. (See Telegram 1530.)

The French replied that a GLOIRE class cruiser is being ordered to sail from Dakar and proceed at top speed to the scene of the accident, because the avisos DUMONT D'URVILLE and ANNAMITE which are 1,000 miles from there could not arrive there until the night of 16 Sep. at the earliest. At 1045 the order of the naval commander at Dakar to DUMONT D'URVILLE was intercepted by radio monitoring, directing her to proceed at top speed to 01° 57' S, 11° 22' W, where she will meet 3 German and Italian submarines loaded with survivors.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines requests the German Armistice Commission (with copy to the Naval Staff) to instruct the French to approach the sinking scene by daylight only, to release recognition signals as early as possible, and also to flash searchlight signals, to hoist the national flag on the top mast when nearing the scene, and to flash the suggested radio signal over the 600 m wavelength one hour before reaching the spot. The French warships should expect that the submarines may be submerged at the time of their arrival at the rendezvous point.

With these measures everything possible has probably been done to rescue the surviving Italians.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

2. Incursions:

During the night of 14 Sep. 100 enemy planes penetrated into northwestern Germany from the west. They concentrated their attacks on Wilhelmshaven. 1 attacker was shot down by anti-aircraft, 2 by naval anti-aircraft, and 1 by fighter planes. Preliminary reports indicate considerable damage. For details see daily situation report, where a belated report concerning the attack on Bremen in the night of 13 Sep. will also be found.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

10 enemy planes were shot down at Tobruk during the night of 13 Sep. In the course of the day German air forces scored 9 direct hits with 250 kg bombs on a cruiser which was left burning, and 1 direct hit each on 2 destroyers; these ships were part of the enemy force which had attacked Tobruk. In addition a PT boat loaded with troops was sunk.

4. Eastern Front:

79 enemy planes were shot down at the various Army sectors.

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Regarding the operation against convoy PQ 18 and its results see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

Reconnaissance activity in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.

1 steamer was sunk and 2 others damaged on 13 Sep. out of a convoy on Lake Ladoga. At Nov.Ladoga a patrol vessel was set afire.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, a large ship, apparently a battleship, escorted by 3 small vessels, passed the Strait of Gibraltar in an easterly direction at 2145 of 13 Sep. At noon of 14 Sep. a convoy of 7 steamers, 2 of which were equipped with catapult and plane, arrived at Gibraltar from the Atlantic. Also cruiser CHARYBDIS and a loaded steamer arrived at Gibraltar from the Atlantic at 0700. Intensified patrol activity was observed in the Strait of Gibraltar in the forenoon.

Messages from 2 British ships, possibly submarines were intercepted by radio monitoring in the area between Minorca and Sardinia during the forenoon and from other ships at sea in the Gibraltar area and eastward.

Submarines were spotted west of Argostoli and north of Benghazi.

An enemy landing operation west and east of Tobruk was carried out and covered by light naval forces at 0045. After 0700 these forces were intercepted and attacked by German aircraft northeast of Tobruk. Reports received so far are partly contradictory; according to them the enemy force consisted of 1 or 2 light cruisers, 6 or 8 destroyers, and a few motor gunboats which withdrew in an easterly direction after suffering losses. At noon another force, probably 1 cruiser and 6 destroyers, was on an easterly course 60 miles northeast of Marsa Matruh. A captured operations order revealed the enemy's plans as follows:

a. Landings at 3 points east and west of Tobruk.

b. Greatest possible destruction of harbor installations.

c. Sinking of ships found in the harbor.

Definitely lost were 2 destroyers, reportedly of the JERVIS class, one of which struck a mine while the other succumbed to German anti-aircraft artillery, 2 corvettes, and 1 motor gunboat which ran aground. A third destroyer was probably lost due to an explosion.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

The heavy air raid on Tobruk lasted until 0310. At 0045 unidentified enemy units landed at Marsa Umm, Esc, and Sciausc. A counterattack was launched by an Italian unit. Around 0430 an enemy ship shelled Tobruk and the Derna road. At 0845 the Army was already in a position to report that the landing attempt had failed and that the naval forces had been retreating in an easterly direction since 0600.

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At 0630 4 motor minesweepers started a search of the coast and captured the grounded British motor gunboat "314" and 130 prisoners, partly survivors of the sunken destroyer. Around noon the harbor situation at Tobruk had quieted down; no damage had been caused. At 2 points fighting was still in progress against encircled small enemy detachments. The Navy suffered no casualties or losses.

This operation should probably be classified as armed reconnaissance and the British Admiralty termed it such.

During the night of 13 Sep. Benghazi was also attacked from the air. It is suspected that aerial mines were laid.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Proceeded according to plan. Coastal shipping was resumed after the weather improved.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report..

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance spotted 3 steamers on a northwesterly course off Tuapse during the forenoon. As revealed by radio monitoring, cruisers KRASNY KRIM and KRASNY KAVKAS, several submarines, and destroyers were at sea in the southeastern Black Sea.

See Telegram 1806 for a report of the Naval Defense Command, Black Sea about the 1st Russian PT Boat Division, and Telegram 1811 concerning the Dnieper Flotilla.

Own Situation:

German PT boats operating southeast of Gelendzhik during the night of 13 Sep. encountered no ship traffic. Minesweeping in the Sea of Azov and in the Cape Sarych and Kerch areas proceeded according to plan; the minefield south of Sarych was swept and the coastal route from Balaklava to Yalta checked for mines without result.

Heavy artillery fire on Novorossisk continued. The Naval Shore Command, Caucasus reports losses of personnel. 2 small enemy ships of unidentified type which tried to enter Anapa during the night of 12 Sep. were forced to withdraw. Superior bomber forces attacked Novorossisk all day and night. Yalta, too, was attacked again on 11 Sep.

Naval barges, Siebel ferries and landing barges ferried 21,144 men, 9,229 horses, and 3,802 vehicles in connection with operation "Bluecher" up to 13 Sep.

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IX. Situation East Asia

The U.S. radio reports that a Japanese cruiser was sunk and another one damaged by heavy bombers in the vicinity of Milne Bay.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

Heavy fighting in the Novorossisk area continues. The enemy showed remarkable offensive activity at all sectors of the Army Group. However, all our positions were held.

Army Group B:

The battle for Stalingrad continues in the face of tough and stubborn enemy resistance. One of our divisions succeeded in penetrating the city and reached the west bank of the Volga River.

Our tank units in the Don River bend northwest of Svoboda went over to the offensive.

Central Army Group:

Strong enemy movements were observed in the area south of Sukhinichi. In the Rzhev area the enemy renewed his attacks with considerable forces; he succeeded in penetrating into our positions in the Rzhev city park. North of Smolensk our forces advanced northeastward against partisans.

Northern Army Group:

An attack on the Volkhov sector succeeded in rolling up an enemy position on a front 600 m. wide. Enemy units which had penetrated into the lines of the light infantry division south of Lake Ladoga were cut off. The enemy probably has 60 to 70 batteries south of Lake Ladoga and 35 batteries on the Neva front.

2. Finnish Front:

In the rear area west of Alakurtti an enemy detachment tried to blow up the railroad.

3. North Africa:

Heavy enemy gunfire along the entire Egyptian front during the night of 13 Sep. During the day normal artillery and scouting activity on both sides; lively enemy air reconnaissance.

The British detachments landed at Tobruk were destroyed with small German losses. 300 prisoners were taken and a number of landing craft, weapons, and equipment captured.

Enemy sabotage detachments were annihilated by Italian troops near Benghazi and Barche. A few German planes were destroyed at the Barche airfield.

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An unconfirmed report contends that the enemy also dropped parachutists in connection with his landing attempt; this is denied by the British.

13 Italian planes were destroyed through sabotage at 2 Italian airfields on Rhodes Island. During the night of 13 Sep. a German ammunition depot in Catania caught fire.

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Items of Political Importance

U.S.A.:

In a message to Congress President Roosevelt gave an account of Lend-Lease activities for the past 1½ years. For details see Political Review No. 216, par. 1. On this occasion the President declared that the continuation of the Lend-Lease program on a scale sufficient to ensure the victory of the Allies is dependent on a drastic curtailment in the consumption of consumer goods. The U.S.A. has hardly reached the half-way mark on the way to maximum war production.

France:

According to a new law introducing compulsory labor service, all men between 18 and 50 years and unmarried women between 21 and 35 years of age are liable for service.

A rumor current in foreign countries concerning an alleged landing of U.S. forces in French Equatorial Africa and in the Belgian Congo is not confirmed by authoritative Vichy circles.

China:

According to a Chungking report, Japan has had to relinquish most of the interior of Hopei Province. The open countryside is said to have been taken over by the nationalist guerilla forces.

India:

Unrest throughout the country and systematic destruction of railroad stations and post offices continue.

Special Items:

The Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff has investigated the possibility of damaging the enemy fleets in the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean by means of submarines to such an extent that our heavy surface forces can operate.

He has come to the conclusion that this is impossible. The prospects of success are so poor that it would not pay to divert the submarines from operations against enemy merchant vessels, and thus forego sinking these.

The situation would not be changed materially if a compromise solution were considered whereby fewer submarines would be assigned to the above operations; the chances of submarines against the much faster surface ships are after all very poor, particularly once the enemy is on guard.

The analysis of the situation is contained in War Diary, Part C, under 1/Skl I op 1508/42 Gkdos. Chefs., file "Fundamental Problems of Warfare".

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Situation 15 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff congratulates ship "28" on her latest successes. It is assumed from the report that traffic is routed through quadrant GQ. The assumption held at first, that traffic is running mainly on a course of 45°, is discarded on account of its improbability. (See Radiogram 2038.)

Ship "28" and ship "23" are informed by Radiogram 2216 that the 2 prize crews on board the UCKERMARK are at the disposal of ship "28" either for prize crews or to replace personnel, and that steamers LIMA and BREDA, too, besides the LACONIA, were sunk in quadrant FF by German submarines. The latest crew list is to be forwarded by the TANNENFELS

The CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN is instructed to call at Medan as requested by the Naval Attache at Tokyo, who is informed that the vessel must previously be equipped at Batavia with charts and manuals for this run; also, that she will be able to pick up German seamen at Medan only if some of the war prisoners can first be removed from the overcrowded ship. The Naval Staff accepts the Naval Attache's proposal concerning fuel supply. This matter will be settled by the Armed Forces Intelligence Division, Section IV. Instructions regarding the various loading ports will have to be given to the SCHLIEMANN directly by the Naval Attache at Tokyo, with copies for the Naval Staff and the Armed Forces Intelligence Division, Section IV. (See Telegrams 1500, 2220, and 2335.)

Enemy situation report to all ships in foreign waters by Radiogram 1503.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio London reported extensive invasion maneuvers over the weekend which took place in the London district of the Thames estuary.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

Torpedo missions of the PT Boat flotillas had to be interrupted because of poor visibility.

Mine-exploding vessel "142" sank after striking a mine. 3 more mines were swept on route "Herz". Mine-laying operation "Weser" is scheduled

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for the night of 15 Sep.

Special Items:

a. As ordered, the report of the Naval Staff based on Group West's reply to the questions from Fuehrer Headquarters concerning the seizure of the Casquets is submitted to the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command. For copy see 1/Skl I Nord 22769/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

b. According to a telephone message from Group North, the Commander, Destroyers reported that the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will not be ready for operations prior to the end of October. From previous information it was to have been ready by the beginning of October following the termination of the fleet maneuvers.

The fleet is directed to investigate and report at what date the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will be ready for transfer to the west area. In this connection the Naval Staff calls attention to its order of 1 Sep. concerning disposition of the light forces. (See War Diary of 1 Sep.)

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

During an engagement with 6 enemy motor gunboats off Hook of Holland between 0435 and 0504, 1 enemy vessel was definitely sunk, another one probably sunk and a third one set afire by 4 of our patrol vessels. The latter suffered slight damages and casualties.

3 mines were swept in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North.

Damage was caused to the naval shipyard by an enemy air raid on Wilhelmshaven during the night of 14 Sep.; 6 barracks burned down, but production continued. 2 guns of the Tirpitz harbor anti-aircraft battery were put out of commission. An air defense post received a direct hit. For detailed reports see Telegrams 0200, 0615, 0900, 0715, and 2050.

2. Norway:

An eastbound convoy was shelled at 0045 by a Russian battery on Rybachi Peninsula. An Army coastal battery returned the fire. Reports of an enemy landing of undetermined strength 2 km west of Rybachi Peninsula caused a state of increased readiness of our forces in the Petsamo area.

Destroyer STEINBRINCK arrived at Trondheim. Shipping in the Utsire area was resumed since no trace of the suspected mines was found.

Enemy planes were active in the Trondheim area on 14 Sep. at noon and in the Stavanger area in the forenoon of 15 Sep.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway, reported in detail the quantities of undelivered cargo which could not be shipped on account of the very tense shipping situation; he urgently requested the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff to call on the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff

and Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping for the immediate allocation of at least 30,000 cu. m. of shipping space for the most urgent naval tasks. His demands in this respect could not be satisfied by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway due to the extremely tense transport situation in the Norwegian area and the constantly increasing tasks of the Armed Forces, the Todt Organization and the civilian authorities. (See Telegram 1030.)

The matter will be taken up by the Shipping and Transport Branch, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Operations against convoy PQ 18:

At 0845 the convoy was reported as 27 merchant vessels, 1 aircraft carrier, and the escort, on a course of 120° in quadrant AC 2545. At 2200 3 submarines were in contact with it and 7 more were in the vicinity. The shadowers were ordered to report bearings at intervals over different frequencies. At 1407 submarine U "403" was bombed twice in quadrant AC 2674 by 2 planes, probably He 111's; all bombs missed. The markings were definitely recognized. The planes subsequently attacked the convoy. Submarine U "457" fired a three-fan against a pursuing destroyer and missed. Out of the 12 submarines operating against convoy PQ 18, U "88" and U "589" did not report on 14 and 15 Sep. so that it is possible that they were lost.

The Air Force had no particular success today either. The majority of the planes did not find the target due to bad weather. Direction finder equipment was affected by strong aurora borealis and was partly not audible at all. The last location report after midnight counted approximately 30 merchant vessels, 1 carrier and 18 escort vessels.

> The weather favors the enemy and saved him from suffering losses similar to those on 13 and 14 Sep.; it permitted the enemy to escape the range of our bombers without deviating very far north and to gain time by staying on his course.

At 0727 convoy QP 14 was spotted in quadrant AC 9944 and reported by planes as leaving via the western channel and as composed of approximately 20 steamers and between 10 and 14 warships on a general course of 45°.

Submarine U "456" was ordered to establish contact.

The TIRPITZ reports being completely ready for operations except for Diesel-electric engine II.

With reference to Group North's request for allocation of a submarine tanker for the submarines in the Arctic Ocean (see War Diary of 13 Sep.) the Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports that "UD 2" is technically not suited for use in this war theater. Another ship cannot be assigned without interfering with warfare in the Atlantic or with the equally important training requirements. Comparing the distances in the submarine operations zone in the Arctic Ocean with those in the Atlantic, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines is convinced that type C VII submarines can operate in the Arctic Ocean over longer periods of time without refueling than in the Atlantic.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Nothing to report from the Baltic Sea entrances or the western Baltic Sea.

Mine-laying operation "Seeigel 34" was carried out by 2 naval barges according to plan in the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea.

Steamer ALKAID was damaged by a mine west of Hangoe while weighing anchor and had to be beached. Steamer FINLAND also had to be beached off Lohm.

Mine-sweeping and convoy service according to plan.

V. Merchant Shipping:

The Messagero published figures of a post-war shipbuilding program of the Italian government aimed at providing Italy quickly with a merchant marine of 9,000,000 GRT. Unfortunately such plans do nothing to alleviate the present shortage of tonnage for essential war tasks.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

In the forenoon radio messages from 2 planes were intercepted which reported that they had not encountered convoy HX 106. Another plane reported a depth charge attack on a surfaced submarine approximately 100 miles northwest of the Hebrides Islands at 1630. 39 planes of the 19th Air Group were located. The British steamer RAVENS POINT (1,787 GRT) reported from the Gibraltar area at 0808, without giving her position, that she was listing heavily due to an underwater detonation.

From the U.S. coast and the West Indies we intercepted reports of 3 submarine attacks and 4 sightings.

2. Own Situation:

For operations against PQ 18 and QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

In the North Atlantic, Group "Pfeil" in quadrant AL 45 was directed against a westbound convoy of between 11 and 15 steamers intercepted at 1909 by a submarine of the group. Contact with the convoy was lost, however, after 2 hours due to fog. The group was ordered to continue the operation.

4 submarines are en route toward quadrants AL 27 and AE 29 against the warships returning from the PQ convoy mission.

Group "Vorwaerts" is replenishing its supplies.

No successes were reported by the submarines operating off the American coast.

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From the West Indies submarine U "515" reports the sinking of a British steamer of 6,000 GRT in quadrant EE 7776 and the Norwegian steamer SOERHOLT (4,801 GRT) in quadrant EO 1129.

In the South Atlantic, submarine U "159" is taking the place of U "156" in Group "Eisbaer", which is scheduled to take on supplies on 22 Sep. in quadrant GG 1999.

Submarines U "506", U "507" and U "156" are to arrive in quadrant FE 9695 on 17 Sep. to transfer the survivors of the LACONIA.

The German Armistice Commission reports that the French refuse to flash radio signals in view of the possibility of giving themselves away, but agree to the remaining suggestions of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines. (See War Diary 14 Sep.). The GLOIRE left Dakar on 14 Sep. at 2130 Central Greenwich Time and will arrive at the scene of the LACONIA sinking in the afternoon of 17 Sep. The dispatch vessels ANNAMITE and DUMONT D'URVILLE were at sea with convoys, and are likewise expected to arrive at the scene in the afternoon of 17 Sep. (See Telegram 1945.)

Nothing to report from the Mediterranean.

For additional reports see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

20 planes attacked Boston during the night of 15 Sep.

2. Incursions:

12 bombers and 24 Spitfires attacked Cherbourg during the afternoon. Steamer SOLMGLINT was hit below the waterline and almost capsized. This danger was averted by flooding opposite compartments with the help of explosives. The barracks of submarine personnel were damaged. 2 planes were shot down.

20 incursions were reported in the coastal area of the German Bight during the night of 15 Sep. No bombs were dropped, but mine-laying is suspected.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

4 enemy planes were shot down during the fighter attacks on Malta. 22 of the enemy fighters which took off on account of our dive bomber attacks were shot down for sure and 3 probably. Enemy air activity in the entire North African area has decreased. Reconnaissance extending to longitude 40° W brought no results.

4. Eastern Front:

For operations against convoy PQ 18 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean. So far, the Air Force reported sinking 17 steamers totalling 116,000 GRT, including 1 tanker.

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Special Items:

Mass British attacks were carried out recently in close formation. Freya radar instruments to help divert the aim and the fire are therefore urgently needed.

The Operations Staff, Air Force requests the Naval Staff to put 20 Freya sets from the current deliveries to the Navy at the disposal of the Air Force between now and the end of 1942. (See Telegram 1715.)

The matter will be handled by the Chief, Communications Division, Naval Staff.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

The ship situation at Gibraltar is unchanged and that at Valletta showed only slight changes. A search for damaged British ships in the Marsa Matruh-Alexandria area was futile.

A German submarine sighted a convoy of 3 steamers and 2 escort vessels in the eastern Mediterranean sailing on a southerly course approximately 20 miles northwest of Haifa.

At 1400 radio monitoring intercepted a report from a British plane about 2 destroyers and 3 planes heading east approximately 75 miles west of Crete.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Resistance of the enemy detachment which landed at Tobruk was finally broken around noon of 14 Sep. The number of prisoners was increased to 550. A resume of the German Naval Command, Italy about the landing attempt at Tobruk reports also the sinking of an enemy destroyer due to a mine. Among the destroyers sunk are the SIKH and the ZULU. Statements concerning the enemy naval forces sighted by the Air Force are contradictory and a clear picture of their number and composition could thus far not be obtained. The report emphasizes the good work done by the Naval Communications Officer, Cyrenaica, who was first to report the landing and the only one to furnish information on the enemy situation during the first hours of the operation. It cannot be determined yet whether the successes reported by the Air Force will be confirmed. For copy of report see 1/Skl 22933/42 Gkdos. in War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Operations proceeded according to plan.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

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Own Situation:

6 enemy planes attacked Suda Bay during the afternoon of 14 Sep. No damage was reported. The Candia net barrage was damaged by bad weather. Convoy traffic on schedule.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring, the cruiser KRASNY KRIM was at sea in an undetermined position during the forenoon. 1 destroyer, 1 submarine tender, and 2 submarines were at sea southwest of Sukhum.

Own Situation:

Enemy planes raided Yalta during the nights of 11 and 12 Sep. The searchlight on the pier was hit.

A mine was swept on 14 Sep. by a mine-sweeping plane between Mariupol and Yeisk. Supply traffic is in progress between these places. Convoy and transport services were partially hampered by bad weather. On the evening of 14 Sep. 2 barges ran aground at Anapa.

3 naval barges were newly commissioned. 2 of them passed through Vienna on 14 Sep. on their way to Galatz.

Special Items:

a. The Admiral, Black Sea is making preparations for land transports from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. (See Telegram 1630.) The Shipping and Transport Branch of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is requested to inform the Transport Command urgently of its transport requirements and to call attention to the significance of naval operations for the Army operations.

b. Referring to the reduction of Greek occupation costs, Group South forwards a communication of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast according to which ship repairs are not subject to regulations for curtailment of occupation costs.

IX. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

Enemy attacks at all sectors of this group continued.

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Army Group B:

The battle for Stalingrad is progressing slowly but successfully amid sandstorms. At Voronezh the enemy succeeded in penetrating our line by surprise. A German counterattack is under way.

Central Army Group:

Several enemy thrusts south of Kirov were repulsed. 2 German tank divisions penetrated deeply into enemy lines east and northeast of Sychevka. The operation is still progressing.

In the Zubtsov area and on both Volga River banks the enemy continued his offensive. We were able to hold our lines. Enemy concentrations north of Rzhev were dispersed by artillery. The fight for the city park of Rzhev is still going on.

Northern Army Group:

Southeast of Staraya Russa the enemy launched a surprise attack on both sides of the Redvya River; a counterattack is under way. All enemy attacks south of Lake Ladoga were completely repulsed. Attrition fire is being maintained in this area by our artillery.

2. Finnish Front:

Lively artillery and scouting activity on both sides.

3. North Africa:

Normal enemy scouting activity and artillery fire along the entire front. The number of prisoners taken during the attack on Tobruk has increased to 580.

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Items of Political Importance

U.S.A.:

According to an Italian report from Ankara, President Roosevelt declared in a telegram to the Chief of the U.S. Military Mission at Cairo that the Middle East is at present the Allies' most important theater of war; the U.S.A. must therefore concentrate its attention there and must ship the bulk of all American supplies to this area.

Hull informed the French Ambassador that the large-scale supply of French labor to Germany is considered assistance given to the enemy and is thus incompatible with France's international obligations. Moreover, the U.S. Government condemns the large-scale expulsion and deportation of Jewish refugees from unoccupied France.

Argentina:

The Foreign Affairs Committee of Congress voted 5 to 3 for adherance to the resolutions of the Rio Conference and by a similar vote declined to sever relations with the Axis Powers.

Brazil:

The ships bought from the German and Italian Governments some time ago (7 German and 18 Italian vessels totalling 180,000 GRT) were declared national property by Government decree. The money deposited in accordance with the sales contracts was confiscated.

Chile:

The Chilean Foreign Minister believes that no change of the country's foreign policy can be expected prior to the President's return from Washington by the middle of November, unless untoward incidents should occur. The crisis, if it comes at all, will become acute early next year, depending on the development of the war situation.

India:

At the Parliament in New Delhi the British referred to the country-wide organized sabotage acts, particularly against strategically important installations, and declared that the spread of the movement is interfering with the successful prosecution of the war.

France:

In addition to the negotiations between the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping and Laval concerning the transfer of 120,000 tons of shipping space from French jurisdiction, the German Armistice Commission has resumed the conferences regarding the French plea for reinforcing French forces defending the African possessions. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. The conferences now taking place between Laval, Petain, and the leaders of the French Armed Forces are probably concerned with this problem.

The opinion voiced at Vichy with regard to the shipment of American forces to Africa is at variance with the British report that U.S. troops have arrived at Brazzaville.

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Special Items

The Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch has taken a stand on the following question raised by the Naval Staff, Operations Division: "Which of these two alternatives is the most effective type of warfare against merchant shipping, to sink ships bound for the British Isles, considering that all war materiel and essential commodities there must be imported, or to sink ships bound for America?"

The Naval Intelligence Division makes the following statement: The enemy's ship construction program aims at a monthly output of 900,000 GRT (of which 750,000 GRT constitute cargo space) by the beginning of 1943.

The decisive factor in answering the above question is the amount of shipping sunk per month. If it is possible to increase this figure to about 1,300,000 tons and to keep it at this level, then, no matter whether these ships are loaded or where they are bound, these sinkings will soon exert a strong influence on the outcome of the war. But even so it is better to attack loaded supply ships, since the effect will be greater and faster. The further the actual sinkings fall below the above figure, the smaller is the likelihood that the outcome of the war will be affected decisively by sinkings, no matter where, etc. Then it will be all the more urgent to attack loaded supply vessels, especially in the South Atlantic, the Arctic Ocean and en route to the British Isles, rather than to sink any kind of ships at all.

The decision whether and when such a shift in emphasis is necessary depends on the view taken of the future prospects of the submarine arm, since, under present conditions, submarines are the principal agents of warfare against merchant shipping.

For copy of the above see 1/Skl 1833/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

The above comment is an integral part of an extensive situation survey now being made by the Operations Division, Naval Staff with regard to submarine warfare.

Situation 16 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Among the unending series of invasion rumors reported by the Intelligence Service, there is an agent's report from France according to which operations of Anglo-American forces both in western Europe and Africa appear to be imminent early in October. While an American operation from Bathurst is to be directed against Dakar, with a simultaneous landing at Portudal and other American forces are to land at Riah in Morocco, British forces are to attempt a landing on the southern bank of the Seine River at Le Havre and south of Brest, possibly west of Quimper. In addition, U.S. forces are to disembark simultaneously northwest of Bordeaux in the

Garonne estuary in order to penetrate to the center of the unoccupied area, where it is allegedly expected that French forces which had been organized quickly by preparatory propaganda would join them. All of these operations would be preceded by heavy activity of the air forces.

> Such an undertaking would force France to show her colors. As matters stand today, even a successful large-scale invasion of French territory would hardly suffice to disrupt the policy of Petain and Laval. On the contrary, we may assume that France would be driven into participation in the war on the Axis side, though naturally not without some internal tension. It follows that plans as outlined above can succeed only if political developments guarantee a more favorable outcome, namely, if the enemy can be sure that France would not join our side, or, if France should join the Axis, that the Allies could fully compensate for this, e.g., by alienating an important member of the Axis. However, there are no indications of such a development at present and therefore, as far as France's attitude is concerned, we are justified in giving these reports only enough attention to be on guard. On the other hand, we should remember that clarification of German-French relations, which can still be achieved today, would greatly relieve our concern.

More important is an intelligence report from Rome, dated 12 Sep., according to which a convoy of 26 vessels with tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and other war material left a northern Irish port on 23 Aug. in the direction of Capetown.

It is learned from the same source that Churchill declared in a confidential discussion that the British offensive on the Egyptian front will begin within the next 10 days or 2 weeks and will last for about a month.

2. Own Situation:

In the opinion of the Naval Attache at Tokyo, it cannot yet be assumed that the Japanese permission for the voyage of ship "10" to Japan has been granted; the ship is therefore instructed by Radiogram 0858 not to proceed for the time being. The Naval Staff is endeavoring to clarify the situation.

Ships "23" and "28" are instructed that the sailing orders issued to the TANNENFELS contain the blockade runner routes for the voyage from Japan to Europe. The points "Tornado", "Taifun", and "Treibanker" as defined in the TANNENFELS sailing orders will be referred to also in future instructions to the auxiliary cruisers concerning blockade runners. (See Telegram 2047.)

CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN is instructed to proceed through the Sunda Strait and to pick up German seamen at Medan. A pilot will be furnished by the Japanese Navy. Sailing instructions for the voyage through the Sunda Strait will be given by the Naval Attache at Tokyo who is aware of the lack of charts for the voyage to Medan. (See Radiogram 0043.)

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In connection with the UCKERMARK's imminent passing through the area between Freetown and Natal, the Naval Staff issues the following estimate of the enemy situation:

a. Shipping passes mainly west of St. Paul's Rock. Southbound ships from the British Isles to South Africa pass St. Paul's Rock between 100 and 200 miles to the east, northbound vessels between 200 and 300 miles to the east. Tankers rarely use this route; on their way from Trinidad to South America they either pass west of St. Paul's Rock or proceed directly to Freetown and thence southward.

b. The UCKERMARK is therefore advised to assume an apparent course toward Freetown or Trinidad in the event that she is sighted by the enemy in this area.

c. Enemy shipping rarely exceeds a speed of 16 knots. If sighted, the UCKERMARK is to adjust her speed accordingly.

d. The Naval Staff advises a breakthrough off the African coast just west of the western limit of the submarine zone of operations, because traffic is comparatively light there.

Information of the UCKERMARK to this effect by Radiogram 2328.

The Foreign Merchant Marine Branch of the Naval Intelligence Division made a survey of the enemy's shipping routes in the Atlantic as of 7 Sep., listing the changes which have occurred since 15 Aug. 1942. The above estimate of the situation by the Operations Division, Naval Staff is based on this survey. For copy no. 21 see 1/Skl 2297/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

The Italian blockade runner CORTELAZZO will be ready to sail overseas from Bordeaux early in October. She will follow the same sailing orders and recognition signals which the Operations Division, Naval Staff issued to the PIETRO CASCIO.

For copy of corresponding directive to the High Command, Italian Naval Forces, Atlantic (Betasom), and to Group West, with copy to the Chief, Communications Division, Naval Staff, see 1/Skl Ik 1803/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

The First Lord of the Admiralty declared in an address at Portsmouth: "We have destroyed more magnetic, acoustic, and moored mines off the British coasts than would have been required to sink the entire British merchant marine."

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

4 long-range fighters (Ju 88 C) operating in the Bay of Biscay shot down 3 enemy planes for sure and a fourth one probably.

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Special Item:

In view of British efforts to intercept and combat German submarines, particularly in the Bay of Biscay, the northern Spanish coast and consequently the entire Iberian Peninsula assume particular importance. By establishing air bases or observation posts on the southern shore of the Bay of Biscay, the enemy would greatly improve his control over this area and at the same time render the German position much more difficult. It is therefore of utmost importance to watch the Iberian Peninsula for all possibilities which it may offer to enemy actions, whether directed against Germany or Italy. The Naval Staff requests the Naval Attaches at Madrid and Lisbon to keep this in mind.

For corresponding directive see 1/Skl Ia 1799/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

Channel Coast:

Torpedo boats T "18" and T "19" collided during the night of 15 Sep. and reached Cherbourg in damaged condition. T "18" is out of commission (see Telegram 1155).

See Telegram 0725 for a report on the enemy air raid on Cherbourg during the afternoon of 15 Sep. and on the damage to steamer SOLGLIMT. (Compare War Diary of 15 Sep. under Aerial Warfare, Incursions.)

Mine-exploding vessel "168" was damaged by a particularly strong detonation 20 m off her bow, which indicates an unknown powerful explosive. In the afternoon the "Grosser Kurfuerst" battery fired four 28 cm shells at 4 light warships observed in the harbor of Dover, but ceased firing due to the impossibility of observing results.

Mine-laying operation "Oder" (north of Barfleur) is scheduled for the night of 16 Sep.

Owing to the increased threat from ground mines, traffic on route "Herz" between Ostend and Blankenberghe is particularly endangered and requires added protection. (See Telegram 1640.)

Special Item:

Differences of opinion between Naval Group Commands West and North about furnishing information to the command authorities of Group North about the PT boat operation in the Channel were settled by an agreement reached over the telephone by the Commanding Admirals, Group West and Group North. In accordance with this agreement Group North withdraws its original demand that the Naval Communications Officer at Utrecht be furnished with the data on the radio frequency used by the PT boats. On the other hand, the Commander, PT Boats guarantees that the command authorities in the area of Group North will receive information about PT boat operations to the same extent and just as fast as those in the area of Group West. (See Telegram 1800.)

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Patrol and escort services suffered by bad weather. Enemy planes operated off the German Bight coasts during the night of 15 Sep. and mines were probably laid. Bombs were dropped at Brunsbuettel. Naval Station, North Sea corrects its damage report concerning the raid on Wilhelmshaven of 15 Sep. by Telegram 1445. 4 ground mines were swept between Schiermonnikoog and Terschelling.

2. Norway:

An enemy submarine was sighted on 15 Sep. north of Svaerholtklubben by air reconnaissance. Following a futile chase, our subchaser force was attacked by aerial torpedoes without success. The attacking plane was shot down by a subchaser and its documents captured.

Enemy air activity over the arctic coast on 14 and 15 Sep. Bombs were dropped on Kirkenes without causing damage. The Eltevik battery will have only 3 guns ready for action for 5 or 6 days beginning 16 Sep.

Convoy and transport service according to plan.

Special Item

In view of the ordered increase in the number of naval forces in Norway, Group North considers the 8 destroyers (including the STEINBRINCK) assigned to it as insufficient and suggests the allocation of a minimum of 10 or 12 destroyers in order to safeguard freedom of action of the fleet forces located in the harbors of Trondheim, Narvik and Alta Fjord. Moreover, Group North considers the allocation of PT boats for patrol duty during transfers of naval forces highly desirable. In this connection the Group places great value on the allocation of a number of fleet torpedo boats or ships of the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla. (See Telegram 1728.)

Comment by the Operations Division, Naval Staff will follow.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring intercepted a report of the 95th Air Regiment of 1130 on 14 Sep. addressed to the commander of the operational air force of the Arctic Ocean fleet: "On 13 Sep. between 0542 and 1850 the operational group escorted the Allied ships in the area (?) to 67° 57' N, 41° 40' E in groups of 4 to 6 planes. We executed reconnaissance missions, searching for enemy submarines at the White Sea entrance and on approach routes. A convoy of 14 ships remained intact while under escort."

Own Situation:

a. Operation against PQ 18 and QP 14:

Altogether 5 submarines had contact during the day with convoy PQ 18, proceeding on a southeasterly course. At 1100

it was reported by a submarine as located in quadrant AC 6332 in a snow storm and with low visibility. Planes lost contact around noon, after having reported at 1120 that convoy PQ 18 consisted of approximately 31 merchant vessels, 1 aircraft carrier, 1 heavy cruiser, 13 destroyers and 8 escort vessels.

Submarine U "255" executed 2 unsuccessful daylight attacks on the aircraft carrier.

Submarine U "377" reported the probable torpedoing of a steamer in quadrant AC 6653 at 1918.

On account of bad weather the Air Force did not attack.

At 0815 reconnaissance planes reported convoy QP 14 on a northerly course in quadrant AT 4871 composed of 18 steamers under escort of 5 destroyers and 5 escort vessels. Submarine U "456" reported very strong air patrols in quadrant AT 7130. A total of 7 submarines are operating against QP 14. Submarine U "405" scored a hit on an AFRIDI class destroyer at 2200 in quadrant AT 4174.

The planes lost contact with QP 14 at noon.

Group North informs the Naval Staff, with copy to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, about the directive to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean which is based on the assumption that PQ 18 and QP 14 will meet in the course of the day or during the night.

For copy of this telegram see 1/Skl 22971/42 Gkdos. in file "Eispalast".

b. Mine-laying operation in the Iceland area:

On 3 Sep. Group North requested that submarine U "117", which was assigned by the Commanding Admiral, Submarines for a mine-laying mission in the Kara Sea, be made available for a mine-laying mission in the Iceland area planned by the Group (see War Diary of 18 Jul.); moreover, it was requested that 132 SMA mines with safety mechanism and timing device set for 60 days be provided.

However the Commanding Admiral, Submarines adheres to his opinion that a weapon not ready for operational use must not be used, and that when SMA mines are ready for use, there are more urgent tasks to be carried out.

On 14 Sep. Group North asked permission to execute the suggested operation in the Iceland area immediately by submarine U "117", which is to sail from Kiel on 19 Sep., and to postpone mining of the Kara Strait which is already frozen most of the time, and, besides, is not being used by the enemy as far as could be observed. If it is being used after all, however, then it is planned to have a destroyer lay EMF mines with timing device at the western entrance. The Group renews its request that submarine U "117" be made available to the Group for additional mining operations and that the mines requested be allocated unless there are other more important tasks within the area of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

Thereupon the Naval Staff decides as follows:

(1) Permission is granted to use submarine U "117" for the operation on the east coast of Iceland instead of in the Kara Strait.

(2) The allocation of mines for additional operations in the area of Group North will be decided on later. This reservation is necessary because the report requested from the Commanding Admiral, Submarines about the planned mining operations of submarine U "117" has not yet been received.

c. Mine-laying operations in the Arctic Ocean:

Group North submits to the Naval Staff a copy of its directive to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean concerning previous plans not yet executed and new mine-laying plans:

Tasks still to be executed are the operations "Paul", "Iwan I" and alternative "Zar" ("Zar 14-20" by HIPPER). The following operations were cancelled: "Rasputin", because Matochkin Strait is frozen and sealed by minefield "Peter"; "Rurik" and the uncompleted sections of "Romanow" and "Iwan II".

Newly planned are:

(1) A minefield off Kanin Nos, consisting of approximately 100 EMF and EMC mines with timing device set for 60 days to be interspersed with 30 or 40 cutter floats, to be laid by 2 destroyers. Code name "Zarewna".

(2) Mining of the approach route to the White Sea with EMF and EMC mines without timing devices, also cutter floats, to be laid by destroyers.

d. Blockade of Murmansk:

The Naval Staff shares the opinion of Group North on this matter (see War Diary of 4 Sep.) and submits its comment, which corresponds to the stand of the Group, to the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters, who, during a conference with the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff on 17 Jul., had asked how Murmansk could be "cut off" from supplies during the winter by mine-laying operations.

For copy of memorandum and telegram see 1/Skl. op 1665/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

e. Operations of naval forces:

Group North informs the Naval Staff about the general directive to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean outlining the measures to be taken in the probable event that the task force of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers will not be committed against the convoys PQ 18 and QP 14.

(1) (a) At the end of the operation against PQ 18, the SCHEER is to be withdrawn to Narvik with 2 destroyers.

(b) The TIRPITZ to be withdrawn to Trondheim with the destroyers previously assigned to escort the SCHEER and with torpedo boats T "9" and "12".

(2) Following the arrival of convoy PQ 18 at its destination, the HIPPER with the KOELN and 4 destroyers will execute the following mission:

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(a) HIPPER to lay mines, for instance the minefields "Zar 14-20".

(b) KOELN (depending on the weather) and destroyers after crossing the zone of submarine operations will strike against the Kola coast and annihilate the patrol vessels. Depending on the situation, they will then return either to Kirkenes or Alta Fjord for refueling, whereupon the destroyers are to set out once more to pick up the HIPPER.

Group North requests the Admiral, Arctic Ocean's opinion whether it would not be better to substitute a minefield, perhaps in quadrant AT 48, for the "Zar" minefield.

> Since the transfer of the TIRPITZ to Trondheim is not urgent, the Naval Staff is of the opinion that it would be expedient to keep the ship at Narvik for the time being, since it is certain that any operational opportunity which arises will necessitate a jump-off from a point as far north as possible.

Group North is therefore instructed to postpone the withdrawal to Trondheim of the TIRPITZ, unless her return for shipyard repairs is unavoidable, in which case this should be reported.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Steamer SCHARHOERN suffered slight damage from an exploding mine in the Kattegat.

Minefield "Sauna IV" was laid according to plan in the Gulf of Finland. Motor mine sweeper R "66" sank in quadrant AO 3389 due to a mine hit. 7 of the crew survived. Convoy service proceeded according to plan.

Motor mine sweepers and detonations in the Kronstadt Sea Channel observed by Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion 530 indicate enemy minesweeping operations. Group North advises the Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries that it is most urgent to renew the laying of torpedo mines by assault boats. Very many mines must be laid, because the Russians have demonstrated in the case of "Seeigel" that even a mine barrage does not prevent them from breaking through. (See Telegrams 1330 and 1537.)

V. Merchant Shipping

Roosevelt informed Congress of the establishment of "Cargoes Incorporated", which will build freighters on a mass production basis under the supervision of the Navy Department and the Maritime Commission.

According to newspaper reports, Roosevelt spoke of building a torpedo-proof merchant vessel in the U.S.A. The British press calls this type vessel a "Seamobile" and assumes that its secret lies in extremely shallow draught.

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VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance activity in the rendezvous area was centered in the Bay of Biscay. A plane was ordered to attack a submarine northeast of the Faeroe Islands; later a second plane reported a depth charge attack.

Reports on submarine attacks were intercepted from the St. Lawrence River, east of St. Johns, and northeast of Trinidad. The last one at 1806 originated from an unknown steamer ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS. Also a number of messages reporting sighted submarines were intercepted.

2. Own Situation:

Regarding operation in the Arctic Ocean see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean. In the North Atlantic, Group "Pfeil" is operating against a convoy in quadrant AK. Contact was maintained intermittently and only by a few submarines. Submarine U "221" reports having been driven off to the north by a submarine decoy ship. The operation continues.

4 submarines were newly dispatched to the zone of operations and have orders to head for a line from quadrant AL 22 to AM 44 and to report when crossing this line.

Submarine U "165" sank a 6,000 GRT steamer out of a convoy in the St. Lawrence River.

From the West Indies, submarine U "558" reports sinking a coastal steamer of 2,000 GRT in quadrant ED 9995, submarine U "514" the torpedoing of the British steamer CIOSTO in quadrant ED 9929. The wreck ran aground and was set on fire by gunfire.

No reports about any successes were received from the South Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

In connection with the LACONIA rescue action, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines is directed to take along as many of the British officers as possible on submarines as prisoners of war, and not to transfer them to French ships; according to international law, survivors taken aboard naval forces of a neutral power have to be interned so that there would be danger of their release some time in the future. (See Telegram 1818.)

Submarine U "156" was attacked by a U.S. plane, abandoned the rescue operation, and withdrew in westerly direction for repairs.

For additional reports, particularly on the LACONIA operation, see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Daylight reconnaissance and fighter bomber missions against Rye and Eastbourne. During the night of 15 Sep. fires were caused

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by raids on Boston and Ipswich.

About the enemy planes shot down over the Bay of Biscay by the 13th Squadron of the 40th Bomber Wing see Situation West Area.

Colchester and Harwich were attacked during the night of 16 Sep.

2. Incursions:

Approximately 200 enemy planes penetrated into western German territory and reached Osnabrueck, Lemgo, Giessen, Wiesbaden, and Wittlich. 36 of them were shot down. Heavy damage was wrought at Dortmund, Oberhausen, Bochum, Duisburg, Essen, Wuppertal, minor damage at Cochem, Wiesbaden-Biebrich, and Neuwied.

> The number of planes shot down is in proportion with the planes involved. The attacks on industrial and traffic installations as well as residential sections of our towns are reaching highly unpleasant proportions and will eventually affect our war potential. The enemy evidently attributes vital importance to the devastating and terrorizing effect of his air attacks on German territory.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Nothing to report.

4. Eastern Front:

On 15 Sep. 100 enemy planes were reported shot down by our fighters and 18 by anti-aircraft artillery along the various Army fronts; on 16 Sep. the figures were 67 and 12 respectively.

Reconnaissance activity in the areas of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea, in the Gulf of Finland and over Lake Ladoga.

In the Arctic Ocean, 1 PT boat was definitely damaged and 2 more probably damaged on 15 Sep. in Pumanki Bay.

Regarding operations against convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

Special Item:

The appointment of a commander of advanced training for carrier detachments as requested on 17 Aug. by the Inspector with the Air Force General attached to the Commander in Chief, Navy was refused by the Operations Staff, Air Force as unnecessary at this moment. According to a communication from the Plans and Schedules Branch, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, the present organizational plan provides for a commander of shipborne planes who will take care of the tasks suggested for the commander of advanced training. Moreover, an inspector of naval air is planned as a higher command.

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VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Steamer RAVELLO was damaged during an enemy air raid on Benghazi at noon.

Enemy planes attacked Tobruk between 2030 and 2250. At 2150 the Commanding Officer, Supply and Transports, North Africa reported an enemy landing 14 km west of Tobruk and enemy forces advancing toward Via Balbia. According to a message of 2250, everything was quiet at Tobruk. It may be that the report was caused by an encounter with scattered remnants of the earlier landing or with parachutists.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The convoy of motor ship BARLETTA was attacked in the evening by enemy planes south of the western tip of Crete. The convoy ANKARA, with destroyer HERMES and 2 torpedo boats, was spotted by British reconnaissance planes 60 miles northwest of Tobruk. A naval barge sank on 14 Sep. due to high seas while under way from Suda to Derna.

Otherwise, transport service proceeded according to plan.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Submarines were sighted in the evening of 15 Sep. off Candia and northwest of Skiathos.

Own Situation:

Losses of personnel were caused by an enemy air attack on Candia during the afternoon of 14 Sep. which, according to Reuter, was carried out by heavy U.S. bombers.

Battery 2/520 is reported ready for operation with 3 guns on Prapanon east of Suda.

Convoy and transport shipping according to plan.

Special Item:

As reported by the Chief Administration and Supply Officer of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast, the reported curtailment by 25% of the occupation costs was merely an experiment which proved a failure.

The Admiral, Aegean Sea and Group South rightly point to the injurious effects of this experiment and request a decision that in view of the progressive devaluation of the Greek currency the amounts of funds appropriated for Greece should not be fixed. For details see Telegram 1720.

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The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will follow this matter up.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring it is probable that the large ships located on 14 and 15 Sep. have reached Poti and Batum.

Reconnaissance planes sighted a convoy on a northwesterly course off Gagry at noon; it consisted of a large steamer escorted by 1 mine sweeper and 2 motor mine sweepers.

Own Situation:

Auxiliary mine sweeper XANTEN arrived at Galatz on 11 Sep. from Linz.

Transport and convoy traffic proceeded on the whole according to plan. Barge convoys for the Crimea sailed for the first time.

2 PT boats are scheduled for operation against enemy shipping off the coast between Tuapse and Sochi during the night of 16 Sep.

Special Item:

Group South submits the requirements for transferring coastal batteries to the Caspian Sea and the Caucasian coast to the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division. For copy of telegram see 1/Skl 23024/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

IX. Situation East Asia

According to Reuter, the Japanese have been landing troops on Guadalcanal since 12 Sep. and are attacking the airfield.

According to the United Press, an incendiary bomb was dropped on 9 Sep. on the southern coast of Oregon (U.S.A.), probably by a plane released from a Japanese submarine.

U.S. fighter planes attacked Japanese ships and troops on Kiska Island in the Aleutians.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

Enemy pressure on all sectors of the Army Group continues. North of Isherskaya in the Grozny area, German forces advanced in an easterly direction and forced the enemy to withdraw.

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Army Group B:

Long-range reconnaissance sighted a strongly held enemy trench system northwest of Astrakhan. In the battle for Stalingrad, we repulsed enemy tank attacks in a southern suburb. The enemy is trying to prevent a junction of the forces battling their way to the center of the city from the south and north. German infantry fighting near the south station succeeded in advancing on either side of the railroad and reaching the Tsaritsa River bank. Strong enemy attacks in the Don River bend northwest of Svoboda were repulsed. Heavy enemy pressure in the Voronezh area continues.

Central Army Group:

An enemy attack south of Novosil is expected. Enemy troop concentrations in the Sychevka area were dispersed by gunfire. Enemy attacks at Zubtsov and in the Rzhev area continue in unabated strength. German ground attack planes supported our successful defense.

Northern Army Group:

A strong enemy attack on the penetration point northeast of Lyuban was repulsed. Our newly won positions south of Lake Ladoga were held successfully by the light infantry division against all enemy attacks.

2. Finnish Front:

An enemy scouting detachment which had landed in the western sector of Motovski Bay was annihilated by one of our outposts.

3. North Africa:

The enemy is feeling his way toward the southern front sector with tanks and riflemen. Otherwise normal harassing gunfire.

The report of another enemy landing at Tobruk proved false.

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Items of Political Importance

Madagascar:

According to an official report from Vichy, General Annet the Governor of Madagascar, has begun negotiations with the British Commander in Chief. Fighting continues, however.

Great Britain:

British public opinion considers the severe German air raid on London of 15 Sep. 1940 an event of greatest historical importance. The British Air Ministry published a memorandum about it. The Times speaks of "A Trafalgar of the air". For details see Political Review No 218, paragraph 2.

Minister of War Production Lyttleton points out that only 20 of the expected 80 critical days are left; thereafter the war will enter a new phase. If Russia can bear up even a few weeks more, the course of events will change in favor of the Allies. Time is the important factor.

For the Minister's remaining statements regarding British war production which still exceeds American production see Political Review No 218, paragraph 3.

The London Times report on the German demands for French shipping space, of which the Government is aware, is on the whole accurate. A decision on these demands has not been made. It seems that the newspaper has learned nothing of the concessions offered by Germany in return.

Syria:

De Gaulle's attempt at reconciliation between Generals Catroux and Spears seems to have failed. De Gaulle has left Beirut for French Equatorial Africa.

Iceland:

The Althing has postponed the decision on the question of independence until after a plebiscite, a development which is highly pleasing to Denmark.

Japan:

In connection with rumors current in foreign countries about Japanese efforts to mediate between Moscow and Berlin, the Japanese Office of War Information denies a report of an alleged visit in Moscow by Ambassador Sato.

Iran:

The Transocean News Agency reports that the Russian Army confiscated Iranian tonnage lying in Iranian Caspian Sea ports following the failure to reach an amicable agreement.

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Special Items:

A compilation of enemy information obtained by the radio decoding and intercept services during the period of 7 to 13 Sep. is contained in Radio Intelligence Report No 37/42 issued by the Naval Communications Division, Communications Intelligence Branch.

Reference is made to the description of the U.S. radio monitoring achievements against German submarines on the North Atlantic coast with a chart showing the information obtained since 1 Aug. 1942 (see top secret radio intelligence report (XB), pages 6 to 9).

The Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff calls the attention of the Chiefs, Naval Communications Division and Naval Intelligence Division to the discrepancy between XB report no. 36/42 of 10 Sep. 1942 and the picture presented by the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch with regard to enemy shipping routes in the Atlantic. In the opinion of the Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff the original text of the British sailing instructions does not in itself indicate whether ship traffic is to be routed inside or outside a 300 mile strip off the coast; this ambiguity should have been pointed out in the XB report. The Naval Staff holds that in any case the information obtained by the Chief, Naval Communications Division exclusively from the radio intercept and radio deciphering services should be evaluated in consultation with the Intelligence Division, Naval Staff where intelligence from all available sources is concentrated.

For copy of letter see 1/Skl I k 23004/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

This touches on the much debated organizational problem as to whether the Radio Intelligence Service should primarily be regarded as a matter of tactical and technical nature or as of operational nature.

Situation 17 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an Italian report from Lourenco Marques, the 3 battleships RODNEY, REVENGE, RAMILLIES, the submarine CLYDE, and a number of escort vessels were at Durban on 8 Sep. A total of 60,000 U.S. troops was being expected at Capetown, 4,000 of which arrived on 28 Aug. A convoy of 12 ships sailed from Durban for Madagascar on 2 Sep. The ships anchored in the Durban roads are protected by planes and torpedo boats. Approximately 30,000 men are at Durban at the present time. A few of the warships lying at Durban belong to the U.S. Navy.

According to a French communication of 17 Sep. to the German Armistice Commission, British forces on Madagascar are slowly advancing in the direction of Tananarive. On 14 Sep. they reached Andriba which was occupied on 16 Sep. Morondava was evacuated again on 14 Sep. Additional British forces landed in the northwestern

part of the island between Analalava and Ambajana. The Vichy Government has requested Governor General Annet to confirm that he will continue to resist in accordance with his orders.

An intelligence report of 11 Sep. states that near Rakka a 600 m steel bridge across the Euphrates River has been in use since the middle of August.

2. Own Situation:

The Japanese Navy has finally agreed to the visit by ship "10" but requested that the ship call at Balik Papan after passing Sunda Strait and take on a capacity load of Tarakan oil for use of the blockade-runners in Japan. Ship "10" is to refuel later in the southern area on her return voyage.

The Naval Staff instructs ship "10" accordingly by Radiograms 1250 and 2243.

The Naval Staff informs the Naval Attache at Tokyo that ship "10" will sail on 20 Sep. from 13° 00' S, 105° 00' E to the Sunda Strait at a rate of 15 knots.

The Naval Attache at Tokyo reports that the Japanese Navy will bring the German seamen from Medan to Shonanho (Singapore), where they will be put aboard the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN after 50 war prionsers have been taken off. The SCHLIEMANN is to sail directly to Shonanho through the Sunda and Karimata Straits, where she will load as much oil as possible for the Japanese Navy and then proceed directly to Japan. The Japanese Navy is investigating whether it is possible for the ship to take on 250 tons of Tarakan oil at Shonanho for German test purposes. If this is impossible, the tests cannot be carried out. (See Telegram 2011.)

The Naval Staff informs the WESERLAND by Radiogram 1552 as follows:

"Southbound enemy shipping is routed between 100 and 200 miles, northbound traffic between 200 and 300 miles east of St. Paul's Rock. In addition there is direct traffic somewhere along the line Bahia to Freetown. This should be borne in mind if the ship is sighted and has to assume a deceptive course. A straight course from point "Waschbord" to point "Welle" appears to be favorable at this moment, but it is preferable to keep to the east rather than to the west thereof."

Enemy situation report to all ships in foreign waters by Radiogram 0421 and 0750.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

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2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

2 ground mines were swept in the Gironde estuary.

The Naval Staff informs Group West, with copy to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, that the TANNENFELS will sail around 23 Sep. from the center of large quadrant GD after delivering supplies to the auxiliary cruisers "28" and "23". She will proceed north at a speed of 11 knots and will sail at a top speed of 15 knots between 15° S and 10° N and after crossing 35° N. Group West is requested to investigate whether the ship can get through at these speeds in view of the present enemy situation. The Group is to assume command of the ship after she reaches 30° N. The TANNENFELS is camouflaged as the TORRENS or the TALBOT. She has temporary orders to proceed via 42° N, 37° W; 46° 30' N, 22° 00' W; 43° 48' N, 07° 52' W.

Channel Coast:

2 enemy planes, one a 4-engine bomber, were shot down at 0100 and 0128 by naval coastal artillery.

Mine-laying mission "Oder" was executed according to plan.

Special Items:

a. The Naval Staff investigated the question of whether some of the ships of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla could be used to escort ship "45", the sailing of which can no longer be postponed; it was decided that the 3 ships FALKE, KONDOR, JAGUAR can be used for the purpose in spite of certain inconveniences.

An order to this effect is given by 1/Skl I op 22934/42 Gkdos. For copy see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

Group West reports that, according to a report of the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla, the engine overhaul of T "10" and T "14" may be postponed by 4 weeks in each case. (See Telegram 2215.)

b. A supplement to the Naval Staff's report to the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command concerning The Casquets is forwarded by Telegram 1/Skl I a 22769/42 Gkdos. For copy see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Heavy enemy air activity in the area of northern Holland

was reported during the night of 16 Sep. One plane was shot down at Ijmuiden by naval anti-aircraft. A ground mine was swept off Schiermonnikoog and one off Ameland. Convoys from the Elbe River to Hook of Holland were postponed for 24 hours due to bad weather. Traffic on the Elbe and Ems Rivers had to be suspended.

2. Norway:

Lively enemy air activity on 15 and 16 Sep. is reported. Bombs were dropped at several points on the arctic and north Norwegian coasts. 3 British torpedo planes sank steamer KARPFANGER (4,974 GRT) out of a convoy near Obrestad at noon on 17 Sep.

On 15 Sep. at 2400 a Russian battery on the Rybachi Peninsula fired without result on a westbound convoy. A patrol vessel of the Coastal Patrol Group, West Coast sank on 16 Sep. due to a collision.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway submits a supplementary report of the Admiral, Arctic Coast about the sinking of steamer BORNHOFEN; he shares the view expressed therein that the sinking was caused by an explosion from within the ship, probably a bomb planted in the coal cargo. It could not have been caused by a mine, since the steamer was proceeding behind a minesweeper and no mines were observed afterwards. Ground mines could not have been involved, since the water depth measured 100 m. Torpedo tracks or columns of water were not observed. (See Telegram 1855.)

3. Arctic Ocean:

a. Operation against PQ 18 and QP 14:

Reconnaissance planes reported PQ 18 at 0950 in quadrant AT 7117, consisting of approximately 30 merchant vessels on a course of 180°, without the aircraft carrier which evidently had been shifted to convoy QP 14. At 1551 submarine U "251" sighted 3 destroyers and ship-borne planes, probably belonging to the carrier, in quadrant AC 3568. Neither submarines nor aircraft were able to close in for attack on either convoy.

Submarine operations against PQ 18 have, on the whole, been terminated. Nothing has been heard from submarines U "88", U "457", and U "589", which must unfortunately be considered lost. The results achieved by the submarines, 15 of which were operating at times against PQ 18, amount to the sinking of 4 steamers, totalling 24,000 GRT, 3 torpedoings with 1 hit each on steamers and 2 probable hits on destroyers; the loss of 3 submarines is a high price for this unsatisfactory achievement, which must be attributed to the strong defenses of the convoy and to the submarine captains' lack of experience in combatting heavily escorted convoys. The Naval Staff requests Group North to submit a final review of this operation. In view of the strength of convoy PQ 18, which is reported still to consist of 31 merchant vessels, the Group is convinced that the Air Force's reports about damage to numerous vessels must be due to duplications and incorrect observation, and that submarines therefore have little prospect of finding damaged ships. For this reason it is best to continue the battle against PQ 18 as long as possible. The Group further raises the question whether it would not be advisable, in view of the strong defense to be expected, to launch a massed attack of submarines against the whole convoy QP 14 from

a greater distance and to fire G 7 A type torpedoes from a fine angle on the bow.

The Commanding Admiral, Group North expressed his great appreciation for the excellent performance of the submarines during the operations against convoy PQ 18.

8 submarines can be in patrol line between quadrants AC 2171 and AC 2444 at 1700 on 18 Sep.

7 submarines are engaged in the operation against QP 14.

b. Concerning fuel supply for the submarines operating in the Arctic Ocean:

With regard to the adverse attitude of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines (see War Diary 15 Sep.) Group North remarks that it is not in a position to judge whether training is as important as operations in the Atlantic. The distance which will have to be covered in future operations on account of the changes in the enemy's convoy system (PQ and QP convoys meet off Novaya Zemlya) is 5,200 miles, according to the Group's calculations. Thus, if it is impossible to allocate submarine tankers, Group North considers it necessary to have a number of naval barges, converted into small-size tankers, stand by in the northernmost island waters of northern Norway.

c. Submarine operations planned in the Arctic Ocean:

Group North informs the Naval Staff, with copies to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and the 5th Air Force, of its new directive to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean about the disposition of submarines for intercepting and combatting convoys:

(1) As soon as convoy QP 14 has reached port, 3 submarines are to lay the minefields "Paul", "Iwan", and "Knospe II"; the remaining boats will rest and attend to repairs.

(2) Approximately a week later 2 or 3 submarines are to maintain a permanent patrol line off Iceland.

(3) 2 or 3 submarines are to guard the Bear Island passage or the entrance to the White Sea, attention to be focused on Bear Island.

(4) When definite information about approaching convoys is received, all submarines standing by at all ports are to be used for a concentrated attack.

The 5th Air Force is requested to reconnoiter and patrol the waters between Iceland and Jan Mayen as well as the Denmark Strait and to gather information about the principal convoy assembly places and the Iceland fjords.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Steamer SCHARHOERN reached Aalborg under her own power. Motor ship ANNIE (235 GRT) sank off Samsoe after striking a mine. The

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Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea submits a belated report of a mine detonation near steamer TRAUTENFELS west of Kallundborg which took place on 13 Aug.; the ship suffered no damage.

The Swedish Navy recommended that if at all possible Swedish merchant vessels sail within Swedish territorial waters between Oeregrund and Norra Kwacken.

The Naval Staff forwards this information from the German Naval Attache at Stockholm to Group North, the Baltic Naval Station, and the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea, with the request from the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping that everything be avoided that might increase the difficulties of Swedish ore shipping, since the ore transport situation is so critical. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping is willing to accept the greater risk involved.

Except for convoy traffic which proceeded according to plan, all other activity in the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea suffered from bad weather.

The Naval Liaison Staff, Finland requests an early decision whether the coastal mine laying vessels and the Italian subchasers are to remain in or to be removed from Lake Ladoga, because the Saima Canal will also be frozen by the middle of October. (See Telegram 1430.)

Group North reports the schedule planned for the trip east of the Commanding Admiral, Group North between 20 and 29 Sep. See Telegram 2155.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Lively reconnaissance activity, particularly in the Bay of Biscay, where 3 submarines were reported. A submarine attack was reported 450 miles north of Georgetown.

The Canadian Navy Minister announced that an Atlantic convoy was attacked by submarines during the week ending on 12 Sep. and that 4 guard ships and 1 escort vessel were lost. Submarine activity off the Canadian coast has apparently been increased as a result of improved defenses along the U.S. east coast.

A Reuter dispatch from authoritative London sources which asserts that the German claim of having sunk 19 ships during the submarine operations against an Atlantic convoy (as reported by a communique of the Armed Forces High Command) is far from true.

> The communique of the Armed Forces High Command concerning the operation of Group "Vorwaerts" which is referred to in the above denial corresponds to the suggestion of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines. In the case in question, reports were received about a considerable number of unconfirmed torpedo hits, from which the Commanding Admiral, Submarines assumed that 3 steamers were sunk. Should

this be the cause of the discrepancy, the British have no right to deny our report in such strong terms.

According to press reports, the Brazilian steamer BARBACENA (6,375 GRT) and the tanker PIAVE (2,547 GRT) were sunk probably around the end of July.

2. Own Situation:

3 additional submarines have left Germany, and 1 has left western France. Regarding operations against convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

In the North Atlantic, Group "Loss" was directed to operate against an HX convoy which was located in quadrant AJ by radio monitoring.

Group "Pfeil" was unable to establish contact with the convoy reported in quadrant AK. The Group will proceed from a patrol line quadrant AK 5966 to AK 9814 to a new line from AK 6587 to AK 9654 where another westbound convoy may be expected to show up.

No successes were reported from the American coast.

Submarine U "515" reported from the West Indies that she sank the steamer MARY (7,200 GRT) in quadrant EO 4326.

South Atlantic Group: Submarine U "552" is to operate off the Tejo River mouth.

Group "Iltis" is deployed in patrol line from quadrant DT 5019 to DT 6619.

Submarine U "109" sank the British steamer PETERTON (5,221 GRT) in quadrant EH 3258.

In the course of the LACONIA rescue operation, submarine U "507" transferred 163 Italians to the dispatch vessel ANNAMITE and kept the communications officer and another British officer of the LACONIA on board. 7 life boats with approximately 330 British and Poles are at point "Treibanker" in quadrant FE 9612, additional life boats are in quadrant FE 9619. The GLOIRE was informed of their positions. Submarine U "506", too, has delivered survivors to the dispatch vessel; the submarine was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy sea plane at noon.

For additional reports see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Since the entire route "Anton" is now within the zone closed to submarine operations, single ships may no longer be attacked east of 20° W and north of 5° S. However, according to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, this zone offers good possibilities, and he has therefore requested that the waters north of a line from 30° W. 0° N to 15° W 5° S and hence along latitude 5° S to the African coast be reopened for submarine operations.

In view of blockade runner traffic, the Naval Staff cannot approve the request in its entirety, but defines the eastern border of route "Anton" as follows until further notice, to become effective at once:

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The Spanish coast at 42° N via 42° N 30° W, 10° N 30° W, the equator at 20° W, 5° S 15° W; from there along latitude 5° S to the African coast. In addition, a strip 300 miles wide along the African coast is open to submarine attacks. The western border of route "Anton" remains the same as heretofore.

See Telegram 615 for the corresponding order to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

Following consultation with the Foreign Office, permission to execute the planned mine-laying operations off New York is granted as of today.

For copy of order see 1/Skl 1 c/e 22751/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol IV.

For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Reconnaissance operations were carried out. Harwich and Worthing were attacked by fighter bombers during the day. Kingslynn and Great Yarmouth were raided during the night of 15 Sep.

2. Incursions:

10 to 15 enemy planes penetrated into the Bordeaux area and attacked the harbor. For damage report see daily situation report. 10 enemy planes also mined the waters north of Cherbourg.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Today's activities included missions at the African front, convoy escorts and a fighter attack on Malta.

4. Eastern Front:

65 enemy planes were shot down at the Army front. Reconnaissance flights were carried out over the Black Sea.

From Lake Ladoga a bomber attack with good results on the Selenez Islands radio station is reported to have been carried out on 16 Sep. Regarding operations against convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

An Italian signal station on Sardinia was fired on by an enemy submarine on 16 Sep. An enemy submarine was sighted on 17 Sep. off Cape Misurata and another off Rhodes. Otherwise

nothing to report from the Mediterranean.

The British Admiralty confirmed the loss of destroyers SIKH and ZULU during the engagement off Tobruk on 14 Sep.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

The commander of the 6th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla intends to use the captured British motor torpedo boat "314" as a fast subchaser on the North African coast.

The German Naval Command, Italy reports regarding the commitment of submarines to the western Mediterranean: Due to the present state of readiness of our submarines we cannot safely count on having 4 submarines at our disposal by October for operations in the eastern Mediterranean and 2 for the western Mediterranean. Pointing to the slim prospects in the eastern Mediterranean and the enormous risks for our submarines involved, the German Naval Command, Italy reports its intention to commit at least 2 submarines in the western Mediterranean and to have at least 3 submarines in readiness for the new moon period; the resul ing decrease in the eastern Mediterranean would have to be accepted. The German Naval Command, Italy is convinced that the enemy, who is aware that the German Air Force is tied up, will take advantage of this at the latest during the October new moon phase for a new large-scale operation for the supply of Malta. Therefore the German Naval Command, Italy believes that successes in the western Mediterranean would be very important.

The Naval Staff approves of these plans. As far as distribution of submarines is concerned, they should be concentrated in the western Mediterranean until further notice. However, the eastern Mediterranean should not be stripped completely in view of possible operations for the supply of Malta from the east and on account of a possible threat to the coasts occupied by our forces.

For copy of directive see 1/Skl I u 1639/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The convoy of the FOUGIER, bound for Tobruk, was spotted at noon on 17 Sep. by British reconnaissance planes 60 miles south of Crete. Another convoy en route to Tobruk was attacked by enemy bombers during the night of 17 Sep. northwest of Tobruk. Steamer CASTORE (1,016 GRT) ran aground 50 miles south of Sfax while proceeding from Naples to Tripoli.

Otherwise nothing to report about supply and coastal shipping.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

During the night of 15 Sep. Candia was again attacked by enemy planes. Damage in the harbor was slight. Otherwise nothing to report.

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Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

During the afternoon of 16 Sep. 2 escorted tankers, one northbound, the other southbound, were sighted by air reconnaissance between Gelendzhik and Tuapse. A heavy cruiser and 1 destroyer were observed on a northwesterly course southwest of Sukhum. At noon 4 steamers were heading northwest in the waters off Tuapse. Photo reconnaissance at 0645 of 17 Sep. located 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, 5 submarines, 1 torpedo boat, 7 tankers and 13 steamers at Batum.

Own Situation:

PT boats operating during the night of 16 Sep. north of Sochi found no trace of the enemy. Apparently all enemy traffic along the Caucasian coast moves only by day on account of the attacks by our PT boats at night.

2 naval barges in tow between Yalta and Feodosiya were unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes on 16 Sep. During an enemy air raid on Kerch, one motor mine sweeper was severely damaged. 2 motor mine sweepers and 1 naval barge suffered minor damages. The net barrage at Feodosiya was completed. Yalta'a anti-aircraft defenses were reinforced with six 2 cm machine guns. Unfortunately, heavy anti-aircraft artillery is not available.

Submarine chase, mine-sweeping and convoy operations proceeded according to plan.

VIII. Situation East Asia

According to a Tokyo report, Japanese submarines and warships sank 72,000 GRT during August, bringing the total since the beginning of the war to 271 ships with 1,716,000 GRT.

The U.S. Navy Department belatedly announced the loss of aircraft carrier YORKTOWN during the battle of Midway Island on 6 Jul.

Japanese operations on Guadalcanal developed into a large-scale offensive.

The U.S. Pacific fleet reports that at least 2 Japanese ships were sunk and 5 planes shot down during an air raid on Kiska. Fires and explosions were caused among the harbor installations and oil storage tanks.

In connection with the sinking of the Italian hospital ship ARNO, the Japanese state that the Japanese hospital ship KHARBIN MARU was attacked by enemy submarines as early as 10 Jan. and hospital ship ASAMA MARU on 26 Mar. by enemy planes.

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17 Sep. 1942

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The Staff of this Army Group has been transferred to Voroshilovsk. The commander of the Group, Field Marshal List, has been relieved.

An enemy landing attempt southwest of Novorossisk during the night was repulsed. Enemy attacks continued at all sectors of the Caucasian front.

Army Group B:

In the battle for Stalingrad we succeeded in capturing additional sectors of the devastated city. The 24th Panzer Division and the 71st Infantry Division, attacking from the south and north respectively, established contact with each other.

Strong enemy tank formations attacked the former penetration point at the southeastern outskirts of Voronezh. Counterattacks are in progress. Also north of Voronezh we repulsed an enemy tank attack.

Central Army Group:

The expected enemy offensive south of Novosil began in the morning hours and was halted at all sectors. The battle will certainly be renewed. The enemy resumed his attacks also in the Rzhev area.

Northern Army Group:

Strong Russian forces attempted to force a concentric breakthrough at the northern sector of the Demyansk front. This and other attacks northwest of Lyuban and at either side of the plateau were repulsed. South of Lake Ladoga the enemy succeeded in breaking through the line of our light infantry division; the penetration was sealed off and measures were taken to restore the situation.

2. Finnish Front:

According to statements obtained from war prisoners, an oil pipe line runs from Kobona northward to the lighthouse in the Chernoye area, hence across Lake Ladoga westward to Irinovka and overland to Leningrad.

Strong enemy forces attacked at Maselskaya. The annihilation of enemy units which succeeded in penetrating our lines is in progress. Deserters predict a general offensive on the entire northeastern front for 20 Sep. Enemy forces which attacked southern wing of the Litsa sector were almost completely destroyed by a successful flanking maneuver.

3. North Africa:

The day passed quietly at the El Alamein front.

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Gialo oasis is under attack of strong enemy forces. Due to the weakness of the Italian garrison its capture by the enemy must be expected. For details see daily situation report.

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Items of Political Importance

Madagascar:

According to official French reports, opposition will continue since the negotiations of the Governor of Madagascar with the attackers have failed.

Middle East:

According to Reuter, the transfer of the entire Polish Army from Russia to the operations zone of the Middle East has been completed.

Brazil:

President Vargas ordered general mobilization on 16 Sep.

Japan:

The chief of the Office of Information, Mr. Tani, was made Foreign Minister. In his first radio address the new minister stated that the war will be long and drawn-out in spite of the brilliant successes of the Japanese Armed Forces.

The Japanese-directed Chinese press protests against the growing U.S. influence on Chungking and demands greater cooperation with Japan. Diplomatic circles conclude from Japanese propaganda and from official statements, that the recent military operations in China did not produce the expected results.

U.S.A.:

The fact that a U.S. Red Cross ship was despatched to France is taken as an indication that the U.S. does not intend to alter her relations with Vichy.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff

The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports that the SCHARNHORST will not be ready for operations as early as expected since her propeller was damaged through contact with a buoy mooring chain.

The only war transport vessel to be built in Germany was built at the Deutsche Werft and was completed within 90 days. Italian shipyards should strive to equal this achievement. As reported by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, the ship will be engaged in shuttle service between Kirkenes and Petsamo.

Otherwise no reports nor decisions of importance.

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Special Items:

I. The Naval Staff makes the following decision regarding disposition of the light naval forces:

According to prevailing orders and plans, the following forces are available:

a) To Naval Group North: All destroyers which are ready for action, and the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla (2 torpedo boats are engaged in open water firing at Trondheim, all others are assigned to the Torpedo School in so far as needed).

b) To Naval Group West: The 3rd and 5th Torpedo Boat Flotillas. For the time being it is not possible to assign fleet torpedo boats or vessels of the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla to Group North.

For corresponding directive to Group North with copies to Group West, the Fleet Command, the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, and the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers, see Telegram 1717.

II. See Telegram 1300 for executive order of the Commander, Destroyers instructing torpedo boat T "22", the FALKE, and the JAGUAR to escort ship "45" in the west area in accordance with orders of Naval Staff. (See War Diary 17 Sep.)

III. The Armed Forces Intelligence Division transmitted the personal views of a reliable agent who asserts that the withdrawal of our battleships from the Atlantic coast has afforded Britain an almost unbelievable degree of relief. This very interesting report, which on the whole certainly gives a correct picture of the situation, is contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a under 1/Skl 31 572/42 geh.

IV. Another intelligence report from an agent who has not been tested so far but who appears reliable, deals with British plans in the Middle East. It asserts that Auchinleck's successor as commander of the 8th (Egyptian) Army, General Alexander, has drawn up a plan for establishing a second front in the Middle East with all available means. Churchill is said to have taken this plan to Moscow. The attempt of the strong convoy to force passage through the Mediterranean was already in line with Alexander's plans and was connected with the arrival of strong, fresh American forces at Basra and of British units at Suez. These forces arrived without heavy armament and were to have been equipped with the materiel carried by the convoy which was destroyed and dispersed in the Mediterranean. The American forces landed at Basra are estimated at 30,000 men, the majority of whom have remained as occupation troops in Iraq, where hardly any British units are left; the rest is destined for Iran.

Alexander's plan is said to be aimed in the first place at mustering the strongest possible force to oppose Rommel; in the second place, at establishing a strong position in the Caucasus with the aid of the withdrawn Russian Caucasian army, a reserve army located in the Tiflis area, as well as fresh British and American forces and Indian and Iranian auxiliary troops. In this way a German breakthrough to Iran is to be prevented, and strong German forces are to be tied up in the Caucasus at the same time. In short, Alexander's plans provide for a very heavy concentration of Allied forces in the Near East, facing north and west.

Politically, the plan is said to aim at preserving the alliance with Turkey, and at foiling potential German plans to cause Turkey to abandon her present neutrality in favor of pro-German non-belligerency as the result of further German military successes close to Turkey. It appears altogether possible that Turkish participation in an Allied Caucasus front is the ultimate political aim of the plan.

In connection with the Anglo-American plans for warfare in the Near East outlined above, it should be remembered that nothing would suit Turkey better than a strong concentration of Anglo-American forces in the Near East; Turkey fears nothing more than a Rommel victory in Egypt, which would close the Suez Canal, jeopardize Turkey's imports and, most of all, would throw Turkey's foreign policy out of balance.

The report deserves earnest consideration and is very plausible.

Situation 18 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff informs ship "28" and the UCKERMARK that the latter should head for point "Wagner" every day after 24 Sep. for a rendezvous with ship "10"; after completing her supply mission, the UCKERMARK is to proceed to point "Schumann" for a rendezvous with ship "23".

Ship "10" is advised by Radiogram 0513 of the sailing instructions for the voyage to Balik Papan as wired by the Naval Attache at Tokyo.

The Naval Attache at Tokyo requests a suitable cover name for the RAMSES and in reply to an inquiry of the Naval Staff gives a report on the captain of the DOGGERBANK, Schneidewind. See Telegrams 1138 and 1501.

By Telegram 1810, the Attache further reports that the REGENSBURG has been advised to take aboard German repatriates at Batavia and requests suppression of any publicity regarding their experiences, because such publicity might jeopardize the repatriation of more German nationals from these areas.

Enemy situation report to all ships in foreign waters by Radiogram 2026.

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18 Sep. 1942

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance over the Channel revealed nothing of interest.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Mine-exploding vessels swept 2 mines off the Gironde mouth. The shipping lane from Le Verdon to Bordeaux was closed.

Channel Coast:

Torpedo operations of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla during the night of 17 Sep. brought no results. The convoy attacked was able to dodge most of the torpedoes on account of their phosphorescent tracks. For short report see Telegram 1020. Low-flying planes attacked battery Ramin at 1520; one attacker was shot down. A motor launch was sunk as a result of another enemy air attack off Ostend.

Mine-laying operation "Elbe" is scheduled for the night of 18 Sep.

Group West reports on additional mine-laying projects to reinforce the minefields off Fecamp by minefields "Emil V" (code name "Donau") and "Emil VI" (code name "Mosel").

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

1 ground mine was swept north of Borkum by a mine-sweeping plane. It is belatedly reported that a Danish trawler sank on 27 Aug. 60 miles west of Blavandshuk following 2 mine explosions.

Escort and patrol operations in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North proceeded according to plan.

2. Norway:

According to the captain of steamer ROBERT BORNHOFEN, who was questioned at Tromsoe, it is highly probable that a torpedo was responsible for the ship's loss. It is not believed that a mine or sabotage were responsible.

On 17 Sep. a floating crane with armored cupola capsized at Haugesund while in tow and sank in shallow water.

Enemy air activity was reported over the Arctic coast on 15 Sep. and over the west coast on 17 Sep.

Convoy service in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Norway proceeded according to plan without interference.

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Between Lister and Feiestein anti-submarine barrages will be laid upon receipt of the code word "Riegel".

In consideration of the required combat training, Group North suggests the November new moon period for the transfer of the SCHARNHORST. At the same time 5 destroyers will be ready for transfer from Germany. (GALSTER, RIEDEL, STEINBRINCK, IHN, and JACOBI.)

The Commanding Admiral, Norway commented on 16 Sep. on the overcrowded conditions in the harbor of Kirkenes; he referred in this connection to the Fuehrer's directive to the Shipping and Transport Branch of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, which was transmitted orally, on the basis of which the naval offices had stopped larger steamers from proceeding to Petsamo. The Naval Staff confirms the view of the Commanding Admiral, Norway that the quoted Fuehrer directive applied exclusively to the period of the arctic summer nights. Once darkness sets in, there is no reason why large steamers should not call at Petsamo. In view of overcrowded conditions at Kirkenes and considering the delay caused by overland transports, attempts should be made to send also convoys of large vessels directly to Petsamo. The Commanding Admiral, Norway is asked to investigate how the situation might be relieved and to report his findings. (See Telegram 1634.)

3. Arctic Ocean:

a. Operation against PQ 18:

The Air Force reported convoy PQ 18 at the White Sea entrance at 1000. The 5th Air Force reported sinking 6 merchant vessels aggregating 46,000 GRT and 1 escort vessel; probably sunk were 8 merchant ships totalling 15,000 GRT. 5 merchant ships and 1 destroyer were damaged. Prior to the attacks the convoy consisted of between 49 and 53 ships; following the attacks there remained 40 to 43 ships including escort and patrol vessels, about which detailed information could not be obtained due to bad weather.

b. Operation against convoy QP 14:

Air reconnaissance reports convoy QP 14 in quadrant AB 1635 at 1057. Submarine U "405" assumed the convoy was in quadrant AC 5030, proceeding on a course of 280° at 2037. According to air reconnaissance reports, convoy QP 14 is heavily protected by an aircraft carrier and by escort vessels; this convoy is escorted as heavily proportionately as PQ 18. The Admiral, Arctic Ocean therefore considers the prospects for successful submarine operations poor and orders the submarines to leave the patrol line between AC 8171 and AC 8444 at maximum cruising speed, pointing out that the submarines should aim primarily at maintaining contact with the convoy in order to assist the Air Force, and at sinking damaged ships, since QP 14 is less valuable than PQ 18.

Since all submarines have been engaged against QP 14 since 17 Sep. the Naval Staff questions the advisability of these instructions.

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Submarine U "405" is ordered to return to base on account of damages sustained through depth charges.

c. Group North suggests withholding publication of the results achieved against PQ 18, because the reports on hand by evening of 17 Sep. indicate that, inclusive of 5 sinkings by submarines, a total of only 15 merchant vessels is missing from the convoy due to damage or sinking. The Group recommends postponing an announcement until the operations against QP 14 are concluded too.

d. Mine-laying mission of submarine U "117":

Group North submits the directive for the execution of the mine-laying mission off Iceland by submarine U "117", in accordance with the Naval Staff's decision (see War Diary 16 Sep.). The submarine will sail from Kiel on 19 Sep. and proceed from Kristiansand South to quadrant AE 5300 to carry out her task. She will then return to Bergen and await further instructions.

Group North anticipates particularly good results if submarine U "117", after completing her Iceland mission, would, shortly before PQ 19 gets under way, lay her entire supply of mines (with timing device set for a brief period) over a wide area where it would not interfere with submarine attacks; this would be within a radius of 100 miles of the White Sea entrance or Kola Bay. "The chances of success are all the greater, as this would constitute the first instance of a purely tactical minefield." It will be possible to lay the mines if they are laid just within sight of remote escorts and are adjusted to become active after 30 minutes at the latest. The Group therefore proposes that submarine U "117" or a boat of the same type be assigned to this operation, because the experiences had with PQ 18 have shown that it is necessary to find new ways of combatting convoys.

Group North reports that the area between 66° N and 64° 30' N and west of 11° 30' W is closed to shipping as of 25 Sep. because of the mine-laying operation to be carried out in the Iceland area. Only naval forces which will be in the Iceland area are to be notified of this fact. It is not to be entered into the charts of naval forces. (See Telegram 1511.)

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Nothing of importance to report from the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea.

Continuous bad weather interfered with patrol and mine-sweeping operations in the Gulf of Finland.

With reference to the proposal of the Naval Liaison Staff, Finland, Group North requests permission to have the coastal mine vessels and Italian subchasers returned to the Gulf of Finland before the Saima Canal and Lake Ladoga freeze; they should operate in the Gulf of Finland as long as the ice situation permits. It is suggested that the ships remain at Reval for the winter. (See Telegram 1155.)

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Group North ordered that the Gulf of Bothnia be reopened to shipping at once and that shipping be directed to proceed either in Swedish or Finnish territorial waters (see Telegram 2335); this order causes the Naval Staff to point out, with reference to the directive of 17 Sep., that the instructions to remain within territorial waters or within the Finnish inter-island routes greatly complicate ore shipping, and that this order must be cancelled immediately. (See War Diary 17 Sep.)

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Lively reconnaissance activity in the rendezvous area and in the Bay of Biscay. At 1430 a submarine was attacked by aircraft south of the Faeroe Islands. 2 submarine warning signals were intercepted in the Bay of Biscay.

In the afternoon a convoy sailed from Gibraltar in a westerly direction. On 12 Sep. a convoy of 24 steamers with troops on board left New York for the British Isles under heavy escort.

A message about a submarine attack was intercepted from the area east of the Orinoco River mouth and 3 submarine warning signals from the U.S. east coast and off Trinidad.

2. Own Situation:

For operation against convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

Submarine U "620", U "253" and U "610", en route from the North Sea, are assigned to quadrants AL 32, 34 and 35 respectively where they are to intercept the escort forces returning from convoy duty in the Arctic Ocean.

An enemy submarine was observed beyond any doubt in quadrant BE 9895.

Since 1750 several submarines of Group "Loss" established contact with a convoy proceeding on a northeasterly course in quadrant AJ 9187; the operation is still in progress.

Nothing to report about Groups "Vorwaerts" and "Pfeil".

From the St. Lawrence River submarine U "517" reports sinking a British auxiliary warship of 3,500 tons in quadrant BA 3911 on 11 Sep. and a 5,000 GRT steamer out of a large convoy in quadrant BB 1763 on 15 Sep. Several submarines observed convoy traffic running on a regular schedule on the St. Lawrence River and recommend simultaneous operations of a number of submarines.

Submarines operating in the West Indies had no successes to report.

Neither were reports of importance received from the South Atlantic (Groups "Eisbaer" and "Iltis") or the Mediterranean.

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The rescue action for survivors of the LACONIA can be considered terminated. All survivors picked up by submarines U "506" and U "507" have been transferred to the dispatch vessel ANNAMITE. As reported by the German Armistice Commission, the GLOIRE has taken aboard from 12 lifeboats survivors which were picked up upon information supplied by the German submarines. The French vessels are continuing the search and request to be advised about any reports received from German submarines.

For additional reports see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Special Item:

Group North assumes from a report of the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate that mine-laying submarines can be supplied with SMA mines only at Peyse, so that SMA operations cannot be carried out from Norway or from Atlantic ports. (See Telegram 2347.)

An explanation of the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate must be awaited.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During reconnaissance flights and attacks on ships off Dartmouth a 1,500 GRT steamer was sunk and other ships damaged.

2. Incursions:

During the afternoon the enemy raided Belgium and northern France. 80 of the 140 reported enemy planes penetrated into German territory during the night of 18 Sep. A large-scale mine-laying operation was evidently carried out in the Weser River mouth, the Baltic Sea entrances and in the Baltic Sea area from Fehmarn Island to Pillau.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

German air forces flew a total of 228 sorties. Gialo oasis was attacked by 25 enemy planes.

4. Eastern Front:

97 enemy planes were shot down at the various Army fronts.

A survey of the number of German and enemy missions flown during the period of 5 to 12 Sep. indicates the relative strength of the opposing air forces:

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1st Air Force:	2,996 sorties	2,125 enemy sorties
4th Air Force:	7,507 sorties	2,834 enemy sorties
The Air Force Commands, East and Don River:	4,665 sorties	5,586 enemy sorties
Total	15,168	10,545

Reconnaissance activity over the Black Sea and Caspian Sea.

In the Arctic Ocean 2 motor launches in Litovska Bay were damaged.

Regarding operations against convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Enemy air raids on Tobruk during the nights of 16 and 17 Sep. caused little damage in the harbor.

At noon on 17 Sep. a coastal steamer and an auxiliary sailing vessel were attacked unsuccessfully by a submarine with torpedoes and gunfire off Cape Misurata.

The German Naval Command, Italy approves of the plan of the Commander, 8th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla to use captured British PT boats. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division agrees.

An Italian description of the enemy attack on Tobruk during the night of 13 Sep. is contained in the appendix to Foreign Press Report No. 219 of the Naval Intelligence Division.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Steamer CARBONIA (1,237 GRT) was sunk, probably by air attack, on 17 Sep. in the Gulf of Hammamet while proceeding from Naples to Tripoli. 560 tons of German supplies and 4 guns were lost.

During the night of 17 Sep. enemy planes attacked the steamers NERUCCI and FOUGIER between Suda and Tobruk. (See War Diary 17 Sep.) No details have been reported as yet.

1 Italian transport submarine has been under way since 17 Sep. from Tripoli to Taranto and another one from Benghazi to Taranto.

Supply transport from Greece to North Africa and coastal supply traffic proceeded according to plan.

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4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report. Convoy and transport service on schedule.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance spotted a convoy consisting of 2 small tankers on a west-northwesterly course south of Sukhum.

Own Situation:

Since enemy shipping along the Caucasian coast is evidently proceeding in daytime only, our PT boats and the Italian subchasers operate only if warranted reconnaissance reports.

2 more motor mine sweepers were damaged during the air raid on Kerch of 17 Sep. Another air attack took place in the evening of 17 Sep. 4 of the 10 bombs dropped fell in the harbor.

In connection with operation "Bluecher" a total of 30,605 men, 13,254 horses, and 6,265 vehicles were ferried up to 16 Sep.

Convoy service proceeded uneventfully. Transport vehicles for carrying Italian subchasers overland to the Caspian Sea are expected to arrive at Mariupol on 30 Sep.

VIII. Situation East Asia

The Japanese Navy informed the German Admiral at Tokyo that a large U.S. aircraft carrier was hit by 4 torpedoes from a submarine 300 miles southeast of Guadalcanal on 15 Sep., and sank 2 hours later according to allegedly uncontestable eye witness accounts.

Japanese forces are slowly gaining ground in bitter fighting on Guadalcanal. The airfield is still in enemy hands. Enemy reports of Japanese ships sunk are denied. Japanese ships suffered only minor damage.

An intelligence report from China, dated 4 Sep., states that the rumors about an offensive against Russia have died down. Feverish activity reigns in military circles. Continuous troop movements are explained as operations to relieve personnel.

The U.S. Navy Department announced that 4 enemy merchant vessels were newly sunk and 4 others damaged by U.S. submarines in Far Eastern waters. The total of Japanese ships sunk or damaged (probably warships and merchant vessels) by U.S. naval and air forces is given as 272 as against 53 U.S. ships.

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IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

At the Terek sector east of Maisky the 13th Panzer Division succeeded in capturing strongly-fortified enemy positions against stubborn defense.

Army Group B:

At Stalingrad the 94th Infantry Division reached the Volga bank on a narrow front after bitter house-to-house fighting south of the Tsaritsa River. North of the river, the 71st Infantry Division mopped up the western part of the town as far as the railroad.

Strong enemy tank forces broke through the strip of land along the railroad south of Kotluban with 3 regiments and advanced as far as Borodkin. The situation was restored by a counterattack.

Following preparations by an artillery barrage, several enemy divisions launched a strong concentric, bomber-supported attack at Voronezh from the south, east, and north, which was repulsed by drawing on all available reserves. Heavy fighting is still in progress at the eastern end of the town.

Central Army Group:

Enemy attacks at Novosil and Sychevka, too, were repulsed. North of Smolensk our forces advanced in a westerly direction and captured a number of villages.

Northern Army Group:

The enemy attacked unsuccessfully at the Demyansk sector and north of the strip of land leading to the II Army Corps. Fighting south of Lake Ladoga is still in progress. An attempt of 2 barges to land on the eastern bank of the Neva was frustrated.

2. Finnish Front:

Fighting is still going on south of Seg Lake.

3. North Africa:

Gialo oasis is still holding out. Motorized enemy forces south of the oasis were attacked by German and Italian planes.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

London and Washington are tensely watching the final phase of the battle for Stalingrad. It is feared that the fall of the city might be the signal for a Japanese attack on Russia, just as the fall of Paris was the signal for Italy's entry into the war.

Argentina:

The Transocean News Agency reports that the committee investigating anti-Argentine activities resolved on 17 Sep. to recommend that the Chamber announce it would like the Government to declare the German Naval Attache, Captain Niebuhr persona non grata. In addition, the findings concerning the escaped crew members of the GRAF SPEE are to be turned over to the courts.

Russia:

On 17 Sep. Willkie arrived at Kuibyshev from Teheran.

Croatia:

Foreign reports assert that heavy fighting has broken out in western Bosnia between Croatian regular forces and rebel partisans of General Mikhailovich.

Special Items:

I. On 9 and 10 Sep. the Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff visited the Army General Staff, the Air Force General Staff and the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command.

For transcriptions of his conferences see 1/Skl 1843/42 Gkdos. Chefs. Copy No. 2 in War Diary, Part C, files "Basic Problems of Warfare".

II. Evaluation of materiel captured with motor gunboat "335" on 11 Sep. in the Channel by the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla, as submitted by the Chief, Communications Division, Naval Staff:

(a) 1 Syko machine (known before).

(b) Cypher tables of the Loxo, Syko, and Nyko systems valid for September. These tables are very valuable for deciphering, especially for the Syko system.

(c) Instructions for the British radio system (home territory) provide new information; for instance cover names used for convoys.

(d) International call letters of merchant vessels.

(e) Signal code no. 2 for auxiliary vessels, which was previously unknown.

(f) 3 charts for the Hoofden area containing valuable information on minefields.

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(g) 7 pieces of radio equipment.

(h) 1 case containing star signal shells.

III. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is requested to investigate the possibility of converting naval barges for the transport of fuel. These are needed for:

(a) The transport of fuel for the Army and the Air Force (to be unloaded at open coasts and in harbors).

(b) The delivery of fuel to submarines at sea (advanced submarine bases, for instance in the Norwegian island waters).

IV. For the directive of the Naval Ordnance Division, War Economy Branch of 19 Sep. regarding delivery of materiel to our allies in order to maintain their fighting power see 1/Skl 31870/42 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

V. Data furnished by the Naval Staff, Intelligence Division about the enemy situation in Russia contain information on the following:

(a) The use of Allied forces in the Russian area.

(b) The creation of guard units within the Red Army.

(c) Markings of warships.

For copy of information see 1/Skl 31902/42 geh. in War Diary, file "Barbarossa".

Situation 19 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

An intelligence report contains statements dated 28 Aug. of a British naval officer, according to which large numbers of British, Canadian, and U.S. troops are to be shipped to the Middle East, Egypt, and the Caucasus. A large convoy, said to consist of approximately 70 steamers lying at Scotch harbors, is supposed to sail shortly with approximately 200,000 men and full war equipment; it will be escorted by 2 large aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, a number of cruisers and destroyers, and numerous PT boats which are to be kept supplied by a tender sailing in the convoy. Additional vessels with troops and war material from the U.S.A. will join this convoy at Capetown.

2. Own Situation:

At 1717 ship "10" reported by short signal: "22 Sep., rendezvous point "Altmuehl"; 25 Sep., have reached ordered position".

The Naval Staff confirms receipt of message by Radiogram 2042.

The following directive is transmitted to ship "23" and UCKERMARK

19 Sep. 1942

by radiogram 1718:

a. Rendezvous at point "Schumann" is planned on or after 28 Sep.

b. Out of the supplies for ship "10" carried by the UCKERMARK, all of the provisions and the entire camouflage material may be delivered to ship "23". All other supplies must be retained for delivery to ship "10". The UCKERMARK to deliver any oil.

c. On 29 Aug. ship "28" reported by short signal: "Fuel will last until 6 Dec." According to the Naval Staff's calculations her fuel supply should last considerably longer. The Naval Staff assumes that the ship's endurance does not go beyond 6 Dec. due to lack of provisions, water, or coal.

d. Following the rendezvous with UCKERMARK another report concerning endurance is to be transmitted when convenient.

e. Subsequent to the completion of her supply mission, the UCKERMARK is to proceed to Japan, rounding the Cape of Good Hope at a latitude 9° south of point "Amiens".

The following directive of the Naval Staff is transmitted to the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN by Radiogram 0305:

a. The order to call at Medan is cancelled. Instead, the ship is to proceed to Singapore by way of Karimata Strait. Instructions regarding rendezvous with Japanese forces will follow.

b. 50 war prisoners are to be handed over at Singapore and 30 German seamen to be taken aboard and brought to Japan. Prisoners to be handed over should be those unsuitable for questioning.

c. As much oil for the Japanese Navy as possible is to be taken on at Singapore, whereupon the ship is to proceed directly to Japan. It is likely that 250 tons of Tarakan oil will be received for German test purposes. Instructions regarding this matter will come from the Naval Attache at Tokyo. All fuel problems to be settled directly between the captain and the Japanese naval authority at Singapore.

The Naval Attache at Tokyo transmits sailing instructions for the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN's call at Singapore by Telegram 1436.

All ships in foreign waters are informed about the extension of the zone of submarine operations off West Africa by Radiogram 2257.

Information about the meeting between Churchill and Stalin at Moscow, about Willkie's trip to Ankara, and about the Madagascar situation by Radiogram 1223.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Between 11 and 13 Sep. French fisherman 180 miles

west of Brest were ordered by British destroyers and patrol vessels to proceed and put into Scilly Islands ports. 3 trawlers obeyed the order. One man from each of 2 other boats were taken off as hostages.

According to a press report from La Linea, the British seized 3 Spanish steamers and brought them to Gibraltar.

Commenting on the Dieppe landing operation, the Canadian Defense Minister asserted that a chance encounter and unforeseen engagement with an escorted German tanker were to blame for the fact that the raid did not come as a complete surprise to the enemy. "This engagement is responsible for the heavy losses suffered by the Canadians, which amount to a total of 3,350 dead, wounded and missing".

The complete text is contained in appendix I of Foreign Press Report No. 220 of the Naval Staff Intelligence Division.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Due to the presence of aerial mines, the harbor and roadstead of La Pallice were closed. A dredge sank in Bayonne harbor after striking a mine.

The Naval Attache at Madrid pointed out that it would be better if outgoing blockade-runners did not follow the Spanish coast line in order to avoid giving the British an excuse for protests against the use of Spanish territorial waters.

The Naval Staff informs Group West of the above.

Channel Coast:

Execution of mine-laying operation "Elbe" was postponed 24 hours.

Special Items:

On 14 Sep. 1942 Group West submitted a brief memorandum to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West and the 3rd Air Force, with copies to the Naval Staff and other authorities, concerning the possibilities for the use of naval forces in the event of enemy landings.

For copy see 1/Skl 1832/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

The Naval Staff cannot agree with Group West's memorandum in its present form. The definitely existing possibilities for successful intervention by naval forces in repelling enemy landing attempts are not sufficiently brought out. In the Naval Staff's opinion, Group West's memorandum is poorly expressed, in that it emphasizes difficulties in the use of naval forces and does not mention the natural willingness of the Navy to use all possible resources also in the event of an invasion. Thus, authorities other than naval, as for instance the Commanding General, Armed Forces West, can easily receive an erroneous impression.

That this is actually the case is evident by the reaction of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, who states that we cannot do completely without naval forces in case of an invasion, lest the enemy have undisputed control at sea; the intercession of even the weakest naval force, even though remote or directed against the enemy's supply lines only, would suffice to divert some of his forces. Any sort of interference with the enemy's plans would have some effect. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, West informs Group West of this viewpoint and refers to his complete agreement with the attitude of Group North.

The Naval Staff's comment is transmitted to Group West by Telegram 1/Skl I op 1832/42 Gkdos. Chefs. For copy of directive and communication of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West to Group West see 1/Skl 1852/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

There was little reconnaissance activity over the central North Sea. After 1420 a few planes flew over the Dutch and East Frisian area, after 1630 also over the German Bight as far as Heligoland.

Own Situation:

During the night of 18 Sep. enemy planes flew over the Dutch coast and the coastal areas of the German Bight. It was observed that mines were dropped at Ameland, and probably they were also dropped at other East and West Frisian Islands. In addition, considerable air forces crossed Germany for mine-laying operations in the Baltic Sea.

7 ground mines were swept on the convoy route between Terschelling and Borkum. A convoy off Schiermonnikoog was unsuccessfully attacked with bombs.

Minesweeping operations were affected in part by bad weather. Convoy service suffered delays.

2. Norway:

A Russian battery on Rybachi Peninsula fired a few rounds at 0115 at an eastbound convoy and at 0425 shelled Petsamo harbor. Enemy planes were active over the arctic coast on 14, 17 and 18 Sep. It is probable that they were reconnoitering the ship anchorages in the Bogen Bay. On 18 Sep. enemy planes flew over the west coast. On 19 Sep. 6 guns of battery Eltevik went out of commission; it will take several days to repair them.

Special Items:

Since experience has shown that the Arctic Ocean is the area in which the heavy ships can operate and repel enemy landings most profitably the Naval Staff considers that Alta Fjord is the most favorable

main base for them and invites the comment of Group North and the Fleet Command. For copy of directive to this effect see 1/Skl I op 1849/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

3. Arctic Ocean:

a. Operation against PQ 18:

Air reconnaissance sighted convoy PQ 18 at 1530 at the northeastern entrance of Dvina Bay. It is expected to reach Archangel around 2230. Final reports about the number of ships still in the convoy have not yet been received, or have not yet been evaluated.

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean submits a short report, subject to final information following the return of the submarines, and arrives at the following conclusions:

Decisive results against convoys protected by very strong escorts can be achieved with submarines only if the convoy is split up, for instance through aerial attack. To this end the aircraft carrier was designated to the submarines as their most important targets so as to facilitate aerial attacks and to achieve results by combined attacks from both branches of the Armed Forces. In this we failed. As long as a convoy constitutes a solid formation with adequate remote and close escort and air protection it will rarely be possible to break through the protective forces undetected during the period of short nights and corresponding high visibility. It is difficult to contact the actual convoy on account of air and remote escorts; contact can be maintained only with the escort. Usually attacks have to be made from in front of the convoy from prepared positions in deep formation. It is possible to place submarines in such positions only with constant plane contact and with particularly good night communications. None of these prerequisites existed due to bad weather and magnetic disturbances of radio communication. As long as our air forces attack, our submarines must keep at a distance; our air attacks therefore are unfavorable for the effectiveness of submarine operations against convoys, except against damaged stragglers, as long as the convoy is not split up. The closest cooperation with the Air Force is therefore of paramount importance. Despite the greater number of submarines engaged, their achievements did not match those attained against PQ 17 because the effectiveness of the Air Force was hampered by the presence of an aircraft carrier and by nightfall and bad weather.

A final check of all reconnaissance data (Air Commander, Lofoten Islands) shows that convoy PQ 18, prior to the actual start of operations, consisted of 45 or probably more merchant vessels, 1 aircraft carrier, approximately 20 destroyers and escort vessels, and 1 light cruiser.

As many as 12 submarines were committed against PQ 18.

Results: 4 steamers (24,000 GRT) sunk, 1 probably sunk, 1 hit on an AFRIDI-class destroyer, 2 probable hits on steamers, 2 probable hits on a JAVELIN-class destroyer.

Losses: 3 submarines have not been heard from for the past few days; these may be lost (U "88", Captain Bohmann; U "457" Captain Brandenburg; U "589" Captain Horrer). Submarines U "251", U "255",

U "403" and U "405" were damaged by depth charges.

For copy of telegram, see 1/Skl 23326/42 Gkdos. in file "Eispalast".

On the basis of reports from the 5th Air Force received by the Naval Staff between 13 and 19 Sep. 1942, the Air Force definitely sank 16 and probably 6 merchant vessels on 13 and 14 Sep., and sank 6 and probably 2 on 18 Sep. According to this a total of 26 merchant vessels were sunk definitely and 9 probably, out of the convoy which was estimated by the Air Commander, Lofoten Islands on 13 Sep. as consisting of 45 merchant vessels. However, on 17 Sep. convoy PQ 18 was repeatedly reported as proceeding in close formation consisting of 30 merchant vessels. It remains to be seen what the final report of the Air Force will be after a final check of its reported successes.

b. Operation against QP 14:

Contact was established at 0120 in quadrant AC 1429 by submarine U "435", but was lost a few hours later due to a snow storm coming from the north. At 0348 submarine U "403" attacked a submarine decoy in quadrant AC 1183 with a four-fan.

10 submarines tried all day to reestablish contact west of the Bear Island-Spitsbergen line, and at 2120 submarine U "606" finally succeeded. The convoy was then proceeding on a 315° course. 5 submarines were ordered into position in patrol line from quadrant AE 7757 to quadrant AB 2218 for 0600 on 20 Sep.

As reported by the Air Force, QP 14 consists of approximately 20 merchant vessels with an escort of 1 aircraft carrier, 3 heavy cruisers, and 23 destroyers and escort vessels, proceeding at 9 knots.

c. Mine-laying operation in the Iceland area:

Group North submitted an excerpt from the operations order issued to submarine U "117". The operation carries the code name "John Bull". 11 mine patches of 6 SMA mines each, 2 miles long, will be laid in the area between 66° N and 64° 30' N, west of 11° 30' W; particular attention is to be given to the areas off Reidar and Seydis Fjords. According to the written order, the commander in charge of the operation may, at his discretion, deviate from these instructions by laying the minefields further out to sea or by changing the time of the execution of the order if necessary due to strong enemy patrol activity.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

A surprise large-scale aerial mine offensive was carried out by the enemy during the night of 18 Sep. in the Baltic Sea entrances and in the Baltic Sea as far east as the Bay of Danzig. 2 planes were shot down.

The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea assumes that besides in the Great Belt, many mines were laid off the eastern Jutland coast extending to 11° E from the latitude of Fornaes to the latitude of Skagen. In addition, ground mines were laid in a

strip of 20 miles off the coast from Skagen to Hirtshals. German steamers observed 5 enemy planes dropping aerial mines north off Grenaa. 2 ground mines were swept in the Bay of Danzig, a third one on the ferry route from Helsingoer to Helsingborg. A Danish patrol cutter sank in the Sound, and the Danish steamer ASTRID sank south of the anti-aircraft battery at Oestrem, both after striking a mine. Submarine U "415" reported the explosion of 5 aerial mines close to the boat on the shipping lane from Hela to Gdynia off Gdynia. Submarine U "227" reported 6 detonations while proceeding from Gdynia to Roenne approach buoy, resulting in the failure of both Diesels and a battery. In both these cases acoustic mines are suspected. Several British aerial mines were also observed near the Swedish border at Trelleborg and Naval Station, Baltic considers it advisable to suggest to Sweden that she keep the ferry route from "Gruen 05" to Trelleborg, which is used by Swedish traffic, constantly swept. (See Telegram 1522.)

Group North has not yet commented on the new mine situation in the Baltic Sea.

Mine-sweeping in the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea was strongly affected by bad weather. Convoy service proceeded according to plan.

The Naval Representative at the Armed Forces Intelligence Division Espionage Branch reports in connection with operation "Klabautermann" that 2 groups of agents were landed near Leningrad during the night of 14 Sep. according to plan. The landing was effected with Italian subchasers at Toserovo (15 km south of the front on the western shore of Lake Ladoga).

The Naval Staff notifies the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command of the following (with copies to Vice Admiral Krancke and Group North):

a. Operations of coastal mine vessels and Italian subchasers on Lake Ladoga will cease around the middle of October on account of ice conditions.

b. The Naval Staff plans to transfer these ships to the Gulf of Finland by 10 Oct. at the latest, where they will be used as long as ice conditions permit; thereafter they will spend the winter and be overhauled for next year's operations at Reval.

c. The Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command is requested to give its consent to item b.

V. Merchant Shipping

According to an intelligence report of 17 Sep., Argentina and Chile agreed to lease 3/4 of their merchant tonnage, i.e. approximately 500,000 tons, (it is not clear whether this figure refers to GRT or deadweight) to the U.S.A. In view of the requirements of the two countries, the Naval Staff Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch considers this report untrue.

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19 Sep. 1942

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Lively reconnaissance activity in the southern rendezvous area.

Radio monitoring intercepted a report about the torpedoing of the U.S. tanker PETROFUEL (7,294 GRT) east of Cape Charles. Submarine warning signals were flashed off Cape Hatteras and in the waters off Trinidad.

2. Own Situation:

2 submarines are under way to the zone of operations from German and 3 from western French ports.

Regarding operations against QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

In the North Atlantic contact with the convoy headed northeast was reestablished in quadrant AJ 6656 by Group "Loss". Another convoy was spotted in the same area on a westerly course at 2300. The Group was ordered nevertheless to continue operations against the first one. No reports of successes have come in as yet.

One of the Group's submarines was rammed while making an underwater attack, but suffered no important damage and continues in operation.

Nothing to report from the other groups and single boats operating in the North Atlantic.

No success reports from the submarines off the American east coast. Submarine U "175" sank a 3,000 GRT tanker in the West Indies in quadrant EO 1815 and encountered a submarine decoy ship in quadrant EO 1816.

Submarine U "516" reports sinking a single ship estimated at 6,000 GRT in quadrant EE 7544.

Submarine U "156" of the South Atlantic Group sank the 4,750 GRT steamer QUEBEC CITY off Freetown. Submarine U "109" discovered secret sailing instructions to Freetown, Lagos and Takoradi which were in the possession of the captain of the sunken steamer PETERTON. The harbor of Freetown is protected by a boom barrage but is accessible day and night. Lagos is closed at night.

Submarine U "375" sank a 1,200 GRT steamer and 4 sailing vessels in the Mediterranean.

For further reports see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The German Armistice Commission was notified by the French that the cruiser GLOIRE, after taking over survivors picked up by other ships, has 335 Italians, 664 British on board, including 10 women and children. Additional survivors are still aboard an Italian submarine and will be taken over by a French dispatch vessel on 20 or 21 Sep. (See Telegram 2035.)

Special Items:

a. ~~By Telegram 1/Skl I u 1851/42 Gkdos. Chefs. the Commanding~~

19 Sep. 1942

Admiral, Submarines is directed to order 6 additional submarines to the Mediterranean, where they will be at the disposal of the Commander, Submarines, Italy during the coming new moon period. Copy of directive is contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

b. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines submits the requested report on his plans for the use of mine-laying submarines suitable for carrying SMA mines. Their greater operating range permits exploitation of the possibilities on the American and African coasts. In addition, it will be possible to execute occasional missions in the waters of Iceland and the British Isles without too much waste of time. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines leaves it to the commands involved to judge the conditions for use in the Arctic Ocean.

The following areas along the U.S. coasts may be considered:

(1) The waters between Boston and Cape Sable, the areas off Halifax, off Sydney, off Cape Race, off St. Johns, where mines may be laid without interfering with normal submarine operations.

(2) The Mississippi River estuary.

(3) Cabot Strait, St. Lawrence River, Strait of Belle Isles, the Old Bahama Channel, the vicinity of Trinidad.

The areas mentioned under (2) and (3) will have to be reserved for the time being exclusively to torpedo-submarines.

Along the African coast the following areas may be considered:

(1) Off Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, Capetown.

(2) In the Gulf of Guinea, off the Congo coast, Pointe Noire, Libreville, Lagos, Takoradi.

(3) Less favorable are Bathurst, Freetown, Monrovia, as well as Duala, Port Harcourt, Calabar. In the latter areas if necessary Spanish traffic to Fernando Po should be taken into consideration.

Aside from these purely geographical considerations, the use of SMA mines will be determined by the traffic and defense situation. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines figures that traffic will be heaviest and of greatest importance in American waters, these being the point of origin of the supply routes to the British Isles and Russia; by comparison, the volume of strategically important shipping around the Cape of Good Hope is presumably considerably smaller. It is more difficult to mine the routes to Freetown on account of the depths encountered there. Traffic to the Guinea coast is of minor significance. A chance to establish the exact location of shipping routes by observation exists at few points only, since the distance from the coast is ordinarily too great.

The execution of mine-laying operations in all of the areas mentioned above is possible in spite of existing defenses. The enemy will be able to cope with mines more readily in the American than in the African area. Mine-laying operations will become more difficult with the further increase of submarine defenses in the American area.

Taking these conditions into account, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines suggests that the first mine-laying operations following the release of the G.A mine should take place off the American coast. In his opinion, the main objective, also of mine-laying operations, is to achieve immediate successes which besides sinkings also include the temporary blocking of seaports. The prospect of splitting the enemy's defense forces and of spreading unrest in remote areas figures second in his considerations.

The Naval Staff agrees on the whole with the reasoning and the proposal of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines in that, apart from Iceland, the American area should be considered primarily. However, the South African ports should be included in these operations as soon as possible thereafter on account of the high strategical importance of shipping in this area. The fact that this will cause the enemy to increase his mine defenses is of less importance in this area, because the enemy is already aware of the use of mines through his experiences with the DoGGEBLA K minefields. A final decision will be taken following further examination of the problem.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day our planes carried out reconnaissance flights and depth charge attacks at several coastal places.

No reports were received as yet about our night operations.

2. Incursions:

150 enemy planes penetrated into southwestern German territory. Their attack centered on Munich. 12 planes were shot down. Considerable damage was wrought in the residential district and heavy damage to the industrial sector. Some damage was caused also at Saarbruecken. For details see daily situation report.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Nothing to report.

4. Eastern Front:

At the various Army sectors a total of 61 enemy planes were shot down.

Lively shipping was observed on 18 Sep. on the Volga River between Astrakhan and Stalingrad. Regarding operations against convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

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19 Sep. 1942

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

A total of 100 planes was observed in the harbor and on the airfield of Gibraltar. More and more planes are being stationed there. An intelligence report of 18 Sep. states that patrol activity east of the Strait of Gibraltar has been increased.

In the eastern Mediterranean a cruiser escorted by 3 destroyers on a northerly course was spotted by Italian air reconnaissance west of Haifa, and another cruiser with 2 destroyers on a south-southeasterly course.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

The Italian cruiser BOLZANO which had been beached following a hit from an aerial torpedo on 13 Aug. was towed to Naples on 15 Sep.

The Italian Armed Forces High Command announced on 18 Sep. that assault boats of the Navy penetrated into the harbor of Gibraltar and sank the steamer RAVENS POINT. In a preceding engagement 4 identified and a 5th unidentified steamer were severely damaged by other assault boats in the Bay of Gibraltar. Most of the attacking boats returned to base. Details of this action are contained in supplement II of Foreign Press Report No. 220 by the Naval Intelligence Division.

The German Naval Command, Italy reports that detailed information about this operation is as yet not available from the Italian Naval High Command.

The Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command informed the Naval Staff that 6 more Italian torpedo boats are required to escort increased shipping to Crete. The Naval Staff is requested to make sure that these ships are supplied by the Italian Navy, the date to be fixed in consultation with the Admiral, Aegean Sea.

The Naval Staff informs the German Naval Command, Italy to this effect and orders it to support the demand of the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command at the Italian Naval High Command in consultation with the German General attached to Italian Armed Forces Headquarters, who received identical instructions from the Armed Forces High Command.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The convoy comprising steamers NERUCCI, DORA and FOUGIER arrived at Tobruk on 18 Sep. The convoy consisting of motor ship MONGINEVRO and APUANIA was spotted by British reconnaissance on the way from Italy to Benghazi and attacked 90 miles west of Crete. Further information is not yet available.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

19 Sep. 1942

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed slight traffic off the Caucasian coast during the day. 90 miles south-southwest of Tuapse a submarine was attacked by a plane. Details are still missing.

Own Situation:

On 17 Sep. Yalta was attacked by enemy planes and Balaklava on 18 Sep., in the latter case by 6 planes carrying German identification markings. A naval barge burned up, one motor trawler was sunk and a tank lighter damaged.

1 mine was swept on 17 Sep., a second on 18 Sep. by a mine-sweeping plane at the harbor entrance of Yeisk. It is necessary to have planes sweep the supply routes in the Sea of Azov. 4 naval barges arrived at Sulina from the Danube. Convoy traffic in the Black Sea and the Sea ov Azov proceeded uneventfully.

Group South requests the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division to rush the transfer to the Black Sea of the promised 4 additional motor mine sweepers as much as possible, since the demands on the 3rd Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla are very great, and a number of its ships have broken down.

Russian air activity was greatly intensified during the last few days and resulted in successful attacks on the Crimean bases and transshipping places; these were carried out from altitudes which cannot be reached by light anti-aircraft artillery. As reported by Group South, the Air Commander, Crimea declared it impossible to provide heavy anti-aircraft artillery and declined fighter protection for shipping in the Kerch Strait. Group South considers fighter protection in the Crimea as the minimum requirement and requests the Naval Staff to provide relief. (See Telegram 1030.)

The Naval Staff submitted the Group's request to the Commander in Chief, Air Force, with copy to the Naval Representative on the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, with the urgent request to grant these demands if at all possible. The Naval Staff used this opportunity to reemphasize the grave consequences for the conduct of the war of further losses of shipping space and escort forces.

IX. Situation East Asia

According to a compilation of the U.S. Naval High Command, the Japanese have thus far definitely lost 59 and probably lost an additional 15 warships. 60 warships were damaged.

These figures appear grossly exaggerated.

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19 Sep. 1942

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The 3rd Rumanian Mountain Division is making a concentric attack on Krivanskaya. The 3rd Panzer Division gained ground in a westerly direction east of Maisky.

Army Group B:

Fighting in Stalingrad continues. A new enemy attack south of Kotluban is under way. Italian units west of Kazanskaya foiled an enemy attempt to cross the Don River. A renewed attack north of Voronezh was repulsed with heavy enemy losses.

Central Army Group:

South of Novosil the enemy renewed his futile attacks. Several enemy thrusts in the Rzhev area were repulsed.

Northern Army Group:

The enemy launched particularly strong attacks against our lines along the railroad in the northern Demyansk sector, all of which were completely repulsed. Renewed attacks supported by tanks, bombers and artillery are in progress. Unsuccessful attacks were launched also north and south of the land bridge. We succeeded in improving our position on the Redvya River and gained ground in a southerly direction south of Soltsy. Enemy attacks south of Lake Ladoga were repulsed.

2. Finnish Front:

Enemy attacks in the Maselskaya area were halted before they could reach our lines. The enemy is bringing up reinforcements and artillery. Increased Partisan activity is reported from the Alakurtti area.

3. North Africa:

No reports received as yet.

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30 Sep. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

Lord Winster, an authority on shipping, stated in a newspaper article that the Allied shipping situation can be compared only with that in the critical year of 1917. It is useless to publish figures of what has been shipped to the Soviet Union, because shipments and deliveries are two entirely different things. The U.S. Maritime Commission announced that the amount of tonnage lost during a recent month by far exceeded the figure of the worst month of last year, which means that it was greater than 849,000 GRT. Apart from this grave loss of merchant tonnage, the British Admiralty has conceded the loss so far of 3 battleships, 2 battle cruisers, 4 aircraft carriers, 28 cruisers, 14 auxiliary cruisers, 80 destroyers, and 40 submarines. The critical situation of British sea power must be attributed to strategic errors, lack of foresight and a faulty administration and command organization.

U.S.A.:

Secretary of the Navy Knox stated in an address that all steps have been taken to reduce ship losses to a tolerable measure in the long run. However, the war will last long and will be a hard one. The New York Times says that an open rift has occurred between Moscow and the Allies in the 4th week of the battle for Stalingrad about the establishment of a second front. Yet nothing can justify establishing the second front as long as the preparations for it have not been completed. It would be of no assistance to Russia if the democracies were beaten in the west.

According to Swiss reports from Vichy, there are signs that the tension between France and the U.S.A. has eased to a certain degree. The Washington Government is showing full consideration for France's difficult position and Vichy has taken the standpoint that the occasion for a break must not be provided by France.

Turkey:

The Transocean News Agency reports that the Turkish Foreign Minister offered 4 arguments to oppose Willkie's demand for active Turkish participation in the war on the Anglo-American side as follows:

1. The Turkish Army's complete lack of adequate equipment.

2. The critical Turkish food situation.

3. The fact that Turkey would be exposed to a direct German attack.

4. The fact that adequate Anglo-American assistance was not offered during any phase of the entire negotiations.

According to an Argentine report, Turkey is negotiating with Argentina about the purchase of 500,000 tons of grain, which is to be shipped to Lisbon on Argentine vessels and transferred there to Turkish ships.

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20 Sep. 1942

Special Items

I. Intelligence Center No. 10 has put into service all motor trawlers not engaged in fishing which were placed at its disposal by the Shipping and Transport Branch of the Naval Quartermaster Division for the surveillance of Danish fishing on the west coast of Jutland, in the Skagerrak, and in the Kattegat. The trawlers, which are based on Esbjerg and Skagen, are already operating in the Skagerrak and Kattegat. Operations on the west coast will start in the immediate future.

II. On 24 Aug. the Naval Staff informed the Naval Group Commands, the German Naval Command, Italy, and the Fleet of its viewpoint concerning acceleration of communications within the Navy. This memorandum was prompted by the events at Dieppe and was to impress once more the operations staffs with the necessity for immediate reports (see War Diary 26 Aug.). The Commanding Admiral, Group West, replied to this memorandum on 3 Sep., indicating that Group West feels that the Naval Staff's note is a reproach. Neither the content nor the tone of the note justifies such interpretation, nor was it intended as a reproach against the Commanding Admiral, Group West. With regard to the admitted delay in transmitting its report, Group West refers to an order of the Commanding General, West with which it agreed; according to this order, reports must not be sent to superior commands which concern the common coastal defense or the battle dispositions of another branch of the Armed Forces, unless the opinion of the Commanding General, West was previously obtained. This was evidently ordered as a result of the experiences at St. Nazaire and in the interest of uniform reporting.

In its reply the Naval Staff once more states the purpose of the memorandum and remarks that the particular illustrations used were selected simply because the events at Dieppe had just happened. Instances in the past in which the Naval Staff was not satisfied with the manner of reporting were settled in every instance whenever necessary, and there is no sense in bringing this matter up again.

The order of the Commanding General, West regarding the transmission of reports can apply, as far as the Navy is concerned, only to reports with respect to matters relating to both Army and Navy or Army and Air Force, but not to reports addressed to the Naval Staff and relating exclusively to commitment and operations of naval forces and activities of naval authorities.

III. As already stated by the Naval Staff during the conference on the situation with the Chief, Naval Staff on 13 Aug., the captain of supply ship UCKERMARK is not to be blamed for interrupting his mission on 12 Aug. The regrettable breakdown of the UCKERMARK's radio system deprived the authorities in command of the possibility of ordering a second breakthrough attempt following the first attack by enemy planes. By the repeated breakthrough attempts and by the successful breakthrough at the third try, the captain proved that he had learned by his first experience. A corresponding comment of the Naval Staff has been added to the war diary of Group West under 12 Aug.

IV. The Naval Construction Division, Section V reports that according to the decision of 14 Jan. 1942 the Tosmare shipyard at Libau has been or will be fitted so as to permit complete simultaneous overhauls, inclusive of armament repairs, of 1 light cruiser, 2 torpedo boats, and 1 submarine target vessel, while an additional 6 submarines can be repaired over the weekend. The Naval Construction Division intends to overhaul at least one pocket battleship and 8 mine sweepers or equivalent vessels at the same time, apart from the above-mentioned ships, and to create docking facilities for heavy cruisers at Libau. No date has been set when these goals are expected to be reached.

V. The armor plating available at the Nikolayev shipyard, which is to be used for fortification projects upon order of the Fuehrer, has already almost completely been used up in the battleship under construction there. Since so far orders have been given to preserve this ship, the Naval Construction Division requests a decision whether she should now be dismantled, commenting that, since there are no plans available, to complete the ship would practically amount to building a new one. It therefore recommends that the ship be dismantled.

Comment of the Naval Staff Operations Division:

a. It is impossible at this time, due to lack of labor and material, to finish the battleship.

b. This would be difficult also at a later time since the plans are not available.

c. The necessity to create a German Black Sea fleet of heavy vessels after the war is not very urgent. Besides, it will always be unsatisfactory to adapt a foreign design to our purposes. Thought should also be given to the problem of passing the Dardanelles.

d. Purely practical considerations favor the dismantling of the ship; in this connection it is also important that a slipway will become available for the construction of merchant vessels and later for warships.

e. It is desirable that the considerable quantities of raw material and armor plating should not be lost to the Navy upon dismantling the ship, except those which, according to the Fuehrer's directive, are to be used for the construction of fortifications.

f. Conclusion:

The Operations Division, Naval Staff has no objections against dismantling. However, it should be provided that all raw material, scrap and other material becoming available is used primarily, if not exclusively, for the benefit of the Navy, except for the armor plating which must be assigned to the construction of fortifications in compliance with the Fuehrer's order.

Instructions to this effect are given to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, which is advised to obtain a final decision from the Commander in Chief, Navy.

VI. In accordance with a directive of the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, precautions are to be taken that travel into

the Caucasus area and to Stalingrad, following its capture, be restricted to what is absolutely essential because of the motor vehicle and fuel situation. (See Telegram 2135.)

Situation 20 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

It is learned from an Italian source that preparations are being made in South Africa to accommodate 120,000 U.S. soldiers, who are expected to arrive in the course of the next 3 months.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "10" is directed to use her own discretion in arranging for the overhaul of her engines in Japan. Subsequent to her stay in Japan she is scheduled for a mission in the Antarctic Ocean. She is requested to send a report about her schedule by way of the Naval Attache at Tokyo. On the occasion of the engine overhaul the boiler system is to be adapted for the use of Tarakan oil. (See Radiograms 1459 and 1803.)

Ship "23" is informed by Radiogram 0136 that the private mail addressed to her between the end of May and the end of August was lost due to a bomb hit on the PASSAT.

The Naval Attache at Tokyo is requested to present to Captain Gumprich upon welcoming him to Japan the German Cross in gold, which the Commander in Chief, Navy awarded to him on 11 Sep. 1942 on behalf of the Fuehrer.

All ships in foreign waters are advised of the situation with regard to sovereignty within the French Colonial Empire. (See Radiogram 1148.) Enemy situation report by Radiogram 0545.

The Japanese Naval Liaison Officer orally communicated the following message of the Japanese Admiralty to the Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff:

a. The Japanese Navy intends to extend its operations on occasion to the operations zone agreed upon by the German and Japanese Navies as long as no German auxiliary cruiser is active there.

To this the Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff remarks that Japan is, of course, at liberty to do so and that the German Naval Staff has no objections. The Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff in return asks that it be notified by the Japanese Navy when the operations zone is not included in Japanese operations, so that a German auxiliary cruiser may again be sent there.

b. The Japanese Navy intends to intensify its operations in the South Pacific and therefore requests the German Navy to refrain from sending an auxiliary cruiser into this area and rather to send one into the Indian Ocean.

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20 Sep. 1943

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance in the Channel revealed nothing of interest. According to radio monitoring, a British trawler ran aground off Duncansbay Head.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla made an exploratory sweep from St. Nazaire to La Pallice without encountering any mines. Mine sweeper M "4448" was seriously damaged by a ground mine in the gap between the minefields at the Bayonne harbor entrance and had to be beached. A ground mine was swept off Lorient and one off La Pallice.

Channel Coast:

According to Group West's report, mine-laying operation "Elbe" north of Barfleur was executed according to plan. Otherwise nothing to report.

Special Item:

On 20 Sep. Admiral Marschall took over the task of Commanding Admiral, Group West from Admiral Saalwaechter. Thus the merging of the commands of Group West and the Commanding Admiral, France has gone into effect.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

3 ground mines were swept north of Schiermonnikoog and Terschelling. 3 more ground mines were swept off Texel on 19 Sep. Escort and patrol missions were affected by bad weather. Several enemy planes penetrated into the Dutch area and the German Bight during the night of 19 Sep. It is suspected that mines were laid north of Ameland, Schiermonnikoog and Borkum.

The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North reports that the acoustic mine-exploding vessels could not yet be tested in operation, as ordered by Group North, because the Mine Laying Experimental Command failed to supply the required equipment. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North is convinced that the enemy has laid acoustic mines so that the allocation of protective equipment is of prime importance if the convoy routes in the North Sea are to be kept open.

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2. Norway:

Enemy air activity on 19 Sep. over the west coast. Convoy service in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Norway proceeded according to plan. Destroyer STEINBRINCK sailed from Trondheim in a southerly direction.

By order of Group North, the 15th Mine Sweeper Flotilla will transfer to Norway by the middle of October as planned after completion of repairs and following anti-submarine training.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway called the attention of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway to the inadequate defenses of Kristiansund North. Harbor installations, coastal battery, and the important radar set are located outside the fortified strongpoint from which, according to Army plans, a counterattack on invading forces would be launched. The Commanding Admiral, Norway is convinced that such a counterattack would in any event come too late to prevent the destruction of ships and important harbor installations. In view of the threatening situation and the naval requirements in the area in question, he requests the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway to reexamine and revise the existing tactical plans and to make a thorough investigation of all important coastal areas for deficiencies such as those at Kristiansund North.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway will report on the result of this communication as soon as a reply from the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway is received.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring intercepted a report of the 95th Air Force Regiment to the Commander of the Air Force Groups of the Arctic Fleet on the escort mission for PQ 18 on 19 Sep., which unfortunately gives no information about the composition of the convoy. Besides 4 single ships, which may be stragglers, a group of 30 vessels on a 200° course is reported in the Kanin Nos area. The fact that reconnaissance flights are being made into the area north of Kanin Nos seems to indicate that more stragglers are expected. One transport was reported on fire and sinking at 1310 at 68° 55' N, 42° 40' E.

Own Situation:

Operation against convoy QP 14:

According to reconnaissance reports of our submarines, convoy QP 14 was sailing on a northwesterly course and headed for quadrant AB 2320 up to 2305 of 19 Sep., when it changed to a southwesterly course. The Commanding Admiral, Norway assumes that the extended detour to the north was made in order to pick up the supply tanker believed to be waiting at the Spitsbergen west coast. The submarines were able to maintain unbroken contact with the convoy. The patrol line was shifted to the southwest, corresponding to the convoy's change of course, in order to set as many submarines as possible in the latter's path. The signal for attack was given at 0725. The convoy is reported to consist of approximately 30 steamers. Contact was maintained by 5 submarines up to 1958. Last reported position was in quadrant AB 1914.

Submarine U "435" (commanded by Lt. Strelow) scored 4 hits with 5 torpedoes at 0627 and definitely sank one destroyer, probably sank a 6,000 GRT steamer, and torpedoed 2 other steamers. At 1820 submarine U "255" scored 3 hits on a large steamer; strong interference by the defense forces prevented observation of her sinking. Submarine U "703" sank a TRIBAL class destroyer at 1955 in quadrant AB 1836 and reported an aircraft carrier, apparently the FURIOUS, near the convoy. A patrol line of 7 submarines from quadrant AB 1785 to AB 4257 is planned for 0500 of 21 Sep.

At 1622 an enemy submarine made an unsuccessful attack on submarine U "408" in quadrant AB 1376. Submarine U "403" reported a large Russian S I submarine in quadrant AB 6976 which was in telegraphic communication with another nearby submarine, and was operating against U "403".

No report about the combat activities of the Air Force was received.

Group North calls the attention of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines (with copy to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean) to the route usually taken by heavy escort groups of PQ and QP convoys which runs on a line connecting quadrants AN 1535, AM 3245, AE 9635, 5365, 3775, 3445, and 3245; thus we can assume that the forces protecting QP 14 will follow a similar course and will head for the Scapa Flow area possibly after refueling in Reidar or Seydis Fjord. Group North requests the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to examine whether any submarines en route to operations areas could operate for a short while particularly in the Faeroe Islands area.

Special Item:

The Commanding Admiral, Arctic Ocean reported to Group North that the office of Chief of Staff need not be filled for the time being, although the office should be maintained in view of other branches of the Armed Forces. The Commanding Admiral, Group North deems it absolutely necessary to assign an additional flag officer as aide to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean in view of the planned reinforcement of the naval forces in the Arctic Ocean.

The matter is being studied in consultation with the Naval Officer Personnel Division.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Additional ships were assigned to channel-sweeping operations in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea. In view of the surprise appearance of British acoustic mines and the complete lack of protective equipment, save one experimental apparatus, the Baltic Naval Station requests that all anti-acoustic mine devices should be given highest priority regardless of the usual procedure, since the submarines are directly affected. The Naval Staff has ordered an investigation of the situation.

A three-masted schooner was damaged by a mine in the Little Belt. In the southern part of the Great Belt a Danish steamer sank after striking a mine.

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Army Coastal Battery "521" reported sighting a submarine off Hirtshals at 1045. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea questions this report and states that no German submarine is located in the Skagerrak. Due to the lack of appropriate ships and because of many enemy mines, a submarine chase in the Skagerrak is impossible. The escorts of all important convoys conducted through the Skagerrak are reinforced.

According to a Swedish press report, approximately 15 British planes dropped mines in Swedish territorial waters in Oere Sound during the night of 18 Sep. Swedish anti-aircraft batteries laid a barrage in the path of the incoming aircraft. A Swedish auxiliary warship engaged in mine-sweeping was seriously damaged at noon on 19 Sep. by striking a mine and sank.

Transports from Danzig to Finland were halted pending clearance of the sea lanes.

A subchaser had a brush with 3 enemy PT boats in quadrant AD 3717 in the Gulf of Finland. 4 enemy torpedo boats unsuccessfully attacked a mine-sweeper in quadrant AO 3631. North of Vigrund a Russian PT boat ran aground and was abandoned by the crew. Russian fighter planes set the boat afire. Enemy covering ships were fired on by our mine sweepers and withdrew behind a smoke screen.

Otherwise there is nothing to report from the area of the Commander Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea.

V. Merchant Shipping

Group North and the Baltic Naval Station repeatedly urged that control stations be set up off Trelleborg and in Kalmar Sound where merchant ships arriving from Finland and eastern Sweden would be compelled to halt for a check of their sailing instructions. Since this suggestion can be carried out only if the Swedish Government agrees, the Foreign Office approached them about the matter in July 1942. So far, the result was negative. The Naval Staff agrees with the opinion held by the Foreign Office that a change of the Swedish Government's attitude cannot be anticipated in the near future on account of its basic policies, and therefore we cannot hope to carry out the plan proposed by Group North and the Baltic Naval Station. Both of them were notified to this effect.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance activity of both air groups was slight. Radio monitoring intercepted a few submarine warning signals off the American coast and in the West Indies.

According to an announcement of the British Admiralty, submarine URGE is overdue. According to a Canadian Navy Ministry communique,

the Canadian destroyer ASSINIBOINE reported sinking a German submarine, the captain of which was killed in the action, while the crew was taken prisoner. A press report from Lisbon asserts that the British steamer ALOUETTE was torpedoed and sunk on 19 Sep. off Cape Espichel.

2. Own Situation:

2 submarines sailed for the zone of operations.

Regarding operation against convoy QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

In the North Atlantic, Group "Pfeil", too, was directed to operate against the convoy proceeding on a northeasterly course in quadrant AK, so that a total of 21 submarines, including those of Group "Loss" and 2 submarines en route from Germany to their operations areas, are operating against this convoy. At first progress of the operation was affected by the increasingly bad weather. Submarine U "373" attacked a corvette in quadrant AK 4215 with a 3-fan and, according to hydrophone observation, scored a hit on the convoy. Subsequently the sinking of a steamer was detected by hydrophone. Almost simultaneously the convoy was attacked also by submarine U "596" which heard the explosions of 2 steamers. Debris was sighted. It may be that submarine U "373" and U "596" sank the same steamer. Contact with the convoy was lost in quadrant AK 1949 and 2000.

Group "Vorwaerts" has refueled.

No results were reported from the American coast and the West Indies, nor from the submarines in the South Atlantic, where Group "Iltis" is informed that a northbound convoy is expected to arrive at its patrol line on 21 Sep.

Nothing to report from the Mediterranean.

For additional reports see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

As reported by the German Armistice Commission, the dispatch vessel DUMONT D'URVILLE has taken aboard 14 more British survivors, apart from those reported to be on board the cruiser GLOIRE. The DUMONT D'URVILLE and the ANNAMITE are proceeding to the rendezvous with the Italian submarine at 1000 (German Summer Time) in 02° 00' S 13° 25' W.

Special Item:

With reference to Group North's complaint regarding the loading facilities for SMA mines (see War Diary 18 Sep.), the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate states that installations for the storage and loading of SMA mines at Atlantic ports were begun 18 months ago. The Chatern installation at Brest is now finished and some ships have already been equipped there. Installation Keranten at Lorient and Regue de Thau at Bordeaux are still under construction. SMA mines have also already been loaded at Kiel. The request that mines also be loaded in Norway is entirely new.

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VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

There was little reconnaissance activity because of bad weather. Sunderland was raided with good result by 19 planes during the night of 19 Sep.

2. Incursions:

No enemy planes flew into German or German-occupied territory.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Reconnaissance missions were flown to Suez and Kufra oasis and combat missions in support of the Panzer Corps, North Africa. Enemy air activity was at a minimum.

4. Eastern Front:

42 enemy planes were reported shot down at the various Army fronts.

Reconnaissance flights over the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.

The 1st Air Force deployed 307 planes in support of the 11th Army. Ships were attacked on Lake Ladoga and 1 small steamer was sunk, another one damaged and a patrol boat set afire.

Convoy PQ 18 was observed dispersing off Archangel in the Arctic Ocean. Due to bad weather the harbor itself could not be reconnoitered, neither could convoy PQ 14 be spotted.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to press reports, the planes at Gibraltar were reinforced by another 36 planes. With this exception, there is nothing to report from the entire Mediterranean area.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

The captured British motor torpedo boat "314" was commissioned as a fast subchaser by the 6th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla under the name "RA 10".

During the night of 19 Sep. Bardia was attacked without result by enemy planes; an attack on Navarino during the evening of 19 Sep. fared no better.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Steamer SATURNO proceeding from Palermo to Tripoli put into Trapani during the night of 19 Sep. in order to escape an enemy air attack, and sailed from there in the evening of 20 Sep.

An enemy plane attacked 4 auxiliary sailing vessels under way from Tripoli to Benghazi on 19 Sep.; no damage has been reported. With these exceptions, supply shipping from Italy and Greece to North Africa and North African coastal traffic proceeded according to plan.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

2 submarines were sighted northeast of Candia.

Own Situation:

Convoy service on schedule without special incidents.

Group South asks for a reduction of the Italian October oil quota from Rumania by 10,000 tons, which should be allocated to the Admiral, Aegean Sea for the most urgent requirements of Africa transports which cannot be carried out with only 6,000 tons. Besides, the Italian Naval High Command has withdrawn a good deal of the oil stored at Piraeus and transferred it to the Central Mediterranean. (See Telegram 1815.)

A decision will be made by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

A northbound barge convoy was attacked during the night of 19 Sep. off Burnos with 2 submarine torpedoes, both of which missed. 2 Italian submarines under way to the Bosporus developed engine trouble and will be transferred from Constanta to the Crimea after completion of repairs. 3 more Italian submarines sailed from Sulina on 19 Sep.

A few buildings were damaged during an air raid on Mariupol on 19 Sep. Renewed air attacks on Balaklava and Ivanbaba took place on 20 Sep. A mine-sweeping plane crashed off Kerch Strait on 19 Sep. due to engine trouble. Escort service according to plan.

IX. Situation East Asia

The Commander in Chief of the India Fleet announced that all major Indian ports have been converted into naval bases. The main bases are Karachi, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta.

According to a U.S. Navy Department communiqué, a Japanese force consisting of several battleships and cruisers was attacked on

14 Sep. northeast of Tulagi by heavy U.S. bombers which ran into strong anti-aircraft fire. 2 battleships were probably hit.

General MacArthur's headquarters report that the battle on Timor between Australian and Japanese units is still going on.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

Enemy landing attempts southwest of Novorossisk are reported to have been repulsed by Rumanian forces; details have not yet been learned. The railroad bridge across the Terek River at Arik was captured undamaged in a surprise attack. The large dam east of Maisky was captured, too.

Army Group B:

The enemy attacked heavily east of Chalchutea and gained some ground. Since we have observed preparations for further attacks, German reserves are being brought up. At the southern sector of the Stalingrad front we foiled enemy attempts to approach our lines. A few fortified blocks were captured in the city after bitter fighting. Enemy attacks southeast of Kotluban were repulsed At the penetration point northeast of Borodkin the enemy attacked with strong infantry and tank forces; the action is still in progress. 2 villages in the Don River bend northwest of Kachlinska were captured by the enemy. Our counterattack failed. 4 enemy attacks on the left wing of the Voronezh bridgehead and another thrust against the right wing and the center of the 75th Infantry Division were repulsed. Fighting north of Voronezh continues.

Central Army Group:

An attack west of Byelev collapsed with heavy enemy losses.

Northern Army Group:

Partisan bands were engaged southwest of Kholm. An enemy attack against the railway embankment north of Sychevka was repulsed.

2. Finnish Front:

Strong enemy pressure was maintained at Maselskaya. During the night of 17 Sep. a strong Russian detachment landed on the southern shore of Motovsky Bay on the northeastern sector. Our counterattack forced the enemy to reembark under the protection of heavily armed ships. Enemy motor launches which tried to enter Litsa Bay by daylight were forced to withdraw under artillery fire.

3. North Africa:

Normal enemy artillery and reconnaissance activity.

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The 9th Australian Infantry Division, deployed at the northern sector of the El Alamein line, was relieved. The Italian garrison of Gialo oasis is still holding out and is supported by German and Italian air forces.

[Handwritten note by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff to the Naval Staff Operations Branch, Mine Warfare and Anti-Submarine Section:

Referring to paragraph IV (Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea) about protective equipment against acoustic mines: This is not true. It may be, however, that the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea failed to order adequate equipment in time and to forward it to the threatened areas and also neglected to train personnel.

Signed: Fricke, Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, 27 Sep.

This has been settled. See War Diary 24 Sep. 1942, paragraph IV.

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Items of Political Importance

U.S.A.:

Secretary of the Navy Knox also made the following statements:

At the present time the submarine threat is the most difficult problem for the U.S.A. It affects in particular the decision regarding the establishment of a second European front, the date for the beginning of a large-scale counteroffensive in the western Pacific, and the problem of supplying war material to the Russian Army. The battle against the submarines will be long and hard. On the other hand, it is fortunate that the Axis Powers are losing their air superiority more and more. For their victories in Russia the Germans had to pay a price out of proportion with the result. The German and Italian Navies are on the defensive in all theaters of war. The German submarines have been driven from the British home waters and from the U.S. Atlantic coast.

Great Britain:

According to Reuter, the First Lord of the Admiralty announced that within the last 2 1/4 years it has been possible to make up for the loss of battleships, aircraft carriers and cruisers and to more than replace the very great loss of destroyers. In addition, a fleet of corvettes and of hundreds of small landing craft has been newly created. At some future date it will be said that once again the fleet saved Great Britain from her greatest ordeal.

In a radio address to the American people Lord Halifax pointed out that the British nation has undergone an important change of mind. The passive attitude that everything depended on the ability to hold out has been replaced by the recognition that it is necessary to strike at the enemy in order to win the war. The tremendous fanaticism fostered by National Socialism must be countered by a firm belief in democratic ideals.

Finland:

The Finnish Envoy to Washington officially confirms the rumors that Finland has asked for a separate peace. Similar statements were made also by other diplomatic missions. According to Reuter, Secretary of State Hull is said to have declared that the U.S. Government has been informed about the Finnish willingness to conclude a separate peace.

Bulgaria:

On 16 Sep. the Prime Minister lodged a protest with the Russian Embassy at Sofia against the bombing of Bulgarian towns by Russian planes.

Argentina:

The German Embassy in a statement to the press denies the accusations against the German Naval Attache which were made by the investigating committee and declared that the Attache had no connection whatsoever with the escape of officers and crew members of the pocket battleship ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE.

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21 Sep. 1942

Special Items

I. A directive has been issued to the Naval Quartermaster Division in order to comply with the Fuehrer's wish that the Navy use all available ships in Norway during the coming winter season.

For copy see 1/Skl I op 1829/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

II. The British Admiralty and Air Ministry reported that more than 100,000 mines have been laid in enemy waters since the beginning of the war; they were laid in the Baltic Sea, in the Kiel Canal and off the French Atlantic coast. Surface forces and submarines laid mines on all shipping routes from Norway to the French Atlantic coast. The mine-laying offensive has been stepped up during the last 6 months.

III. The Wilhelmshaven Intelligence Center reported on the questioning of crew members from the British steamers EARLSTON and CARLTON which were sunk during the operation against convoy PQ 17. The report contains valuable information about enemy ship losses and enemy merchant shipping in general. For copies see 1/Skl 31673/42 geh. and 31675/42 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

Another interrogation report of the same agency contains interesting statements of crew members of motor gunboat "335", captured on 12 Sep. about the organization and operations of British gunboats in the Channel. For copies see 1/Skl 31674 and 31676/42 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

Situation 21 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

At 2037 ship "23" reported: "Equipped for 5 months; fuel supply sufficient for 12 weeks; expecting depot or supply ship on 15 Nov."

Receipt of the message by the Naval Staff is confirmed by Radiogram 2219.

By Radiogram 0636 the Naval Staff informs the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN of the sailing instructions cabled by the Naval Attache at Tokyo for the voyage to Singapore. The ship is to proceed from Singapore to Yokohama.

The Naval Attache at Tokyo is notified that the Naval Staff expects the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN to reach the Sunda Strait around 26 Sep. The Attache is requested to report at his convenience when and to whom the mines and torpedoes from the DOGGERBANK were delivered. (See Telegram 1540.)

Enemy situation report to all ships in foreign waters by Radiograms 1331 and 2000.

21 Sep. 1942

The Naval Staff issued operations order 1/Skl Ik 1777/42 Gkdos. Chefs. to ship "45" on 18 Sep. The ship is to carry on cruiser warfare in foreign waters; the most important object is to tie up enemy naval forces and to inflict damage to the enemy:

a) by forcing him to organize convoys and to reinforce the protection of shipping also in remote waters;

b) by increasing the demands made on his naval forces;

c) by deterring neutral ships from carrying goods for the enemy;

d) by other unfavorable effects of mercantile and financial nature.

Copy no. 8 of the order is filed in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

Also on 18 Sep., the sailing orders for the ELSA ESSBERGER and the ANNELIESE ESSBERGER were forwarded to Group West. These orders are identical with those issued to blockade-runners heretofore. For enclosures regarding routes, reference and rendezvous points see 1/Skl IK 1822/42 Gkdos. Chefs. (Copy no. 4) in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The roadstead and harbor of La Pallice which were closed to shipping the evening of 20 Sep. were reopened. A ground mine was swept off La Rochelle and 3 mine explosions were observed off Ile de Groix.

Channel Coast:

Steamer DIAMANT (780 GRT) ran aground near Jersey and was lost.

Special Item:

The Commander, Destroyers reports the final list of ships assigned to escort ship "45": Torpedo boat T "23" with the commander of the 5th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla aboard, torpedo boat T "22", the JAGUAR, and if necessary the FALKE. These ships can arrive at Cuxhaven in the forenoon of 6 Oct. at the earliest.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

~~Enemy Situation~~:

Nothing to report.

21 Sep. 1942

Own Situation:

4 ground mines were swept in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North. Mine Sweeper M "3412" was strafed by enemy planes west of Scheveningen at 1730 and suffered slight casualties. Patrol operations were curtailed due to bad weather.

2. Norway:

A Russian battery on Rybachi Peninsula fired 108 shots at an eastbound convoy on 20 Sep. without causing damage, and on 21 Sep. 10 shots at Petsamo harbor, causing minor damage. 19 shots were fired by us in reply.

The electric power plant in the Glom Fjord was destroyed by sabotage.

On 20 Sep. there was slight enemy air activity in the western coastal area.

Regarding a planned minefield off the west coast in the Lister area see Telegram 1915.

On the basis of a request by the Commanding Admiral, Norway, the Naval Staff inquires how many artillery barges have been asked for use as gun carriers and how many as anti-aircraft carriers. The suggestion made at the same time that naval barges be converted into floating torpedo batteries is still being investigated. Since artillery barges can be used as transports only to a limited extent, the Commanding Admiral, Norway can expect to get a number of additional naval barges for transport purposes soon.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

London claims that the losses of convoy PQ 18 announced in the German Armed Forces communique are grossly exaggerated.

According to the radio intercept service, convoy PQ 18 consisting of 28 merchant and 22 escort vessels, passed Kanin Nos at noon. At this time and later, air attacks and hits on the convoy were observed. It can thus be assumed that the successes against PQ 18 which the 5th Air Force reported for 18 Sep. were achieved only while the convoy was passing Kanin Nos or thereafter. If actually 6 merchant vessels were definitely and 2 more were probably sunk as reported, according to the information available to the Naval Staff, 20 or at the most 23 merchant vessels may be assumed to have been destroyed, including those probably sunk. Air and photo reconnaissance at 0800 established a group of 20 merchant ships and 6 escort vessels proceeding on a southerly course at low speed directly off Archangel and another merchant ship somewhat behind them. These ships probably represent the part of PQ 18 which succeeded in reaching Archangel. There may be a few more stragglers. The Armed Forces High Command communique of 20 Sep. mentions a total of 38 merchant vessels sunk, however. The Naval Staff believes it necessary to investigate this discrepancy.

Own Situation:

Operation against convoy QP 14:

Guided by air reconnaissance. our submarines established

contact with QP 14 around noon in quadrant AB 4115 and were able to maintain contact until 2200, at which time the convoy was in quadrant AA 6921. No successes have been reported. Submarine U "606" fired at a Consolidated plane, forcing it to make an emergency landing.

In its comment on the brief report of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean on the operation against convoy PQ 18, Group North states that our submarine operations were handicapped by the strong air and destroyer escorts as well as by the well disciplined behavior of the convoy and the efficient manner in which it was handled. These facts accounted for the absence of damaged ships and stragglers, against which submarine attacks proved so successful in the case of convoy PQ 17. For a copy of this comment see 1/Skl 23457/42 Gkdos. in file "Eispalast".

Group North asks permission for mine operation "Meisenbalz" to be carried out by the HIPPER alone, without the KOELN.

Group North's plan to have submarine U "117" lay a tactical barrage meets with the approval of the Naval Staff. The Naval Staff must reserve its decision, however, on account of mine-laying operations in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines which may be more important. Moreover, Group North's plan cannot be carried out at present because the clockwork arming switches (UES) must be set for at least 3 hours, since the mines cannot be guaranteed to function properly sooner due to oscillation after they are moored.

For possible future submarine mine-laying operations in the area of Group North following the return of submarine U "117", 132 SMA mines equipped with safety and timing mechanisms are allocated with the designation "Bruno V". Details are to be worked out directly between the Group and the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate. The Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch, is instructed accordingly and requested to examine immediately whether and by how much the minimum 3 hour delay mentioned above can be reduced, and what disadvantages might result.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

The effects of the enemy's mine offensive of 19 Sep. and the use of acoustic mines has had other effects: A British acoustic aerial mine was detonated by a seaplane taking off from the Copenhagen Air Force Station. 4 more acoustic mines were swept in the Pommersche Bucht partly by means of towed coil gear and partly by vibration. A dredge was sunk off Gdynia due to an explosion. Submarine U "446" sank in the southern gap of the Danzig minefield after her stern struck a mine. 18 men of the crew were rescued, the captain is missing. An unidentified Danish motor trawler struck a mine and sank. There were no survivors. Another 4 mines were swept north of Swinemuende and southeast of Rixhoeft.

Another incursion by enemy planes took place at the Baltic Sea entrances during the night of 21 Sep.; mine-laying is suspected.

The Air Force General Staff telephoned that tanker MITTELMEER (6,370 GRT) with 850 tons of aviation gasoline for the 5th Air Force has been ready to sail at Libau since 13 Sep. Since the convoy had not been reported to the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea or to Group North, the tanker must now wait, because of the lack of escort vessels, for the next convoy of hospital ships for Finland which will sail in

approximately 10 days. The blame for this delay rests exclusively with the Air Force, which failed to report in time.

Operations of light forces in the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea continued to be affected by bad weather.

Convoy service: a supply transport from Libau to Reval had to be cancelled due to the breakdown of an escort vessel. A southbound convoy had to put into Libau temporarily due to closing of the Neufahrwasser area; on this occasion steamer MOLTKEFELS ran aground. A Russian patrol boat was observed sinking off Nargen on 20 Sep., probably due to a mine.

V. Merchant Shipping

Ore shipments from Lulea during the week of 23 to 29 Aug. increased over those of the preceding week by 44,000 tons, since larger German vessels were used. 45 ships, including 7 German and 31 Swedish vessels, were loaded. Total shipments during this season amounted to 1,930,225.5 tons up to 31 Aug., which is approximately 200 tons less than last year.

Harbor traffic at Freetown increased in July and August in tonnage as well as in number of ships.

The Government of Brazil ordered the nationalization of the entire merchant marine, of all shipyards, and oil refineries.

For more news about foreign merchant shipping see Brief Report No. 31/42 of the Naval Staff Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Lively reconnaissance activity in the southern rendezvous area. A submarine attack was reported approximately 80 miles south of Halifax. Freetown rebroadcast a submarine warning signal originating about 45 miles north of Ascension.

2. Own Situation:

2 more submarines are en route to the zone of operations.

Regarding operation against convoy QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

Operations against the convoy in quadrant AK were seriously hampered by unfavorable weather in the North Atlantic. Reports from submarines assert that offensive action is impossible. Since the weather is expected to improve, the operation is continued.

Group "Vorwaerts" placed 7 submarines on patrol line from quadrant BC 3143 to BC 3851, where a westbound convoy is anticipated for 23 Sep.

Submarine U "175" reports from the West Indies sinking a 6,000 GRT

steamer in quadrant EO 1865.

Submarine U "561" sank a 500 ton sailing vessel in the eastern Mediterranean.

For further developments see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The German Armistice Commission reports that gunboat DUMONT D'URVILLE took over 42 survivors from the Italian submarine and is continuing the search. The French request that Axis submarines be notified of this. This request will be complied with.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Reconnaissance flights and fighter bomber attacks on Bexhill took place during the day.

2. Incursions:

11 enemy planes flew over the Baltic Sea entrances, 1 plane into the Heligoland area, evidently for mine-laying.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Nothing to report.

4. Eastern Front:

Reconnaissance activity over the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Arctic Ocean. For details see daily situation report. For operations against convoys QP 14 and PQ 18 see Situation Arctic Ocean.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

There is nothing to report about the naval situation in the western Mediterranean. 119 aircraft were observed in the harbor and on the airfield of Gibraltar. This very considerable number of planes makes it appear likely that the air force units on Malta are to be reinforced. 2 submarines were sighted in the central Mediterranean off Brindisi and Ragusa. Photo reconnaissance of Alexandria revealed nothing of importance in the eastern Mediterranean. 3 submarines were sighted from the coast proceeding on a westerly course north of Crete.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

2 Italian PT boats in waiting position in the Strait of Sicily were repeatedly attacked by enemy planes in the evening of 19 Sep.; one boat was sunk.

Enemy planes raided Tobruk during the night of 20 Sep.; one of the attackers was shot down.

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The Commanding Admiral, Submarines, the German Naval Command, Italy and the Commander, Submarines, Italy are explicitly informed by the Naval Staff (with copy to the Naval Representative on the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command) that neither Italian commands nor the Italian Liaison Officer to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines are to be informed of the planned transfer of German submarines, because utmost secrecy is absolutely essential.

On request of the Naval Representative on the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, the Naval Staff asked the Italian High Command for its position with regard to retaliatory measures for the sinking of the Italian hospital ship ARNO. The Italian High Command considers it unwise to take such steps against British hospital ships in the Mediterranean, since their activity is very limited and unimportant. On the other hand, Germany and Italy have a moral obligation to ship their wounded and sick out of Africa without interference, and this is also necessary for reasons of supply.

The Italian attitude, which corresponds to that of the Naval Staff, is submitted to the Armed Forces High Command. (See Telegram 1055.)

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The attacks on the escorted steamers MONGINEVRO and APUANIA during the night of 19 Sep. were unsuccessful and the ships reached Benghazi undamaged. Steamer SATURNO was not attacked by enemy planes during the night of 19 Sep. as erroneously reported, but is proceeding to Cagliari on schedule. The steamer CASTORE which ran aground on 17 Sep. was refloated and is en route to Tripoli. Steamer PALOMBA (1,110 GRT), proceeding from Palermo to Tripoli, ran aground in the northern part of Hammamet Bay. Auxiliary sailing vessel EVANGELISTRIA sank on 18 Sep. in Bomba Bay for unknown reasons. 140 tons of German cargo were salvaged. Supply and coastal traffic otherwise according to plan.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Special Item:

The Fuehrer ordered that first of all the personnel required to reinforce the Crete defenses be shipped there as quickly as possiblp and with only the most essential equipment. Transport planes are to be assigned for this purpose. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast was ordered by the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command to submit a proposal for the priority to be accorded to shipments of the remaining equipment and personnel. Exactly what ships will be available for these transports cannot yet be foreseen. The Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command will report on this matter following clarification of the amount of tonnage, particularly French tonnage, which will be available. (See Telegram 1410.)

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance on 20 and 21 Sep., lively steamer traffic was observed on the east coast to and from Tuapse;

night traffic has apparently been resumed. For details see Aerial Warfare.

Own Situation:

3 Italian submarines arrived at Ochakov from Sulina on 20 Sep. A bomb attack on an enemy submarine off Cape Sarych was unsuccessful. A landing attempt by Russian PT boats and subchasers northwest of Novorossisk during the night of 20 Sep. was repulsed by 2 vessels of the Neumann group. Casualties were light. 5 small enemy ships were fired upon by a land-based battery in Ivanbaba Bay during the night of 19 Sep. Balaklava, Yalta, Ivanbaba, Feodosiya, and Kerch were repeatedly raided by enemy planes. The small tanker MOSELLA was damaged at Balaklava. The front end of the stone pier at Anapa was destroyed. The wooden pier is unfit for use. All roads in the harbor of Novorossisk are open to enemy observation and fire.

Convoy operations in the Black Sea proceeded according to plan and without interference.

IX. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

11 enemy air attacks were made on Kerch. The remnants from the landing attempt southwest of Novorossisk were mopped up completely. At the Terek front we captured the railroad station of Baksan. In addition we captured 4 small villages. All enemy attacks against the eastern flank of the 13th Panzer Division were repulsed.

Army Group B:

At Chalchutea the enemy withdrew to his original fortified field positions. The battle for Stalingrad continues with undiminished tenacity. Enemy attacks on the northern sector between the Volga and Don Rivers became weaker. A tank-supported penetration at the Kotluban railway station was repulsed and another attack halted. Our counter-attacking forces west of Kachalinskaya gained ground in an easterly direction. Russian attacks in the Don River bend were repulsed. Enemy attempts to cross the Don at Kazanskaya on the Italian sector were frustrated. An enemy attack in the Don River bend north of Voronezh collapsed. A new attack supported by 42 tanks is in progress. Enemy forces which penetrated into our line south of Yelets were thrown back.

Central Army Group:

Renewed enemy attacks in the Rzhev area were repulsed. Tanks which had succeeded in penetrating our lines were either destroyed or driven off. An enemy attack along the road from Zubtsov to Rzhev gained

ground in a northwesterly direction. The situation is not yet clarified. Local reserves were thrown into battle. The enemy succeeded in penetrating into the city park of Rzhev but was almost completely thrown back again. For the first time after a long silence heavy enemy gunfire flared up north of Demidov.

Northern Army Group:

Forces of the 11th Army attacked Gaitolovo. The enemy is offering stubborn resistance. The Chernaya River was crossed. Northwest of Gaitolovo we broke into the enemy position and repulsed enemy counterattacks.

2. Finnish Front:

The Svirstroi power plant is under fire from heavy enemy guns. Enemy attacks at Maselskaya were repulsed by counterattacks. At the northern flank of the northeastern sector a battle is in progress with enemy forces of batallion strength. A renewed landing attempt of 2 cutters was frustrated. Lively shipping was observed in Motovsky Bay.

The sabotage act against the Glom Fjord power plant during the night of 20 Sep. was executed by 6 Englishmen and 1 Norwegian who probably landed from a plane; all of them were captured.

3. North Africa:

Slight enemy artillery and reconnaissance activity.

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Items of Political Importance

Russian statements have recently been heard amid the general discussion about a second European front, to the effect that Great Britain needs a second front more than Soviet Russia; only in this way can Germany be prevented from concentrating her forces on England.

On the basis of reports from Washington military experts, the Vichy Telegraphic Service discusses the problem of the British-American invasion of Europe which would require an estimated one million men. The present British air superiority is not yet sufficient for an invasion, especially since it must be expected that Germany will concentrate her Air Force in western Europe, once the Eastern Front has been stabilized. It will take several months more for American air forces to become effective. A basic improvement in the maritime transport situation is also considered necessary.

The new Japanese Foreign Minister and the spokesman of the General Staff issued similar statements about the relations between Japan and Russia to which, according to press reports from Shanghai, great importance must be attributed. Both emphasized in surprisingly similar terms that the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union will remain unchanged, as long as Russia adheres strictly to the existing pact.

Widespread attention and comment was aroused by the statements of the Finnish Envoy at Washington about a separate peace. Official Helsinki circles are not yet in possession of the text of the declaration allegedly made at Washington, but believe it out of the question that the Envoy spoke about Finland's desire to conclude a separate peace with the Soviet Union.

Special Items:

I. It was learned from the Air Force General attached to the Commander in Chief, Navy that the aircraft tender completed by the Rotterdam Special Command and the one still under construction are to be transferred to the Navy, according to a decision by the Commander in Chief, Air Force.

II. The Japanese Liaison Officer reported on 21 Sep. that "Kirschbluete" has rounded the Cape on her return voyage and entered the Indian Ocean. On this occasion he expressed once more the thanks of the Japanese Naval Mission in Germany for the cordial reception afforded to the Japanese Submarine.

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Situation 22 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

It is learned belatedly from the statements made by the captain of a ship sunk by a submarine in June that enemy ships sailing to the South Atlantic received a written warning to watch for German whaling ships in the South Atlantic. Our whalers are considered to be scout ships.

According to an intelligence report, U.S. and British troops of all service branches are said to be concentrated at Bomba Mtali and Leopoldville to be flown from the latter place to the Mediterranean front in large U.S. transport planes.

According to an intelligence report from Portugal, the British cable-layer MIRROR arrived at Ponta Delgada on 20 Sep., followed on 21 Sep. by the British mine sweeper "103", both for provisioning on their way to England.

Indian Ocean:

It is reported from Lourenco Marques that on 18 Sep. a large convoy destined for a northern port dropped anchor there. The U.S. steamer PAUL LUCKENBACH reported on 21 Sep. that she was torpedoed at the exit of the Strait of Aden and was continuing her voyage slowly.

As reported by the German Armistice Commission, the British forces slowly advancing on Madagascar have not yet made contact with the French defense forces at Tananarive. It is learned that strong British forces are being massed at Brickaville (90 km south-southwest of Tamatave). The island population is said to be undisturbed and to cooperate without reservation in the defense of the island.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "28" is informed by Radiogram 2213 of the award of additional medals in recognition of the recently reported successes.

All ships in foreign waters are notified of the WESERLAND's sailing route by Radiogram 1346.

See 1/Skl I k 23279/42 Gkdos for instructions to the Fleet Branch of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division concerning the UCKERMARK and the WESERLAND. For copy see War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report received from Portugal,

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6 British motor torpedo boats were sighted at noon of 21 Sep. 6 miles southeast of Cape St. Vincent. 2 British PT boats and 1 corvette passed the cape on a northerly course in the evening.

According to another intelligence report, the American Vice Consul at Casablanca is said to have stated that a landing and an offensive against Dakar from Gambia is scheduled in about 4 weeks, following the termination of the Madagascar operation. The next major landing attempt is allegedly planned in about 4 to 6 weeks in the Gironde.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

On the evening of 21 Sep. a slightly damaged Whitney plane made an emergency landing south of Brest and was captured.

Submarine U "600" was slightly damaged by a mine explosion close to the hull in water of 36 m. depth, while training outside of the shipping channel south of the mouth of the Gironde. It is assumed that the mine in question was of the acoustic type.

Torpedo boat T "13" transferred from La Pallice to Brest for engine repairs.

Channel Coast:

7 boats of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla transferred from Rotterdam to Ijmuiden.

The Naval Staff assumes that the damaged torpedo boat JAGUAR will be replaced by the FALKE for escorting ship "45", so that the ships assigned to this mission consist of torpedo boat T "23" with the Commander of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla on board, torpedo boat T "22", and the "FALKE".

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

All mine-sweeping activity had to be cancelled due to bad weather. Convoy service was affected for the same reason.

At 1158 the blast furnace plant of Ijmuiden was attacked by enemy planes. Both furnaces were put out of commission. At 1505 another attack took place against the same target and the Ijmuiden cement plant; also in this case considerable damage was done.

2. Norway:

Destroyer Z "27" reported sighting a bubble track in

22 Sep. 1942

Alta Fjord off Langnesholm at 1020. Submarine patrols have been reinforced.

Enemy air activity on 21 and 22 Sep. over the Arctic Coast (Alta Fjord, Kirkenes, and Vardoe) and over Stavanger.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Decoded radio messages revealed that convoy PQ 18 sailed into Gorlo Strait on 18 Sep. under escort of 12 planes of the 95th Naval Air Regiment. At 1118 of that day the convoy was sighted from Kanin Nos, at which time it was still under attack by German planes. 3 single ships, probably stragglers, were observed north of the convoy, one of which was burning while another one was sinking. At 1200 the convoy was reported by the Russian planes as consisting of 28 transports and 22 escort vessels and its position was given as 68° 40' N, 42° 40' E. It was unfortunately impossible to make out the number of merchant vessels reported subsequently at 1310, so that the result of our aerial attacks could not be determined precisely. Radio Archangel reported at 1312 that Russian fighter planes had taken off. At 1624 the convoy was at 68° 20' N, 42° 10' E and at 1705 at 68° 05' N, 42° 00' E. On 20 Sep. the convoy was escorted off Archangel by a squadron of the 729th Fighter Regiment. Radio monitoring revealed that on 22 Sep., too, fighter planes took off at 1126 for the protection of PQ 18 which was at Archangel at that time.

Own Situation:

Operation against convoy QP 14:

5 submarines maintained uninterrupted contact with the convoy all night and during the day. The convoy proceeded on a southerly course west of Jan Mayen and is probably headed for the Denmark Strait. It was last reported at 1959 in quadrant AA 9857. According to air reconnaissance, it consisted of 18 steamers with 3 cruisers, 4 destroyers, and 10 escort vessels. It is assumed that the aircraft carrier was withdrawn from the convoy during the night of 21 Sep. following an attack on her by submarine U "378" at 2329 on 21 Sep. in quadrant AA 6964. The submarine had fired a 4-fan which missed.

The same submarine missed with another 4-fan against a destroyer in quadrant AA 9316 at 0405 on 22 Sep. Submarine U "435" (commanded by Lt. Strelow) continued the successful operation begun on 20 Sep. by scoring 2 hits on an auxiliary cruiser of 12,000 GRT and 3 hits on three 8,000 GRT steamers out of 5 shots during an attack in quadrant AA 9286 at 0719. The sinking of the auxiliary cruiser and of one steamer was seen and confirmed by hydrophone. Subsequently the spots where 4 ships had sunk were observed. At 1022 submarine U "408" torpedoed an AFRIDI-class destroyer in quadrant AA 9278, the sinking of which was established by hydrophone.

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean suggests that the captain of submarine U "435" be mentioned by name in the coming official announcement of the results of the operation against convoy QP 14. The Naval Staff forwarded this suggestion to the Executive Office of the Commander in Chief, Navy.

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The operation continues.

Operation "Zarin":

Operations order is submitted by the Admiral, Arctic Ocean. The object is to mine the area northwest of Novaya Zemlya by the HIPPER. Aside from the HIPPER, 4 destroyers under the Commander, 5th Destroyer Flotilla are participating in the operation. The tactical command is in the hands of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers, the operational command in those of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean. The barrage order specifies 7 barrage sections of 96 type F standard mines, timed for 60 days and set for a depth of 17 m., distance between mines 600 m. For the best location of the barrage sections see copy of operations order in Telegram 0037.

The Naval Staff informs Fuehrer Headquarters, with copy to the Naval Representative on the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, of its intention to engage the HIPPER in a mine-laying operation off the west coast of Novaya Zemlya following the termination of the operation against convoy QP 14 and requests that this be brought to the Fuehrer's attention.

Group North agreed with the above operations order on condition that the operation is called off if the task force is reported upon emerging from the inter-island waters and if air reconnaissance spots the heavy enemy force still north of 65° N. Otherwise, the operation is to be carried out. It is scheduled to begin after 23 Sep. following receipt of permission from the Naval Staff.

After Fuehrer Headquarters reported that the Fuehrer had been notified, permission for the operation was given to Group North by the following telegram:

"Permission to execute mine-laying operation replacing "Zar" by the HIPPER is granted."

Thereupon the Admiral, Arctic Ocean orders that the operation begin at 2100 of 23 Sep.

Special Item:

Group North has assigned a submarine for the transport of a weather detachment in the north area. Since the cargo may also contain a great number of gasoline containers and several hydrogen cylinders, the Group requests a decision whether a cargo of this nature is allowed on board a submarine. (See Telegram 1533.)

The Naval Staff, Submarine Division is looking into the matter.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

2 ground mines were swept north of Swinemuende, 1 west of Kalundborg, 5 in the southern portion of the Great Belt, and 1 in the southern part of Samsoe Belt. Mine-exploding vessels

swept 6 of them by means of cracker equipment (K.K.G.). This proves that acoustic mines were used by the enemy also in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea. Otherwise there is nothing to report from the areas of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea and the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea.

V. Merchant Shipping

In a conference at the Baltic Naval Station between representatives of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, the Naval Staff, Operations Division and the Baltic Naval Station it was stated once more that even the slightest decrease of the Swedish ore supply is intolerable in view of the short time during which shipping is still possible. It is considered necessary to lift all restrictions immediately. The Naval Staff therefore advised Group North (copy to Baltic Naval Station and Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea) supplementing the directive of 19 Sep. that the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping also considers intolerable anything that would interfere with any Swedish ore shipments. The Naval Staff therefore requests Group North to see that all such restrictions be lifted at once.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, the Norwegian steamer MATHILDA was attacked by a submarine in the North Atlantic, approximately 300 miles northwest of Newfoundland. According to an intelligence report from Portugal, a British corvette sank on 19 Sep. 6 miles west of Cape Espichel. No further reports of any importance were received.

2. Own Situation:

See Own Situation, Arctic Ocean for reports on operations against convoy QP 14.

5 submarines are under way to the zone of operations, among them 3 sailing from Germany for the first time.

The 3 submarines stationed in the Denmark Strait are transferred to the command of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean as of 0300 on 23 Sep. 3 submarines stationed east of Iceland were transferred south of the newly established closed area on 15 Sep.

The operation in the North Atlantic against the convoy in quadrant AK yielded no results yet, because stormy weather (northwest wind 10, sea 7-8) made any offensive action impossible. 19 submarines operating in that area were combined into Group "Blitz", and are supposed to assume position in a patrol line from quadrant AK 0317 to 7559 by 2400 of 25 Sep.; on their way to the newly assigned positions they are to exploit any opportunity of attacking stragglers.

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Submarine U "211" of Group "Vorwaerts" sank a fast tanker of 10,000 GRT in quadrant AM 7712, submarine U "380" of the same group, the Norwegian steamer OLAF FOSTENES (3,000 GRT) in quadrant BC 9177.

Submarine U "562" sank steamer VIBRAY (2,993 GRT) in quadrant AD 3959.

No other reports about any successes were received.

For details see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

According to a report of the German Armistice Commission, the GLOIRE has hurriedly taken on supplies at Dakar and is now under way to Casablanca where she will disembark Italian survivors to facilitate their transport to Italy.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

70 planes carried out reconnaissance flights and fighter bomber attacks in the course of the day. The enemy raided anti-aircraft batteries and industrial installations in Belgium. Nothing of importance has been reported.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Fighter bomber sweeps met with no enemy opposition. A Spitfire was shot down over Crete. At the Egyptian front enemy batteries and concentrations of motorized equipment were attacked with good results and airfields were raided.

3. Eastern Front:

51 enemy planes were shot down at the various Army sectors.

Reconnaissance flights over the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean.

11 Ju 88's laid mines in the harbor of Archangel on 21 Sep. 2 large steamers were attacked off Cape Kirbey; results were not observed.

See Own Situation, Arctic Ocean for report on operations against convoy QP 14.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

131 enemy planes were counted at Gibraltar.

Otherwise no enemy reports of any importance.

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2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

During the night of 20 Sep. an enemy submarine off the Tunisian east coast fired on 2 Italian motor mine sweepers, one of which was sunk. No report was received about the other one. The same enemy submarine sank the French steamer LIBERIA, proceeding from Tunis to Sfax on 22 Sep.

A heavy enemy air raid on Benghazi took place between 1825 and 1840. As reported by the Benghazi Shipping and Transport Office, steamer APUANIA with a cargo of German ammunition exploded and other vessels were damaged. The Floria Stalia pier was destroyed. Losses of personnel are heavy. Darkness prevented exact determination of the amount of damage.

Upon request of the Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South addressed the following communication to the Italian High Command:

"Should the British attempt to renew their operations for the supply of Malta, our defense would find itself in the most unfavorable situation if the following events took place:

"a. Simultaneous departure of convoys from Alexandria and Gibraltar.

"b. A simultaneous offensive of the British 8th Army against the Panzer Army while our air bases in Africa, Crete, Sicily and Sardinia were paralyzed.

"c. A simultaneous offensive against parts of the Italian Navy which might constitute a threat to the British convoys. In this case neither the Commanding General South nor, in my opinion, the Italian Air Force Command is in a position to destroy both of the convoys or to prevent at least the bulk of them from reaching Malta. This would be all the more impossible if the weather situation rendered reconnaissance and air attacks difficult. It is my opinion that, irrespective of strongest support of the operations against both convoys by the Air Force, the Italian Navy must participate. As far as I can judge, the conditions for cooperation by the Italian Navy are more unfavorable in the case of the western convoy. The battle against this convoy should be fought only by the Air Force, supported by submarines, PT boats and subchasers. As to the eastern convoy, however, the participation of the Italian fleet from the flanking position Greece-Crete-Rhodes could be of decisive value. Air protection could be furnished by Me 110 and Ju 88 night fighters from Crete and North Africa to an extent which, while offering no absolute protection against all types of enemy planes, could provide a minimum of protection in view of the number and type of our planes compared with the enemy's bomber and fighter planes.

I request examination of this matter and a decision so as to be able to take all necessary measures well in advance."

This step meets with the fullest approval of the Naval Staff.

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3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Steamer PALOMBA was refloated and continued on the way to Tripoli.

The convoys of the PROSERPINA and the SESTRIERE were attacked by enemy planes on the evening of 22 Sep. Details are not known as yet.

Otherwise, supply transports and coastal shipping proceeded according to plan.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

In the evening a submarine was sighted from land 13 miles east of Candia. The escorted tanker CAUCASO was spotted by enemy air reconnaissance during the forenoon west of the Cerigotto Passage while proceeding from Benghazi to Piraeus. Otherwise nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

An intelligence report from Bulgaria asserts that the Russian Black Sea fleet would under no circumstances scuttle its ships but would put into Turkish ports; such events are however still very remote. It would continue to operate from Turkish ports exactly like the German and Italian ships operate against Russia from Bulgaria.

This could just be propaganda connected with the current disagreements between Bulgaria and Russia.

According to radio intelligence, 1 submarine tender and 14 submarines were at sea in unidentified positions, among them 3 or 4 in the western part of the Black Sea. Air reconnaissance located 3 northbound and 1 southbound escorted steamers off the Caucasian coast on 22 Sep. It seems that some convoys are calling at Sochi and Gagry at night whence they proceed in daytime only. Enemy Shipping off the Caucasian coast is also protected by flying boats.

Own Situation:

At noon of 21 Sep. a German convoy was unsuccessfully attacked with torpedoes twice by an enemy submarine off Yalta. It is believed that aerial mines were laid off Cape Takil (Kerch Strait) during the night of 21 Sep. No damage resulted from an enemy air raid on Anapa.

Convoy operation on 21 Sep. suffered from bad weather.

Group South repeats its reminder to the Naval Staff (with copies to Army Group A and the Naval Liaison Officer at the High Command, Army) that the time has come to deal the final blow to the Russian fleet, lest its activity cause severe damage to German operations and German supply shipping. For copy of telegram see 1/Skl

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23548/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

IX. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

German and Rumanian units went over to the offensive southeast of Novorossisk. An enemy attack northeast of Tuapse was repulsed. The 3rd Panzer Division is engaged in bitter fighting in the Isherskaya area against fresh enemy tank forces.

Army Group B:

The see-saw battle for the possession of Stalingrad continues. Our attack at the penetration point south of Voronezh resulted in a bitter battle which is still in progress. At the Don River bend at Olkhovatka the enemy succeeded in breaking through our main defense line. A counterattack for the relief of our forces encircled in a forest made no headway.

Central Army Group:

Our counterattack against enemy forces which penetrated into the Rzhev city park is slowly gaining ground. In the Demidov area the enemy was forced to withdraw to the north.

Northern Army Group:

Enemy attacks against the strip of land leading to the II Army Corps continued. At the sector south of Schluesselburg we captured the important hillsides north of Totolovo.

2. Finnish Front:

Enemy pressure made it necessary to abandon our fortified position at Rugozero near Maselskaya. Enemy attacks on the Kandalaksha sector were repulsed. Enemy forces which had penetrated into the northern flank of the XXXVI Mountain Corps were dispersed. An enemy detachment of 2 batallions at the northern end of the front suffered the same fate.

3. North Africa:

Normal artillery and reconnaissance activity. At the present time 193 German and 135 Italian tanks are ready for operation.

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Items of Political Importance

Russia:

On the basis of a report from a Moscow correspondent, the British magazine New Statesman and Nation calls attention to the resentment of the Russian people due to the failure to establish a second front. Pravda is reported to have published a sarcastic cartoon. It is significant that leading Russian newspapers did not even comment on Churchill's visit. Moscow circles still maintain that the British made a binding promise regarding the second front.

France:

The German Ambassador reports as follows:

Laval authorized the Minister of Production and the Minister of Labor to issue regulations concerning the compulsory labor law in order to release French labor for transfer to Germany. As a result of discussions with Laval, Gauleiter Sauckel fixed the 15th of October as the ultimate date for the arrival of 150,000 skilled workers in Germany. If this deadline is met, he, in turn, will be willing to arrange that 50,000 farmers now prisoners of war are released at that time and will see to it that, starting now, an exchange is initiated in a ratio of 3,000 to 1,000. Half of the 200,000 unskilled workers to be furnished by France are to be placed at the disposal of the Todt Organization for work in France.

Spain:

At the conclusion of the session of the Council of Ministers on 21 Sep. the following official announcement was made:

The Council of Ministers reasserts its adherence to the principals guiding our foreign policy for the last 6 years, which follow the line of an anti-communist crusade and conform to the laws of the new European order. The Council reaffirms Spain's close friendship with Portugal and her traditional solidarity with the Latin-American countries. Spain has improved her defenses. The political unity of all Spaniards is to be maintained and they will observe strictest discipline and respect of the law. The Government will fight any attempted agitation or revolt and will ruthlessly stamp out any assaults on the authority and prestige of the State.

Portugal:

The German Legation at Lisbon reports that, while pressure is being put on Portugal by the refusal of navicerts, the Brazilian Minister has proposed to the Portuguese government that Portugal lease the Portuguese Atlantic insular possessions on a lend-lease basis to Brazil for the duration of the war in return for free imports from Brazil to Portugal. The German Legation considers it unlikely that Salazar will accept this proposition. It can, however, be expected that the U.S.A. will bring increased pressure to bear on Portugal, either directly or through Brazil.

Brazil:

It is learned from diplomatic sources that U.S. activity is concentrated in the northern Brazilian states of Pernambuco, Parahyba, Rio Grande del Norte and Ceara. Brazilian military circles believe that an offen-

sive toward Africa will be launched from these areas, and that this is the reason for the massing of U.S. war material, and Brazilian and U.S. troops and ships, and for the construction of air bases. Up to the present time, there is no indication that Brazil has asked Portugal for permission to occupy the Azores.

Authoritative Brazilian military circles consider formal cooperation with the U.S.A. the best means to provide the Brazilian armed forces with the latest armament. Vargas and Aranha carry full responsibility for the declaration of war, while the Army, its armament modernized as the result of the war, is in a position to assume the leading role, irrespective of the outcome of the war. In the event of an Axis victory, the military will always be in a position to disclaim responsibility for entering the war and to take over the Government.

Finland:

Authoritative Washington circles declared that there is no basis for the assumption that Finland is trying to make a separate peace with Russia. The statement made by the Finnish Minister was misinterpreted.

Special Items

I. The Naval Staff Operations Division released new data concerning the enemy situation:

a. Regarding bases and harbors of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as of the beginning of September 1942. For copy no. 11 see 1/Skl 32326/42 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

b. Regarding the sinking of aircraft carrier YORKTOWN according to the report of the U.S. Navy Department of 16 Sep. For copy no. 4 see 1/Skl 32029/42 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XVII.

c. Regarding tasks, organization and evaluation of the U.S. Navy. The analysis permits the conclusion that the well-known split of the naval forces will continue until sufficient heavy ships are available for offensive action (1944). Up to this time offensive operations by or under the protection of the U.S. Navy will take place only in proportion to the anticipated strength of the defenses. No large-scale naval battle is to be expected in the Aleutians or any other part of the Pacific.

For copy no. 3 of this very interesting review see 1/Skl 32100/42 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XVII.

d. Regarding the operations of Russian submarines in the Baltic Sea outside the Gulf of Finland from the middle of June to the middle of September 1942 and regarding the appointment of a Russian Naval Attache for Stockholm.

For copy no. 3 of this report see 1/Skl 32009/42 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

II. In view of the experience had from the incident at the Casquets, the Fuehrer orders that the garrisons, the armament and defense installations of all similar outposts located on small rocky islands be reinforced.

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The Naval Staff therefore issues the following directive to Group North, the Commanding Admiral, Norway, Group South, and the Admiral, Aegean Sea:

The garrisons must be of adequate size to provide for uninterrupted guard duty, and defense installations and armament must be sufficient to repel enemy raids. All strong points in Norway and in the Aegean Sea are to be checked for compliance with above requirements. All necessary measures are to be taken. Reports to this effect to be submitted to the Naval Staff by 30 Sep. 1942.

Situation 23 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache at Tokyo forwards statements by a Hindu prisoner from the captured ALMAIDA, who asserts that German vessels were at Goa in July 1941 in Mormugao harbor, opposite San Salvador; they could be reached from land within 5 minutes by rowboats. The crews were able to land at the beach south of the anchorage by sailboats without being detected and could reach San Salvador.

The Naval Attache at Tokyo further reports that ship "10" passed Sunda Strait at 1700 of 22 Sep.

Following up the report received from ship "23" (see War Diary 21 Sep.) the auxiliary cruiser is instructed by Telegram 0510 (also for the information of the UCKERMARK) to replenish her fuel supply fully from the UCKERMARK. The fact that the short signal was transmitted leads the Naval Staff to believe that ship "23" met the TANNENFELS and probably also ship "28", and that the TANNENFELS started north on 21 Sep. Only if this assumption is incorrect, ship "23" is requested to report as convenient when the TANNENFELS was dismissed.

The TANNENFELS is instructed by Radiogram 2214 to arrange her return voyage so as not to cross longitude 30° W before dawn of 8 Oct.

The Naval Staff wired to the Naval Attache at Tokyo for his information as follows:

a. The Japanese Admiralty stated by way of the Naval Attache at Berlin that the Japanese Navy intends to use the Indian Ocean zone of operation assigned to German auxiliary cruisers, as long as no German ships are operating there. The Naval Staff requested the Japanese Naval Attache to ask the Japanese Navy to notify them as soon as Japan is no longer using this zone. Our intention to resume auxiliary cruiser operations in that area approximately at the end of November has been communicated to the Japanese Attache.

b. Our renewed request for an operations zone for a German auxiliary cruiser in the South Pacific, submitted by way of Nomura, was refused by the Japanese Navy. Japan prefers to have a German auxiliary

cruiser in the Indian Ocean. Additional remark by Naval Staff: Following the arrival of ship "10", discuss with the captain the problem of the Indian Ocean operations zone. On the basis of his experience try to persuade the Japanese Navy to agree to a definite operations zone. (See Telegram 0010.)

Enemy situation report by Radiogram 2123.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report received from Belgium, the inhabitants of Westende-Bains expect a British landing on 24 Sep.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Evaluation of reports from French fishing vessels reveals that a number of spherical mines was found in the nets on 12 and 20 Sep. in quadrant BF 6877 (50 miles west of the mouth of the Gironde). 2 mines exploded.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

The Ijmuiden steel plant was badly damaged during the reported air raid of 22 Sep. and production will probably be interrupted for several months.

Convoy activity suffered from continued bad weather and in some cases had to be cancelled.

Special Items:

On 23 Jun. 1942 the Naval Staff called the attention of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to the increased danger to shipping in the North Sea, suggesting that at least some of the North Sea transports be shifted to inland waterways and that it be investigated to what degree the Dutch inland waterways and the port of Delfzijl could be used to alleviate the congestion on the route to Rotterdam.

On 18 Sep. the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping replied as follows:

Economic reasons speak against the use of Delfzijl harbor (as this would involve a delay of 9 days, due to the necessity of transporting coal there). Experience shows that ships are particularly endangered between Ameland and Heligoland, so that the proposed shift would in no

way diminish the risk in this respect.

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping is taking all necessary steps to reduce traffic by sea to Rotterdam by improving unloading facilities and increasing railroad capacity at the German North Sea ports.

The Naval Staff Operations Division is investigating the naval side of the matter.

2. Norway:

Batteries on Rybachi Peninsula fired at a westbound convoy off Petsamo and Nurmansaetti without causing any damage. An eastbound convoy was attacked by 3 torpedoes which missed by an enemy submarine south of Kyberg; 3 subchasers went out in pursuit. Lively enemy air activity over the Arctic coast, presumably to gain information about the ships anchored in Alta Fjord. It is suspected that aerial mines were laid off Havningsberg. Convoy service proceeded according to plan.

The mine-laying vessels ROLAND and SKAGERRAK laid 2 deep angle-patterned barrages of anti-submarine mines type B in single rows for the protection of the convoy route off the southwestern coast. For report on the location of the minefield see Telegram 1120. 5 detonations took place during the laying of the second minefield.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring established the presence of 8 or 10 British ships in the Archangel area. A Russian submarine and another submarine of unidentified nationality were located at sea. The 10th Royal Air Force Group was observed in the Murmansk area.

According to air reconnaissance, 1 light cruiser and 3 destroyers were anchored in Reidar Fjord on 22 Sep. At 1028 on 22 Sep. it was observed that a submarine torpedoed and sank an 8,000 GRT steamer of convoy QP 14 and a destroyer was damaged at 1220.

On 23 Sep. convoy QP 14 was spotted by a submarine at 0309 in quadrant AE 2374 and at 0533 in quadrant AE 2297; it was reported on a southerly course and evidently heading for Denmark Strait.

Own Situation:

a. Operation against QP 14:

At 0330 the Admiral, Arctic Ocean took over command of the 3 submarines operating west of Iceland but the submarines were unable to close in on the convoy in time. They were therefore assigned to new attack positions in quadrant AE 17 and were returned to the command of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

8 submarines closed in on convoy QP 14. Submarines U "703" and U "251" report torpedo misses against steamers of the convoy. 6 submarines which reached 67° N 22° W, the extreme end of the zone of operation, turned back as ordered and submitted their reports. Convoy QP 14 was last reported at 1315 approximately 90 miles northwest of Iceland.

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b. Successes against PQ 18:

A check of all data in the Naval Staff's possession discloses that a maximum of 23 merchant vessels out of the 45 which assumedly made up convoy PQ 18 did not reach their destinations, whereas the communique of the Armed Forces High Command dated 20 Sep. announced the sinking of 38 merchant vessels, viz., the virtual annihilation of the convoy. In view of this gross discrepancy the Naval Staff requests the Operations Staffs of the Armed Forces High Command and of the Air Force through the Naval Liaison Officers for information in their possession.

See Telegram 1/Skl I b 23437/42 Gkdos. in file "Eispalast".

c. The beginning of operation "Zarin" was postponed by the Admirl, Arctic Ocean for 24 hours due to bad weather.

d. The mine-laying operation in the Iceland area by submarine U "117" will take place at 0000 of 26 Sep. at the earliest, in order to ensure that all submarines have left the area.

e. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines granted special permission that the submarine assigned to weather service (see War Diary 12 Sep.) may load gasoline containers and hydrogen cylinders, since it is hardly to be expected that she will be attacked with depth charges.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

The German auxiliary sailing ship HEIMAT sank in quadrant AO 7371 and the Danish schooner SARA in quadrant AO 7344, after striking mines. In the case of the HEIMAT 3 mines detonated simultaneously, indicating acoustic mines.

Tanker MITTELMEER, carrying aviation gasoline, joined a northbound troop transport at Libau.

Nothing to report from the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea.

Past experience showed that it is not feasible to seal the Gulf of Finland with minefields and the available vessels against breakthrough attempts by Russian submarines; the Naval Staff therefore assigned 20 of the first armed trawlers becoming available in Germany to Group North to be used as subchasers for this purpose.

In the event that we should not succeed in completely eliminating the Russian Baltic fleet this year, it will be necessary to provide sound detectors and additional armed trawlers as subchasers next spring to close off the Gulf of Finland.

For corresponding directive to Group North and the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division see Telegram 1717.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Lively reconnaissance activity on the part of the 15th Air

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Force Group, and the Home and Iceland squadrons. A message was intercepted concerning the torpedoing of steamer PENNMAR which is part of the convoy approaching in the North Atlantic.

Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

2 submarines have left for the zone of operations.

Regarding operations against convoy QP 14 and other activities in the Arctic Ocean see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

In the course of operations by Group "Blitz" in the Atlantic, submarine U "617" sank a 9,000 to 10,000 GRT tanker and a straggler of 5,500 GRT from the convoy in quadrant AK 3955. Contact with the convoy was later lost. At 2212 submarine U "258" contacted a convoy sailing on a 70° course in quadrant AK 3555, which is probably the one lost sight of in the forenoon. All submarines of Group "Blitz" which are able to establish contact with it by the evening of 24 Sep. are ordered to attack this convoy. Submarine U "258" scored 3 hits at midnight on several overlapping ships in quadrant AK 3564 and reports a burst of flames; the Commanding Admiral, Submarines credits the boat with sinking 5,000 GRT and 1 torpedo hit.

Submarine U "380" established contact with a convoy on a northeasterly course in quadrant BC 3421 during the forenoon and all other boats of Group "Vorwaerts" are ordered to converge on it. The submarines of Group "Blitz" which are unable to operate against the convoy intercepted by submarine U "258" are ordered to participate in this action, too. No results were reported against this convoy, which turned abruptly to the north.

Submarine U "455" carried out the assigned minelaying operation off the U.S. eastern coast.

Submarine U "512" sank a 7,500 GRT steamer on 18 Sep. in the West Indies in quadrant EE 4423, which is unfortunately probably the Spanish steamer MONTE GORBEA. For details of this incident see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Submarine U "125" of the South Atlantic Group "Iltis" sank steamer BRUGERE (5,335 GRT) in quadrant ET.

For additional reports see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

According to a communication from the German Armistice Commission, the GLOIRE disembarked 3 sick Italians at Dakar and is proceeding to Casablanca with 370 Italians and 668 Britishers, among them 50 women and children. Gunboat ANNAMITE is under way to Dakar with 41 Italians and 14 Britishers. Gunboat DUMONT D'URVILLE has no more survivors aboard and is returning to Porte Boue after a futile search.

The GLOIRE established that the LACONIA had 1,800 Britishers and 1,000 Italians on board at the time of her sinking; 414 Italians and 682 British were saved. British planes repeatedly circled over the GLOIRE without incident.

The Naval Staff requested that the Foreign Office permit operations in a 20 mile strip along the Brazilian coast. To this the Foreign Office

objects. The Naval Staff intends, however, to insist that at least operations be permitted up to the latitude of Natal; the Commanding Admiral, Submarines is requested to report on the following:

a. The possibilities for operations in a 20 miles strip.

b. The adverse effect on our submarine operations which refusal to release this strip would have.

According to information from the Naval Staff, Submarine Division, all VII C type submarines are being equipped for the time being with 2 model 151 machine guns in box-trail carriages and 1 single-barreled 2 cm machine gun for antiaircraft protection. Later it is planned to equip new submarines and thereafter if possible, also submarines already in operation with cylinder carriages. However, this will not be possible before a year from now. Ultimately, VII C type submarines will receive antiaircraft armament consisting of:

2 model 151 machine guns on cylinder carriages
1 double-barreled 2 cm machine gun.

Similar armament is planned for submarines of types IX, XB, and XIV but this depends upon whether an autogyro observation kite will be put on board them or not.

The sooner submarines are in a position to defend themselves effectively against aerial attacks the better. The Naval Staff welcomes this development in view of its expected tactical advantages.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

2. Incursions:

During the night of 23 Sep. 136 enemy planes flew over our territory, 85 of them penetrating into Germany. 10 planes were shot down. Attacks were made in an area extending from Heligoland and Bremen to Schleswig-Holstein. Bombs were dropped on Wilhelmshaven, Flensburg, Hamburg, and Wismar. For details see Daily situation report

La Pallice was strafed and attacked with demolition bombs.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

See Own Situation, Mediterranean for report on the effect of enemy air raids on Benghazi.

Missions flown by our air forces had no results of any importance. Alexandria and Suez were reconnoitered by photo reconnaissance. For results see Enemy Situation, Mediterranean.

4. Eastern Front:

A 5,000 GRT steamer was damaged during an air attack on Adler. ~~Reconnaissance activity in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea.~~

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Regarding operation against QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean. Some ships of this convoy are apparently carrying lumber.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, an agent reported from London on 15 Sep. that a large convoy with war material was being assembled off the Isle of Man. Its escort consists of planes and warships, including an aircraft carrier. The convoy is reportedly expected to arrive in the Mediterranean (Egypt) around 19 Oct.

According to intercepted radio messages, the convoyed steamer SESTRIERE was spotted by air reconnaissance southeast of Cape Santa Maria di Leuca at 0135 and was attacked between 0200 and 0300. An escort destroyer reports an attack on the escorted tanker PROSERPINA at 1840 of 22 Sep. 45 miles northwest of Cape Ducato by 10 torpedo planes. Radio monitoring also intercepted a message from the escorted tanker RONDINE, en route to Tobruk, at 1423 10 miles west of Crete.

According to photo reconnaissance, the following ships were at the various harbors of Suez: 45 steamers (214,500 GRT), 3 tankers (10,500 GRT), 1 transport (36,000 GRT). In addition light naval forces.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Porto Empedocle was attacked by enemy planes in the evening of 23 Sep. During the night of 22 Sep. the heavy air attacks on Benghazi were renewed. For the report of the Shipping and Transport Office at Benghazi on the heavy damage caused by the raids of 22 Sep. see Telegram 1315.

The German Armistice Commission reports that the French believe the steamer LIBERIA was sunk by enemy submarines on her run to Sfax because the ship was being handed over to the Germans. The LIBERIA belonged to the first group of ships to be handed over. (See Telegram 1200.)

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

No details are known about the identity of the convoys attacked. Supply operations and coastal shipping proceeded on the whole according to plan. For details see Telegram 1210.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch has compiled the following data:

Total tonnage unloaded at Tripoli during August 1942:	3,012 tons
German goods amounted to:	--
Total tonnage loaded at Tripoli:	6,573 tons
German goods amounted to:	2,473 tons
Total tonnage unloaded at Benghazi during August 1942:	26,602 tons
German goods amounted to:	8,777 tons
Total tonnage loaded at Benghazi:	13,097 tons
German goods amounted to:	8,479 tons

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Total tonnage unloaded at Tobruk during	July 1942:	August 1942:
	18,258 tons	29,983 tons
German goods amounted to:	18,258 tons	17,251 tons
Total loaded:	3,832 tons	6,763 tons
German goods amounted to:	3,832 tons	4,069 tons

The amount of unloadings and loadings and its increase during August must be attributed primarily to the fact that German unloading equipment was available.

The compilation proves that only about 50% of the supply requirements of the Panzer Army were met.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing of importance was learned from air reconnaissance in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report, except enemy air raids on Feodosiya on 22 Sep.

VIII. Situation East Asia

U.S. Navy Secretary Knox warned in his press conference that the situation in the Pacific should not be judged too optimistically and announced that the Japanese have definitely crossed the Owen Stanley Range on New Guinea so that Fort Moresby is gravely threatened.

A U.S. Navy Department communique announces that U.S. Army bombers attacked the Island of Gizo and the shore installations in Rekata Bay on 19 Sep. Dive bombers inflicted damage to a Japanese cruiser northwest of Guadalcanal. U.S. positions on Guadalcanal are reported unimpaired.

On the other hand it is reported by Domei News Agency that the U.S. forces which had landed on the Solomon Islands were virtually annihilated.

Japanese reconnaissance activity over the Indian area (Bengal and the provinces of Bihar and Orissa) was resumed as the monsoon period is nearing its end. The Royal Air Force and the Indian Air Force are expecting reinforcements.

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IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

Due to interruption of communication lines no reports have been received.

Army Group B:

The situation remained essentially unchanged. For details see daily situation report.

Central Army Group:

It can be assumed that the enemy will be reinforced by reserves in the Sukhinichi area. 300 to 400 parachutists were dropped in the 9th Army area but their whereabouts has not yet been discovered. The enemy advance in the penetration point at Rzhev was halted. Our operations north of Demidov proceeded according to plan. Several localities were captured.

Northern Army Group:

Our advance south of Schluesselburg made only small progress in the face of strong enemy resistance. A new attack on Gaitolovo is in progress.

2. Finnish Front:

Long-range patrol activity on both sides at the southeastern front sector. Major German forces began an offensive at the northeastern sector.

3. North Africa:

Reports have not yet been received.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

In a message addressed to a convention of the shipbuilding industry Churchill declared that the shipping situation continues grave in spite of a recent improvement.

According to Reuter, the British Radio broadcast a message to France on 23 Sep. recommending that the population evacuate the coastal areas because the Allied offensive is in the offing. No announcement of time and place of the attack will be made beforehand. When the time is ripe, the French population will be called upon to cooperate. The offensive will comprise landings on French soil as well as naval operations in French territorial waters.

The German News Agency (DNB) reports that American disapproval of the British policy toward India is clearly reflected by several articles of U.S. correspondents of London newspapers.

Sweden:

The German Legation reports that recent increased German criticism of Sweden's attitude has not failed to make an impression in Stockholm circles.

Russia:

The Russian Official News Agency Tass was authorized to state that the reports about alleged Russian air attacks on Bulgarian towns were invented for the purpose of provocation.

U.S.A.:

Reports from a neutral diplomatic source describe the state of mind prevailing in the U.S.A. as follows:

The attack on Pearl Harbor made a tremendous impression on the entire population and radically changed their attitude toward the war, which they expect to win in 1944. Germany is considered the principal adversary and only following her defeat will the account with Japan be settled. It is generally agreed that it is necessary to establish a second front; at the same time, however, the opinion is voiced that the U.S.A. should occupy the European trouble spots and take an active part in reorganizing Europe. During discussions about this subject American arrogance is making itself felt most disagreeably, also toward Great Britain. There is an imperialistic will to take over Europe's heritage. America's war machinery is getting into full stride and can no longer be stopped. Life in the U.S.A. is normal on the whole, whereas shortages are becoming evident in Canada. Anti-semitism is increasing, because the Jews are occuping the positions vacated by drafted soldiers. The achievements of the German Armed Forces are admired.

China:

According to a press dispatch from Shanghai, the Chinese Government is trying to eliminate the dominating Russian influence in the important northwestern province of Sinkiang in order to shift the main Chinese forces more to the northwest. This province, which once was purely Chinese, has come more and more under Russian influence since World War

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I and has repeatedly been a stronghold of the Communist Army. Chinese Communists even now oppose all efforts in this direction on the part of the Chungking Government.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

The Chief, Naval Staff who is on leave in Berlin between 14 Sep. and 4 Oct., informed himself in detail about the situation.

The Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff reported on the armament of the new fleet torpedo boat model 41. In accordance with the viewpoint taken by the Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff the final decision about the gun calibers was deferred until construction has progressed sufficiently, in order to utilize additional experience which may be gained meanwhile. To prevent any loss of time, 10.5 cm as well as 12.7 cm guns are being prepared for the above-named class of ships.

Special Item:

Evaluation of information obtained by the radio decoding and intercept services during the period from 14 Sep. to 20 Sep. 1942 is contained in Radio Intelligence Report No. 38/42 of the Chief, Naval Communications Division, Communications Intelligence Branch.

Situation 24 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache at Tokyo reports that the REGENSBURG arrived at Balik Papan on 23 Sep., will leave on 24 Sep., and is scheduled to arrive at Batavia in the forenoon of 27 Sep.

The Naval Staff informs ship "10" by Radiogram 0721 about the receipt of the Tokyo Naval Attache's message reporting passing of Sunda Strait by ship "10" on 22 Sep.

Ships "23" and "28" are instructed by the Naval Staff about the names of enemy ships suitable for cover names. See Radiograms 1854 and 2159.

The Naval Staff notifies the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN by Radiogram 2035 of the following cable received from the Naval Attache at Tokyo:

(1) I welcome the ship upon her arrival in the area under my authority.

(2) Japanese coast guard and air reconnaissance services are inferior to those of Germany. You must be prepared for enemy submarines and be on the lookout.

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(3) Proceed from Singapore to Yokohama. Wire your expected arrival there prior to sailing from Singapore.

(4) While proceeding to Japan carry out tests with undiluted Tarakan oil.

Remark to item 4 by the Naval Staff:

The tests are to be made first with the auxiliary engines, then with the main engines. Prior to the auxiliary engine tests with pure Tarakan oil, use a mixture of gas and Tarakan oil and increase the Tarakan oil component gradually. Watch sedimentation. Avoid damage to engines.

See Radiogram 2216 for notification of the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN with regard to war decorations awarded by the Commander in Chief, Navy for courageous discharge of supply tasks on the high seas over a period of many months and under difficult conditions and thereby making it possible to wage auxiliary cruiser warfare.

The TANNENFELS is instructed by Telegram 0218 that the order of 23 Sep. as per Radiogram 2214 will go into effect after the ship has passed point "Trosse".

The Naval Attache at Tokyo is instructed by Telegram 2330 to give the Japanese Admiralty confidential information that a German submarine force will appear in the vicinity of Capetown about 1 Oct. The boats will operate in the eastern South Atlantic on their return voyage. The Attache is to request the Japanese Navy to instruct its forces of this fact only if they operate in that area. The Japanese Naval Attache at Berlin receives the same information from the Naval Staff.

All ships in foreign waters are informed by the Naval Staff about the Turkish situation. See Radiogram 1134.

Enemy situation report by Radiograms 0535 and 1307.

See 1/Skl I K 1890/42 Gkdos. Chefs. (copy no. 1) in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I about a survey of the zones of operations and the achievements of the auxiliary cruisers during the spring of 1942.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

2 ground mines were swept off the mouth of the Gironde. Mine-exploding vessel I was damaged and is temporarily out of commission. The Loire River mouth was closed to shipping on account of suspected mines. An enemy plane was shot down off Isle de Groix.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report except an enemy plane shot down off Boulogne.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Lively enemy air activity developed over the coastal area of the German Bight during the night of 23 Sep.; the attacks were not concentrated on any one area, but were evidently for mine-laying and general harassing purposes. Slight damage was inflicted on the Navy Yard at Wilhelmshaven. For details see Telegram 0722, 0750, and 1010. Convoy "1924" was unsuccessfully bombed from great altitude around midnight off Schiermonnikoog. Steamer SANTOS suffered slight damage. The light artillery carrier FORTUNA struck a mine and was damaged off Langeoog, and was towed to Wilhelmshaven. There were casualties. With this exception, convoy and patrol services proceeded according to plan.

Ships located between Hook of Holland and Scheveningen were fired upon between 0733 and 0744 and forced to withdraw.

2. Norway:

Enemy planes dropped aerial torpedoes in the vicinity of the Alta battery. Enemy air activity is reported from 22 and 23 Sep. over the Arctic coast. Losses of personnel occurred at Kirkenes, but no other damage was reported. In the forenoon of 24 Sep. enemy planes operated over the west coast. The Air Force suspects that mines were laid off Bergen.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported a number of merchant vessels under escort of 3 destroyers and 1 patrol boat on a 200° course off Cape Eystrahorn (Iceland) at 1230. The 5th Air Force assumes they are part of convoy QP 14 which is now disbanding. No enemy forces were sighted along the route from the North Cape via Bear Island and the Ice Fjord to 77° N, 05° E.

The British Admiralty announces the arrival on 23 Sep. of a large British and American convoy at a northern Russian port. Losses were suffered due to strong enemy attacks. However, most ships had reached their destinations. No escort vessel was lost.

This communique doubtless refers to convoy PQ 18.

Own Situation:

a. Our submarines were unable to reestablish contact with convoy QP 14. A search of the coastal area of northern Iceland was futile in spite of good visibility. The operation was terminated. It was carried out at first by 10 and in the end by 7 submarines.

Results: Submarines U "435", U "703" and U "488" sank 3 destroyers, submarine U "435" an auxiliary cruiser and U "435" and U "255" 2 steamers (totalling 27,600 GRT). In addition, 4 steamers were torpedoed

by submarine U "435".

In view of the prevailing conditions this result is quite satisfactory. Submarine U "435" (Lt. Strelow) must be credited with most of the success. The captain's name was unfortunately not mentioned in the communique of the Armed Forces High Command, as suggested by the Naval Staff.

b. The Air Force Operations Staff replied to the request of the Naval Staff (see War Diary 23 Sep.) concerning the reported success in the battle against convoy PQ 18 as follows:

The announcement that 38 vessels of convoy PQ 18 were sunk did not originate at the Air Force Operations Staff, which reported only 23 ships sunk (through Robinson). The Kurfuerst intermediate command (deputy to the Chief, Section Ic) added 2 probable sinkings to this number. The Armed Forces High Command added the 8 vessels reported seriously damaged by the Air Force to the number of vessels sunk. The Air Force Operations Staff cannot be blamed for this. The matter is being investigated as carefully as indicated in the Navy's communication. This information tallies perfectly with the data in the possession of the Naval Staff. The Air Force Operations Staff is taking into account, however, that 5 merchant vessels were reported during these days in Byelushya Bay (Novaya Zemlya), which apparently joined the convoy north of Kanin Nos. The reports about the strength of the convoy are based on visual observation and photos were not taken during these days. This would account for errors concerning the type but not the number of vessels, considering overcasts ranging from 80 to 100% and ceilings of 100 m.

Granting that the assumption of the Air Force Operations Staff is correct and ships did join the convoy from Byelushya Bay, this nevertheless cannot alter the fact that approximately 20 vessels of convoy PQ 18 reached Archangel; it could possibly serve to justify to a certain extent the sinking figures reported by the Air Force. There is no justification for adding the 2 probable sinkings.

We must now await the forthcoming explanation of the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command. It is unlikely that the ships reported damaged were included in the list of sinkings without good cause, which may not be readily apparent.

c. Group North submits the following communication received from the 5th Air Force:

The extremely tight fuel situation in which the 5th Air Force finds itself requires that, in addition to the stringent restrictions of air transport services, reconnaissance and combat missions, too, must be considerably limited. Thus any activity will have to be limited for the time being to supporting the Army during decisive offensive or critical defensive operations. As far as naval operations are concerned, reconnaissance must be limited to spot checks of general areas or to locally concentrated coverage of areas directly threatened or of target areas.

This most unpleasant new difficulty arising for the conduct of naval warfare is highly regrettable. In addition

to the fact that, as reported by Group North on a previous occasion, reconnaissance flights over the southern and central North Sea were discontinued a long time ago, the most elementary requirements of naval warfare for routine reconnaissance will also no longer be met from now on either in the northern North Sea or in the Arctic Ocean. In view of the constant grave threat of enemy attacks on the northern Norwegian area, which is constantly emphasized by the Fuehrer himself, the Air Force is assuming a terrific responsibility in taking this step.

d. Concerning the commitment of the naval forces (see War Diary 16 Sep.), Group North reported on 17 Sep. that the TIRPITZ will remain at Narvik as ordered. At the same time the Commanding Admiral, Group North requested "information about the reasons for this order and directions or an order referring to the rest of my forces, so as to be able to make my dispositions conform to the plans of the Naval Staff which did not reach me and in order to avoid having to cancel orders previously issued by me. I intended to transfer the TIRPITZ now for the following reasons:

(1) We are not interested in tying up British forces in the north area while combatting QP convoys and during subsequent operations.

(2) The problem of escorting the TIRPITZ could have been solved easily now with 2 torpedo boats available for the purpose.

(3) My long-range plans call for the transfer of TIRPITZ and SCHARNHORST to Trondheim, of HIPPER, PRINZ EUGEN, SCHEER, and possibly LUETZOW to Narvik, of NUERNBERG and KOELN to Alta Fjord; the destroyers to be divided in the proportion 1:1:3. The purpose is:

(a) To disperse my forces and avoid concentration.

(b) To take into account existing shipyard facilities.

(c) To provide jump-off places for limited operations and for defensive tasks in the event of an enemy invasion."

Group North should have realized that the consent of the Naval Staff or if necessary of the Fuehrer through the Naval Staff should be obtained first in a matter of such fundamental importance as the strategic distribution of the German Navy.

The Naval Staff replied to Group North on 24 Sep. The reply comprises a detailed analysis of the operational possibilities for the forces in the north area and concludes with the request to submit his plans once more revised in accordance with this analysis. For copy of Telegram 1/Skl I op 1862/42 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Enemy air activity during the night of 23 Sep. ranged over the Danish area, Schleswig-Holstein, and the western and central Baltic Sea as far as Darsser Ort. Bombs were dropped among other places at Flensburg and Wismar and caused substantial damage. Mines were dropped

off Langeland and the Baltic Sea entrances were closed on account of suspected aerial mines. For details see Telegrams 0720, 0740, 1210, and 1714. 1 plane crashed near Flensburg, another one was shot down by a patrol boat off Omoe.

9 acoustic mines were swept in the Baltic Sea entrances by mine-exploding vessels equipped with special acoustic mine-sweeping gear.

3 vessels of the 9th Patrol Boat Flotilla took up positions in a patrol line off the Swedish coast in order to discourage breakthrough attempts.

Special Items:

The Baltic Naval Station's request (see War Diary 20 Sep.) caused an investigation into the equipment of commands with protective gear against acoustic mines; this check revealed that, according to information from the Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch, the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate had warned all commands on 20 Sep. of the urgency of protection from acoustic mines and had informed them of the available equipment. The Baltic Naval Station evidently did not take the necessary precautions within its area in time as was done by other commands. On 21 Sep. there were only 4 anti-acoustic mine gears in the area of the Baltic Naval Station and 4 in that of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea, whereas the Commanding Admirals, Defenses, North and West had 6 and 12 respectively. The request of the Baltic Naval Station was supported by the Naval Staff.

Eastern Baltic Sea:

Group North submits a belated report on the situation of 12 Sep. according to which the Finnish steamers HERA (1,379 GRT) and JUSSI H. (2,325 GRT) were sunk by a submarine during the night of 11 Sep. in the Finngrund area northeast of Gaevle.

During the night of 22 Sep. an abandoned vessel, possibly the Dutch steamer ANNA (290 GRT), showing traces of shelling and fire, was sighted drifting north of Kasko in the Gulf of Bothnia.

Nothing to report from the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea:

Special Items:

a. The Naval Liaison Staff, Finland reports, following its conferences with the Chief of the Finnish General Staff about transfer of the ships from Lake Ladoga, that Marshal Mannerheim's past attitude opposing the withdrawal of the coastal mine-layers and Italian subchasers was motivated mainly by his hope for an imminent change of the strategic situation on land. Since this hope did not materialize, General Heinrichs believes that the Marshal will no longer oppose the transfer.

This report was forwarded to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff.

b. With reference to the sinking of motor mine sweeper "11" off Reval, the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea commented extensively on her war diary entries of 11 Jun. 1942. Group North submits the war diary together with the comment of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea and remarks that the latter's notes reveal a chain of misunderstandings which eventually ended with the fateful mine explosion. A clarification

of the question of responsibility can be expected solely from the investigation of the circumstances of the sinking or the subsequent court martial proceedings.

In its reply to Group North (with copy to the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea) the Naval Staff refers to its previous directive (see War Diary 12 Aug.) and states that the Group's comment does not deal with the question of whether motor mine sweeper "11" was advised of the Russian mine situation according to the information the Group had received. The Naval Staff requests Group North to see that this point is clarified during the investigation and the subsequent court martial proceedings.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance was particularly lively over the Bay of Biscay. Apart from a number of submarine warning signals, a message reporting an attack by a submarine was intercepted from east of the mouth of the Orinoco River.

2. Own Situation:

Regarding the termination of operations against convoy QP 14 see Own Situation, Arctic Ocean.

Submarine U "610" sighted 4 steamers on an easterly course in quadrant AE 1718 and was ordered to shadow them.

In the North Atlantic both Group "Blitz" and Group "Vorwaerts" are operating against the 2 incoming convoys observed in quadrant AK.

In the evening a third convoy of 12 steamers and 8 escort vessels, this one outbound, was reported in quadrant AK by submarine U "599". The boat made a futile attack but was subsequently driven off. The submarines of Group "Blitz", depending on their positions, thus have the possibility of operating against this convoy, too.

3 submarines also attacked 3 single ships in quadrant AK and sank an 8,000 GRT steamer and the steamer ROUMANIE (3,563 GRT). The sinking of the third ship is doubtful.

No reports of successes from the U.S. east coast were received.

In the West Indies, the British steamer REEDPOOL (4,898 GRT), the Norwegian steamer LINDVANGEN (2,412 GRT) and a U.S. steamer of 4,500 GRT were sunk by submarine U "515", and an 8,000 GRT steamer by submarine U "512".

The submarines of the South Atlantic Group "Iltis" had nothing to report.

Submarine U "501" sank a transport sailing vessel in the Mediterranean.

For further news see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

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The German Armistice Commission confirms the reported sinking of the Spanish steamer MONTE GORBEA, under way from Buenos Aires to Bilbao via Curacao, which took place on 19 Sep. at 14° 55' N, 60° 00' W. The Spanish survivors have reached Martinique.

The report of submarine U "612" has not arrived as yet.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Daylight reconnaissance and fighter bomber attacks on Seaford and Hastings, where hits were scored. York and the alternate target of Beverley were attacked during the night of 23 Sep. During the night of 24 Sep. Truro near Falmouth was raided.

2. Incursions:

45 enemy planes laid mines in the Baltic Sea as far as Danzig and in the German Bight during the night of 24 Sep.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Nothing to report.

4. Eastern Front:

Only reconnaissance reports were received from the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

The ship situation at Gibraltar has not changed on the whole. No further increase of the number of planes was observed. Radio monitoring at 0530 located only 1 ship east of the Strait. A floating crane was towed from Gibraltar in the direction of the Atlantic under escort of 2 vessels in the evening of 28 Sep.

Several submarines were located in the central and eastern Mediterranean.

Reconnaissance planes spotted what seemed to be a motor gunboat on a westerly course at 1710 70 miles northeast of Marsa Matruh and a convoy of 4 steamers with an escort of 2 destroyers and 2 planes on a southerly course approximately 85 miles north of Port Said.

An agent reports that 1 cruiser, 10 destroyers, 6 transports, 5 loaded tankers, and 5 submarines left Haifa in a westerly direction on 22 Sep.

Radio monitoring intercepted a number of air reconnaissance messages reporting the sighting of German convoys in the central Mediterranean.

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2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

The Italian torpedo boat TIFONE struck a mine off Bari and was towed to port.

Tobruk and Trapani were raided by enemy planes during the night of 22 Sep.

The German General attached to Headquarters of the Italian High Command reports to the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command that as previously reported, the Italian Command attributes particular importance to sealing the passage between Cape Bon and Ras Mustapha. In order to be able to close this gap rapidly in an emergency by means of a barrage in 2 parts, it is necessary to reduce the width of the passage from 3 miles to 1200 meters. The Italian High Command requests the Armed Forces High Command to define its opinion on this important matter at its earliest convenience.

The German Naval Command, Italy forwards this report to the Naval Staff and remarks that the plans for the alarm minefield are being prepared by the Italian Admiralty. The exact location will be reported as soon as a decision is made. The German Naval Command Italy suggests complete sealing of the territorial waters and this has been requested from the Italian Admiralty. (See Telegram 1800.)

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Convoy COL DI LANA was attacked during the evening by an enemy plane north of Cape Stilo. Details are not yet reported, neither were reports received about the outcome of enemy air attacks on the escorted tanker RONDINE.

Otherwise, supply service and coastal traffic proceeded according to plan.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring and air reconnaissance, movements of warships and merchant vessels were of normal volume only. No special information was received.

Own Situation:

Taman Peninsula, Kerch, Balaklava and Sevastopol were attacked from the air and suffered minor damage and casualties. The towed barges attacked off Cape Takil on 22 Sep. were attacked again on 23 Sep. and suffered casualties.

Mine-sweeping, convoy and transport services proceeded according to plan. 9,011 tons of goods were unloaded at Yeisk between 4 and 20 Sep. 4 Siebel ferries and 2 lighters with 1,000 tons of ammunition and provisions for Yeisk were held up at Mariupol for lack of fuel.

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VIII. Situation East Asia

Japanese Headquarters announce that a U.S. NORTHAMPTON-class cruiser was damaged by Japanese submarines.

According to an Exchange Telegraph dispatch, a Japanese division is moving in the direction of Chengkiang from Burma.

IX. Army Situation:

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The right wing of the Army Group is mainly engaged in defensive fighting. Kotlyarevski at the Terek sector was captured. Strong enemy forces are holding out between the Terek and Baksan Rivers.

Army Group B:

In the fighting in Stalingrad a few more blocks of the northern section of the city were captured. South of Kotluban the enemy succeeded in advancing to our supply route 5 km north of Rassoshka. At the northern sector of the Army Group we are on the defensive.

Central Army Group:

An enemy strongpoint at Novosil was captured. Northeast and southeast of Rzhev the enemy penetrated temporarily into our lines. In the Demidov area our forces captured a number of villages and our offensive gained some ground in a northeasterly direction.

Northern Army Group:

Enemy attacks were repulsed at Kholm, Lubnitsa, at the land bridge to the II Army Corps, and north of Novgorod. A bitter seesaw battle is in progress southeast of Schluesselburg. Our forces began a new offensive in the direction of Gaitolovo.

2. Finnish Front:

Enemy attempts to cross the Svir River were frustrated. 2 enemy attacks at the White Sea Canal north of Povyenets were repulsed.

At the Kandalaksha sector the enemy was beaten and withdrew in a southeasterly direction.

3. North Africa:

Normal scouting and artillery activity on both sides.

General of the Panzer Forces Stumme has taken over temporary command of the German-Italian Panzer Army from Field Marshal Rommel who is on leave for reasons of health.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

In connection with the numerous accounts describing the resentment of the Russian people over the failure to establish the second front, the Daily Telegraph points to the tremendous demands made on Great Britain's and America's resources from every part of the world, which cannot be fulfilled because of the lack of transport facilities. The need for merchant tonnage has become increasingly urgent during the summer.

The Food Minister declared in an address that drastic reductions in food rations are unavoidable during the next 12 months. The present living standard can no longer be maintained.

Central Africa:

The Times reports that Brazzaville and Leopoldville have recently been garrisoned by U.S. forces. Leopoldville has gained particular importance as a depot for tin and rubber and has taken the place of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies in this respect. Brazzaville is the political center of De Gaullist Africa. Both towns are equally distant from Dakar, Tunis and Alexandria, a fact emphasized by the Times in connection with the efforts to construct trans-African highways.

France:

In commemoration of the anniversary of Dakar's successful resistance in September 1940, the Governor General of West Africa stated that there is general unanimity that French West Africa must be defended against the greedy attacks to which the country is exposed. He termed West Africa the vanguard of the North African bloc. Marshal Petain can count on West Africa under all circumstances.

Finland:

On 24 Sep. the Government officially denied all rumors spread since 20 Sep. about the alleged desire for a separate peace with Russia and termed them false and without foundation. See Political Review No. 225, paragraph 5 for the complete text of the denial.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

No reports of importance were made nor any decisions taken.

As reported from headquarters, the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Halder, resigned and was replaced by General Zeitzler.

Special Items

I. A report is made on further interrogation of the radio operator of the captured motor gunboat "335" at the Wilhelmshaven Intelligence

Center and information about the operation of the direction finding gear. The Chief, Communications Division, Naval Staff reports on the evaluation of this information in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

II. A special announcement issued for publication by Japanese Headquarters reveals that Japanese naval forces have begun operations in the Atlantic in close cooperation with the Axis Powers. A Japanese submarine is said to have called at a German naval base. The announcement emphasizes that Japanese operations in the Atlantic are a counterpart of German naval operations in the Indian Ocean and have great significance.

A corresponding announcement was issued simultaneously by the Armed Forces High Command.

The publication took place by special Japanese request. The Japanese evidently feel the need of stressing their collaboration in the European and American theaters of war in order to match German activity in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The text of the announcement was prepared in consultation between the Executive Office of the Commander in Chief, Navy and the Japanese Naval Attache.

III. The Transocean News Agency reports from Ankara about the disposition of forces in the Near East: Numerous indications point to the fact that British forces in the Near East are being concentrated more and more on the Egyptian front; the positions relinquished by the British in Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Iran are occupied by auxiliary contingents and newly arriving U.S. forces. Command posts of the U.S. Air Force are said to have already been established at Beirut, Lydda and at the large Habbania airfield west of Bagdad. A large number of Polish units, released from Russian captivity and reorganized by British officers, are garrisoned in Palestine. Apart from Australian forces, Greek troops and De Gaullist units are said to be in Syria. The number of U.S. troops in Iraq is estimated to exceed that of the remaining British forces. U.S. contingents seem to be in the majority in Iran, too, although reports that U.S. forces have taken over the northern Iranian zone occupied thus far by Russia could not be confirmed. The U.S. have a liaison staff in Tabriz because U.S. planes are delivered there to Russia. The best units of the Soviet occupation forces in Iran have been transferred to the Caucasian front and have been replaced, according to Turkish reports, by units composed of women. This seems to have been the decisive factor in the revival of revolts in northern Iran.

Situation 25 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Both the French and the British official communiques report the capture of Madagascar's capital city Tananarive by British forces on 23 Sep.

According to Reuter, U.S. Secretary of War Stimson announced on 24 Sep. that the new Alaska highway will be opened for traffic on ~~1 Dec. 1942~~.

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Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The TANNENFELS is directed by Radiogram 2347 to pass 300 to 350 miles east of St. Paul's Rock and to proceed to point "Takelage".

Enemy situation report by Radiogram 1436.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, the battleships HOWE and ANSON are to be commissioned in the Firth of Forth on 26 Sep.

The idle tonnage available at southern and western ports is decreasing, while the number of ferry ships to be used in landing operations following the capture of a harbor is on the increase. 8 or 9 of these craft allegedly left port for the Dieppe raid, but were not used.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The Loire River estuary was reopened to traffic. 6 ground mines were swept off the Gironde.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

Special Items:

The Naval Representative on the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command reports that the Fuehrer has received an account on the distribution of food, tobacco, etc. captured at Dieppe, which is bound to reflect badly on the Navy.

The Naval Staff orders Group West to report on the matter immediately. The immediate reply submitted by the Commanding Admiral, Group West is contained in Telegram 1/Skl 32307/42 geh. For copy see War Diary, file "Enemy Landing at Dieppe, 19 Sep. 1942".

The report was transmitted literally to the Naval Representative on the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, who stated in reply to questioning that the Fuehrer had received the first report from the Minister of Armament and War Production. Thus court martial proceedings, which the Commanding Admiral, Group West suggested because of the scandalous distortion of the truth in informing the Fuehrer can not be undertaken.

The Commander in Chief, Navy will avail himself of the next opportunity to discuss this matter with the Fuehrer.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Between 2220 and 0020 during the night of 24 Sep. enemy mine-laying planes were busy over the German Bight. Mines are suspected at the East Frisian Islands, off the Elbe River mouth and west of Sylt.

Mine sweeping was handicapped by bad weather.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Intelligence reports assert that American, Canadian, Norwegian, and British troops have been concentrated on the Orkney Islands for a raid on northern Norway scheduled for October. Originally, the action was planned for September. 10 divisions are said to be standing by.

An agent reported on 24 Sep. that 5 major warships were sighted that day off Honningsvaag.

Own Situation:

Enemy air activity was reported on 23 and 24 Sep. over the Arctic coast, on 24 and 25 Sep. over the west coast (Stavanger), and on 25 Sep. over Oslo. Damage was confined to Oslo.

Convoy service proceeded according to plan.

An investigation by the Commanding Admiral, Norway, made by order of the Naval Staff in compliance with a suggestion of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, resulted in the reveal of the limitation imposed on shipping between Kirkenes and Petsamo. However, larger ships should be sent only in the most urgent cases and under favorable weather conditions only, in view of the threat from gunfire and on account of the difficulties of navigation in the approach to Petsamo Fjord.

Information to this effect by Telegram 1210.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to intelligence from Sweden dated 24 Sep. and based on observations of a reliable agent, a large northbound convoy from Canada to Russia was at 59° 58' N, 44° 15' W on 22 Sep. 1942.

This looks like the beginning of convoy operation PQ 19.

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It is reported that efforts of the Allies to increase the shipment of war material to Russia may be expected in the immediate future.

According to radio monitoring, 6 or 7 British ships were in the Archangel area on 25 Sep. A Russian pilot vessel is missing in the Kanin Nos area.

No tactical information was gained from air reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean.

Own Situation:

The HIPPER and destroyers Z "13", Z "29", Z "30" and Z "28" of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla sailed as planned at 2100 of 24 Sep. for operation "Zarin".

Nothing else to report.

Special Items:

As previously reported, submarine U "334" was strafed and bombed by a Ju 88 while operating against convoy PQ 17 in quadrant AC 2953. An investigation conducted by the 5th Air Force shed no light on the incident. The Naval Staff is firmly convinced that the attacking plane was a German Ju 88, but is not going to follow up the matter in view of an agreement to this effect between the Commanding Admiral, Group North and the Commander, 5th Air Force.

For copy of 1/Skl I Nord 23512/42 Gkdos., which was forwarded to Group North and the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, see War Diary, file "Roesselsprung".

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

During the night of 24 Sep. approximately 30 British planes flew over the Danish area and laid mines as far as Danzig Bay.

An accustic mine was swept south of Hela off Gjedser, another one off Malmoe, and 4 in the Little Belt.

The patrol line off the Swedish coast is occupied by 3 patrol boats. Convoy service in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea proceeded according to plan.

Bad weather prevented mine-sweeping in the eastern Baltic Sea. Submarine chase and convoy service according to plan.

V. Merchant Shipping

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping doubts whether it is feasible to place construction contracts with Spanish shipyards and whether it is possible to acquire Spanish tonnage for Germany as suggested by the Naval Staff. (See War Diary 24 Aug.) All Spanish slipways are occupied and furthermore

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Spanish laws prohibit the construction of ships for foreign accounts in Spanish shipyards and the sale of Spanish tonnage to foreigners. As indicated by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, every chance to obtain additional Spanish shipping space by surreptitious means is utilized to the utmost. These negotiations, which are rather difficult, are made mostly for the Navy, and are in the hands of the Deputy for the Four Year's Plan. Repairs on German ships or ships chartered by Germany are constantly being done at Spanish yards.

According to a communication of the Shipping and Transport Branch, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, the Navy owns the following ships now in Spain:

1. 10 ships totalling 4,375 GRT of the shipping firm Commercial Maritima de Transportes, which belongs entirely to the German Navy.

2. Bought by acquiring the entire capital stock, but not yet in operation are:

a. Approximately 6 steamers of the Compagnia Naviera Bachi with a total loading capacity of 5,176 to 6,090 tons. (5 of them in the Mediterranean, 1 on the northern Spanish coast.)

b. 4 trawlers of the Sociedad Pesquera Vizcainan in northern Spain.

3. Under construction for the Navy:

a. 20 wooden auxiliary sailing vessels at Valencia.

b. 2 transport steamers of 300 tons loading capacity each, at Barcelona.

c. 4 motor ships of the same size at Valencia, for 2 of which suitable motors have to be provided.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

The escort vessel ROCKROSE (800 GRT) was torpedoed at 1621, 225 miles southeast of Reykjanes, according to radio monitoring.

From the Gulf of St. Lawrence we intercepted 3 submarine sighting reports and a report about an attack on a submarine following which oil slicks were observed. Other submarine sighting reports originated off the Newfoundland coast and off Cape Hatteras. A ship east of Trinidad reported a submarine attack.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report from the Norwegian submarine group.

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In the North Atlantic contact with the first incoming convoy intercepted by submarine U "258" could not be reestablished. 17 boats are operating against the second incoming convoy. The enemy was spotted once more at 1200 and attacked by 10 submarines in the course of the afternoon. The convoy in question is probably an "AT" convoy and consists of an unusually great number of transports (fast convoy from America to the British Isles). Submarine U "96" reported sinking a 10,000 GRT steamer, submarine U "216" 3 hits on a large 2-funnel steamer of at least 10,000 GRT, but probably more. Hydrophone observation established that she probably sank. 6 submarines attacked unsuccessfully.

The outgoing convoy observed on 24 Sep. in quadrant AK 55 by submarine U "599" was not seen again. Submarine U "432" sank steamer PENNMAR (5,000 GRT) in quadrant AK 2721.

The convoy of 4 steamers reported by submarine U "610" at the northern entrance of Denmark Strait turned out to be a group of fishing steamers. The submarines U "610", U "620", and U "253" were ordered to proceed to quadrant AK 30 in the Atlantic.

No successes were reported from the American coast.

From the West Indies it is reported by submarine U "517" that the 8,000 GRT steamer sunk in quadrant EO 1419 had already been damaged by torpedo hits and was accompanied by 2 vessels. Submarine U "512" is ordered to report the circumstances under which steamer MONTE GORBEA was sunk.

The boats of the South Atlantic and Mediterranean groups had nothing to report.

Special Item:

See 1/Skl I U 1871/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV for copy of the report of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines on his plans for operations of type XD2 submarines at the southeast African coast, copy of the plan of the Italian Commander, Mine Sweepers, Bordeaux to commit submarine AMMIRAGLIO CAGNI in approximately the same area and finally the copy of the approval of these plans by the Naval Staff.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The day passed without any major event. During the night of 25 Sep. our forces attacked Penzance with observed good results.

2. Incursions:

Several daylight flights into the Oslo area were apparently aimed at a meeting of the National Samling (Quisling's party, Tr. N.) held at the square in front of the royal castle, but failed to interfere with it. For other damage inflicted see daily situation report. During the night mines were laid in Dutch and Danish waters and in the German Bight.

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3. Mediterranean Theater:

U.S. fighter planes made their first appearance over Malta. Successful missions were flown by our air forces at the Egyptian front. Otherwise reconnaissance activity.

4. Eastern Front:

30 enemy planes were shot down on 24 Sep. and 27 planes on 25 Sep. at the various army sectors.

Nothing else to report.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, Gibraltar was attacked on the evening of 24 Sep. by two single planes. Damage has not been ascertained. The number of ships in the harbor is slightly higher than on the day before. Apart from the ships regularly lying at Valletta 7 submarines were observed there. The tonnage at Alexandria had increased by approximately 10,000 GRT as compared to 20 Sep. Besides, there were 37 small craft, apparently landing barges.

Photo reconnaissance of Suez revealed that merchant tonnage has increased by 38,000 GRT since 23 Sep.

In the forenoon 4 transports and 2 destroyers or escort vessels and a group of 3 warships were spotted approaching Alexandria.

Radio monitoring intercepted reports of British reconnaissance planes in the central Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

An enemy PT boat headed toward the coast of Tobruk was scared off by Italian warning shots during the night of 23 Sep.

A coast guard station on Linosa Island was fired upon by an enemy submarine on the evening of 25 Sep. The Italian subchaser CYPROS sank on the forenoon of 24 Sep. off Zante for unknown cause following an explosion. The Italian steamer FIUME (386 GRT) was sunk on the same day off Rhodes by an enemy submarine.

In connection with the report of the German General attached to Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces High Command (see War Diary 24 Sep.) the Naval Staff submits a plan of how best to solve the problem of sealing the French territorial waters off Cape Bon to the Naval Representative on the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, with copy to the German Naval Command, Italy.

For copy of Telegram 1/Skl Im 1902/42 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

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3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Steamer PALOMBA did not reach Tripoli since she was sunk on 23 Sep. off Cape Curiat by an enemy submarine. An auxiliary sailing vessel engaged in coastal shipping ran ashore on 23 Sep. at Marsa el Gazella.

Nothing else to report.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

3 Swedish supply ships sailed from Piraeus on 24 Sep. Convoy service proceeded according to plan.

The Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea reports for the period from 15 Jun. to 14 Jul. that there were 39 convoys in the Aegean Sea, escorted by destroyers, torpedo boats, and other ships, and 3 convoys to and from North Africa, all 3 escorted by destroyers, and torpedo boats, and 2 by subchasers as well.

During the period from 15 Aug. to 14 Sep. the number of convoys within the Aegean Sea increased to 60, requiring 23 destroyer and 24 torpedo boat escort missions, etc., while the number of North African convoys rose to 34 requiring 15 destroyer and 35 torpedo boat escort missions. To the above figures must be added traffic by means of Spanish steamers and auxiliary sailing vessels which operated without escorts.

> The above figures illustrate among other things the weakness of our escort service particularly in the North Africa traffic.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring, battleship PARIZHSKAYA KOMUNA was proceeding 130 miles west of Ochemchiri in the evening of 24 Sep. A submarine was sighted east of Yalta during the night of 23 Sep. Reconnaissance revealed nothing unusual about convoy traffic along the Caucasian coast.

Own Situation:

An Italian subchaser operated during the night of 24 Sep. against the submarine sighted east of Yalta.

During the same night PT boats S "26" and S "49" operated off Gelendzhik and sank 2 steamers of 1,500 and 2,000 GRT anchored off Cape Idukopas. No convoys were sighted.

Mine-sweeping activities off Sevastopol, in the Kerch Strait and off Varna proceeded according to plan. A lighter sank on 24 Sep. in Beresinki Canal due to an influence mine.

Enemy air activity increased on 24 Sep. 2 naval barges and communication and harbor installations at Kerch were damaged. Aerial mines are suspected to have been laid southeast of Feodosiya.

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Convoy service on schedule. The Group decided to operate the steamers KASSA, KOLOZSVAR, BUDAPEST and VOLGO-DON in the Sea of Azov exclusively.

Special Items:

The Naval Liaison Officer to the Army General Staff informs the Naval Staff Operations Division and the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division of his concern about the effects of enemy mine-laying operations upon our future supply traffic off the Caucasian coast and of the order given to Naval Group South to investigate whether it is possible to procure the urgently needed reinforcement of modern mine-sweeping equipment (approximately 2 motor mine sweeper flotillas) from Germany. (See Telegram 1900.)

The Naval Staff Operations Division and the Naval Quartermaster Division also receive copies of the questionnaire teletyped to Group South by the Naval Liaison Officer to the Army General Staff, concerning past and expected future transport performance, which show that in the Naval Liaison Officer's opinion the supply shipments in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov are by no means sufficient to meet the operational requirements of the Army. (See Telegram 1901.)

The Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff thereupon telephoned the Naval Liaison Officer to the Army General Staff and pointed out that his method of gathering information could not be approved; the Naval Liaison Officer asserted that he had merely intended to pick up all pertinent data in order to be prepared for the expected protests on the part of the newly appointed Chief of the Army General Staff. He was then told that the Navy did everything within its power to meet the demands of the other service branches with regard to supply and transport, and was instructed to get in touch with the Admiral, Black Sea, so that he would be able to present the measures taken by the Navy to the Army General Staff in a correct light.

IX. Situation East Asia

The U.S. Navy Department announced the loss of destroyer JARVIS off Guadalcanal and of U.S. auxiliary transport LITTLE (World War I destroyer) in the Solomon Islands.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The operations at the western sectors of the Army Group are characterized by extraordinarily stubborn enemy resistance encountered particularly in the Shapsupskaya area. In the first

stage of our offensive toward Tuapse the 101st Light Infantry Division broke through heavily fortified enemy positions after bitter fighting and reached the area west-southwest of the Khadizhenskaya railway station.

At the eastern wing the 23rd Panzer Division established a bridgehead across the Baksan River south of Novo Poltavskoye after overcoming similar stubborn enemy resistance. The village itself was attacked from the south and southeast by a flanking maneuver of the 13th Panzer Division. Illarinovka was captured. The 111th Infantry Division repulsed an enemy counterattack.

Army Group B:

In the northern section of Stalingrad we captured the block of Communist Party buildings. Enemy pressure at Yersovka and Kotluban continued. The gain achieved by our counterattack at the Voronezh penetration point could not be held. An enemy batallion established itself at both banks of the Veduga River mouth on the west bank of the Don River. An enemy penetration occurred also north of Korsun and led to a counterattack on our part.

Central Army Group:

Enemy attacks north of the Vyazma-Kaluga railroad were repulsed in hand to hand fighting. The enemy did not resume his attacks in the Rzhev area. The penetration north of Byela was cleaned up in bitter close-range fighting and ground was gained in the Demidov area. One of our divisions attacked from the newly won position and fought its way to a few villages and hilltops which were captured. Also at Velizh we occupied 2 villages.

Northern Army Group:

Renewed enemy attacks on the northern flank of the land bridge to the II Army Corps were repulsed. Continuing the attack the two assault groups succeeded in making contact with each other at Gaitolovo. The southern wedge is still being enlarged. Our attack on the Chernaya River sector is making progress.

2. Finnish Front:

It became evident that the enemy is concentrating on the Svirstroi electric power plant sector of the Svir River front. This is true to a lesser degree at the Maselskaya sector.

3. North Africa:

Artillery fire has become heavier.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain and U.S.A.:

Radical British and American left wing groups have started another campaign for the establishment of a second European front and point in particular to the threat which would menace England if the Germans were to turn westward with unchecked fury following a collapse of Russian resistance. For details see Political Review No. 226, paragraph 1. It had to be expected that heavy pressure would be exerted on Willkie during his visit to Russia so that he would continue his trip advocating the immediate opening of a second front; this is borne out by the news coming from Moscow.

U.S.A.:

United Press reports an announcement issued by the Maritime Commission according to which the 8,000,000 GRT construction goal for 1942 will probably be reached and the goal of 15,000,000 to 16,000,000 GRT for the coming year will likewise be reached, provided the necessary raw materials are available.

It is hard to believe that an official agency would release propaganda of this type with such qualifications.

United Press also reports that the Undersecretary of the Navy in an address to a shipyard workers' convention warned of the danger of over-optimism and complacency in no uncertain terms and stated that the U.S.A. will lose the war if America does not wholeheartedly concentrate on the war effort.

Chile:

President Rios declared in a press conference that no agreements whatsoever had been signed during his visit to the U.S.A.

Turkey:

According to a Times report, the contracts for the purchase of Turkish products by Great Britain have been signed. Moreover, negotiations are under way for British purchases of Turkish chromium ore.

Situation 26 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

According to dead reckoning, the DRESDEN will overtake the KULMERLAND in the South Atlantic between the 4th and 5th reference points after point "Rose".

Both ships are therefore instructed by Radiogram 1228 that the KULMERLAND is to stay 100 miles east and the DRESDEN to stay 100 miles west of the main course. Moreover, the KULMERLAND is to reduce her speed for 2 days between point "Kurbelwelle" and the latitude of point "Sache" so that the ships will pass one another in the central South Atlantic.

As reported by the KULMERLAND, the ship is expected to pass point "Kurzgeleit" on 2 Oct. A check of this report at the Naval Staff by dead reckoning shows that the progress at cruising speed is calculated on a very conservative basis and that weather conditions were taken into account.

The Naval Staff informs the KULMERLAND to this effect and counts on the ship's passing the above mentioned point between 28 and 30 Sep. She is then to proceed via points "Kurbelwelle" and "Kulmination". (See Radiogram 1736.)

The WESERLAND is ordered by Telegram 1948 to proceed according to her sailing instructions after passing point "Welle".

Ship "45" reported on 25 Sep. being ready for operations, except for the autogyro observation kite which will be delivered on 28 Sep.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring intercepted messages beginning 2019 involving the rescue of British flyers approximately 52 miles west-southwest of Guernsey, in which the CLEVELAND, 3 destroyers, torpedo boat KRAKOWIAK, and 6 motor launches took part under protection of 3 Hudsons. Altogether, 7 ships, 2 subchasers, 1 patrol vessel, 8 motor launches, 15 escort vessels, and 4 vessels of undetermined classification were located at sea.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Group West orders the blockade-runner BRAKE to sail on 27 Sep.

Channel Coast:

Mine-laying operations of the 2nd, 4th, and 6th PT Boat Flotillas are scheduled for the evening.

Ships of the 36th and 38th Mine Sweeper Flotillas were bombed and strafed by enemy planes between Calais and Blanc Nez in the early morning hours of 26 Sep. and suffered minor damage.

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26 Sep. 1942

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

A Danish wooden trawler sank off Llavandshuk due to a mine, probably an acoustic mine. At 0020 the mine-exploding vessel "145" was unsuccessfully attacked by bombers. Several air attacks were made during the night of 19 Sep. on mine-exploding vessel "17"; all of the 10 bombs dropped missed the target. 7 ground mines were swept off Scheveningen and off Schiermonnikoog.

2. Norway and Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

The British Admiralty issued a detailed account on the convoys PQ 18 and QP 14. A copy of it is contained in supplement to Foreign Press Report No. 226 of the Naval Staff Intelligence Division. It reveals for the first time the enemy assumption that German planes dropped mines on 12 Sep. in the path of the convoy. Destroyer SOMALI, from the escort of QP 14, was torpedoed and taken in tow, but sank 3 days later. Also the motor ship LEDA was sunk. 2 German submarines were definitely sunk and 4 more probably damaged. 40 German planes crashed. Only vague statements are made about the number of convoy ships lost.

> This report is highly disputable. It describes among other things air attacks supposed to have taken place on a day when the German Air Force had no contact with the enemy at all.

Own Situation:

On 24 and 25 Sep. a Russian battery on Rybachi Peninsula fired upon an incoming motor mine sweeper group and also on Paitna and Nurmansaetti without result. The fire was returned.

The submarine alarm reported by destroyer Z "27" off Langneset in Alta Fjord was probably an attack with aerial torpedoes, according to subsequent investigation.

5 guns of the Eltevik battery are ready for action.

Enemy air activity during the night of 25 Sep. in the Oslo area; no bombs were dropped.

The forces engaged in operation "Zarin" have not yet reported.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

2 ground mines were swept on 25 and 2 on 26 Sep. in the Little Belt by the experimental vessel HEISTERNEST with large noise boxes. Cutter III, equipped with towed coil gear sank in the Sound probably due to an accustic mine. On 24 Sep. the Finnish steamer NAVIGATOR struck a mine off Trelleborg and a small Dutch steamer another mine south of Falsterbo canal; both of them sank.

In the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea an enemy

submarine was pursued after being sighted off Steinort. Compulsory convoying was ordered for troop transports, leave steamers, hospital ships, tankers and similar important war transports sailing for Bothnian Gulf ports by way of Abo.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Very lively reconnaissance activity in the southern rendezvous area. A total of 45 planes were observed, including 10 fighter planes which made low-level attacks on patrol vessels off Brest.

An unidentified steamer reported a submarine 220 miles northwest of Madeira. The steamer reported torpedoed on 25 Sep. 225 miles southeast of Reykjanes was not the ROCKROSE but some unidentified ship.

Own Situation:

5 submarines recently left for the zone of operations.

In the North Atlantic, the operation against the incoming convoy was continued by Group "Blitz"; submarine U "91" torpedoed a 5,000 GRT steamer in quadrant AL 4499 and submarine U "404" sank a destroyer in quadrant AL 5473. The 2-funnel steamer sunk on 25 Sep. by submarine U "96" answered the description of the REINA DEL PACIFICO (17,700 GRT).

At 1400 submarine U "617" encountered a southwestbound convoy of more than 20 steamers in quadrant AK 6382 and torpedoed 2 ships of 5,000 and 3,000 GRT. She was subsequently driven off. The 12 submarines operating in this area plus 6 approaching ones are joined into a new group "Tiger" and are instructed to operate against this convoy, since operations against the incoming convoy had to be called off.

Another success in this part of the North Atlantic is the reported sinking of a FLORIDA-type steamer (10,000 GRT) by submarine U "619".

Submarine U "442" sank an unidentified ship belonging to a convoy of 3 steamers in quadrant AE 8519.

From the U.S. east coast situation reports only have been received saying nothing about any achievements.

This applies also to the West Indies and the South Atlantic group "Iltis".

For additional news see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Referring to the sinking of the Spanish motor ship MONTE GORBEA, submarine U "512" reports seeing the neutrality markings, but considered them a camouflage, because the ship was steering a zigzag course and did not match the description furnished by the Groener

manual. (See Radiogram 2225.) For detailed report see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Special Items:

On 3 Sep. the Commanding Admiral, Submarines submitted a report on the interference by enemy planes with submarine warfare; citing practical experience, he pointed out that, in view of the recent aeronautical developments, the time is not far off when the aerial situation with regard to combatting convoys will become intolerable in almost every part of the North Atlantic. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines is therefore renewing his urgent pleas that our Air Force combat the enemy escort air forces; since the prerequisites for this task are not completely met by the He 177's whose range of action does not exceed 2200 km, he requests that the demand be emphasized for an efficient long-range combat plane to serve for future offensive submarine warfare.

The Naval Staff agrees in full with these arguments regarding the necessity of adequate countermeasures and considers the elimination of enemy escort planes as one of the essentials for successful submarine operations. The demand of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to provide efficient combat planes, superior to the He 177, was submitted to the Air Minister and Commander in Chief, Air Force, although the development of a new plane type will take considerable time in view of the well-known tight situation of the aviation industry. (The request was submitted on 26 Sep. under 1/Skl 23966/42 Gkdos.)

However, in the Naval Staff's opinion, to throw our own air forces into the battle against enemy aircraft has its disadvantages, too; as long as there is no rapid, simple, and reliable identification signal device which permits certain identification of friend and foe, submarines will always be forced to submerge immediately upon the approach of any plane. Thus contact with the target is lost and later operations jeopardized. Furthermore, the range of enemy air forces will always exceed that of our planes in view of the existing geographical conditions. Finally, it has to be taken into account that the enemy will always be in a position to make use of his aircraft carriers. For all these reasons the Naval Staff sees an urgent need to improve the anti-aircraft weapons and identification signals of our submarines, apart from the development of efficient combat planes. The Naval Staff instructed the Naval Staff, Submarine Division to push the solution of these problems more energetically.

Directives to this effect were issued to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and the Submarine Division of the Naval Staff.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

2. Incursions:

31 enemy incursions were reported in the evening, 25 of which penetrated into western and 1 into eastern German territory.

In the west, mines were laid in the German Bight and in Danish waters; the planes flew as far as Warsaw and Radom in the east. No bombs were dropped and 1 enemy plane was shot down.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

10 enemy planes were reported shot down over Egypt. Cufra oasis was attacked with good results. Otherwise there was only reconnaissance activity.

4. Eastern Front:

A large tug and one transport were damaged by bombs during raids on Tuapse and Sochi on 25 Sep.

The Caucasian coast and the Caspian Sea were reconnoitered. For details see daily situation report.

Special Item:

The comments of Naval Group North on the cooperation between Navy and Air Force (night fighters and anti-aircraft) addressed to the Air Force Group Commander, Central Area is submitted to the Operations Division, Naval Staff for its information. For copy see Telegram 1036. The Group objects to too great restrictions on the freedom of naval anti-aircraft batteries and warships to open fire.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, a convoy of 8 ships and 3 escort vessels was sighted on an easterly course off Cape Spartel. According to an Italian report 8 more steamers are at Gibraltar than on 25 Sep. Radio monitoring from the Gibraltar area leads the German Naval Command Italy to believe that preparations for an operation directed toward the central Mediterranean might have been in progress for the past 2 days. Italian agents reported that 2 ships, probably destroyers, have left Gibraltar in an easterly direction.

Submarines were sighted off Tobruk and Trieste.

Lively convoy traffic is reported from the eastern Mediterranean.

Photo reconnaissance of Suez showed that tonnage at this harbor, contrary to the report of 25 Sep., had decreased by 80,000 GRT as compared with 23 Sep.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

2 motor mine sweepers transferring from Derna to Palermo arrived at Piraeus, where also a PT boat arrived from Porto Empedocle on 25 Sep.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The escorted steamer FOUCIER was attacked by enemy planes

30 miles north of Tobruk in the evening while proceeding from Tobruk to Piraeus. Details are not yet available. Otherwise supply traffic from Italy and Greece to North Africa and North African coastal traffic proceeded according to plan.

4. Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

5. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Battleship PARIZHSKAYA KOMUNA, which by radio monitoring of 25 Sep. appeared to be at sea, was observed at Batum on the same day by air reconnaissance. The radio message may have been a ruse used by the patrol vessels. Lively shipping was observed in the Tuapse area. According to photo reconnaissance, the following ships were at Ochemchiri at noon of 25 Sep.: 3 submarines, 5 motor minesweepers, 1 PT boat, and several steamers. At the same time the following ships were at Poti: 3 cruisers, 2 warship hulls, 3 destroyers, one of which was in dock, 3 minesweepers, 5 motor minesweepers, 4 PT boats, 14 submarines, 11 steamers, 3 floating cranes, etc. At Batum: 1 battleship (see above), 1 heavy cruiser, 5 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats, 6 submarines, 6 motor minesweepers, 2 PT boats, 2 passenger steamers, 6 tankers, 13 steamers, etc.

A great number of merchant vessels, tankers, lighters and tugboats were sighted at the Caspian Sea ports Astrakhan, Makhach Kala, Baku and Guryev and in the Ural River estuary. The only naval vessels at Astrakhan were 6 minesweepers.

Own Situation:

On 25 Sep. one of our convoys was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine 30 miles north-northeast of Constanta; enemy air activity caused minor damage only at Balaklava and Ivanbaba. Aerial mines were laid at the northern exit of Kerch Strait. Minesweeping operations and supply shipping proceeded according to plan.

Special Items:

a. Naval Group South informs the Naval Staff Operations Division of its reply to the questionnaire submitted by the Naval Liaison Officer on the Army General Staff with regard to supply operations. (See Telegram 1335.)

b. The Admiral, Black Sea called the attention of Army Group A, with copy to the Air Commander, Crimea, to the necessity of reinforcing the anti-aircraft defenses of the Crimean ports; he warned that no replacements are available for losses, so that the Army, i.e., Army Group A, may have to get along with fewer shipments.

Group South notifies the Naval Staff of the above by Telegram 2045 and suggests that this information be forwarded to the Naval Representative on the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command.

This was carried out.

c. According to a communication from the Quartermaster, Armed

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Forces High Command, Transnistria will no longer be part of the Army's zone of operation beginning 1 Oct. 1942 in accordance with a Fuehrer directive of 12 Sep. 1942. The Liaison Staff of the German Armed Forces for Transnistria will stay there and will be under the authority of the Chief of the German Army Mission in Rumania. Its duties and authority remain unchanged.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division has informed Naval Group South, the Admiral, Black Sea and the Baltic Naval Station to this effect.

IX. Situation East Asia

Allied Headquarters report that the Japanese advance toward Port Moresby has come to a halt for the time being since the transport of heavy artillery across the mountains is meeting with difficulties.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The enemy thrust at Shapsuskaya was halted by German forces and enemy pressure on the main highway east of Abinskaya relieved. Our operation in the direction of Tuapse is progressing according to plan. Our attacks at the Terek River sector gained ground in southeasterly direction. The eastern wing of our spearheads have reached the bend of the railway of Vosnessenskaya.

Army Group B:

In the battle for Stalingrad, units of the 94th and 71st Infantry Divisions reached the Volga River bank after a battle of several hours against stubborn enemy resistance. Enemy attacks at Kotluban were repulsed. An enemy thrust against the bend of our line north of Voronezh following a heavy artillery barrage and supported by ground attack planes was halted by a counterattack and eventually repulsed. Northwest of Rzhev the enemy attacked our bridgehead across the Volga River under cover of fog. He succeeded in breaking into our line, but will be mopped up by reserves.

Northern Army Group:

A number of enemy attacks against the forces which cut off the pocket south of Lake Ladoga were repulsed. At the Neva River sector the enemy was able to gain footholds on the eastern bank in the Dubrovka area in several places. All of the enemy forces which had crossed the river were destroyed, except for a small bridgehead which was sealed off.

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2. Finnish Front:

Nothing to report.

3. North Africa:

Artillery fire increased during the night of 25 Sep. Otherwise the situation is unchanged.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

Eden stated in a speech that the last convoy which reached northern Russia carried the largest single shipment of war material ever made by Great Britain and the U.S.A. Not less than 75 British warships were employed to escort the convoy consisting of 40 ships. The Minister commented also on the growing effect of British aerial warfare against Germany, which aims at destroying manufacturing sites and at paralyzing the intricate German communications system. For details see Political Review No. 227, paragraph 1.

Russia:

In a press conference at Moscow, Willkie advocated the speedy establishment of a second front stating that otherwise aid for Russia, which has already lost 5,000,000 men, will come too late. The decision will have to be made by the military authorities, of course.

A widely read article in the New York Times takes a different view, emphasizing that the clamor for a second front is absurd as long as such a front would serve Russian interests only, and not those of Britain and the U.S.A.

Finland:

In an address to Parliament Prime Minister Rangell, defining Finnish foreign policy, stated that the country stands on Germany's side in its fight against the Soviet Union. After the experiences had on the occasion of the first Russian attack, nothing could induce Finland to pursue another policy than one dictated by her own vital interests.

Japan:

Prime Minister Tojo, addressing the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, declared that endurance is one of the main factors in the present war. Japan is firmly resolved to destroy the Chungking Government. Japanese forces in Manchukuo are firmly protecting the northern frontier. Japan is determined to destroy the enemy in closest cooperation with the other Axis powers.

Special Items:

I. According to information received from the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command, the Fuehrer has ordered the transfer of the 5th Mountain Division to Norway with all its horses and equipment following completion of operation "Nordlicht".

The ordered exchange of divisions stationed in Norway for fatigued combat divisions from the Eastern Front cannot take place prior to the beginning of November, since replacements from Germany will be available only after 1 Nov.

The Chief, Shipping and Transport Branch, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is informed to this effect.

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II. The Naval Staff directs Group North and the Fleet to transfer the SCHARNHORST and NUERNBERG to the north area by early November, together with all destroyers ready for operations by that time.

III. The German General attached to Headquarters of the Italian High Command reports to the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command that the situation in North Africa was discussed in a conference at the Italian High Command on 23 Sep. at which Field Marshal Rommel, who was passing through, Field Marshal Kesselring and Marshal Cavallero were present. Field Marshal Rommel stated that a British attack is to be expected in October. For this assault the Panzer Army must be equipped with adequate supplies in order to be able to launch an offensive of its own after repelling the attack. This presupposes that Malta is paralyzed, which the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South promised to achieve by increasing aerial attacks to a maximum by early October. In connection with the requested supplies, Cavallero outlined the existing difficulties which consist mainly in the lack of escort forces. The Italian High Command considers transferring a cruiser division and escort destroyers to the Aegean Sea; this would reinforce the defense of Crete, afford a favorable flanking position against naval actions, and increase the number of escort vessels available for North African transports by placing the destroyers at their disposal. A fuel oil stock of 20,000 tons in the Aegean area is, of course, a prerequisite for this step.

IV. A letter (Ob. d. M. M Wa Wi 24500/42 geh.) addressed to the Minister of Armament and War Production by the Commander in Chief, Navy was prompted by the unjustifiable interference with building projects of strategic importance at Wilhelmshaven on the part of the Minister's regional representative for the Weser-Ems district. For copy see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

Situation 27 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

A force reported at 36° N, 11° W on 23 Sep. is believed to be the RAMILLIES with an escort of 4 destroyers.

South Atlantic:

At 1345 a submarine warning signal originating from an unidentified ship at 24° 55' S, 21° 51' W was rebroadcast by Freetown. On 26 Sep. Ascension transmitted a coded QQQ message from the British steamer SHERIDAN. The German Consul at Santa Isabel reports a 10,000 GRT steamer which passed under escort of a submarine in the direction of Duala on 24 Sep.

Indian Ocean:

According to an intelligence report based on statements of a crew member from a British steamer, a large transport vessel was rammed at Capetown around the end of July with the loss of 200 men and 2,000 mail bags. According to the same source, 1 destroyer and 7 merchant

vessels were sunk and 2 large warships and harbor installations damaged during a Japanese air raid on Colombo; unfortunately, the date of this attack could not be ascertained.

On 26 Sep. Radio Colombo flashed a QQQ signal of the U.S. steamer ALABAMAN and stated that a suspicious vessel resembling the Danish vessel SELANGIA followed her for about half an hour at 13° S, 56° E.

This report probably refers to a Japanese ship.

According to report of the Consulate at Lourenco Marques a convoy of 35 ships carrying troops and planes arrived at Capetown, from where it will sail for Aden on 28 Sep. There it is to be split, one section proceeding to Egypt, the other to Basra.

2. Own Situation:

No reports were received from our ships in foreign waters.

All our ships in foreign waters are notified of the sailing instructions for the DRESDEN and KULMERLAND by Radiogram 1016.

The Naval Attache at Tokyo is informed about names of ships suitable as cover names for the RAMSES. See Telegram 1500.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

In the late afternoon of 26 Sep. 12 enemy fighters attacked Brest and Morlaix. 2 Spitfires were shot down by naval antiaircraft artillery and several others by German fighters.

The blockade-runner BRAKE sailed for Japan on schedule.

Group North advised the BRAKE by Telegram 1304 to avoid Spanish territorial waters as much as possible. A forecast of the weather to be expected en route was transmitted to her by Telegram 1916; visibility will be 8 to 4 miles and turbulance clouds at 300 m. to 400 m.

Channel Coast:

18 vessels of the 2nd, 4th and 6th PT Boat Flotillas laid mines in irregular pattern and with wide intervals off the Humber mouth during the night of 26 Sep. For short reports see Telegrams 1730 and 2255.

The blockade-runner BURGENLAND is scheduled to sail on 28 Sep.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

A number of enemy planes penetrated into the German Bight area during the night of 26 Sep. Aerial mines are suspected north of the Frisian Islands. One plane was shot down off Hook of Holland.

North of the harbor entrance of Hook of Holland approximately 15 ground mines were swept, which had evidently been laid by PT boats as reported on 26 Sep.

Convoys to Holland were postponed 24 hours due to fog and mine hazard off Hook of Holland. Otherwise escort and patrol service proceeded according to plan.

2. Norway and Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance of the Arctic Ocean as far as Spitsbergen revealed nothing of tactical interest.

Own Situation:

A Russian battery on Rybachi Peninsula shelled Petsamo between 2308 on 25 Sep. and 0452 on 26 Sep. with intervals of 10 minutes between shots. We replied with 6 shots without observing any results. Enemy air activity over the Arctic and west coasts on 25 and 26 Sep. One of our convoys was unsuccessfully bombed off the Arctic coast at 0710 of 27 Sep. Otherwise convoy service proceeded according to plan. One of our harbor defense vessels was rammed and sunk in Boemmel Fjord by a Norwegian steamer. The question of responsibility is under investigation.

The mine-laying ships ROLAND, KAISER, and SKAGERRAK arrived at Kristiansand South from the south.

Group North reports that the forces engaged in operation "Zarin" will reach the island waters at 0400 of 28 Sep.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

During the night of 27 Sep. enemy planes flew harassing and mine-laying missions in the Baltic Sea entrances, Kiel Bay, Luebeck Bay and the Flensburger Foerde. It is suspected that aerial mines were laid. Channel-sweeping operations were delayed due to fog. A mine was swept off Apenrade.

Mine-sweeping in the Gulf of Finland had to be canceled owing to bad weather but proceeded according to plan in Riga Bay.

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At noon a convoy from Abo to Oulu was attacked by an enemy submarine 30 miles west of Vasa. Tanker MITTELMEER with 800 tons of aviation gasoline received a torpedo hit and burst in flames. The vessel is still afloat and an attempt is being made to tow her to Vasa. The fire is under control.

As reported by the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, the Fuehrer ordered in directive no. 40 that the island of Tytersaari which lies in front of the Army operations zone be placed under the 11th Army's authority.

The Naval Staff informs Group North accordingly.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance activity in the northern rendezvous area was lively, probably on account of an approaching convoy; normal reconnaissance only in the southern area.

An unidentified British steamer flashed a QQQ signal approximately 100 miles northwest of Capetown; the report was later canceled. A submarine sighting report was intercepted from the middle South Atlantic.

Own Situation:

Another submarine left for the zone of operations.

In the North Atlantic, contact could not be reestablished with the outbound convoy observed by submarine U "617". Group "Tiger" reinforced by 2 submarines has orders to continue the search on a westerly course.

Submarine U "404" encountered 2 large steamers of a new type, with one funnel and one short thick mast; following an attack on them, the boat observed a detonation and sinking noises.

A new group "Luchs", formed of 13 submarines, is to proceed at cruising speed to a patrol line extending from quadrant AK 6653 to quadrant AL 9814, where a convoy sailing on a southwesterly course can be expected to arrive on 30 Sep.

Submarine U "177" encountered a subchaser force consisting of fast single ships in quadrant AL 5640 which located the boat.

In quadrant FA 2385 in the West Indies submarine U "514" torpedoed 2 steamers totalling 10,000 GRT which were proceeding in a convoy.

For additional reports see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The Commander in Chief, Navy orders once more explicitly that all submarine captains are to be strongly reminded to adhere strictly to all instructions concerning the treatment of neutral ships. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines issued an order to this effect.

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Complying with a suggestion of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to the Executive Office of the Commander in Chief, Navy with copy to the Naval Staff, the following special communique of the Armed Forces High Command is made public:

A fast enemy convoy, consisting of a few large passenger liners only, heavily guarded and carrying troops, ammunition and other war material, was intercepted on its way from America to the British Isles by German submarines in the North Atlantic; it was pursued and engaged in a bitter battle which lasted several days.

We sank a 19,000 GRT 2-funneled steamer of the VICEROY OF INDIA class, which capsized after being hit by 3 torpedoes; a 17,000 GRT 2-funneled steamer, class REINA DEL PACIFICO, which exploded with a large burst of flame after receiving 2 torpedo hits; an 11,000 GRT transport of the DERBYSHIRE class. In addition, we sank one of the escort destroyers and damaged 2 other transports by torpedo hits. These losses constitute a severe blow to enemy warfare.

The sinkings referred to concern the AT convoy attacked on 25 and 26 Sep. by submarines U "216", U "96", U "619", U "404", and U "91". (See War Diary 25 and 26 Sep. and Telegram 1850.)

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Little reçonnaissance activity during the day and no night operations. During the attack by 12 Spitfires and fighter bombers on Brest and Morlaix (see Situation West Area) around 1900 of 26 Sep., 9 enemy planes either were shot down or crashed. Rescue and search measures were taken by the enemy for all of the 12 planes engaged in this action.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

A total of 8 enemy planes was shot down on 26 Sep. by the new Me 109 G 2, some of them at altitudes exceeding 8,000 m.

Harassing attacks were carried out east of El Alamein. The Heliopolis airfield was raided by 10 Ju 88's. A photo reconnaissance mission was flown over Alexandria.

3. Eastern Front:

50 enemy planes were shot down on 26 Sep. and an additional 65 on 27 Sep.

It is reported that a steamer was damaged by a bomb hit off Tuapse on 26 Sep.

13 more enemy planes were shot down in the Arctic Ocean without any losses of our own.

Photo reconnaissance was conducted over Kola Bay.

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27 Sep. 1942

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

A convoy of 5 loaded freighters escorted by 2 destroyers and 1 corvette arrived at Gibraltar from the Atlantic in the evening of 26 Sep. According to an intelligence report from Spain, the Strait of Gibraltar has been under close observation for the past few days, apparently in anticipation of passing submarines which had been sighted.

Radio monitoring intercepted messages from unidentified British ships in the waters of Alexandria and east of Rhodes. Apart from light naval forces, 11 steamers of 62,000 GRT were anchored at Alexandria.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

The motor minesweepers R "10" and R "16" sailed from Piraeus for Patras.

Tobruk and Benghazi were attacked by enemy planes. The outer pier of Benghazi received a bomb hit.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The convoy of motor ships BARBARO and UNIONE were repeatedly attacked by submarines and torpedo planes while proceeding to Benghazi. Both ships were hit by one torpedo each and efforts are being made to tow them to Navarino. The UNIONE (6,071 GRT) carried 2,110 tons of supplies, 15 guns, 103 motor vehicles and 72 men, all German, the BARBARO (6,342 GRT) an Italian cargo. Otherwise supply and coastal traffic proceeded without major incident.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla operated during the night of 26 Sep. between Tuapse and Cape Idukopas. PT boat S "26" sank a 1,000 GRT steamer at anchor in spite of strong defense by 3 patrol vessels.

The Italian subchasers were idle due to the lack of fuel; supplies are under way. 3 Italian submarines arrived at Skadovsk and will transfer to Feodosiya.

A cutter of the Neumann command sank in an engagement at Novorossisk after suffering a hit below the water line.

Enemy air activity at Kerch, Taman (where 1 naval barge and 1 Siebel ferry were damaged), Yalta, Ivanbaba, and Mariupol. It is suspected that aerial mines were laid.

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Mine-sweeping and escort operations proceeded according to plan. Cargo ship VOLGO-DON is already operating in the Sea of Azov.

Group South proposes to transfer 20 motor launches from Germany to the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea. (See Telegram 1530.)

The matter is being attended to by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

We succeeded in halting enemy attacks at Krimskaya. Our offensive toward Tuapse is making headway against strong enemy resistance. The bridgehead over the Terek River west of Maisky was widened. A bitter battle is being waged in the Kardzhin area.

Army Group B:

The battle for Stalingrad continues in and around the city, where a few more blocks were captured. The 100th Light Infantry Division, the 24th Panzer Division and the 389th Infantry Division launched an attack in the northern sector.

All enemy thrusts against the land bridge at Kotluban were repulsed, as was an attack north of Voronezh.

Central Army Group:

South of Novosil the enemy succeeded in penetrating our lines in a surprise attack. A counterattack is in progress. Strong enemy attacks at Zubtsov and north of the Volga River were repulsed; the enemy also attacked the bridgehead north of Rzhev and the penetration point northwest of the town. Our forces were successful in the Demidov and Velizh areas.

Northern Army Group:

Our offensive to widen the land bridge to the II Army Corps in a westerly direction was launched from the south and gained a few kilometers of ground. Fighting on the Neva River sector resulted in local gains.

2. Finnish Front:

With the exception of futile enemy attacks at the southern wing of the Kandalaksha sector only gunfire and scouting activity.

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3. North Africa:

Normal artillery and reconnaissance activity.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

General Wavell declared in an address that the second front will be established, although there is still much bitter fighting ahead for the Anglo-American forces before this can be done. It is his impression that Russia will hold out. Germany is planning a pincers operation in the Near East for 1943 from Egypt and from the Caucasus, possibly also across Turkey. The preparations for this drive, however, have not been very successful as yet, and the strategic goals set for 1942 have not by any means been attained. Germany has not been able to eliminate the Russian Army, and a winter campaign is thus unavoidable, particularly if Stalingrad continues to resist. The African pincers have been halted and there is hope that they can be driven back a considerable distance. Japan can be compared to a boa constrictor which has swallowed a large bite and needs a long time to digest it. Japan does not have the ships to take the offensive against the naval forces of the Allies and in addition, Russia constitutes a permanent threat. Therefore Japan must try to solve the Chinese problem and while doing so is hardly in a position to carry out another large-scale invasion (this refers probably to India). It is of paramount strategic importance for Great Britain to retake Burma. The ship losses, though heavy, are not heavy enough to prevent a British final victory, all the more as the losses sustained by the Axis powers are much greater. Germany must be beaten first. With regard to a date for the final victory, Wavell confidentially made an estimate which, according to the Delhi radio which broadcast the speech, was not discouraging.

The Transocean News Agency reports from Ankara that the attitude of the Anglo-American Powers is being sharply criticized in Moscow. All contact between Anglo-American and Russian circles in Ankara has ceased completely.

Iberian Peninsula:

Relations between Spain and Portugal have recently become considerably more amicable. Well-informed Lisbon circles are convinced that the existing non-aggression and friendship pact will shortly become a mutual assistance pact.

Russia:

The Soviet Government has recognized the French National Committee (De Gaulle) as the sole authority entitled to represent French interests with the Soviet Government, and thus went considerably farther than its British and American allies.

Special Items:

I. According to a report by the Military Attache at Helsinki, the U.S. Military Attache, Lt. Col. Huthsteiner remarked about a week ago that the following Allied operations are planned for the spring of 1943:

1. Landing on the Danish coast and if possible a simultaneous landing at the Channel or northern French coast.

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2. Large-scale landings at several points of the Norwegian coast, with the aid of 3,000 Norwegian paratroopers.

3. Landing of U.S. forces on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, a thrust toward Tripoli and merger with the British coming up from Egypt following destruction of the German and Italian North African Army.

4. The French North African coast is to be the basis for future operations against Italy aiming at separating this country from the Axis.

> Paragraphs 3 and 4 very likely represent the Allied strategic goals for 1943, while paragraphs 1 and 2 may indicate diversionary maneuvers.

An intelligence report from the early part of September deserves attention, too. It comes from a reputedly very reliable source with excellent connections to the Swiss Army General Staff and is based on London information of the Swiss Intelligence Service. According to this report, a strong bridgehead is to be established in Norway this fall in anticipation of a future second front. A number of minor commando raids are still to be made at the western front and at the same time a landing is to be made in Norway by large forces consisting in the main of U.S. troops. There are quite a number of reports in the possession of the Swiss Intelligence Service concerning naval and troop concentrations which have been made for this purpose.

II. Conference with the Chief, Naval Staff was held in preparation for a report to the Fuehrer on submarine warfare. Minutes of the conference are being recorded by the Chief, Submarine Division, Naval Staff.

Since the Fuehrer was present at the traditional address to the officer candidates of the Armed Forces in Berlin, a conference on submarine warfare was held in the afternoon.

Minutes of this conference will be filed.

Situation 28 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

The aircraft carrier LEXINGTON was launched at Quincy, Mass. on 26 Sep., 15 months after her keel was laid and one year ahead of schedule. The first ship of this type, the ESSEX, was launched on 31 Jul.

Indian Ocean:

According to a report of the German Consulate at Lourenco Marques, a convoy of 12 ships sailed on 19 Sep. from Capetown for Australia with U.S. troops and a cargo of planes. 3 British submarines left Simon's Town on 21 Sep. for Aden and Mombasa. Steamer QUEEN ELIZABETH is expected to pass through Lourenco Marques for Suez on 10 Oct. Mombasa is a secondary naval base.

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At 2300 Radio Simon's Town rebroadcast a QQQ signal originating from the British steamer OCEAN VANITY, which sighted a suspicious vessel at 2235 at 32o 43' S, 29o 00' E. The report was cancelled at 2312.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache at Tokyo points out that the permission granted to German vessels to transmit or receive radio messages is valid only during their voyage to or from southern Japanese ports and not for the main island. Special regulations also apply to Batavia.

The Attache also calls attention to incorrect statements of the Naval Staff concerning the steamers ASAMA MARU and CONTE VERDE, since the latter is at anchor at Shanghai and the former in the service of the Japanese Navy. (See Telegram 2001.)

Enemy situation report to ships in foreign waters by Radiogram 2239.

II. Situation West Area

Atlantic Coast:

Weather reports transmitted to the BRAKE by Group West indicate relatively low visibility and favorable conditions for the break-through.

The sailing of the BURGENLAND was postponed by 24 hours on account of fog.

Channel Coast:

The 5th PT Boat Flotilla is scheduled to carry out a mine-laying mission off Start Point during the night of 28 Sep. One mine was swept in quadrant BF 2929. The convoy route was closed between points 334 and 336.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Ships of the Maas Flotilla were strafed off Goeree by 15 Spitfires while towing one of their vessels which had run aground in a fog; they suffered damage and casualties.

A ground mine was swept in quadrant AN 8584. Escort and patrol service suffered from bad weather.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

For reports concerning plans for landings see Special Items, I.

Own Situation:

Enemy air activity centered on the Arctic and west coasts during 26 and 27 Sep. Bombs were dropped on Kirkenes airfield and on one of our westbound convoys off Sylt Fjord without causing damage. 80 bombs were dropped on Banak airfield. 1 plane was destroyed by fire and 3 others damaged.

The mine-laying ships ROLAND and KAISER as well as 6 vessels of the 17th Subchaser Flotilla carried out a mine-laying mission from their base at Kristiansand South according to plan. (Deep flanking minefields in the area between Stavanger and Lister.

The Naval Staff directs the Commanding Admiral, Norway, with copies to Group North, the Admiral Arctic Ocean, the Fleet, and the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers to get in touch with the Fleet (Commanding Admiral, Cruisers) and the Admiral, Arctic Ocean and to comment jointly on the question of where the enemy has a better chance to prevent the sailing of our ships through submarines and mines, at Trondheim or at Narvik? The Naval Staff wants to know where enemy submarines find better operating possibilities and where our defenses are more effective.

Where are geographical conditions more favorable for laying mines? Where can the enemy lay mines more readily undetected and unhampered? Where is it simpler for us to sweep mines, considering the present state of our defenses?

The report is to be submitted through Group North.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

The HIPPER force entered Kaa Fjord at 0700; operation "Zarin" was carried out according to plan. All 4 destroyers were damaged somewhat by the heavy seas. The HIPPER sprang a leak in the boiler plant and is not entirely ready for operations.

For a brief report of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers see 1/Skl 24024/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

The Naval Staff believes that mining operation "Zarin" in quadrant AT 16 was carried out somewhat late in the season, since shipping around the northern tip of Novaya Zemlya stops during October because of the ice situation. On the other hand a minefield in quadrant AT 4817 as suggested by Group North would interfere with our submarine operations in the entrance of the White Sea to such an extent that it would cancel the advantages in mining that area. Thus the Admiral, Arctic Ocean had only the choice of following the original plan or giving up the idea of laying a minefield altogether. Furthermore, the Naval Staff has not been informed of the opinion of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean in this matter.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

No special incidents in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea. Steamer FRANZ RUDOLF (1,419 GRT) sank at 0400 off the Pomeranian coast in quadrant AO 8612 for reasons as yet unknown. During maneuvers in quadrant AO 9812 near Gdynia 5 mines exploded. 1 torpedo recovery vessel was damaged.

Calling attention to the great number of enemy mines in the Baltic Sea, especially the eastern Baltic Sea and the Bay of Danzig, which jeopardizes submarine training greatly, the Naval Staff requests the Air Force Operations Staff to take measures to combat enemy planes by providing sufficient numbers of night fighters, since the Naval Staff must require that enemy planes are fought off in the west before they can drop mines. We cannot afford to have submarine training interrupted and hampered, and must prevent this with all possible means. The Air Force Operations Staff is requested to report steps taken.

No special incidents in the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea. Subchase near Steinort was unsuccessful. Tanker MITTELMEER arrived at Vasa under her own power.

V. Merchant Shipping

Because of increased danger of air attack the armament of British merchant vessels is being reinforced as regards the number and size of the guns.

Between 15 May and 31 Jul. 93,500 tons of supplies were shipped from U.S. ports to the Persian Gulf. Not counting troop transports, 30 to 40 ships of 5,000 GRT each are being used for this purpose.

For these and other reports concerning foreign merchant shipping see Brief Report No. 32/42 of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

The British Admiralty announced the loss of submarine THORN, which probably had been stationed in home waters. According to the radio intercept service, the British steamer BARON SALTOUN (3,404 GRT) sent an SOS signal from southwest of the Azores at 2127, and an unidentified ship from 130 miles southeast of Reykjavik at 2003.

British ships were located 150 miles southwest of Rockall Bank, and 35 and 155 miles northwest of Porcupine Bank. At 1315 a Sunderland plane reported a submarine 650 miles southwest of Rockall Bank, and evidently in connection with this reported an attack on a submarine. Air reconnaissance of both groups over the rendezvous area furnished no special information.

2. Own Situation:

3 more submarines left for the zone of operations.

No success reports were received from the submarines in the North Atlantic, off the U.S. east coast, in the South Atlantic, and the Mediterranean.

In the West Indies, however, submarine U "175" sank a 6,000 GRT steamer in quadrant EO 1396, a 3,550 GRT steamer in quadrant EO 1497, and a 4,500 GRT steamer in quadrant EO 1446. Submarine U "332" reported sinking steamer REGISTAN (5,886 GRT) in quadrant EE 8184.

For details see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day reconnaissance and fighter bomber missions were flown.

In the Great Yarmouth area 1 steamer of 1,500 to 2,000 GRT proceeding in a convoy of 6 steamers and 2 destroyers was damaged at 1055. A similar success was reported from the Cape Finisterre area.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Convoy and reconnaissance missions, nuisance raids, and attacks on ships in the Suez roadstead were carried out without observed effect.

3. Eastern Front:

The General of the Air Force reported 54 planes shot down at the Army front. Otherwise nothing special to report.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

Messages intercepted by the radio intercept service indicate that submarines are being transferred from home waters or Gibraltar to the Mediterranean, or that supplies are about to be shipped to Malta, possibly simultaneously from the east and the west.

Contradictory agent reports stating that a convoy passed through the Strait of Gibraltar during the night of 26 September had not been confirmed by air reconnaissance by 1500.

Between 1900 and 2055 radar located first 7, and later a total of 18 ships off Marsa Matruh 3 to 10 miles off the coast. At the same time an air attack was made on Marsa Matruh. A message was picked up from Marsa Matruh reporting an attack by surface forces at 1958. The report was not confirmed.

According to an Italian report, British destroyers arrived in the eastern Mediterranean from the Red Sea. Furthermore a convoy is to be escorted to Malta from the eastern Mediterranean under especially heavy air

cover in the beginning of October.

According to another Italian agent report, important documents were sent to Madrid by Spanish authorities, which were obtained from the British plane which crashed near Cadiz on 25 Sep.; the crew perished. The documents are in French, dated 22 Sep., and deal with British attacks on French Morocco, Tunisia, and other spots in French North Africa.

An investigation has been started at once. The outcome must be awaited.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

During the night of 27 Sep., enemy planes attacked Benghazi, damaging buildings. The Naval Staff at once telephoned to the Naval Representatives at the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Air Force Operations Staff and the Army High Command the report received at 2201 from the German Naval Command, Italy concerning ships located off Marsa Matruh and the message concerning the attack (see Enemy Situation). At 2350 the German Naval Command, Italy reported that no enemy action was confirmed. At 2125 the alert was cancelled, since no further ships were located.

The Armed Forces Operations Staff informed the German General at Rome about the suggestion made by the Naval Staff to the Armed Forces High Command for the German Naval Command, Italy concerning the mining of French territorial waters off Cape Bon. (See War Diary 25 Sep.) The Armed Forces Operations Staff asked the German General at Rome to support this suggestion, which was approved by the Armed Forces High Command, together with the German Admiral, Rome, at the Italian Armed Forces High Command. For copy of the telegram of the Armed Forces Operations Staff to the Naval Staff see 1/Skl 24034/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII. The telegram was approved by the Fuehrer.

The Naval Staff informed the German Naval Command, Italy accordingly.

The German Naval Command, Italy takes the following stand concerning the wish of Naval Group, South to make available naval barges for the Admiral, Aegean Sea:

a. So far 14 naval barges of the 35 built in the first 2 series have been lost. Of the remaining 21 naval barges, only 9 are fully ready for operations, and 13 are ready to a limited extent. 3 naval barges are in transfer to North Africa.

b. Under present conditions naval barges are the only means for transporting coastal supplies between Tobruk and Marsa Matruh. In spite of maximum utilization of the barges, supplies are insufficient for the front. In view of the extremely critical supply situation, every effort must be made to increase the number of naval barges.

c. Therefore it is suggested that the 4 naval barges still in the Aegean area be transferred to the German Naval Command, Italy for North Africa. In return the Admiral, Aegean Sea will receive a steamer to be selected for the purpose which will have the same cargo space.

The Naval Staff believes this suggestion appropriate.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Motor ship BARBARO sank during the night of 27 Sep. while

being towed into Navarino. Contrary to earlier reports, unfortunately considerable quantities of German fuel for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as 136 motor vehicles, were on board.

During air attacks on Benghazi and Tobruk, 1 Italian motor barge was sunk and steamer SYBILLA (1,077 GRT) was damaged and grounded.

Air attacks on the convoy of steamer FOUGIER were unsuccessful.

Otherwise supply and convoy traffic proceeded without incidents.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Lively reconnaissance and combat missions against supply traffic along the Crimean coast were continued. Ivanbaba was again attacked. In the night of 26 Sep., 3 PT boats tried to approach Ivanbaba but turned away when fired upon. Group South assumes that the operation was in connection with mining operations and air attacks.

According to air reconnaissance and radio intelligence, 7 ships were east of Yalta at 1830 on 27 Sep., and at 1930 one westbound destroyer was south of Yalta. Fire from Yalta was unsuccessful. On 27 Sep. in the afternoon a submarine was sighted and attacked with depth bombs between Ak Mechet and Tarkhankut.

Outside of the Danube delta at Ochakov South a submarine made an unsuccessful attack on the Rumanian torpedo boat NALUCA from a great distance.

The Admiral, Black Sea and Group South assume that the submarine is operating in order to disrupt convoy traffic and to prevent withdrawal of German troops in the Crimea to the Caucasus. It is not considered likely that an operation against the Crimean coast is being planned.

On 28 Sep. German air reconnaissance sighted daytime ship traffic near Gelendzhik,Tuapse, and Gagry.

Own Situation:

2 Italian subschasers were sent out on patrol after enemy forces were sighted south of Feodosiya.

Minesweeping, convoy, and transport traffic proceeded according to plan in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

Group South reports that the staff of the Admiral, Black Sea has been ordered to transfer speedily from Bucharest to Simferopol. The Admiral, Black Sea will set up a Naval Liaison Staff, Rumania. (See Telegram 2000.)

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will take further steps.

The Naval Staff sends the following instructions to Naval Group South and the Naval Liaison Officer to the Army High Command (with copy to the Admiral, Black Sea) on the basis of the statements made by the Naval

Liaison Officer at the Army General Staff to Group South about Army supplies (see War Diary 25 Sep.):

a. It is impossible to transfer additional motor mine sweeper flotillas to the Black Sea, since due to the increased British mine offensive the forces still in Germany are hardly adequate for tasks there.

b. The Naval Staff instructs the Naval Liaison Officer at the Army General Staff to get in touch with the Chief of Staff of the Admiral, Black Sea personally. (See Telegram 1719.)

IX. Situation East Asia

Nothing special to report.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

The operation in the direction of Tuapse is making slow progress. At the Caucasian front enemy attacks were repulsed at the Sancharo Pass. In the Terek sector enemy positions at the Kharista were broken through; the Baksan bridgehead was widened. Sovietski was stormed.

Army Group B:

The battle for Stalingrad is continuing with undiminished fury. Further sections of the city were taken. Enemy pressure continues in the Kotluban area. Several enemy attacks were repulsed.

Central Army Group:

Enemy attacks were repulsed at Orel and in the Rzhev area.

Northern Army Group:

At the Neva River, the enemy succeeded in establishing a bridgehead 2 kilometers wide and 1 kilometer deep across from Dubrovka. The bridgehead was sealed off.

2. Finnish Front:

Enemy reconnaissance activity on the southeast front, in the Loukhi sector, and at the neck of the Rybachi Peninsula.

3. North Africa:

No situation report has been received.

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Items of Political Importance

Willkie's statement in Moscow has set off new discussions concerning the second front in Europe. Attlee reprimanded Willkie sharply, stating that the leaders of the Allies do not need a public reminder on this subject. Furthermore there is complete accord among the Allies about war plans. The Sunday Times demands that the main emphasis be put on aerial bombardment of Germany. With reference to Willkie's statement, Secretary of State Hull declared that no change has occurred in Allied plans.

Special Items

The Commander, Destroyers reported the following information about torpedo boats in October 1942:

1. At the disposal of Group West:

a. The Chief of the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla with torpedo boats T "4", T "10", T "13" (flotilla leader), T "14", T "18", T "19"; of these T "13", T "18", and T "19" will not be ready for operations until approximately the middle of October.

b. The Chief of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla with T "22", T "23" (flotilla leader), and the FALKE will become available approximately 7 October following maneuvers.

2. At the disposal of Group North:

T "9" and T "12" in the Norwegian area.

3. At the disposal of the Torpedo Inspectorate for firing practice from 5 to 24 Oct.: T "16", T "17", T "20", the GREIF, and the KONDOR, insofar as these vessels do not have sufficient fuel to carry out maneuvers of their own.

4. In the shipyards for overhaul and repair:

T "2" (to be commissioned with the crew of T "7"), T "5", T "7", T "11", T "15", the MOEWE, and the JAGUAR.

5. In training:

T "21", the JAGUAR, the GREIF, and the KONDOR (cf. paragraph 3).

6. Warship Construction Testing Command:

T "24" after commissioning, T "21" for final trials.

Situation 29 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

According to an intelligence report from Portugal a convoy carrying troops for the Middle East left U.S. ports between 19 and 21 Sep. escorted by light cruisers. The size of the convoy is unknown.

Indian Ocean:

Radio intelligence intercepted an SSS signal at 2014 from an unidentified steamer at 09° 10' N, 81° 07' E concerning pursuit by a submarine, and at 2040 the repetition by Colombo of a QQQ signal from the British steamer FOO SHING (2,284 GRT) at 09° 23' N, 81° 00' E.

Pacific Ocean:

Allied reconnaissance at 0128 reported 2 destroyers and 1 steamer off New Hanover (Bismarck Archipelago) and at 0342 a southeast-bound heavy cruiser off Bougainville.

Radio intelligence also intercepted a code word issued by an unidentified naval commander, evidently in connection with operations in the Madagascar area or some spot in the southwest Pacific.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "10" reported at 1617 by short signal: "27 Sep. second group not deciphered; 8 Oct. 1000 Neckar."

The Naval Staff confirms receipt by Radiogram 1856 to ship "10":

"1. Naval Staff assumes from brief signal that ship "10" will leave Balikpapan 27 Sep. and arrive at rendezvous point "Neckar" at 1000 on 8 Oct.

2. Naval Attache, Tokyo is being instructed as follows by the Naval Staff: If interpretation in 1. is wrong, repeat."

The Naval Staff informs ship "10" and all ships in foreign waters by Radiogram 2128 that the REGENSBURG left Batavia on 28 Sep. and will arrive at Singapore at 0900 on 1 Oct., and that the RHAKOTIS left Yokohama on 27 Sep., will call at Bangkok, Shogan, Balikpapan, and Batavia, and leave Batavia on 29 Oct.

According to the German Armistice Commission, France, the British advance from Tananarive to the south reached the area 50 km. south of the capital on 27 Sep. in the face of opposition. (See Telegram 1945.)

On 29 Sep. the Japanese Naval Attache delivered the written reply of the Japanese Navy concerning operational areas for German auxiliary cruisers. It includes a chart of the operational area suggested by the Naval Staff in the Indian Ocean, and points out that the agreement is only temporary, "since a new agreement will be reached when operations by a German auxiliary cruiser become possible."

The Japanese agree with the suggestion of the Naval Staff concerning the area in the southeast Pacific south of 0° and east of 120° W, with the following proviso:

a. Since Japan strongly desires Argentina and Chile to remain neutral, the ships of these 2 countries are not to be attacked in the Pacific.

b. There should be no operations off the coast of Chile.

In addition the Naval Attache stated orally:

a. Indian Ocean:

The Japanese Navy approves the suggested zone of operations (35° S, 60° E as far as 15° S, 85° E; from there to 15° S, 90° E, to 25° S, 110° E, to 45° S, 110° E), and in addition permits operations in the area west thereof south of 40° S and west of 60° E.

The Japanese Navy requests information at least 2 weeks in advance when operations are planned in this area.

In case Japanese forces will operate in this area, the Japanese Navy will inform Germany in time.

b. Southeastern Pacific:

For the time being the Japanese Navy agrees to an operations zone for German auxiliary cruisers south of the Equator and east of 120° W, but requests for political reasons that no attacks be made on Argentine and Chilean ships and that there be no operations off the Chilean coast.

No assistance can be expected for the time being in Japanese bases in the New Guinea area and the mandated islands.

Subsequently the Japanese Naval Attache is briefly informed about the area in which German submarines are expected to operate off Capetown in the near future.

The Naval Staff will send corresponding instructions to the Naval Attache at Tokyo and the auxiliary cruisers, especially ship "45".

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Blockade-runner BURGENLAND had to turn back because of engine trouble and entered the Gironde at midnight. No particular reports have been received concerning the BRAKE. The breakthrough is evidently being made according to plan. The RIO GRANDE has been ordered to leave on 30 Sep.

There were no changes in the situation along the Atlantic coast.

Channel Area:

7 vessels of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla carried out a mining mission in the night of 28 Sep. according to plan. For brief report see Telegram 1023.

An operation to lay minefields "Emil" 5 and 6 in order to strengthen the flanking barrages off Fecamp is planned for the night of 29 Sep. and has already been started.

Otherwise nothing special to report.

Special Items:

The Commanding Admiral, Group West (Admiral Saalwaechter) stated by telegram on 20 Sep. in the matter of communications (see War Diary 23 Sep. and 26 Aug.), prior to receiving the opinion of the Naval Staff of 22 Sep., that up to 20 Sep., the day he relinquished his command, no cases had come to his attention in which the Naval Staff was not satisfied with the manner in which Group West reported; he concludes that no such cases occurred in the area of Group West.

The reaction to the communication from the Naval Staff mentioned above, dated 22 Sep., remains to be seen.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Another ground mine was swept north of Hook of Holland. North of Spickeroog a mine exploded next to patrol boat "1213" in 32 meters of water, evidently an acoustic mine.

Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Norway, Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance over Iceland, the Denmark Strait, and the eastern coast of Greenland furnished no tactical information.

Approximately 45,000 GRT of merchant tonnage were in Molotovsk. At the mouth of the Dvina 4 steamers totalling 15,000 GRT were sighted. On 28 Sep. there were 27 ships in the harbor of Archangel; the type and size could not be determined.

Own Situation:

During the night of 28 Sep. an enemy battery on the Rybachi Peninsula unsuccessfully fired at a westbound convoy and at Nurmansaetti. We returned fire.

Enemy bombers unsuccessfully attacked Havningsberg from an altitude of 100 meters at 1445. At 1542 an enemy reconnaissance plane flew over Bogen Bay and probably saw that the TIRPITZ was leaving for the Vest Fjord for maneuvers.

Mine ships ROLAND and SKAGERRAK left Christiansand South for the south at 2230.

Submarine U "117" is laying mines near Iceland.

Otherwise nothing special to report.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

In accordance with the directive of the Naval Staff, Naval Station, Baltic has cancelled all limitations imposed by the Navy on merchant shipping in the Baltic Sea. Only the declared areas are to be observed as heretofore.

This step was taken since no enemy submarine has been reported since those off the Swedish coast and Libau on 17 and 28 Aug.

Now, according to the report by Naval Station, Baltic, it is believed that steamer FRANZ RUDOLF was sunk off Funkenhagen (see War Diary 28 Sep.) by a torpedo.

Further information must be awaited. If an enemy submarine was responsible, not only merchant shipping in the southern part of the Baltic would be affected, but especially submarine training and fleet movements would be considerably hampered.

The Armed Forces Operations Staff informed the Naval Staff of its reply to the request of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Denmark, in which it was stated that the Armed Forces High Command and the Naval Staff recognize the importance of the sea lanes from Warnemuende to Gjedser as well as those in the Sound and the Great Belt, and consider protection of these routes as important as that of other essential routes. However, it is necessary, in view of the many tasks to be performed and the limited number of minesweepers available, to decide from case to case depending on the situation where minesweeping operations are most important.

This is the stand the Naval Staff had asked the Armed Forces High Command to take.

In accordance with the directive of the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff concerning reinforcement of coastal defenses, the Commanding General Armed Forces, Denmark informed the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division that at present no all-around defenses can be provided for Skagen and Frederikshaven, since only limited equipment is available. Since these 2 localities are the only ones about which the Navy is concerned, the Naval Staff has no interest in other aspects of the question at the present time.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will handle the matter.

Eastern Baltic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to the Air Force Operations Staff, 16 British planes, among them 6 seaplanes, arrived in Leningrad on 26 Sep. for the purpose of laying mines.

Own Situation:

Between Tytersaari and Peninsaari 8 mines and 8 cutter floats were swept. The weather somewhat interfered with minesweeping operations in the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga.

Convoy and transport operations proceeded according to plan.

The Armed Forces Operations Staff has now confirmed by telephone that Finland has agreed to the transfer of the coastal mine vessels and Italian subchasers from Lake Ladoga to the Gulf of Finland.

The Naval Staff therefore instructed Group North to take the necessary steps for the immediate transfer of the vessels.

Upon inquiry by the Italian Admiral at the Naval Staff, he is informed of the plans to transfer the Italian subchasers and have them operate from Kotka as long as the ice situation permits, and to have them spend the winter at Reval thereafter.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

A plane attacked a westbound submarine with depth charges 240 miles northwest of Rockall Bank; another plane sighted an eastbound submarine in the same area in the afternoon.

Air reconnaissance around Iceland was lively, and the 19th Air Group was active as far as 13° W. A plane sighted a submarine approximately 265 miles northwest of Cape Ortegal, and reported that it probably scored a hit with a depth charge.

A report of a submarine attack near St. Johns was intercepted from off the U.S. east coast.

2. Own Situation:

3 more submarines have left for the zone of operations. Submarines U "116" and U "118" are on supply missions in the North Atlantic. U "118" located a westbound convoy with strong air cover in quadrant AL 2641, but is unable to maintain contact and is heading for the supply point scheduled for 7 Oct.

Submarine U "610" reported torpedoing a single 4,000 GRT vessel in quadrant AL 4244. The crew left the ship, which remained afloat with the lumber cargo afire.

Group "Luchs" was ordered to operate against the enemy vessels reported by submarine U "118".

4 submarines were organized into a new group "Letzter Ritter". They are to form a patrol line from quadrants AL 7157 to AL 7468.

Concern is felt about U "253" and U "165".

The only other successes were reported by submarine U "125" of group "Iltis", which sank steamer OGILVY (3,391 GRT) and tanker COTATI (3,963 GRT) south of the Freetown area.

For further details see supplement to submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Reconnaissance and fighter bomber missions.

2. Incursions:

There were 28 enemy incursions during the night of 29 Sep., 20 of them into Reich territory, where the hydrogenation plant at Poelitz was unsuccessfully attacked with 4 bombs. Mines were reported dropped in the Baltic Sea Entrances, near Ruegen, and in the Stettiner Haff.

3. Mediterranean Theater:

Reconnaissance activity. In the Gibraltar area a Ju 88 strafed and damaged a patrol vessel.

4. Eastern Front:

70 enemy planes were reported shot down at the Army front.

Reconnaissance activity over the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean. Photographs were taken of a battery on Kanin Nos. At noon 9 BE 109's attacked the airfield at Varlamovo, scoring hits. In dogfights between 29 BE 109's and 30 enemy fighters 5 enemy planes were shot down. 20 Ju 88's flew armed reconnaissance missions over Archangel. A coastal steamer entering Reidar Fjord was attacked unsuccessfully.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

141 planes, an exceptionally high number, are in Gibraltar.

The MALAYA and 4 destroyers were on maneuvers outside the harbor until 1500.

According to the radio intercept service there are several submarines between Gibraltar and Malta.

Submarines were located off Derna and Tobruk.

During the night of 28 Sep. the radio intercept service located a ship or naval force at sea in the eastern Mediterranean, probably in the Alexandria area. Other vessels were located in the Haifa-Beirut area.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

According to the German Naval Command, Italy, the emergency message on the evening of 28 Sep. was not sent by Marsa Matruh, but it is the second case of successful misleading enemy messages.

During the night of 28 Sep. steamer RAVENNA (1,148 GRT) was attacked by enemy torpedo planes off Punta Stilo, and ran aground while evading aerial torpedoes.

Motor ship UNIONE was towed into Navarino.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Nothing special to report.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

An enemy submarine was sighted off Milos the evening of 28 Sep.

Convoy service according to plan. For correction of the reports on transports and convoys in the Aegean Sea for August 1942 see daily situation report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported 1 submarine west-southwest and 1 south of Sevastopol. Numerous small vessels were observed off Gelendzhik. A submarine fired on the Eitodor radar station. Reconnaissance activity against the ports and bases in the Crimea continued undiminished, centering on Taman and Kerch.

The Naval Attache at Istanbul transmitted an agent report according to which Russian naval forces are planning to attack Constanta during the night of 3 Oct.

Own Situation:

Of the 79 mines in the Kamish Burun barrage, 74 have been swept so far.

Only naval barges and a few engineer assault boats are operating in the Kerch Strait at the present time. 22 Army Siebel ferries have been inactive since 23 Sep. because of lack of fuel.

Convoy service proceeded according to plan.

Group South approves and transmits the situation evaluation of the Admiral, Black Sea, who expects increased interference with our shipping, especially with supply transports, as the development of the land situation necessarily causes the Russians to decrease their escort and convoy operations. He once more calls attention to the advisability of plane attacks directly on the fleet bases of the enemy. (See Telegram 1300.)

The telegram was sent simultaneously to the naval liaison officers at the Army High Command, Army Group A, and the 4th Air Force.

VIII. Situation East Asia

According to a report from the U.S. Navy Department, American positions in the Solomon islands have been expanded somewhat. On 25 Sep. heavy U.S. bombers attacked Japanese bases and ships southeast of the Buka Strait, and on 26 Sep. successfully attacked 1 Japanese cruiser and transport vessels in the vicinity of Shortland Island. At the same time Japanese installations and ships at Kiska were attacked with observed effect on 24 and 25 Sep.

An official Chungking report claims that the city of Nanmashin in Chekiang was captured and the suburbs of Tangyang occupied. In the

Kinhwa sector the Japanese are said to have retreated further toward Hatschau.

According to a Japanese official report the commander of a Japanese Army group in central China, General Sakai, was killed on 28 Sep.

No Japanese reports have been received concerning the operations reported by the enemy.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

Our attack in the direction of Tuapse is gaining ground very slowly on account of stubborn enemy resistance. Hard fighting has developed on the Terek front, also, in almost all sectors.

Army Group B:

In the sector of the 6th Rumanian Army the enemy succeeded in capturing Sadovoye. German defense positions are being put up toward the south near Tundostovo.

In Stalingrad the seesaw battle continues in various parts of the city. Enemy pressure has increased on the north front. South of Kotluban the situation was temporarily critical. Further enemy advances in various sectors of our Don line were repulsed.

Central Army Group:

At Korsun and south of Sukhinichi very lively fighting. Northeast of Rzhev enemy attacks were repulsed. At Sloboda and at Velizh our advances were successful.

Northern Army Group:

West of Sychevo fierce fighting is in progress. One strongpoint was lost after almost all of the personnel was killed. Our attack in order to widen the land bridge to the II Army Corps is making progress. South of Schluesselburg our troops have launched a concentric attack on the enemy pocket west of Gaitolovo, and are making good progress. The enemy is making a stubborn effort to break through our lines in the east through attacks from the inside and the outside. In the Neva sector attacks on the enemy bridgehead and its supply lines are continuing.

2. Finnish Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Nothing special to report.

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30 Sep. 1942

Items of Political Importance

A remark appearing in the Times is of interest with regard to the renewed discussion regarding the establishment of a second front. It states that Germany cannot be beaten by Russia alone, not even in conjunction with an air offensive from the west, and that the Anglo-American land armies are indispensable. An Allied offensive is needed, which however might take an entirely different form from what is usually believed.

This remark might be interpreted in any way.

In the House of Commons Churchill gave a number of explanations. He termed French resistance on Madagascar mostly symbolic in character. Tulear, the last harbor in the south of the island, surrendered following an ultimatum. He said that public discussions of future Allied operations are most undesirable, even when such discussions are based on conjectures and not on secret information.

According to a report from a diplomatic source, tension between the British and the Russians in Iran has increased further. The Russians have gained greatly in influence by arming the Kurds.

Argentina:

According to Reuter, the Chamber voted 67 to 64 in favor of breaking off diplomatic relations with the Axis. For the time being this decision is only a significant gesture, since the Senate and the Government will not take any further action.

Arabia:

According to a Transocean News Agency report from Ankara, it is believed in Damascus that the fact that the U.S.has offered to lend money to Saudi Arabia indicates that the U.S. has been given the upper hand in Saudi Arabia as the result of secret Anglo-American agreements concerning spheres of influence in the Near East.

This throws a light on American war aims!

Tibet:

According to a Swedish report from London, the old caravan route between Tibet and China is to become the supply route for Chungking instead of the Burma Road.

India:

A U.S. senator demanded the immediate solution of the India problem, which is not a matter of concern to Great Britain alone.

Special Items

I. In order to protect our submarines against the enemy air force it would be important to push our departure bases closer to the main enemy communication routes. The occupation of the Iberian Peninsula and of

Gibraltar plays a decisive role in the discussions of this problem by the Naval Staff. Because of the few forces available, such plans cannot be carried out at the present time, however. A surprise occupation is impossible without previously occupying the Iberian Peninsula. The only measure that can be taken with regard to the Bay of Biscay at the moment is to increase German air operations over this area as well as against the enemy airfields. The fact that it takes very long to develop suitable types of planes should not be given undue importance, but should rather serve as an incentive to speed up the procedure.

In order to combat enemy convoys on the northern routes enemy bases might be attacked, and this would at least temporarily relieve our submarine operations.

The Naval Staff therefore orders Group North to investigate the possibilities of eliminating the enemy weather stations on Jan Mayen and Bear Island prior to the ice season. This requires thorough air reconnaissance in advance, which the 5th Air Force is to be asked to provide. The Air Force Operations Staff is being informed by the Naval Staff.

For copy see 1/Skl I op 1923/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

The Naval Staff asked the Armed Forces Intelligence Division to investigate possibilities for using sabotage troops on Iceland, pointing out that it is very important to interfere with the enemy's use of the air fields and naval bases on this island. Air forces can be used against this enemy base only to a very limited extent, and an invasion is out of the question entirely at the present time. Therefore the only possibility for harassing the enemy and perhaps inflicting some, even if not very important, damage to his installations is by using sabotage troops.

II. See War Diary, Part C, Vol. XII for the August 1942 report on the war economy situation compiled by the War Economy Division, Armed Forces High Command.

According to this report, armament production was on the whole satisfactory in spite of increased day and night attacks in western Germany.

By 3 Sep. 1,312,000 Russian and Galician civilian laborers and 450,000 Russian prisoners of war were being used in Germany.

So far there are 600,000 French workers, and 350,000 more have been requested.

The transport situation is satisfactory.

The raw material situation is still critical. The rubber situation depends to a great extent on imports of crude rubber from Japan.

Seizure of the Maikop area has so far not relieved the oil situation.

Situation 30 Sep. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

The auxiliary cruiser ANDALUCIA STAR left Buenos Aires on 25 Sep. and is expected in Freetown on 8 Oct.

Indian Ocean:

The British steamer NEWCHWANG (2,485 GRT) sent a QQQ signal at 1740 reporting a suspicious vessel at 25° 20' S, 51° 08' E.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "10" reported by short signal at 1558 that the Naval Staff confirmed the short signal of 22 Sep. incorrectly in Radiogram 1856. It should read: "Transfer completed 29 Sep."

The Naval Staff confirmed the message by Radiogram 1745.

Information on the enemy situation was sent to all ships in foreign waters by Radiograms 0523 and 0700.

II. Situation West Area

1. Atlantic Coast:

Group West reports that the engine repairs on the BURGENLAND will be completed at 2200.

According to air reconnaissance, the BRAKE was in quadrant BE 8796 at 1330.

Departure of blockade-runner RIO GRANDE has been postponed for 24 hours. The Italian blockade-runner PIETRO ORSEOLO is also scheduled to leave on 1 Oct.

Mine detonating vessel "1" was damaged off Lorient by an explosion in 21 meters of water and was towed in.

2. Channel Coast:

Mine operation "Donau" was carried out according to plan. Operation "Mosel" was postponed because of the weather. In addition, operation "Main" is scheduled for the night of 30 Sep.

3. Special Item:

Since another vessel of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla is out of commission, the Naval Staff decides not to use this flotilla for escorting ship "45" and orders that all vessels of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla ready for operations be transferred to the west area by agreement between Group West and the Fleet (Commander, Destroyers) not later than the middle of October. (See Telegram 1718.)

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

The Dutch motor ship GERDINIA sank north of Borkum as the result of a mine. Mine detonating vessels swept 2 mines near Juist. Convoy traffic was hampered by bad weather. In the evening enemy planes flew over the German Bight. It is suspected that they dropped mines near Borkum, Terschelling, and Ameland. 1 plane was shot down by a patrol boat near Terschelling.

Contradictory to the belief of the Commissioner for Maritime Shipping (see War Diary 18 Sep.) that the most dangerous area for shipping is between Ameland and Heligoland, and that this danger would not be reduced by rerouting traffic via Delfzijl, Group North states that the danger area for merchant shipping is definitely between Borkum and Hook of Holland due to an increase in ground mines and air attacks, as well as enemy motor gunboats which have recently appeared there.

Between January and August 1942 traffic between the Ems and the Elbe, also in the Ems estuary, consisted of 2,793 ships totalling 6,068,185 GRT. Of these, 10 ships totalling 30,114 GRT, or .5%, were lost.

In the same period between Borkum and Hook of Holland traffic consisted of 1,353 ships of 3,393,086 GRT. Of these 13 ships totalling 58,626 GRT, or 1.7%, were lost.

The Group points out once more the necessity of expanding the Dutch canal system, emphasizing the military rather than the economic aspect. (See Telegram 1209.)

2. Norway, Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported 4 patrol boats on northeasterly course north of Iceland. Photo reconnaissance of Archangel on 29 Sep. showed 2 destroyers of the CHURCHILL class, 2 Russian destroyers, 2 camouflaged destroyers in dock, 2 corvettes, 1 torpedo boat, 47 steamers totalling 147,000 GRT, among them 18 above 4,000 GRT, and 48 planes.

Own Situation:

On 29 Sep. the Russian battery on Rybachi Peninsula fired 100 rounds at an eastbound convoy and a few rounds at Petsamo and Nurmansaetti without causing any damage. The 1/773 battery returned the fire with 17 rounds. Results were not observed.

On 28 and 29 Sep. enemy planes were active over the arctic coast and in the Stavanger area. No damage was reported.

Mine ships ROLAND and SKAGERRAK have completed the flanking minefield on the southwest coast.

Convoy traffic according to plan.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway reports that he plans to have the submarine barrage off Petsamo, permission for which has been granted, laid at a depth of 12 and not 10 meters, in order to safeguard the large steamers which are being used again on the Petsamo run. (See Telegram 1140.)

Group North gives permission by Telegram 1642.

Via Telegram 1300 the Admiral, Arctic Ocean reports his order to transfer the HIPPER from the Kaa Fjord to the Bogen Bay under escort of 2 destroyers and 2 torpedo boats. The transfer is to take place on 1 Oct. (See Telegram 2040.)

Otherwise no special incidents in the Arctic Ocean.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Fog interfered with channel sweeping in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea.

See Telegram 2145 for the report of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea to the Naval Cperations Division (copy to Group North) concerning cooperation with the Danish Navy. The behavior of the Danish Navy is termed entirely correct and accommodating. The Danish Navy refused only in one case to furnish escorts outside of the inner waters. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea believes that further cooperation with the Danish Navy is absolutely essential.

In the central Baltic Sea the steamer ANNELIESE CHRISTOPHERSEN evaded 2 torpedoes 5 miles off Rixhoeft at 0229. At 0930 a submarine of the 24th Submarine Flotilla definitely observed a bubble track and a surface runner 10 miles southwest of Memel. At 1658 vessels of the 24th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla issued a submarine warning 27 miles southwest of Bruesterort. Submarine chase is in progress at all 3 points. 2 enemy submarines seem to be in the Memel-Danzig area. According to statements by members of the crew of steamer FRANZ RUDOLF, an enemy submarine was also sighted in the vicinity of that ship.

Group North ordered the fleet maneuvers delayed 2 or 3 days because of acute submarine and ground mine danger. The Second Admiral, Submarines, as agreed, is withdrawing all submarines and vessels from the training area until 2 Oct. inclusive. Naval Station, Baltic Sea orders subchase at once in the area east of Bornholm and south of the Wartburg minefields with all available vessels including the 15th Minesweeper Flotilla.

The time will be agreed upon with the Second Admiral, Submarines.

Group North states that it is urgently necessary to allocate torpedo boats to the Naval Station, Baltic Sea for intensive subchasing. See Telegram 1551.

The Second Admiral, Submarines points out that submarine training and the continuation of submarine warfare require that all training areas in the Bay of Danzig as well as the routes to and from the Bay of Danzig along the coast of Pomerania be kept free from submarine chase. Effective immediately, the Second Admiral, Submarines puts 4 recovery vessels of the 24th Submarine Flotilla at the disposal of Naval Station, Baltic Sea through 2 Oct. More vessels cannot be provided.

Minesweeping activities in the area of the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea had to be cancelled in part because of the weather. Other activities according to plan.

Naval Liaison Staff, Finland reports that the Finns have no longer any objections against the planned withdrawal of German coastal mine vessels from Lake Ladoga.

The Finnish Commander in Chief has had inquiries made with the Italian

authorities whether it would be possible to purchase 4 Italian sub-chasers. The Naval Liaison Staff believes that this solution would be very desirable because of transport difficulties. See Telegram 1035.

Group North supports the suggestion of the Admiral, Baltic Countries to postpone withdrawing the Naval Liaison Officer with the 11th Army, as planned by the Naval Officer Procurement Division, until after operation "Nordlicht".

The Naval Staff supports this suggestion also.

V. Merchant Shipping

1. The German Armistice Commission (Naval Section) transmitted a telegram for the information of the Naval Staff which the German Armistice Commission sent on 18 Sep. to the Armed Forces High Command about the transfer of ships discussed by the Commissioner of Maritime Shipping and Laval.

For copy see 1/Skl 24223/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

According to this telegram immobilized French ships will not be used in traffic between the Black Sea and the western Mediterranean until naval warfare in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean has stopped. The Naval Section of the German Armistice Commission is to determine when this is the case in agreement with the naval subcommission of the French delegation. In addition, the necessary fuel oil will have to be made available. There is no provision for selling or chartering the ships.

> This would indicate that the practical results of the discussions between the Commissioner of Maritime Shipping and Laval are very slight, after all.

2. On the basis of observations during an inspection tour of the Sound made by representatives of the Naval Staff and Naval Station, Baltic Sea, the Naval Station, Baltic Sea ordered the Naval Command, Denmark to take all measures necessary to speed up merchant shipping in the Sound, if necessary in consultation with the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea. The Naval Command, Denmark is also to investigate what measures are needed in order to be able to use Swedish territorial waters in the Sound as an alternate route. For details see Telegram 2039.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Lively reconnaissance activity in the Bay of Biscay. Two inbound submarines were reported.

A British steamer with call letters Vi Vi was pursued by a submarine 500 miles east of Newfoundland.

2. Own Situation:

a. Distribution of submarines:

Total	367
in operations area	199
in training	56
with the Warship Construction Testing Command	112

The 199 submarines in the operations areas were distributed as follows on 30 Sep.:

Atlantic:	
in the operations area	108
in harbors	55
Arctic Ocean:	
in the operations area	3
in harbors	18
Mediterranean	
in the operations area	5
in harbors	10

b. Submarine operations:

Group Luchs in the North Atlantic is to take up positions in quadrants AK 2449 to AK 3959 on 1 Oct. at 0100.

Group Tiger is being dissolved.

On 2 Oct. 4 submarines are to refuel from submarine U 116.

Two outbound submarines were notified of the departure of the BRAKE for emergency purposes.

Submarine U 513 sank an ore steamer of 6,000 GRT off the U.S. coast in quadrant BB 6386.

In the West Indies submarine U 516 sank a 1,500 GRT coastal steamer in quadrant EO 6595 and a 5,000 GRT steamer in quadrant EO 5637.

Submarine 506 of the Iltis group sank the former Danish steamer SIAM (6,637 GRT) in quadrant ET 8831.

Following the first attacks off Capetown, the submarines of the Eisbaer group as well as submarines U 179 and U 178 are given permission to attack all ships east of the line between quadrants FE 91 and GZ 16 as far as 40° S.

All submarines in quadrants BE and BF are informed that the enemy has become aware of the great number of homebound submarines and has increased surveillance of the Bay of Biscay. The Naval Staff has investigated whether outgoing submarines could take along radar interception

sets for the submarines which are not yet so equipped. The Chief, Naval Communications Division answered in the affirmative. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines has been informed accordingly.

The 3 submarines operating in the western Mediterranean were assigned new attack areas in view of possible further enemy convoy activity.

For details see supplement to the submarine situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The former directive is changed to the effect that Swedish ships found outside the operations area proceeding between Portugal and Argentina are not to be sunk for the time being, but if possible are to be stopped in order to gain information about this traffic. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

The Naval Staff decides as follows on the intended use of SMA mines reported by the Commanding Admiral, Submarines (see War Diary 23 Sep.):

a. Agree in general with intentions in the following order: American coast, Africa coast - with special attention called to the strategical significance of Cape traffic.

b. Submarine U "117" will be made available to Group North for the second operation.

c. Time of operations under a. dependent on SMA mine trials.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Reconnaissance flights and fighter bomber missions against land targets. For details see daily situation report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

At the German-Italian Army sector there were dive bomber and fighter bomber sorties against land targets with good effects. The successful fighter pilot Captain Marseille was killed on the return flight. 1 steamer of 7,200 GRT was torpedoed in the Gulf of Suez during a torpedo attack in the night of 29 Sep. by 5 He 111's. Sinking was not observed.

3. Eastern Front:

70 enemy planes were reported shot down on 29 Sep., 66 on 30 Sep.

Reconnaissance activity in the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean.

There was no photographic reconnaissance of Scapa because of the weather.

Sorties from 16 to 25 Sep.:

At the 1st Air Force:	3,472 German sorties	2,810 enemy sorties
At the 4th Air Force:	9,746 German sorties	4,589 enemy sorties

At the Air Force Commands,

East and Don: 3,851 German sorties 4,899 enemy sorties

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation,Mediterranean:

According to an Italian agent report, the CHARYBDIS was no longer in Gibraltar at 0830. The submarine tender MAIDSTONE was at sea near Gibraltar with 4 destroyers for firing practice from 1000 to 1745.

According to an unconfirmed intelligence report from Spain,in the morning of 29 Sep. 36 blacked-out vessels were seen off Alboran on a westerly course, and 20 vessels, allegedly including an aircraft carrier, were seen west of Melilla at 1030 on an easterly course.

1 submarine is reported in the central Mediterranean, 2 in the area off Alexandria. On 30 Sep. convoy traffic in the eastern Mediterranean was slight.

Photographic reconnaissance of Alexandria on 29 Sep. was without important results.

2. Own Situation,Mediterranean:

During the night of 29 Sep. there were enemy air raids on Tobruk and Porto Empedocle harbor.

On 28 Sep. 2 minesweeping planes swept 5 ground mines in the Bay of Tobruk.

Captain Aschmann is substituting for the Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy, who is sick.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

No special incidents.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

1 submarine was sighted about 20 miles east of Cape Mallas.

During the night of 26 Sep. the motor sailing vessel SIMEON was stopped and blown up by an enemy submarine. A tug which left Candia for Piraeus on 26 Sep. is overdue.

Otherwise no special incidents.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

During the night of 28 Sep. and on 29 Sep. air attacks on Crimean harbors were continued. It is suspected that aerial mines were dropped between Suda and Cape Chauda. At Anapa 2 PT boats attempted a landing during a simultaneous air attack. 2 torpedoes came up on shore.

Own Situation:

During the night of 29 Sep. 2 PT boats operated against coastal traffic near Cape Idokopas.

Minesweeping proceeded according to plan. Convoy traffic was hampered by the fog.

Special Items:

1. The Admiral, Aegean Sea and Group South are concerned about the fact that setting up German Naval Command, Tobruk and Marsa Matruh might create a precedent which would cause the Italians to make similar demands in the Aegean area. Reference is made to a similar attempt in Suda Bay (see Telegram 1225).

The Naval Staff will give an opinion on this matter.

2. The Operational Staff Scheurlen is at the present time not ready for operations due to withdrawals of personnel and to sickness. Group South requests that more personnel be provided if this staff is needed in the near future for further landing operations. (See Telegram 1735.)

The Naval Staff considers it necessary to keep the staff ready for operations and has informed the Naval Officer Personnel Division to this effect.

IX. Situation East Asia

A report of the Allied Headquarters speaks of a flanking attack against Japanese defense positions in the Owen Stanley area during the battle for Moresby.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group A:

Enemy attacks and advances had to be fought off in the northern and western sectors of the front. Some terrain was gained only east of Kotlovina in the face of stubborn enemy resistance. German forces were mainly concerned with defense also at the Terek front.

Army Group B:

The 14th Panzer Division had to be thrown in in the area south of Tsatsa in order to bring an enemy breakthrough at the 6th Rumanian Army to a halt. The operation was successful. However Duvoyi-Ovrag remained in the hands of the enemy.

South of Stalingrad an enemy attack was repulsed. We attacked further sectors of the city with success. The southern part of Orlovka was taken in spite of stubborn enemy resistance. North of Orlovka about 80 enemy tanks broke through from the north. However the attack did not reach Orlovka. We were able to improve our positions in a counter-attack.

Our assault troops attacked near Voronezh. At Olkhovatka there were

strong enemy attacks with bomber support and in some places support by ground attack planes. In part the battles are still going on.

Central Army Group:

At Novosil we contested the enemy crossing the Susha. Further fighting near Belev and in the Rzhev area. During the night of 29 Sep. there were enemy air raids on Smolensk, which stopped railroad traffic for a day.

Northern Army Group:

An enemy attack was repulsed at the Demyansk front. Our counterattack against enemy penetrations at the Knovitsi railroad station were halted. Reserves are being brought up.

The attack on the pocket at Gaitolovo was continued successfully. The Chernaya has been reached at all points from the west and east. Thus the operation is in the main completed.

The enemy is still crossing the Neva toward the Dubrovka area.

2. Finnish Front:

An enemy attack was repulsed on the Karelian Isthmus.

3. North Africa:

After strong artillery preparation with about 5,000 rounds, the enemy, supported by about 40 tanks, attacked our positions in the southern part of the front near Bir el Mnassib. We took about 200 prisoners. Evidently this is large-scale reconnaissance in force in preparation of the general offensive.

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GLOSSARY

Aida
Code name for the planned capture of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

Altmuehl
One of the designations for the Sunda Strait as a reference point on the German blockade-runner route to Japan.

Amiens
German reference point at 34° S, 95° E.

Bantos A
Code name of a minefield laid northeast of Rybachi peninsula.

Barbarossa
Cover name for the invasion of the U.S.S.R. begun in 1941.

Bluecher
Cover name for the crossing of the Kerch Strait by German forces and capture of the eastern shore.

DE priority
Dringende Entwicklung. This classification indicates top priority. It included research work, such as the planning of armaments and machine tools.

Donau
Code name for laying minefield E V off Fecamp.

Doppelschlag
Code name for an operation by the SCHEER and HIPPER against Russian shipping in repetition of the SCHEER's "Wunderland" operation.

Eispalast
Operation against convoys PQ 18 and QP 14.

Elbe
Code word for laying of barrage F IX in the Channel.

EMF mine
Standard mine type F; a moored influence mine.

Etappe
Secret German naval organization for providing German naval units with information and supplies from foreign bases. Etappe Japan was of great importance for German blockade-running activities.

Falter
Code name for a minelaying operation in the northern part of Seine Bay.

Finale
Code name for minelaying operation by the 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla in the area 49° 58' N, 00° 49.5' W; 50° 01' N, 00° 50.5' W; 50° 05.5' N, 00° 20' W; 50° 03' N, 00° 19' W.

Freya apparatus
Antiaircraft radar equipment.

G7a torpedo
Naval torpedo, 7 meters long, air driven, with 21 inch diameter.

Herkules
Code name for the planned capture of Malta in cooperation with Italian forces.

Ilona
Code name for initial countermeasures against enemy action against the Iberian peninsula.

Iwan
Code name for minelaying operation by submarine in the Pechora estuary.

John Bull
Code name for minelaying operation by submarine U "117" in the area 66° N, 64° 30' N, and west of 11° 30' W.

Kirschbluete
German cover name for voyage of Japanese submarine I 30 to Europe. The submarine, under Commander Endo, left Japan the middle of April and arrived in Lorient in the beginning of August. She crossed the equator on 18 Jul. at 20° W. She had expected to reach France in the middle of July but was delayed en route.

Komponisten area
The area between 25° S and 32° S, and 12° W and 22° W; in this area were located points named after composers, such as Schubert, Schumann, and Wagner.

Lachsfang
Code name for operation by the 20th Mountain Army and the 5th Air Force to capture the Murman railroad at Kandalaksha in an attempt to cut Russia's supply lines.

Meisenbalz
Code name for operation of German surface forces against convoy QP 14.

Mosel
Code name for laying of minefield E VI off Fecamp.

Nacht
Code name for the laying of a cutter float barrage in the northern part of Seine Bay.

Narpa
Code name for minefield laid by German and Finnish forces south of Someri.

Nashorn
Code name for a series of German minefields designed to keep Russian submarines from breaking out of the Gulf of Finland into the Baltic Sea. They extended from Nargen on the Estonian side to Porkkala on the Finnish side.

Neckar
A German reference point at 34° 00' N, 139° 50' E.

News Analysis "Foreign Navies" (Nachrichtenauswertung "Fremde Marinen")
A daily analysis of foreign newspaper reports concerning foreign

naval news, compiled by the Naval Intelligence Division (3/Skl).

Nordlicht
Code name for the renewed Army operations against Leningrad in September 1942.

Oder
Code word for laying of barrage F VIII in the Channel.

Orleans
German reference and rendezvous point located at 34° S, 50° E.

Paul
Code name for minelaying operation by a submarine in the western entrance of the Yugor Strait.

Peter
Code name for minelaying operation in the western entrance of Matochkin Strait carried out by submarine U "589".

Political Review (Politische Uebersicht)
A daily review of political developments abroad published by the Naval Intelligence Division (3/Skl).

PQ
Designation of convoys proceeding from the United Kingdom to northern Russia.

QP
Designation of convoys proceeding from Russia to the United Kingdom.

QQQ signal
Distress signal sent by ship when sighting or under attack by armed raider. QQQ was also used when suspicious merchant vessels were sighted.

Ranke
Code name for minelaying operation to close the gap between barrages C 2 and D 1 in the English Channel.

Riegel
Code name for minelaying operation between Lister and Feiestein.

Roesselsprung
Code name for operation against convoy PQ 17.

Rose
German reference point at 24° 00' S, 99° 00' E.

Route "Anton"
A German shipping route. Its geographical borders were: The French coast at 47° 30' N, 47° 30' N, 29° W; 43° N, 40° W; 37° N, 40° W; continued on 37° N; the southern and eastern borders of route "Anton" were defined by the borders of the operations zone of the submarines in the South Atlantic.

Route "Gelb"
Route taken by German vessels to Japan, via Indian Ocean and Sunda Strait. The points touched on this route are given below. The designations of these points were changed from time to time and differed for each ship. Generally the set of names used for a particular ship had the same initial letters as the ship.

1.	Duesseldorf	-	24° 00' S, 99° 00' E
2.	Dahlem	-	Sunda Strait
3.	Danzig	-	09° 15' N, 110° 30' E
4.	Darmstadt	-	20° 50' N, 120° 00' E
5.	Duisburg	-	26° 00' N, 128° 40' E
6.	Doeberitz	-	34° 00' N, 139° 50' E

Runenschrift
Code name for minelaying operation to close the gap between barrages D 2 and E 1 in the English Channel.

Saale
A German reference point in the Indian Ocean. It was located at 24° S, 99° E.

Saege
German reference point at 26° 00' S, 14° 30' E.

Sauna
Minefield in the Eastern Baltic Sea.

Schlaf
Code name for minelaying operation in the English Channel.

Schubert
German reference point located at 25° S, 22° W.

Schumann
German reference point at 31.5° S, 21° W.

Seeigel
Code name for German minefield from the island of Aspoe to 60° 4' N, 27° 9' E; 59° 54' N, 27° 20.5' E, via Vigrund to Cape Kurgalski.

Seeteufel
Code name for plan to close off the Gulf of Finland by a continuous and uninterrupted mine barrage extending from the Finnish to the Estonian coast in case the Russian fleet should try to break out.

Siebel ferry
A double-hull ferry boat developed by Special Command Siebel (Sonderkommando Siebel). It consisted of two steel hulls connected by means of wooden platforms; there was a turret in the center. The Siebel ferry could be used as a gun platform, troop carrier, or supply carrier.

SMA mines
Rack mine type A. A moored influence mine laid by a specially constructed minelaying submarine. Its charge weighed approximately 350 kilograms. This mine was designed for waters of 50 m. to 300 m. depth.

SSS signal
Distress signal sent by ship when sighting or under attack by a submarine; could also indicate being damaged by a mine.

Standard Mine, type F
EMF, a moored influence mine.

Todt Organization
A construction organization (named for the founder) which built the German superhighways, the Westwall, and the Atlantic fortifications. It employed domestic and foreign labor on military projects

both in Germany and in the occupied countries.

Type VII C
A 500 ton sea-going submarine (of earlier construction). It was 67.1 meters (221.43 ft.) in length, had diesel-electric propulsion, and was armed with 4 bow tubes and 1 stern tube.

Type XB
A 1,600 ton minelaying submarine, 89.8 m. (296.34 ft.) in length, with normal diesel-electric propulsion. It was equipped with 30 mine shafts and 2 stern torpedo tubes.

Utrecht
German reference point at 37° S, 00° longitude.

Wagner
German reference point at 28° S, 19° W.

Weichsel
Code name for laying of barrage R VI in the English Channel.

Wiesengrund
Cover name for the planned capture of Rybachi Peninsula.

Wunderland
Code name for operation by the SCHEER during which she attacked Russian shipping and shore installations in the Kara Sea in August 1942.

XB report
Top secret radio intelligence report, as compared to the B or secret radio intelligence reports.

Zar
Code name for minelaying operation off the northern tip and northwestern coast of Novaya Zemlya by the ULM.

Zarewitsch-Romanow
Code name for minelaying operations carried out by German destroyers north and south of Kolguyev.

Zarin
Code name for minelaying operation by the HIPPER and destroyers northwest of Novaya Zemlya.